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Abstract 
The Subject of Islamic legal maxims is one of the sciences in Islamic jurisprudence 
which aphoristically subsumes all the spectrums that purpose of Sharl`ah is all about. 
There are six basic Islamic legal maxims agreed upon among the Islamic scholars on 
which the tenet of Islamic law is based. Each one of these six legal maxims has some 
sub-maxims which are either functioning as further explanation to the grand maxim or 
condition and restriction to it. 
This thesis attempts to analyze those six legal maxims and their sub-maxims in relation to 
Islamic criminal law. Each maxim is theoretically and empirically studied. In doing so, 
the thesis emphasizes on the link between each legal maxim and the overall objectives of 
Islamic law in relation to criminal law. The maxims are: (1) the roles of intention in a 
criminal act (a1-'umcir bi magasidiha), (2) evaluation of evidence from its certainty and 
doubt (al yagln lä yazül bi al-shakk), (3) facility guaranteed in the face of hardship (al- 
mashagqah tajlib al-taysir), (4) preference of Islamic law in eliminating harm (al-darar 
yuzäl), (5) the locus standi of custom (al-`adah muhakkamah) and (6) the effect of 
utterances ('i `mä1 al-kaläm awli min ihmiiih! ). Each one forms a chapter of the thesis 
and in addition, there is a first chapter which delves into the concepts of Islamic Legal 
Maxims (al-Qawi'id al-Fighiy)eah). 
In order to make the theory of these six legal maxims empirically visible, and to integrate 
the work of the past and the present, cases judged in Northern Nigeria Shari `ah courts are 
critically illustrated in line with the overall objectives of Islamic Law (Magiyid al- 
Sbari'ab). The constant questions raised in the thesis are: Do judges consider core 
principles of these legal maxims when delivering verdicts? Do the verdicts corroborate/ 
commensurate/ extrapolate the tenet of Islamic Law? Is attention paid to the cardinal 
difference between the rights of God and the rights of mankind in evaluating crime 
brought before the judge before giving judgments? 
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Introduction 
Shari ah, which simply means "Islamic law", has been defined in various ways. The 
word "Shaifah" literally means a path to be followed. ' Technically, Sharfah is 
defined as `the command of God revealed to Prophet Muhammad. 2 In other words, 
Shalt ah is the way of life and the principle guiding a Muslim's life, divinely ordained 
by God for mankind to follow, so that God will lead them to bliss and success in this 
world and in the hereafter. God says in the Holy Qur'an, "He hath ordained (Shaffali) 
for you..... " (Q. 45V. 18). 
There is ongoing debate on traditional translation and interpretation of Shall'ah as 
Islamic law which denotes immutability of the law. Whereas the phrase `Islamic law' 
is thought to consist of two components, one which is divine and immutable termed 
"Sharfah" and the other, the understandings and interpretations of human beings in 
applying the Shaifah which is termed frgh. 3 
Indeed, following the strict traditional interpretation of Shaifah as "Islamic law" will 
put a barrier to accessing the overall objectives of the Shall ah. While it is 
unanimously agreed upon that Shall ah is immutable, its understanding could be 
different depending on the concept and content in which the rule is applied. A way 
to make the concept of Islamic law universal and more dynamic is to consider the 
two components in application of any rule in Islamic law. 
The primary source of Islamic law is from God, Who is the only Legislator. His 
revelation encompasses the religious and legal system. On this assertion, Mahmud 
Shaltut, a renowned Egyptian scholar, remarks that Shancah tends to guide the 
individual in his relationship to God, to his fellow Muslims, to his fellow human 
t Abdul Rahmän I. Doi, Shari `ah : The Islamic Law, (London: Ta Ha Publishers, 1997) p. 2, 
2 Muhammad Muslehuddin, Philosophy of Islamic Law and The Orientalists (A comparative Study of 
Islamic Legal Study), (2"d edn. Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1980). p. 55. 
3 The term figh which literally means understanding (see Quran 9: 87, Bukhari , hadith 71 and Muslim 
hadith 1037 ) will be explained later. See Mashood Baderin' s argument on the misconception of 
Shaiia'h as "Islamic law" in Mashood Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic 
Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005) pp. 32-34. 
1 
beings and the rest of the universe. 4 Furthermore, Al-Ashqar affirms the absolute 
sovereignty of God and His law: 
There is no other code which deserves to be called law except the Shariah because it 
originates from the Lord of mankind who alone reserves the right to legislate for man... All 
man-made laws are false because they are enacted by those who have no right to make them. 5 
Even Western scholars acknowledge the all-encompassing nature of the Shanah. For 
example, Joseph Schacht notes that "the Sharfah is the most typical manifestation of 
the Islamic way of life.. . the core and kernel of Islam itself, "6 while Anderson also 
observes that the Sharlah is "explicit and assured in its enunciation of the quality of 
life which God requires of man and woman. "7 
The scope of Islamic Law is largely divided into two parts - UkhräwiyyaI which is 
otherwise called `Ibddät (the rules that guide religious rites), and Dunyäwiyyah (the 
law that guides mankind in his day-to-day activities). The former covers religious 
observances, such as beliefs, prayers, almsgiving, fasting and pilgrimage, while the 
latter concerns the affairs of this world and is sub-divided into other aspects including 
criminal law, family law, the law of transaction, as well as political, and international 
law. 8 
Traditionally, Islamic law is formed on the basis of divine revelation. Its source is 
supposedly divine in value. However, because of the universality of Islam, 
consideration is given to intellectualism that is based on guidance from that 
revelation. In other words, the use of intellectual input in Islamic Law should be 
consistent with the divine revelation. Thus, Islamic jurists, including the four Sunni 
Schools of Thought and the Shi'ite Schools, generally agree on four sources of 
Mahmüd Shaltüt, al-Islam, (Cairo: Matba; at al-Azhar, 1959), p. 5. 
s Umar Sulayman al-Ashqar, al-Shari `ah al-'Ilähryyah lä al-Qawänin al lähiliyyah, (Kuwait: Dar al- 
Da'wah, 1983), p. 24. 
6 Josheph Schachat, An Introduction to Islamic Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964) p. 1. 
7 Anderson, J. N. D., `The Legal Tradition' in J. Kritzeck and W. H. Lewis (eds. ), Islam in Africa, (New 
York, n. p. 1969) p. 35. 
S Subhi R. Mahmassani, Falsafat al-TashrT'fi al-Islam, (The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam), 
Trans. Farhat J. Ziadeh, (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: The Open Press, 2000) p. 10. Malik S. H. A, 
`Shar"a': A Legal System and a way of life', in Abdul-Rahmon M. Oloyede , (ed. ), Perspectives in 
Islamic Law and Jurisprudence, (Ibadan, Nigeria: National Association f Muslim Law Students, 2001), 
pp"25-43 (pp. 25-26). 
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Islamic law. 9 These sources are the Qur'an (the Holy book revealed to Prophet 
Muhammad (Peace be upon him), 1° the Ijadith (the sayings and the tradition of the 
Prophet), a1-'Ijmd' (the consensus of scholars) and al-Qiyäs (analogical deduction), 
although some schools attached restrictions to the use of the last two sources. " These 
four sources are divided into primary and secondary sources, the primary sources 
being the Qur'an and the Hadith of the Prophet, and the secondary sources being al - 
'Ijmä' and al-Qiyas12. 
Islam, as a religion, gives an insight into the needs of human beings through the 
Qur'an and the Had th. These two books are the sources of its global perspective. 13 
They stand as an encyclopaedia of Islamic knowledge. From them, in the prophetic 
period, the Islamic law was established. In other words, the only sources of Islamic 
law during the time of Prophet Muhammad were the Qur'an and the flaärth. The 
Hadith serves to explain and complement the Qur'an. It was during this period that 
the Quran and the 1Yadith were unanimously accepted as the sources of the Islamic 
law, and both achieved the fundamental principles of life. 14 
The second period of Islamic law started from the passing away of the Prophet (11 
AH / 632 AD) and lasted until the beginning of the era of the Abbasids (132 AH / 750 
AD). However, this period comprised two separate regimes of different quality - the 
orthodox caliphs (11-40 AH/ 632-661 AD) and the Umayyah dynasty (41-132 
AH/661-750 AD). During the time of the orthodox caliphs, al- Ijmi' and al-Qiyäs 
were resorted to as a solution to contemporary issues that arose as a result of the 
expansion of Islam to other cultures, races and environments. This expansion 
inevitably created jurisprudential problems about which the two divine sources made 
no explicit statement. The use of al-'Ijma' which is "the unanimity of all the learned 
9 Doi, A. R., op. cit. pp. 65-84, (the four sunni schools of thought are Hanafite, Mal ikite , Shafi`ite and Hanbalite. See pp. 4-6 below for the details of the schools), Hossein M. Tabataba'i, An Introduction to 
AN Law: A bibliographical study, (London: Ithaca Press, 1984), p. 3. In the early works of Shia 
Legal Study, giyäs was not mentioned as a source of law, although it was in the earliest works, as noted 
by Tabatabai in footnote of the above book. 
1° This sentence which at times abbreviated as (PBUH) will not be repeated but shall be implied as 
repeated whenever Prophet Muhammad in mentioned as required by Islam. 
11 There is disagreement among Islamic scholars on the use of the last two sources. 
'2 Doi, A. R., op. cit. pp. 64-78. 
13 Qur'an is the divine book revealed to Prophet Muhammad. Hadith is the collections of the sayings, 
deeds and tactic approval of the Prophet. The hadith stands as practical explanation of Qur'an. 
14 Muslehuddin, M., op. cit. pp. 67-68. 
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Muslims (Jurisconsults) of a particular age who have attained the rank of 
'Mujtaliidi7i 15 was made to give support to the authority of the Prophet who was no 
longer alive. 16 The validity of al-'Ijma'was based on the saying of the Prophet, "My 
community shall never agree on an error", 17 while al-Qiyäs, which is "the extension 
of a ShaFfah value from an original case or 'asl to a new case, because the latter has 
the same effective cause as the former", 18 was to meet the demand of the novel 
jurisprudential dilemma. It is important to state here that the relationship between the 
two invented sources both came from ijtihäd (personal reasoning), and not through the 
reasoning of unqualified persons. And any analogical deduction can become ijmä' if it 
is supported by general agreement of versed scholars. 19 It is worth noting that both al- 
'Ijma' and al-Qiyäs are products of al-ijtihäd. No matter could be arrived at by al- 
'Ijmä' and a! - Qiyas without the means of al-ijtihäd. 
However, during the Ummayah period, the four sources were accepted to be the 
sources of Islamic law, although the period was criticized for providing inadequate 
reasoning on a number of issues. Thus, divine law in this epoch was subjected to 
reason `which served to deform and distort it'. 20 
The third period emerged after the extinction of Umayyah and the seizing of power by 
the Abbasids in 132 - 656 AH (750-1258 AD). During the period of Abbasids, Islamic 
law attained great development. In this period - known in Islamic history as the 
golden age of Islam -a number of schools of Islamic law sprang up. The most notable 
and famous among the surviving Sunni schools are the Hanafite, Malikite, Shaficite 
and Hanbalite schools, alongside Zähir and Shiite, while other schools suffered 
extinction. During this period, the traditions of the Prophet and his companions were 
also collected while commentaries on the Qur'an were written. In addition, scientific 
sources were compiled and a number of other sources and methodologies were 
's Iyas A. Bello, `The development of'Ijma' in Islamic Jurisprudence', in Abdul-Rahman M. Oloyede, 
of. cit. p. 162. 
' Hasan A. The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence, (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 
1970) pp. 156-157, Iyas A. Bello, ibid. p. 163. 
17 Ibn Mäjah, Sunan Hadith No. 3950. 
18 Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, (2"d edn. Malaysia: Ilmiah 
Publishers, 2000) p. 167. 
19 Muslehiddin, M., op. cit. p. 69. 
20 Ibid. p. 73, cf. Coulson, Noel James, A History of Islamic Law, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1964) pp. 30-31. 
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applied to give rules on Islamic issues, although there were different opinions on their 
application. 21 
The first recognised school was that of Hanafite, which upheld the theorem of ray 
(rationalization). Its founder was Abü Ijanifah, Nu`män Ibn Thäbit (d. 150 AH). 22 
The school is well known for using ra y and for the formulation of the theory called 
al-Istihsin (juristic preference) being credited to the founder. 23 It was followed by the 
Malikite school, named after the great scholar of Madinah, Imam Abü `Abdullah, 
Malik Ibn Anas (d. 179 AH)' 24 This school was known for its strict adherence to the 
tradition of the Prophet, which distinguishes it from 'ahl ray' of Iraq. The scholars in 
the school are known as 'ahl al-ha&th of Madinah. Imam Malik developed a source 
called al-masalih al-mursalah (unrestricted interest or public interest) and upheld the 
use of the customs of the people of Medina on the presumption that these customs 
were precedents from the Prophet, having been carried down from one age to 
another. 25 
The third school known in Islamic jurisprudence was the Shafi'ite, founded by the 
erudite scholar of usül al-Fiqh (the science of jurisprudence), Imam Muhammad Ibn 
Idiis (d. 204 AH). In his school, he struck the balance between the use of giyds and 
ra y of the Hanafite School and the use of tradition of the Malikite School. His 
Risd1ah26 is a monumental work that depicts his vision and shows his vast legal 
knowledge. 27 He developed a mechanism for the study of jurisprudence "to a degree 
of competence and mastery which had never been achieved before and was hardly 
equalled and never surpassed after him". 8 The last among the surviving famous 
schools of Sunni was the Hanbalite, founded by Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 241 
AH). 29 The Hanbalite School was known to adhere to tradition and was averse to 
ra y. Ibn Ijanbal believed that the proven Divine Law should be restricted to the texts 
21 Subhi Mahmassani, op. cit. p. 17, Muhammad Muslehuddin, op. cit p. 74. 
22 Anwar A. Qadir, Islamic Jurisprudence in the modern World, (Delhi: Taj Company, 1986) p. 91. 
23 Muhammad Muslehuddin, op. cit. 74. 
24 Anwar A. Qadir, op. cit. 
25 Muhammad Muslehuddin, op. cit. p. 75. 
26 A book supposedlyfirst to be written on usul-fiqh 
27 Ibid. p. 76. 
28 Joseph Schachat, The Origin of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1950) p. 12. 
29 Subhi Mahmassani, op. cit. 30. 
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(the Qur'an and the Hadith). For this reason he took a journey in quest of knowledge 
and amassed a collection of traditions. He acknowledged five sources: the text of the 
Qur'an and the Hadith - and the accompanying fatiwis (religious verdicts) that do 
not contradict the text, or are consistent with the text - namely, the Va If tradition 
(with a weak chain of transmission), the mursal traditions (with omission of some of 
the transmitters) and the giyäs (analogy), whenever it is necessary. 30 These are the 
surviving Sunni schools, although there were other Sunni schools, now extinct, such 
as al-'Awzä' (d. 157 AH), Däwud a1-Zähifl (d. 270 AH) and Tabafl (d. 310 AH) 31 
However, these schools synthetically coded the term fiqh (jurisprudence) for their 
thinking to differentiate fiqh schools from dialectical schools of thought (Madrasat 
ahl al-kalim). The term fiqh (the knowledge of the ahkdm al-shar' - legal rulings - 
pertaining to conduct that has been derived from specific evidence)32 originally 
included all the sciences in Sharfah namely, theological, spiritual, ethical and legal 
sciences. 3 Later, during the time of al-Ma'mnn (d. 218 AH), this was restricted to 
practical matters or problems relating to legal matters 34 
Consequently, a new subject termed usü1 al-figh emerged to regulate the deduction of 
rules from the concept of figh. In light of this subject, new technical terms evolved in 
the study of Islamic law, such as wäjib (obligatory), sunnah (The tradition), 
mustahabb (deserable), makrüh (detestable), harem (prohibition), mutlaq 
(unrestricted), muqayyad (restricted), naskh (abrogation) and mansükh (abrogated) 
etc. These technical terms help jurists to examine the legal consequences of any deed, 
and to decide whether it is punishable or attracts reward, lawful or unlawful. 
Development continued until the schools reached their peak. It is pertinent to mention 
here that during this golden period, there was considerable achievement in the 
sciences of law and jurisprudence. However, this rapid progress fell apart and took a 
downward turn at the end of the Abbasids era. For fear of persecution, some Sunni 
30 a1-Jawz"i, Ibn al-Qayyim, '1'1äm al-MuwaqqTn 'An Rabb al-'Alamin (Cairo, n. p., n. d. ) pp. 23-26. 
31 Subhi Mahmassani, op. cit. pp. 33-34, Muhammad Muslehuddin, op. cit. pp. 80-81. 
32 Imran A. Khan Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law (The Methodology of Ijtihäd, online at 
(www. nyazee. com December 7,2000) p. 35. 
33 Ibid. p. 34, Anwar op. cit p. 16. 
34 Ibid. 
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jurists campaigned for the closure of the door of fjtihäd after the fall of Baghdad at the 
hands of Hulagu Khan in the middle of the 7th century All (1258 AD). They also 
claimed that the four schools of Sunni were enough to cater for the needs of 
Muslims. 5 Thus people resorted to imitation by following their schools of thought 
without investigating the sources of their opinions. 
6 This trend persisted until the 
dawn of the nineteenth century when many reformers emerged all over the Muslim 
territories, most especially when Islam spread to other countries in the West. 
Therefore, there emerged as a replacement for tagrd (strict adherence to a particular 
school of jurisprudence), takhayyur (the selection of rules from the different schools 
mentioned above to solve new problems) and talfiq (the combination of elements of 
rules from the various schools to apply and solve a particular problem. 37 
Some of the achievements of this breakout were to simplify the understanding of 
Islamic jurisprudence, to unify the differences of thoughts, and to broaden the scope 
of the Islamic law on the identical modus operandi by the introduction of some 
disciplines. Among the disciplines introduced are: a study of the purpose of Islamic 
law (magd$id Shaiiah ), and Legal Maxims (gawä`id frghiyyah). The former tends to 
look at the intention behind the revelation of law to mankind, and the goals and 
objectives they are expected to achieve on human beings. The latter, which is the 
focus of this thesis, is aimed at harmonizing the opinions of scholars in particular 
cases through the principles laid down in order to depict the aims and objectives of the 
Shan ah. 
i. Northern Nigeria and Implementation of the Sharfah Penal Code 
The implementation of full Islamic law in the Northern Nigeria did not only have 
political motivation but also historical inspiration. It was recorded that Shalt ah was 
fully implemented in the Kanem-Borno Empire, part of which is in the present day 
Nigeria, in 12th century C. E during the reign of Mai Biri Dunmani 38 This reflects the 
35 Subhi Mahmassani, op. cit p. 93. 
36 Muhammad Muslehuddin op. cit. 81. 
37 Wali Bashir, `An Introduction to Islamic Legal Theory', in Abdul-Rahman M. Oloyede, (ed. ), op. cit. 
p. 92 cf. Subhi Mahmassani, op. cit p. 93 and Muhammad Muslehuddin, op. cit. p. 81. 
38 Muhib O. Opeloye, The Sustainability of Shan°ah in a Pluralistic and Democratic Nigeria, 5th 
Faculty of Arts Guest Lecture Series, delivered on 24`x' August, 2005 (Lagos State University), p. 1, 
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acquaintance of the Fulani tribe to the phenomenon of the Shall ah in their region. As 
regards the Hausaland, the Uthman Dan Fodio's Jihäd in reforming the `syncretic 
practices of the Hausa Muslims and abuse of Shaffah stands as inherited system of 
administration between 1804 and 1903 before the British dismantled this heritage 39 
This is not to say that all the elements of Shaifah have disappeared in those regions 
since the British took over. There was agreement between the British colonial 
administrators and the Emirs on non-interference with the Muslims' religious freedom 
which means that the Islamic tradition would still be in operation including the 
judicial system. The Northern government led by the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir 
Ahmadu Bello formed hybridised penal law with British colonial masters to cater for 
the interests of all ethnic groups in the North 40 Not so long ago, some clauses were 
introduced into ShaH'ah administration of justice which systematically eliminated 
some elements of Islamic rulings including punishments that were considered to be 
repugnant to natural justice and human dignity. 
Before the reinforcement of full Islamic penal law, there were two sets of courts in the 
Northern States of Nigeria, viz; Magistrate Courts which stands for common law 
operating together with State High Court which stands as appellate court for it, Area 
Courts which operate on three level and stand for Shaffah law. They entertain civil, 
personal and the 1959 Penal Code in criminal case. Immediately when the Shaffah 
law was promulgated in Northern Nigeria, those levels of Area Courts were changed 
to Shantah Courts to become Shaffah Lower Courts, Shantah Upper Courts and 
Shaffah Courts of Appeal 41 
In 1959 Personal Code was introduced to replace the ShaFt'ah in criminal matters. 
This was considered as the final departure of the Shariah legal system from the 
Ishaq Akintola, Shan`ah in Nigeria: An Eschatological Desideratum, (Ijebu-Ode Nigeria: Shebiotimo 
Publications, 2001) p. 93 
39 Opeloye, Muhib, ibid. 1-2, Rudolph Peters, "The Re-Islamization of Criminal Law in Northern 
Nigeria and The Judiciary: The Safiyyatu Huussaini Case" in Muhammad Khalid Masud et al. 
Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and their Judgments, (Leiden- Boston: Brill) p. 220 
40 Musa A. B. Gaiya, "Commentary " in Philip Ostien, et at. (eds) Comparative Perspectives on 
Shan`ah in Nigeria, (Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books Limited, 2005) pp. 168-169, see also Okpu, 
Ugbana, Ethnic Minority Problems in Nigerian Politics: 1960-1965, (Stockholm: Almqvist &Wilksell 
International 1977) 
41 Rudolph Peters, Re-Islamization op. Cit. p. 221 
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North. It is noted that the introduction of this Personal Code was politically motivated 
as a "response to the demand of the Northern non-Muslim minorities and the Southern 
political class" who considered Shaffah an infringement on fundamental human 
rights. Before the colonial masters handed over power, certain agreements which were 
stated in the operational constitution at independence in 1960 were reached. One is on 
the establishment of Shaifah court of Appeal through the law of Northern Regional 
Government and another is retaining the application of Islamic Law of Personal 
Status. These agreements were considered to be "great concessions" made by the 
Muslims. 2 
In 1979, the Northerners agitated for expansion of the Shaifah beyond the scope left 
by the colonial masters. A recommendation was made by the Constitution Drafting 
Committee which provided for the establishment of Federal Shaffah Court of Appeal 
and for the right of any State of the Federation to establish Shan°ah Court of Appeal. 
These recommendations were vehemently rejected and it indeed divided the Muslim 
and Christian members of the constituent Assembly. Consequently, the Muslim 
members walked out and the issue was left unresolved. 43 
In 1989, the issue was resuscitated by the Muslim members of the Constitution 
Assembly who demanded for the expansion of the scope of ShaFfah while the 
Christian counterparts demanded for the removal of any mention of Shall ah in the 
constitution. The existing then Armed Forces Ruling Council led by General Abdul- 
Salaam (retired) intervened in the issue "by withdrawing from the Constitution 
Assembly jurisdiction over the clause dealing with Shalt ah '' In the final draft of the 
1999 constitution, it was stated thus : 
The Sharia Court of Appeal of a State shall, in addition to such other jurisdiction as 
may be conferred upon it by the law of the State, exercise such appellate and 
supervisory jurisdiction in civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic personal 
42 Musa Gaiya op. Cit 170, Ostien, Philip, "An Opportunity Missed by Nigeria' s Christians: the 
Shari `a debate of 1976-78 revisited" in Benjamin Soares, (ed. ) Muslim-Christian Relations in Africa. 
Islam in Africa Series, Volume 5, (Leiden -Boston: Brill 2005) p. 17, 
43 Opeloye, Muhib, The Sustainability of Shan`ah op. cit. P. 2, Musa A. B. Gaiya, Commentary op. Cit. 
P. 170 
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law which the court is competent to decide in accordance with the provisions of 
section (2) of the section44 
The ambiguous phrase which plunges controversy into the constitutionality of full 
implementation of Sharfah in Nigeria is the phrase "other jurisdiction" in the section 
quoted above. As Gaiya questioned, could that phrase be given interpretation of 
meaning "an area of jurisdiction within the "Islamic personal law" which was not 
included in the constitution? "45 In other words, should the phrase be construed as 
power for the state to expand the jurisdiction of Shall'ah to include criminal law and 
other facets of Islamic jurisprudence which were not enforced before 1999 
constitution? This contentious and ill-phrased section has put conundrum on the 
constitutionality of the implementation of full Sharfah as initiated by Zamfara State 
Governor after his assumption of office as the first democratically elected governor of 
the state. Despite the uproar against the initiation, eleven out of twenty one States of 
the North have followed suit. Those states include Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, 
Kaduna, Kano, Kastina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, and Yobe 46 
ii. Constitutionality of the full implementation of Shazab in Northern 
Nigeria 
One serious issue that has raised dust regarding full implementation of Shaifah in the 
Northern Nigeria is whether such is constitutional or unconstitutional. In the opinion 
of the majority of Muslims and some non-Muslim scholars, the provision of the 
Nigerian constitution of 1999 as contained in section 277 (1) has given any State of 
the Federation the authority to implement full Sharfah if its House of Assembly could 
pass a bill to that effect. Conversely, the majority of Nigerian Christians see the full 
implementation of Sharfah as unconstitutional. Interestingly, there were two 
opposing views among the legal practitioners as well. Former Attorney General of the 
44 Constitution of Nigeria 1999 section 277(1) cf. The 1989 section 261(1) and the 1979 section 242 
(1) 
45 Musa A. B. Gaiya, op. Cit. P. 170. 
46 Rudolph Peters, "Re-Islamization of Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria op. Cit. p. 220 note 4, 
Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, "The future of Shari'ah and the debate in Northern Nigeria", in Philip Ostien, 
et al-. Comparative Perspectives on Shari `ah in Nigeria, (Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books limited, 
2005), p. 328, Human Rights Watch, "Political Shari `a"? Human Rights and Islamic Law in Northern 
Nigeria September, 2004 Vol. 16, No9 (A) p. 14 
10 
Federation, late Bola Ige endorsed the constitutionality of SliaffaI while his 
successor, Kalu Agabi declared that the full implementation of Shill ah was 
unconstitutional. 7 
The former argued that since Section 38 of the Federal Constitution has guaranteed 
freedom of religion, that freedom would be infringed if restriction is placed on it by 
allowing partial practice of the faith. Added to that, Section 227(1) of the 
Constitution has given States Houses of Assembly the power to expand the 
jurisdictional scope of the Sharfah as the States wish. Furthermore, the late Chief 
Justice of the Federation, Hon. Justice Muhammed Bello, lending credence to the 
submission of Bola Ige also argued that Section 4 of the constitution empowers the 
states to make laws on matters not included in the exclusive lists (i. e lists of laws 
reserved exclusively for the Federation) and concurrent lists (i. e lists of laws that 
involve both the Federation and the States). Thus, Sharfah falls within the residue 
and therefore a state has the constitutional power to make laws relating to Shall ah 4s 
Also, Section 6 empowers the states to establish Courts to exercise jurisdiction on 
matters in respect of which the House of Assembly of a state may make laws. In 
addition, Section 275 of the constitution also empowers any State of the Federation 
that requires Sharfah Court of Appeal to establish it. 
However, there are identifiable clauses in the Nigeria constitution which stand as 
obstacles to the constitutionality of full implementation of Shallab Justice 
Muhammed Bello observed. The first obstacle is Section 1 which confirms the 
supremacy of the Federal constitution over any subordinate constitutions. The second 
is Section 36 (12) which renders an act non-offensive unless that offence is defined 
and the penalty therein is described in a written form. The third is Section 38 (1) 
which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and freedom of religion including 
freedom to change one's religion which is a capital offence in Islam (the concept of 
Ridda (apostasy). 
47 Opeloye, Muhib, op. cit. P. 5. Amazingly, both senior legal practitionals are non-Muslims. 
48 Justice Muhammed Bello, "Keynote Address at the National Seminar on Shariah organized by the 
Jama'tu Nasril Islam at Kaduna in Yakubu, A. M., et al. (eds. ) Understanding Shariah in Nigeria 
(Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books Limited, 2000) 
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In order to overcome these obstacles, the governors of the States implementing 
Shaffah resounded their strong sense of loyalty and patriotism to the Federal 
constitution, they rallied round to get the members of Houses of Assembly on board to 
enact the law and ensured that apostasy which could be a violation to the provisions in 
Section 38 was not included in the list of capital offences. 49 They even called the 
Christian minorities to put forward their proposal for canon law if that would lay the 
debate on Shaffah to rest. Beyond that, Kaduna State, one of the states in Northern 
Nigeria, has created a body to take care of the Christians in the State. These efforts 
made no difference to those who believe that full implementation of Shaffah is 
unconstitutional. They argued that Section 10 of the Federal constitution which states 
that "The Government of the Federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as 
State Religion" has prohibited any states of the Federation from adopting a state 
religion. 50 In response to this argument, the states implementing full Shaffah contend 
that implementing full Shaffah does not mean adopting state religion, rather, it 
amounts to exercising legal rights of making laws within the jurisdiction of legislative 
arm of the government which happens to have religious undertone. 
Moreover, it will not be defendable to say that Nigeria or a state in Nigeria is not 
religious. Nigerians are religious people. While the Southern Nigeria is predominantly 
Christian, the Northern part is predominantly Muslims. The only interpretation that 
could be given to this Section therefore is that the state should be impartial and must 
give equal treatment to all religions . 
51 And, this largely depends on the level of law 
abiding of the political leaders and their officers. 
iii. Codification of Islamic Penal Law for ShaFah States in Northern Nigeria 
In conformity with Section 36 (12) which demands that one shall not be convicted of 
a crime until that crime is defined and written in form of codification, all the affected 
states have enacted penal codes to legitimise their actions against any criminal 
offenders. The first state to have published its penal codes was Zamfara which was 
also the first to introduce full implementation of Shar'ab. It is observed that most 
49 Opeloye, Muhib 0, op. cit p. 7 
50 Ibid. 
51 Musa A. G. Gaiya, Commentary on Professor Durham's Article in Comparative Perspectives on 
Shari'ah in Nigeria op. Cit. p. 168. 
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other states only replicated the Zamfara penal code with minor changes. Kano State 
distinctively enacted an independent Sharfah Penal Code, while Niger State followed 
the 1959 Penal Code for Northern Nigeria with some amendments. 52 References will 
be made to these Penal Codes when illustrating emerging cases in each state, arguing 
in support of its conformity with the legal maxims which subsume the magäsid al- 
Shan°ah. 
The school of jurisprudence adopted in the Northern Nigeria is the Malikite School. 53 
Thus, Majority of the Penal Codes in the Northern States unequivocally declare that 
the Sharfah Penal Codes shall based on the Ijtihid of Malikite School of thought. 54 
This narrow espousal contributes to the criticism levelled against full implementation 
of Sharfah in Northern Nigeria. 
From the Human Rights perspectives, since there are divergent opinions on many 
issues arising from interpretation of Sbaifa$ it has been argued that there will be 
miscarriage of justice in some issues affecting citizens if, for instance a state sticks 
exclusively to a particular school of thought. For instance, only the Malikite School of 
thought accepts pregnancy as evidence of adultery. All other schools demand the strict 
evidence laid down in the prophetic tradition. As such, if a suspect of zinc (unlawful 
sexual intercourse) were tried in a state other than a Malikite state he/she would have 
been freed of accusation. Perhaps, his/her accuser might be even punished for qadhf 
(unproved accusation of illicit sexual intercourse leading to defamation of 
character). 55 
However, this should not be a serious problem; after all there are western countries 
such as the United States of America where different rules are applied to a particular 
crime depending on the law enacted in each state. Therefore, it may not be legally 
wrong for any of the Northern States in Nigeria operating on the Shaffah to adopt a 
52 Rudolph Peters, "The Re-Islamization of Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria... op. cit. pp. 219-220 
53 See p. 5 note 23 above 
sa See Sokoto Sharia Penal Code (SSCP) section 94, Kano State of Nigeria Gazette, No. 3, Vol. 34,28th 
February, 2002 p. A32, Kastina State Sharia Court Law 2000 section 8, Aliyu Musa Yewuri "issues in 
defending Safiyyatu Husseini and Aminal Law" in Jibrin Ibrahim, (ed. ) Sharia Penal and family Laws 
in Nigeria and in the Muslim World: Rights Based Approach (Zaria, Nigeria: ABU Press Limited, 
2004)p. 198), Northern Nigeria Law Report N. N. L. R. 2003 p. 143 
ss Abdullah Ahmed An-Na `im, "The Future of Shariah and the Debate in Northern Nigeria" in Philip 
Ostien et al. Comparative Perspective on Shari 'ah in Nigeria op. Cit. p333 
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particular school of jurisprudence while suspects are tried according to the existing 
rules in that state where the offence is committed. 
iv. Human Rights concerns about the implementation of Sba ab in Nigeria. 
Islamic law (Sharfah) has always been under strict surveillance for a considerable 
period of time, especially by those who are opposed to its implementation. There is 
hardly a country or state that attempted implementing full Shall ah that was not a 
target of attack and serious criticism from those who for one reason or another believe 
that the implementation of full Shall ah will automatically infringe on Human Rights. 
On the other hand, those who are cynical about the level of uprightness of those who 
claimed to be pioneers of the scheme have expressed scepticism, objection and 
refutation. Of the overall scope of the Shalfah, no other aspect has received greater 
attack than its criminal laws. Some aspects of Islamic penal law especially hudüd 
(offences that attract fixed punishments) and Qisäs (retaliation) have been branded as 
repugnant and antithetical to positive law56. The 1965 clauses to Northern Nigeria 
Sharfah law made by the British colonial authority is an ample testimony to this. 
Since the introduction of full implementation of Shall ab in the Northern Nigeria, 
many local, national and international bodies, both at the governmental and non- 
governmental levels have expressed misgivings and insinuations. This is the reason 
why any criticism or scrutiny from Western and International bodies is not heeded to 
by Muslims. 
This, however, is not to say that there are no instances of miscarriage of justice since 
human beings who implement the divine law are not infallible. But, to reduce such 
instances to the barest level, certain guidelines which are to be strictly adhered to 
when dispensing justice under the Shaifah are laid down. Before judgment can be 
passed on any positive or negative action, the ShaFah requires that balanced survey 
56 See Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law, op. cit. p. 119, Many negative attitudes 
towards Islamic law by Western countries are stated in Peters' book. See pp. 103-105,110. See also 
Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, "The West and the Rest: Reflection on the intercultural dialogue about Shariah" 
in Philip Ostien, et al,. (eds. ) Comparative Perspectives on Shari `ah in Nigeria, (Ibadan, Nigeria: 
Spectrum Books Limited, 2005), pp. 253-260 and Abdul Qadir Awdah, al-Tashri` al-Jinni al-Islimi 
5 edn. (n. p. 1968/1388), pp. 12-13 
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must be carried out and constructive criticism and recommendations must be 
observed. 
One of the International non- Governmental organisations whose job, inter alia, is to 
oversee and scrutinize the way justice is dispensed in the world is the Human Rights 
Watch. 57 This organisation, through its agents in Nigeria carried out researches on the 
allegations of injustice in the Northern Nigeria Sharfah legal system. The concern of 
Human Rights Watch is not to support or against implementation of Shaffali but to 
see that human rights are not violated as a result of the implementation of any legal 
system in any country. 
58 
Thus, what Human Rights Watch sees as violation of human rights inherently 
constitutes what is termed Sharfah penal law including death penalty, amputation and 
flogging. Invariably and intuitively, there will be clash of view between those who 
implement the Shaifah and its opponents as a result of their ideological differences. 
The proponents of Sharfah submit that it is a divine living law which must be 
implemented in total; including its penal codes. But for the Human Rights activists, 
on the other hand, argue that the ShaFtah penal laws are nothing but relics of the old 
which should, as such, be scrapped from every law including the Shalt ah 
According to the report submitted to the organization's office in the United States, it 
is observed that the Sharfab legal system in the states where it is being implemented 
fall short in the areas highlighted below: 
" Lack of respect for due process which has characterized many trials in 
Sharfah courts such as; lack of access to legal representation, failure to inform 
defendants of their rights; acceptance of statement extracted under torture etc. 
57 The works of the organization are described on it websites thus: "Human Rights Watch is one of the 
world's leading independent organizations dedicated to defending and protecting human rights. By 
focusing international attention where human rights are violated, we give voice to the oppressed and 
hold oppressors accountable for their crimes. Our rigorous, objective investigations and strategic, 
targeted advocacy build intense pressure for action and raise the cost of human rights abuse. For 30 
years, Human Rights Watch has worked tenaciously to lay the legal and moral groundwork for deep- 
rooted change and has fought to bring greater justice and security to people around the world. " 
http: /www. hrw. org/en/about viewed last 16-04-2009 @09: 00 am. 
58 See the Summary of Human Rights Watch "Political Shariah? Human Rights and Islamic Law in 
Northern Nigeria September 2004 vol. 16, no. 9 (A) pp. 1-6 
15 
9 Most of the assumed harsh punishments might have been avoided, had the 
Shallah courts judges followed due process and had defendants been given 
full legal representations, 
" It is also observed that since 2002, the application of Shaifah appears to have 
been lost. Though there are functional tools in place but the political will to 
enforce the strict Shaifah dictates have waned. 
" Some political leaders who have purportedly gained reputation in the first 
place have shown reluctance to carry out some punishments in avoidance of 
further controversy. 
Other observations on the full implementation of Shaffah in the Shaffah compliant 
states include miscarriage of justice by the Shaffah judges; lack of proper training 
and acquaintance with the judicial procedures by the Shaffah judges, giving the 
accused persons rights of defence, giving the accused benefits of doubt and not to 
base judgement on mere confession especially in hudi d related cases. 59 
v. Aims and Objectives of the Research 
The main aims of this thesis is to analyse and discuss the application and applicability 
of Islamic Legal maxims "al-Qawa'id al- Fiqhiyyah" with particular reference to 
Islamic criminal law. To achieve this, the work concerns itself with how the Islamic 
legal maxims can shape the way criminal cases are being dealt with in the 
contemporary age particularly in the Northern Nigeria where Islamic penal law was 
reintroduced in 1999 after its systematic abolition by the British colonial 
administrators. The basis for choosing that particular region of Nigeria is because of 
the growing tension and strident criticism surrounding the full implementation of 
Sharfah in that region. This thesis also looks at whether or not criminal justices have 
been carried out by the states implementing full Sharfah in that region in accordance 
with the dictates of the principles of Islamic Law as fostered in Islamic legal maxims. 
59 Human Rights Watch, Political Shari `ah... op. cit. Pp. 6-8 
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vi. Scope of the Research 
This research is limited to analysis of the six basic legal maxims agreed upon among 
the Islamic scholars and some other related maxims which stand as conditions for and 
restrictions to or explanations for the basic ones. Those maxims are analyzed from 
Islamic criminal law perspectives while the Northern Nigeria Sharfah Penal Law and 
cases judged under the implementation of full Sharfah in those states between 1999 
and 2007 are used for illustration. In some cases, references are made to other cases 
around the Muslim countries where strict Islamic criminal law is applied if there are 
parallels in those cases. In analyzing the legal maxims, I have restricted myself to the 
four sunni schools of Islamic thought because the countries whose cases are referred 
to are within the country (ies) that adopt the four schools. 
vii. Problems encountered during the Research 
During the course of this research, I encountered many envisaged and unexpected 
problems. Some of them were inevitable because of the nature of this project, while 
others were accidental. The following are some of these problems. 
" Lack of sound knowledge about the importance of al-gawä `id al- 
fighiyyah among, the legal practitioners in the Northern Nigeria. 
Surprisingly, some even refuted the existence of legal maxims in 
Islamic law while some others undermined their importance. 
" Majority of the cases in both the upper and lower Sharfah courts of 
Northern Nigeria are written in Hausa Language. Thus, the researcher 
who is inadequate in Hausa Language had to employ the service of 
official translators. Even with that, the translated cases were not up to 
standard because of poor translation and typographic errors. 
" Lack of funds inhibited further investigations into some unpublished 
cases in those states. 
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viii. Literature Review 
Studying and writing on the subject of al-gawi'id al-fighiyyah is said to have started 
very late due to the fact that during the lifetime of the Prophet and his companions, 
there was no need for extra sources to rely on in understanding the Sharfah of Islam. 
Even till the early fourth century of the Islamic calendar, the subject of Islamic legal 
maxims was not visible. This is not to say that there were no elements of use of legal 
maxims in the writings and expressions of scholars in those periods. The work of al- 
Qadi Abu Yusuf, (d. 182 AH), Kitäb al-Kharnj stands as a landmark work among the 
writings on Islamic legal maxim. The book contains evidence that the early Islamic 
scholars were acquainted with the subject. Similarly, discussion on the rule of 
discretionary punishment and the rights of leaders on dispositions of their subjects' 
properties can be found in Kitib al-Kharäj60. Another notable literature written in 
those times is the book of Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani (d. 189 AH) known 
as Kitäb a -As161 
The most reliable literatures on Islamic legal maxims written between the fourth and 
tenth centuries are; al-ashbah wa al-nazä'ir written by al- al-Suyiiti and Ibn Nujaym, 
al- al-manth& fi al-gawi'd written by al-Zarkashi and al-gawä `id written by Ibn 
Rajah. Those books are very useful in enumerating the Islamic legal maxims in 
general but are lacking in details of how to apply them to many fields of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Take for instance the books of al-Suyuti and Ibn Nujaym which are 
identical in title and arrangement, they enumerate the first five Islamic legal maxims 
agreed upon among the Islamic scholars in those days and succinctly mention their 
applications to different fields of Islamic jurisprudence. But they neither mentioned 
their application to Islamic criminal law nor examples of any current issues. The same 
can be said of al-Zarkashi and Ibn Rajab's books. 
60 Kitäb al-Kharij is a book written by al-Qadi Abu Yusuf. In the book, the author states many Islamic 
legal maxims among others are: al-ta `zlr ill al-im iin `all qadr `azam al jwm wa cigharh- It is left to 
the leader/ judge to decide an appropriate discretionary punishment considering the proportionate 
(nature) of the offence; laysa Al Imam an yakhruj shayanmin yad ahadin i11ä bi hagqin thäbit ma `arüP- 
It is not the right of the Imam (leader) to take away someone's property without an established and 
well-known right. See Ya'qub Ibn Ibrahim Abu Yusüf, Kitab al-Kharäj, ( 6th edn. Cairo: al-Matbah al- 
Salafiyyah wa Maktabatuha 1397 A. H. ) p. 180 and p. 71 respectively 
61 Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan Al-Shaybäni, Kitab al-Asl, ed. Abu al-Wafa' al-Afghani, ( India: Matbah 
Dar al-Ma'arif al-`Uthmaniyyah n. d. ) vol. 3, p. 45. Detailes of the content of the book can be found on 
page 44 of this thesis. 
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There are many resources on Islamic legal maxims with different dimensions from 
13th century A. H/18fl' century AD onwards. 62 The most popular, published and 
widespread work on al-gawä `id al-fighiyyah from 19th AD. is The most widespread 
literature the al-Majallah al-Ahakam al-'Adliyyah (referred to as Majallah herein 
after). 63 The Majallah has specific significant in studying Islamic legal maxims, not 
because it is comprehensive in nature but because it is the hallmark of an official legal 
codification in Islamic history. The Majallah contains 99 substantial legal 
codifications with noumerous explanations afterwards. Majority of these codifications 
are meant to address issues related to Islamic transaction. 
Two books emerged from Ahmed al-Zarqa (1938 AD) and Mustafa al-Zarqa (1999 
AD), (father and son respectively) which are commentaries on Majallah. Their 
significant to this research is on their futher explanations of and additional maxims on 
Majallah. Some other credits are given to al-Zarqa's for their rearrangement and 
additional information 64 al-Burnu is also a contemporary Islamic scholar who studied 
Islamic legal maxims from academic perspectives. His two books a1-wajiz fi 'idäh al- 
gawä'id al-fighiyyah al-kulliyyah (a concise book on the explanation of Islamic legal 
maxims) and Mawsii'a al-gawi'id al-fighiyyah are invaluable resources for 
researching on Islamic legal maxims. 5 The significance of his contribution to Islamic 
legal maxims is characterized in his second book which serves as an encyclopaedia of 
the subject in question. In the book, al-Burnu extracts all legal maxims from different 
books of Islamic jurisprudence from different schools of thought. Similar contribution 
is also ascribed to Ali al-Nadwi. 66 In all, the approach of the two authors to the subject 
of Islamic legal maxims is theoretical detached from any empirical study. 
Other dimensions have been explored in contemporary writings on al-qawa'id al- 
fighiyyah. These include: 
62 Rashed Saud al-Amiri, Legal Maxims in Islamic Jurisprudence: Their History, Characteristics and 
Significant. (Birmingham UK.: Birmingham University, Ph. D. Thesis 2003), p. 158. 
63 The full account of the book can be found in chapter two pages 46-48 
64 See page 47 for more details. 
65 See page 48 and note 186 for the description of his book. 
66 See pages 47-48 for more details 
19 
" Researching of a particular Jurist's book. This is a situation whereby a 
particular work by a jurist is studied in such a way that all the maxims 
mentioned therein are extracted and thoroughly explained. This method 
appears in al-Nadwi's works entitled ` al-gawä'id wa datväbit al-mustakhlas 
min al-Tahn'r. This work is a PhD thesis submitted to the Ummu al-Qurä 
University, Makkah Saudi Arabia. In it, the researcher extracted all maxims 
which Mahmud al-Hasiri (d. 1239 AH) cited in his book al-Tahrir. 67 
" Researching all the books of a particular author. This is a situation whereby all 
legal maxims mentioned on a specific theme offiqh in all books authored by a 
jurist will be collected. Examples of this method are al-Husayyin's al-gawä'id 
iva al-dawäbit lil mu'ämalät al-mäliyyah inda Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Sawwat's 
al-gawä'id wa al-dawäbit 'inda Ibn Taymiyyah fi fiqh al-usrah. 68 In the 
former, all Islamic legal maxims related to Islamic monetary transactions and 
cited by Ibn Taymiyyah in his various books, are compiled and examined. In 
the latter, all Islamic legal maxims relating to Islamic family law and 
mentioned by Ibn Taymiyyah in his books, are compiled and examined. 
" Researching a single maxim through the application of thorough examination 
and explanation. In this method, a particular Islamic legal maxim will be 
subjected to extensive examination. This method is adopted by Sälih al-Yusuf 
in his work entitled al-mashaqqah tajlib al-taystr: diräsah nazariyyah wa 
tatbigiyyah (Hardship begets facility: theoretical and empirical study); and 
also by Mahmüd `Armüsh in his work entitled al-Qd'idah al-Kulliyyah: `1mal 
al-Kaläm awlä min ihmälih. Both works are Masters' dissertations submitted 
at Imam Ibn Sa'üd University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 69 
It is pertinent to say that comprehensive writings on this subject in English language 
are very rare. Schacht did not see Islamic legal maxims as a science. In spite of having 
published books and articles on Islamic Law, he only took a few pages to summarize 
the subject of al-gawa'id al-flghiyyah without reflecting on its concept or its 
67 Rashid Saud Amiri, op. cit. P. 165. 
68 Both books are Masters' dissertations presented by the authors at Im Ibn Sa`üd University, Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia. 
69 Rashed Saud al-Am r op. cit. P. 166. 
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importance in Islamic law. 70 There are some Islamic writers who have included witty 
sections on legal maxims in English in their works, but these, at best, are only an 
introduction to the subject. Thus, there still exists a huge vacuum for an intensive, in- 
depth study of the science in English. 7' Two comprehensive, in-depth studies on the 
subject in English deserve some credit here. These are PhD theses by S. O. Rabiu and 
Rashed al-Amiri Saud. 72 The former maintains a somewhat practical approach, while 
the latter amounts to little more than a translation of previous works and adopts a 
theoretical approach to the subject. 73 
Thus, my aims in this thesis are to focus on how these legal maxims can be applied to 
Islamic criminal law and how they can be used to extrapolate the overall objectives of 
Islamic criminal law in protecting human rights in this contemporary age. To make it 
more interactive and empirical, criminal cases from courts in Northern Nigeria are 
being perused to see the extent of compliance of Shad ah courts in those states with 
these judicial apparatus (al-gawä `id al-figbiyyab). 
xi. Research Methodology 
The method used in this thesis is qualitative which includes both descriptive and 
prescriptive approaches. The research exposes how the Islamic legal maxims had been 
applied in the past and to what extent are their values and importances to the Islamic 
jurists. On this hytothesis, theoretically, the research gives the account of the concept 
of the subject. It analyzes the six basic legal maxims and their relevance to the Islamic 
criminal law. Accordingly it questions why legal maxims have not been considered in 
some cases judged under Islamic law in Northern Nigeria courts. 
70 Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, op. cit. pp. 180-188, Joseph Schacht, 
An introduction to Islamic Law op. cit.. P. 40. 
71 Such as Hashim Muhammad Kamali, Qawaid al-Fiqh, op. cit, Izze Dein Mawil, op. cit. 
72 Sulaiman O. Rabiu is a senior lecturer aim the department of Shan`ah Uthman dan Fodio University, 
Sokoto, Nigeria and Rashed S. al-Amiri was a PhD student at the department of Theology and 
Religion, University of Birmingham, UK. 
73 Rabiu's work is somewhat empirical in the sense that some court cases are used to illustrate the 
maxims, although the maxims treated are restricted to the five major ones. By contrast, Rashed's work 
is purely theoretical in the sense that it only gives us the historical development of the subject, without 
giving any analysis or practical illustration of the maxims. In other words, it is more a translation of the 
works written in Arabic on the subject. 
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Empirically, the research studies some cases generated under the full implementation 
of Shari ab in the Northern States of Nigeria. To substantiate the originality of this 
research, apart from reported cases in local, national and international law reports, 
investigations were carried out in some states where some cases that generated heated 
argument and controversies were obtained. Because of the difficulties encountered in 
obtaining unreported cases, the few available cases are used in this thesis and they are 
attached as appendices for reference purpose. 
In the concluding chapter, general survey of the cases judged in the Northern Nigerian 
Shari `ah Implementation are critically evaluated in light of the Islamic legal maxim. 
There are many observasion raised and suggestion forwarded for better ways of 
making use of Islamic law maxims to make sure that 
In illustrating the legal maxims treated in this thesis, the four sunni schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence are adhered to. That is because they all agree in principle on the maxims 
even if there are slight differences in their applications. Also, the Northern states of 
Nigeria as earlier established are malikites sharing the same ideology with the other 
Sunni's schools; that will reduce the level of argument in advocating for talfrq and 
takhylrin codification of Islamic penal law. 
x. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises seven chapters with an introduction and a conclusion. The 
introduction reveals the systematic development of Islamic law and traces how 
different sciences, subjects and terminologies relating to Islamic Law emerged. It 
gives account on the emergence of different schools of Islamic jurisprudence and their 
roles in the development of Islamic jurisprudence. The introduction also touches on 
the reasons why there is a need for secondary sources for Islamic law to supplement 
the primary sources and the level of their usefulness. Also treated in the introduction 
is the systematic emergence of Islamic legal maxims as a distinctive mechanism to 
extrapolate the overall objectives of Islamic law from the thoughts of the schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence. Also discussed is the controversy surrounding the full 
implementation of SharTah in the Northern Nigeria and the concerns of Human 
22 
Rights Organizations. Equally, the aims and objectives of the research, its scope, the 
problems faced by the researcher and the methods employed in the research are all 
enunciated in the introduction. 
The first chapter follows the introduction with a discussion on the science of Islamic 
legal maxims, its concepts, historical development, its categories and its roles in 
Islamic legal system. The second chapter starts with the first Islamic legal maxim 
which centres on the role of action and intention in Islamic criminal law. Focus is 
made on the correlation and corroboration of the two elements and their effects in 
determining the guilt or innocence of an accused person. 
The third chapter examines the rules of certainty and doubt in Islamic criminal 
procedures. Here, the maxim that says that certainty cannot be repelled with doubt is 
analyzed along side with other related maxims which are subsumed under the basic 
maxim. Chapter four looks into the facilities given by Islamic law in the face of 
hardship. The maxim which exposes this rules starts with al-mashaqqah tajlib al- 
tayslr (hardship begets facility) while many related maxims which are subsumed 
under the basic one are also explored. 
Chapter five opens discussion on the stand of Islam in eliminating of harm, whether 
aggressively inflicted or reciprocated. The maxim that deals with this rule is lä Barar 
wall dlrlr and few related others. Chapter six delves into the use of custom al- `adah 
and al- `ur£ Definitions of `urf and `adah are concisely explained. The ambiguous use 
of the two terms is cleared while the effect of `urf in Islamic criminal law is 
emphasized. The issue of whether rules can change or not when time and 
circumstances change is critically debated. 
The last chapter examines the effect of illocutionary acts of utterances particularly in 
criminal acts that involve expressions of the accused. The need to consider literal 
meaning first before pragmatic meaning is centrally discussed. The relatedness 
between literal and metaphorical meaning of an expression is also given attention. The 
thesis is rounded off with concluding remarks such as the summary of the whole 
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thesis, recommendation and suggestions and areas for further researches on the topic 
of Islamic legal maxims. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Concept of al-QawJ'id al-Fighiyyah (Islamic Legal Maxims) 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter examines the concept of al-gawd `id al-fighiyyah. The literal definition of 
al-gawä `id al-fighiyyah is given while its emergence as an independent subject in 
Islamic jurisprudence and its historical development are equally traced. An attempt is 
also made in this chapter to distinguish the features of al-gawä `id al-fighiyyah from 
those of other subjects and terminologies in Islamic law. This, to some extent, 
removes the speculation on the capacity of al-gawä `id al-fighiyyah to stand as an 
independent source on which legal verdicts can be based. Due to the fact that there are 
many legal maxims enunciated in classical books of Islamic jurisprudence, the chapter 
also explains the hierarchy of Islamic legal maxims and justifies the reasons why 
some maxims should be given general status as opposed to the five famous agreed 
upon among the classical Islamic scholars. 
1.1 Definition of al-Qawä`id al-Fighiyyah 74 
1.1.1 Literal Meaning of al-Qawä'id al-Fiqhiyyah 
A1-Qawä7d al-Fiqhiyyah is a name given to a particular science in Islamic 
jurisprudence. It denotes a certain discipline in Islamic studies. The subject matter al- 
gawä`id al-fighiyyah cannot be accurately defined until the two component words are 
separately defined. The first word al-gawä `id is a plural noun of al-qä `idah, derived 
from the verb qa `ada, which has many lexical meanings in the Arabic language 
74 The translation of al-Qawä'Id al-fighryyah as `Islamic legal maxim' has almost become 
conventional in the writings of contemporary scholars, although there are some scholars who have 
translated it as just `legal maxim' to form a parallel meaning with the term used by Western scholars. 
However, this latter translation will undermine the Islamic value of maxims since the value of legal 
maxims in the Islamic domain cannot merely be called legal maxim, as used in the Western term. This 
important difference will be explained in due course in discussion of the importance and the roles of 
legal maxims. It is worth noting that my translation of this subject matter in my Master's dissertation 
was `Islamic juristic maxim', a rendering which I still maintain. This is because the word `juristic' is 
wider than that of `legal'. Of course, these maxims are useful not only to law practitioners, but also to 
those who issue religious verdict (mufti). However, I prefer to adopt the current translation here 
because the term `Legal Maxim' is well understood to both Islamic modern scholars and Western 
lawyers, and because the area to which I want to relate the maxims is purely legal. 
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denoting stability, constancy and foundation75. The Arabs use al-muq `ad for a sick 
person who cannot move from one place to another because of his constancy in one 
place. They also call a married woman qa Tdah al-rajul76 From this meaning, the 
foundation of a house is called gi'idah al-bayt. The Qur'an in some of its verses 
refers to the latter meaning. An apt example is where God says in the Quran: waidlh 
yarfa `u 'Ibrihim al-gawä `id mini al-bayt wa Ismä `i1....... - And (remember) when 
Abraham and Isma `il were raising the foundations of the house.... 77 
In general terms, qä `idah synonymously means "base, principle, rudiment, maxim and 
precept. "78 Thus, al-qä `idah is the base, the foundation of something religious, 
philosophical, political or legal. 79 
1.1.2 Technical Meaning of al-Qawd `id 
The general definition of qä idah is that it is gadiyyab kulliyyab muntabigah `a1ä 
jam! `juz'iyyätih. ý "a general theorem which applies to all of its related particulars, 8° 
or hukmun kulh yantabiq `a1ä juz'iyyätih liyata `arraf `ahakämuha minh, "a general 
rule which applies to its particulars to deduct rules from it.,, 81 The distinctive feature 
of the two definitions lies in the fact that the former is the definition of the scholars of 
logic, while the latter is ascribed to the scholars of usül (the principle of 
jurisprudence). Both scholars agree on the generality of gä'idah. For a qä `idah to be 
universally accepted, it should be general, i. e. there should be no exception in 
applying it to its particulars. 82 The only difference in the two definitions is that from a 
linguistic point of view, `maxim' is gadiyyah `proposition', while the scholars of ucil 
deem a maxim as hukm 'a measure for extracting ruling'. 
75 Muhammad Ibn Makram Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-Arab, Amin Muhammad Abdul al-Wahab and 
Muhammad Sadiq al- `Ubayd, (eds. ), (Beirut: Dar `ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi and Muhassasah al-Tarikh 
al-arabi 1997/1418 entry `Ayn, al-Mu `jam al-Wasit entry Ayn. 
761bid., entry `Ayn. 
"Qur'an Chapter 2, verse 127. 
78 Munir al-Diin Al-Ba'labak, al-Mawrid, (8th edn, Beirut: Daru al-`Ilmi lil Mallayin, 1997) p. 844. 
79 Ahmad All al-Nadwi, aI-Qawä `id al-Fighryyah,.. (4t' Damascus: Dar al-Qalam, 1998/1418) p. 39. 
80 Ali Ibn Muhammad Al-Jurjäni, Kitäb al-Ta `rt, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1983/1403 
171. 
al-Nadwi, op. cit. p. 40. 
82 Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Futüh7 Ibn al-Najjar, Sharh al-Kawkab al-MunTr, Dr. Muhammad al- 
Zuhayli, and Dr. Nazih Hummad, (eds), (Riyadh: Maktabah al- `Ubaykan 1997/1418), vol. 1 p. 45. 
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However, the Islamic Jurists with regards to the definition of al-qä°idah are divided 
into two. The first are those who do not perceive any difference between what 
constitutes a maxim from the linguists' and the jurists' point of view. Thus, al- 
gä'fdah to them is defined in the same way as it is defined by the linguists, the 
logician and the scholars of us171.83 The second are those who regarding the linguistic 
and juristic definitions discern some differences. 84 
There are those who assert that al-gä'idah is hukm kur a `general rule' that relates 
to juristic norm and differs from that of usül and logic. This view is expressed by al- 
Maqari (d. 758 AH) thus: `na `n7 bi al-qawa `id kull kulr huwa `akhas mini al-uciiI 
wasi'ir al- `agliyyah al-ämmab... - (translation: what we mean by gä'idah, is any 
general (rule) which is more specific than usiiI and other general rational ... y85 The 
other view is the view of those who see al-gä'idah as hukm `aghlabl, a `preponderant 
rule', as noted by al-Hamawi thus: 
inna a1-gä'idah `inda al-fugahPghayrhä 'inda al-nuhäh wa al-usuliyyin, idh 'inda al-fugahä' 
hukm akthari-läkuryagtabiq `all aktharjuziyyätih liyuta'arrafahakämuhu 
The term al-gä'idah from the perspective of the jurists differs from what its meaning is in the 
perspective of the linguists and Usulists'. From the jurists' view, it is a preponderant rule- not 
general- which applies to many of its particulars to deduct their rules from it. 86 
The reason for these divergent views regarding the nature of al-gä'idah among the 
Islamic jurists stems from the fact that al-qa idah -from its origin- is kuliyyah, in 
general. However, in some rare exceptional cases, some scholars have reservations 
regarding its generality. Nonetheless, it is safe to say that al-gä`idah al-flghiyyah is 
general in application, regardless of any exclusion that may occur from it for the 
following reasons. Firstly: to say al-gd'idah is kuliyyah (general) conforms to its 
original usage. Secondly: the fact that there are exceptions in some cases is not 
enough to impact greatly on the generality of the term because there is no formula that 
is without an exception in its rules or its applications. The third reason is that it is well 
established in Islamic jurisprudence, and it is an acceptable rule that any ghälib 
ß3 Such as al-SubkT, Taj al-Din in his al-AshbA wa al-Nazä'r see al-Nadawi op. cit. p. 41. 
84 Muhammad Ibn Abdullah Al-Sawät, al-Qawä'id wa al-Dawabit al-Fighryyah 'Inda Ibn Taymiyyah 
fifiqh al-'Usrah, (Ta'if, Saudi Arabia: Maktab Dar al-Bayan al-Hadithah 2001/1422) vol. 1 p. 88- 
85 al-NadwT op. cit. p. 41 quoted al-Muqri, al-Qawa'id. 
86 Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al-Hamaw% Ghamz 'Uyün al-Basä'ir Sharh al-Ashbä wa al- 
Nazä'ir, (Cairo: Dar al-Tiba ` al-Amirah 1357) vol. 1 p. 22 
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akthan, (preponderant majority) rule is regarded as kull! muttarid, (consistent general 
rule) as al-Shatibi (d. 790 AH-1388 AD ) observes: 
Even those gawäid assumed to be less general might be `general and consistent' in another 
way which we do not perceive, or, albeit, may not be maxims on their own because of 
insufficient conditions qualifying them to be called gawä'id. 
87 
Of course, one of the accepted principles is that what is preponderant should be given 
the status of generality, in as much as it is consistent in many cases and it is of 
common occurrence. And the rule and effect is given to what is regular and 
universally prevailing. 88 
Having discussed the term al-gä`idah, the overall definition of al-qawa'id al- 
fighiyyah should now be broached. It is pertinent to briefly define fiqh, to which al- 
gawä`id is attributed. The wordfiqh, comes from the root verb fagiha which means to 
know, to understand, to grasp and to comprehend. 89 The word "fighiyyah" in the 
subject matter is used as an adjective to qualify al-gawä'id Moreover, fiqh, as a 
subject in Islamic studies, has been defined in different ways. The Majallah al- 
`Adliyyah, among others, defines it as "the knowledge of a practical legal question, '90 
but this definition does not give the complete nature of the term. The general 
definition of figh, however, states that it "is the science of the derived legal rules as 
required from their particular sources. s91 
It should however be noted that al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah in most medieval and 
contemporary works has only been defined as a term, and not as a subject. As already 
stated above, majority of medieval writers see al-gawä`id as a specific term in Islamic 
8' Ibrahim Ibn Musa AI-Shätibi, al-Muwäfagat fi iisid al-Shari `ah ed. Abdullah Duraz, (Beirut: Dar al- 
Ma `rifah, 1975) vol. 2 p. 53. 
' AI-Majallah al-Ahakäm al-Adliyyah, Articles 40-41. 
ß9 Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Al-Fayümi al-Misbäh al-MunTr (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-'Ilmiyah n. d. ) p. 
248. 
90 Majallah op. cit. Article 1. 
91 Ahmad Qadir Anwar, op. cit. p. 91, Subhi Mahmassani, op. cit. p. 8. There is a modem theory 
developed by some Islamic writers in whichfiqh is deemed to be the the method by which the Islamic 
law is derived and applied. This attempt is sought to distinguish the term shah `ah from fiqh but yet 
there is confusion in rendering the translation of the two terms into English language. In many cases 
both terms are translated as `Islamic law' as Baderin asserts that the two terms are not technically 
synonymous (Baderin op. cit. p. 33). It seems that the pahrse `Islamic Law' cannot be isolated from the 
two terms because the understating of Islamic Law (fiqh) cannot be drawn without recourse to the 
divine and quasi-divine revalation. Shari `ah) However, it is safe to say that all what is termed Shari'ah 
can be called Islamic Law (in terms of its immutability) not otherwise. (see Ramadan for further 
reading on the issue in Ramadan, S. , Islamic Law: Its Scope and Equity (London, Macmillan, 1970, 
pp. 33-36 ) 
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jurisprudence and, as such, the function of this term is only defined. This approach is 
reiterated by many contemporary scholars. Subhi Mahmassani renders the definition 
of `maxim' as "a general rule that applies to all its particulars". 92' This dogmatic 
approach does not help in the comprehension of the extreme nature of the subject 
matter. Failure to incorporate many features of the science has created a vacuum that 
has to be filled. Another contemporary writer, Izzi-Dien Mawil, defines `maxims' as 
"principles and concepts that could be applied to a wide variety of cases. "93 This 
definition sounds attractive, but could be taken to task for its failure to recognize the 
cognizance of al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah, as opposed to any other gawä'Id. Another 
interesting definition is that of Muhammad Kamali Hashim94 who defines al-gawä'id 
al-fighiyyah as "statements of principles that are derived from the detailed reading of 
the rules of fiqh on various themes" 95 This definition, although credible because it 
recognizes some of the features of the fiqh maxim, fails to address its essence. Of 
course, maxims are said to be products of the extensive reading of the rules of figh, 
but the essence of this extrapolation is to apply this product to other cases that fall 
under their subject. 
A more comprehensive definition of al-gawä`id al-fighiyyah has been given by both 
Mustafa al-Zargä, 96 and Muhammad Ibn Abdullah al-Sawaat. 97 al-Zargä says that 
Islamic legal maxims "are universal fiqh principles, expressed in legal, concise 
statements, that encompass general rulings in cases that fall under their subject . 
08 
Al- Sawwät, however, defines al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah as "a study of the science of 
practical legal Islamic universal theorem and how they are applicable to their 
particulars". 99 
921bid. P. 151, Mawil, Islamic Law: from Historical foundations to contemporary practice. (Notre 
Dame Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), Ppl 13-114. 
93 Mawil, ibid. 
94 Muhammad Hashim Karnali, Qawä `id al-Fiqh: The legal maxims of Islamic law, in Journal of the 
Association of Muslim Lawyers (UK) vol. 3 issue 2 October, 1998 online at( www. aml. org. uk/journal/ 
last viewed 21/06/2006 14: 03 pm. ) p. 1 
9s Ibid. 
96 Mustafa Ahmad al-Zargä, al-Madkhal al-FiqhT al-`Arom, (7`h edn. Damascus: Matba `ah Jami'ah 
1983/1383) vol. 2 p. 933 97 
al-Sawwät, op. cit. 
98 al-Zargä, M. op. cit. 
99 al-Sawwät, op. cit. 
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A comparison of the leading definitions reveals two observations. One, the two 
definitions agree on the universality and generality of Islamic legal maxims. This 
conforms to the opinion of al-Shätibi, mentioned above. Two, the former sees al- 
gawä'id al-fighiyyah as rules or principles, `ahakäm aw usiJ/ while the latter views it 
as gadyyah, theorem. By and large, there is an important aspect that has been left 
unaddressed in the aforementioned definitions: namely, the end objectives of the legal 
maxim. This issue has been raised by both Kamali and Izzi Dien. 1°° Kamali observes 
that one of the functions of Islamic legal maxims is to depict the "general picture of 
the nature, goals and objectives of the Shari `ah and this is why many scholars have 
`treated them as a branch of magäsid (goals and objectives literature)". 101 In light of 
this, the researcher submits that legal maxims are "legal rules, the majority of them 
universal, expressed in concise phraseology, depicting the nature and objectives of 
Islamic law and encompassing general rules in cases that fall under their subject. "' 02 
Hiya `Ahkim fighiyyah Aktharhä kulliyyah masughah bi ush7bin mu jaz tu `abbir 
`an maqisid al-shah `ah watatadamman `ahkim tashr! `iyyah 'immab fi al-ha wadith 
allati tadkhul tahtahä 
By exploring the words 'abkann and fighiyyah, the definition distinguishes the subject 
matter from other maxims. The definition also preserves the importance of 
conciseness in formulating legal maxims. This is important because using lengthy and 
inarticulate phrases will render the nature of the maxims unattractive. Also, there is a 
sense of belonging that Islamic legal maxims are formulated to express the nature and 
value of the Shari `ab. This will guide the application of the maxims in accordance 
with the spirit of Islamic law. 
10° Karnali, Qawaid al-Fiqh op. cit. and Mawil, op. cit. p. 113. 101 Karnali, ibid. 
102 This definition is based on, and formulated from, various opinions to include the ultimate goal of the 
subject. 
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1.1.3 Difference between a[-Qawk'id al-Fighiyyah and al-Qawä'id a! -Usüliyyab 
The science of al-gawä'Id al-figihiyyah is not the same as the science of usrll al-fiqh 
and its gawä'id. The maxims of usül are assumed to be the same as the science of 
usül. This is clearly indicated by Ibn al-Häjib (d. 646 AH) when he defined usül al- 
figh as: "a knowledge of gawä'id which could be used to infer branches of legal 
rulings from their general sources through the means of deduction. "' 03 Thus, it is 
possible to infer from the above definition that there is no independent science 
established for al-gawä'id al-usüliyyah as the science of uci1 al-figh is gä'idah on its 
own. 104 This opinion is not well supported by majority of scholars. However, there is 
a clear difference between the science of figh and of usül, despite the fact that there 
are some legal maxims that "are often cross-referenced and sectioned with those 
relating to usrll al-figh. "105 Al-Ghazäli maintains that the science of fiqh focuses on 
the action of the individual in relation to legal orders, while the science of usil 
focuses on the study of the meaning of words, and of definitions in order to deduce 
legal orders. 106 And each of the two sciences has its own independent gawd'id, as 
indicated above. But the gawä'id of usül have never been separated from their 
source, as opposed to the gawä'id of figh, which have been treated as an independent 
science. 
An in-depth study of the two sciences shows that there are similarities and differences 
between the two subjects and their maxims. The similarities are: (1) the maxims of 
both are general principles that apply to many branches of fiqh (2) there are some 
maxims that are interwoven between uciiI and fiqh, such as the maxim of `urf 
(custom). If it is viewed from the point of its topic as legal evidence, it is deemed as 
being a maxim of usr11, but if it is seen as an act of mukallaf (sound mind), it is 
deemed as a maxim of figh. 107 However, the differences could be summarized as 
follows: 
103 See al-Sawwät, op. cit. vol. 1 p. 101. 
104 Ibid. vol. 1 p. 151. 
los Mawil, op. cit p. 114. 
106 Muhammad, Abu Hamid Al-Ghazäli, al-Mustasfa- mi 'Ilm al-Usül , (3`d edn. Beirut: Dar Ihya' al- Turath al-Arabi and Mu'assasah al-Ta'rikh al-Arabi, 1993/1414) vol. 1 p. 5. 
107 al-Nadw% op. cit. p 70. 
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" Legal maxims are extended products from the legal sources, or an 
extrapolation of legal issues similar to each other. However, the 
maxims of usil are derived from the same source as the science of 
usi 1, which consist of Arabic linguistics, principles of religion etc. 108 
" Legal maxims are based on the fiqh itself, while us& and its maxims 
are concerned with legal reasoning, the applied meaning of commands, 
prohibitions. 
1 09 
" Legal maxims can be used directly to derive legal rulings, as opposed 
to the maxims of usrll, which can only be used to derive rulings 
through the source of Islamic law. To illustrate this difference, the 
maxims `al- `amr yagtad al-wujtib' (the imperative implies 
obligation), and `al- `umür bimagäsidiha' (matters are judged according 
to intentions), are apt examples. The former is a maxim of usü1, which 
implies that prayer is an obligatory duty but that implied meaning 
cannot be directly and clearly understood without imploring the 
interpretation of some Qur'anic verses such as : wa'agimci al-cal it (and 
observe prayer (Q. 2: 43). It is from the imperative form of the verse 
that the obligatory status of prayer is derived. However, the latter, 
being a legal maxim, can supply the obligation of intention in all 
human acts. ' 10 
" The legal maxims are concerned with the acts of mukallaf (persons of 
sound mind), while the maxims of usül are concerned with the legal 
sources. For example, the legal maxim: al yagin lä lazül bi al-shakk 
(certainty cannot be removed with doubt) gives a ruling on the 
certainty of the act of mukallaf, while the maxim of usil : al-'amr 
108 The derivation of al-Usill from those sources is mentioned by many scholars. See al-Jurjant, al- 
Burhän vol. 1 p. 47, al-Amid-1, al-'Ihkäm ed. Dr. Sayyid al-Jumayli, (2°d edn. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al- 
Arabi, 1986/1406) vol. 1 p. 78, Muhammad Ibn Bhadir, al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muh74 fi usul al-figh, 
(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah 2000) vol. 1 p. 28, Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Fut0h Ibn Najjar, 
Sharh al-Kawkab al-Munir, eds. Dr. Muhammad al-Zuhayli and Dr. Nazih Hummad, (Riyadh: 
Maktabah al-'Ubaykan 1997/1418) vol. 1 p. 48, al-SawAt, op. cit. vol. 1 p. 102. 
109 Kamali, Qawaid al-Fiqh, op. cit. p. 1, al-Sawwä(, op. cit vol. 1. pp. 102-103, Khaleel Muhammad, 
The Islamic Law Maxims in Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 44, no. 2,1426/2005 p. 194. 
110 Abdul al-Kareem Zaydän, al-Waj z fi Sharh al-Qawä `id al-Fighyyah fi al-Sharrah al-Islämiyyah, 
p. 188, Khaleel M, op. cit. 194, al-Sawät, op. cit. vol. 1 p., 103. 
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yagtaýft al-wujub (imperative implies obligation) is all about any legal 
rule that is obligatory. l 11. 
" The maxim of usr71 al-figh is without exception; it is always general, 
whereas a legal maxim is not always general, as in some cases there 
are exceptions. 112 
1.1.4 Difference between al-Qawä `id al-Fiqhiyyah and al-Dawäbit a! -Fighiyyah 
The term al-dawäbit is sometimes used interchangeably with the term al-gdwa`id. al- 
Dawäbit is plural of al-däbit which literally means controller. 113 It is a verbal noun 
from dabata which means to tie or to control something. In general, the term däbit 
differs somewhat from gä'idah. This is due to the distinctiveness of the scope of each 
term. However, from the Islamic jurists' perspective, there are two opinions on the 
use of the term. There are some classical and contemporary scholars who assume that 
the term däbit is a sister of gä'idah. In effect, they perceive no difference between the 
two terms. "4 In sharp contrast, there are other scholars who behold a difference 
between the two terms. 115 The distinctive factor that differentiates the two terms can 
only be seen in the scope in which the two terms operate. It is observed that däbit's 
scope is limited to a particular subject or chapter of Islamic jurisprudence and, as 
such, has very limited exceptions. By contrast, gä'idah does not have any restriction 
regarding any theme or particular subject offiqh. This is enunciated and clarified in 
Hashyah al-Bannähi, thus: "legal maxim, unlike däbit, is not peculiar to a subject". "6 
To this, al-Suyüti emphasizes that the fundamental principle is that gä'idah 
111 al-Sawwäl, op. cit. vol. 1 p. 102. 
112 al-Nadwi, op. cit. p. 68. 
113 Muni r Ba'alabaki, al-Mawrid. " A modern Arabic-English Dictionary, (8`h edn. Cairo: Daru El-Ilm 
Lil Mallayin 1997) p. 706. The term `dabit' can also be translated into `regulator' because it also 
regulates the issue discussed from various points of view in particular topics of Islamic jurisprudence. 
114 Such as Ibn UmAm (d. 861 A. H) cf. al-Tahrir with its Sharh on Tagrir wa Tahr r by Ibn Amir al-Häj 
vol. 1 p. 29. Among the contemporary scholars who do not perceive differences between the two terms 
is al-Zuhayli, Wahbah. See al-Nazaryyah, p. 199. 
"S Abdul Rahman Ibn Abi Bakr Al-Suyü i, al-Ashbdh wa al-Nazd'irfi al-Nahw ed. Taha Abdul Rauuf 
Sa'd (Cairo: Sharkah al-Tiba'ah al-Fanniyyah 1975/1395) vol. 1 p. 9, Zayn al-`Abidin Ibn Ibrahim, 
Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbah wa al-Nazä'ir.. (Beirut: Daru al-Kutub a]- `Ilmiyyah 1993/1413) p. 197, a]- 
Burnü, al-Wajiz fi 'Ihdäh al-Qawd'id al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kullryyah, (4t' edn. Beirut: Mu'assasah al- 
Risalah 1996/1416), p. 47. 
116, Abdul al-Rahman Ibn Jäd Allah AI-Bannäni, Häshryah al-Bannäni 'Ali Sharh al-Jaläl al-Muhallä 
Aid Jam' al-Jawämi' (Misra: Matba' Isaa al-Babi al-Halabi 1913/1336) vol. 2. p. 290. See also al- 
Nadwi, op. cit. p. 46. 
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encompasses branches of various chapters of fiqh, while (läbit is confined to 
individual chapters, 17 such as those on cleanliness (tahärah) and marriage (nikäh). To 
illustrate this argument, an example of däbit is the statement of the jurists: "when 
water reaches two feet, it does not carry dirt. " An example of a legal maxim of figh is 
the statement: "The affairs of the Imam concerning his people are judged by reference 
to maslahah (benefit)". ' 18 The formal statement is confined to the topic of cleanliness 
and does not apply to other topics, while the latter is more general and wider in scope. 
It is not specific to any person's affairs, be it transaction, administration, or spiritual. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is safe to define the term däbit, following the view 
of those who have distinguished between it, and gä'idah thus: that dibit is "a general 
rule that applies to branches of a particular theme. "t 19 This definition establishes a 
new term and it allows room for the evolution of knowledge, as al-ta's7s 'awli mina 
al-ta'kid, "establishing a new norm is better than making emphasis. " 120 However, it 
cannot be ruled out that there is a corollary between the two terms. Of course, both 
have been defined as a general legal ruling `hukmu kulli fighi', and both are applicable 
to issues in the Islamic legal framework. It is also noted in the work of al-Subki that 
both can be called gä'idah, but with different adjectives. The one with wider scope 
could be called gawä'd `ämmah, `general legal maxims', while the one with lesser 
scope could be called `gawä'id khassah, `peculiar legal maxims. ' 121 
117 al-Suyüli, op. cit. Vol. 1 p. 7, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 192. 
118 Karnali, Qawa'id al-Fiqh, op. cit. p. 1. 
119 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 192 Al-Sawwät, op. cit. vol. I p. 96. 
120 al-Sawwä, ibid. 
121 al-Nadwi, op. cit. p. 51, quoting al-Shubki from his book al-Ashbä wa al-Nazä'ir, part three, under 
discussion on al-gawä'id al-khässah -('peculiar legal maxims'). 
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In sum, there are divergent opinions on the use of the term däbit to mean gd'idah. But 
as opined above, giving (6b#' a separate meaning establishes a new term, without 
necessarily using it as a synonym of gd'idah. It is noted that both can be used 
interchangeably, especially if they are used in different ways. But if they are used 
together, there should be an external meaning for each. In other words, all dawäbit' 
(controllers) are gawä'id (maxims) but not vice versa. 
1.1.5 Difference between al-Qawä`id al-Fighiyyah and al-Na? ariyyab al- 
Fiqhiyyah 
Having distinguished between gawd'Id and dawäbit, it is also useful to shed light on a 
newly-developed term in Islamic jurisprudence, namely a1-nazariyyah al-fighiyyah, 
(the theory of figh). This modem terminology is aimed at treating a particular 
important area of Islamic law in order to make a thematic and comprehensive 
framework of the said area of law. Examples of these are nazariyyah a! 'aqd, (the , 
theory of contract), and nazarlyyah al-ithbät (the theory of proof). The theoretic 
landmark of this term serves as a departure from the old style of writing on Islamic 
jurisprudence where topics were not well articulated in a suitably formulaic way. 122 
The word al- nazariyyah is derived from naW, which means an in-depth look into 
something visible. It also denotes thought, observation and reasoning. 123 According 
to the scholars of al-usi 1, al-nazar is a reasoning aimed at attaining a particular 
knowledge. 124 It is assumed that the term al-nazariyyab and the style of writing on it 
was borrowed from Western scholars by a number of Islamic modern writers who, in 
one way or the other, have had contact with Western orientation. 125 As such, there are 
some scholars who are cynical about its use in Islamic jurisprudence. The reason, as 
al-Burnu notes, is that the theory of al-nazadj yab springs from human reasoning 
which is not infallible, while Islamic law has its source from divine texts. 126 Al- 
'22 Karnali, Qawaidal-Fqh op. cit. p. 5. 
123 Ibn Manzdr, Lisän al-Arab op. cit. vol. 5 p. 215. 
124 al-Amidi, op. cit., vol. 1 p. 10, al-ZarkashT, op. c it., vol. 1 p. 42, Muhammad Ibn Ali al-ShawkänT, 
Irshäd al-1uht7l i1ä `Ihgäq a1-Hagqmin `Ilmi al-Usr7, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 1413) p. 20. 
12$ al-Nadawi, op. cit. p. 63. 
126 al-Burnti, Muwsü `a al-Qawä `id al-Figh yyah (n. p. 1416) vol. 1 pp. 96-102. 
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Sawwät remarks that if the issues treated under the term al-nazariyyab al-fighiyyah is 
of the nature of ijtihäd (personal effort), the use of the term is justified, regardless of 
where the term is derived. 127 This, of course, is a balanced opinion on the fact that 
knowledge is knowledge and it should be admired regardless of where it is originated, 
as long as it does not contradict or devalue Islamic morals. 
However, al-nazariyyah inserts a philosophical contribution to knowledge that 
deserves an in-depth examination. It is defined as a theory of a "number of topics of 
Islamic jurisprudence which contain legal issues based on rules and conditions and 
bound together under a subject unit. " 128 Therefore, al-na? ariyyah is a collection of a 
particular subject of figh where sub-sections are inter-related, as for example, in the 
theory of ownership and the theory of contract. This newly invented terminology 
emerges in the contemporary style of writing on figh, exemplified by Abu Sannah in 
his al- Nazariyah al-'Ammah li al-Mu'ämalät fi al-Shari'ah al-Islämiyyah - (The 
Theory of Transactions in Islamic Law). 129 But during its development and 
incorporation into Islamic jurisprudential terms, some scholars assumed that it is the 
same as the term al-gawä'Id. One modem scholar who inclines to that assumption is 
Abu Zaharah. He says: "it is important to distinguish between the knowledge of usril 
al-figh and al-gawä'Id which embodies branches of legal rules. This al-gawä'Id is 
best called al-nazariyyät al-`ämmah (general theories such as gawä'Id al-milkiyyah- 
maxims of ownership) v)130 This view is antithetical to the prevailing opinion of the 
majority of Islamic writers. 131 AI-gawä'id is said to be a separate science while al- 
nazariyyah is a separate style. However, there could be traces of similarity in the way 
both terms work. For instance, there are fragments of al-gawa'id and al-dawäbit 
which form al-nazariyyah, in maxims related to 'urf such as : (1) custom is 
authoritative (2) public usage is an evidence for which action must be taken in 
accordance therewith (3) it is undeniable that rules (based on 'urf) change with time 
(4) effect is given to custom where it is of regular occurrence or when it is universally 
127 al-Sawäl, op. cit. p. 106 (footnote). 
128 al-Nadawi, op. cit. p. 63. 
'29 Abu Sannah, al-Nazariyyah al- `Ammah li al-Mu `ämalät fi al-Shari `ah al-Islamiyyah, p. 44. 
'30 Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Usill al-Fiqh, (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 1997), p. 10. The same view is 
emphasized by al-Khaläbi, Abu Tähir Ahmad in his introduction to the edition of Idäh al-Masälik by 
al-Wanshirisi p. 111. 
131 Such as Mustafa al-Zarqa in al-Madkhal al-Fiqh al-Amm op. cit. vol. 1 p. 235. 
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prevailing. 132 These and other related maxims can be called nazari»ah al-`urf, 
regardless of the details of each of these maxims. This is because the prevailing and 
most obvious of all the aforementioned maxims is the theme of `urf.. 133 The same 
practice can be applied to the maxims related to confession - when they are treated 
together they can be called nazariyyab al-'igrär, or `theory of confession'. This is 
why the work of al-Majallah is perceived to be of a nazariyyah nature because its 
predominant focus is on transaction. 
However, there are many ways, listed below, in which the two terms differ 
significantly from each other: 
" Nazariyyah of fiqh deals with details of particular themes in Islamic 
jurisprudence. As such, it is lengthy in scope and in construction, whereas al- 
gawä'id al-fighiyyah is very precise in its wording and style, yet 
comprehensive in application to various branches of different topics of figh, 
although it is not aimed at detailing all their particulars. 134 
"A legal maxim is not defined with its own basic elements or conditions, as 
opposed to al-nazariyyah, whose theme has to be defined with all its details. 135 
" It is possible to say that al-nazariyyah is wider in scope than al-gawa'id. A 
gä`idah can serve as dibit under the theme of nazariyyah, as in, for example, 
the maxim al- 'a cl fi al- `uqi d ridä al-muta'ägidayn - the fundamental principle 
of contracts is the consent of the two contractual parties. The maxim forms a 
däbit (controller) under na? ariyyab of `aqd, although this is not a common 
fact, as gawd'id can be wider than nazariyyab in other ways. The maxim of 
al-'umrir bimagäsidihä- matters are judged according to intentions - is widely 
applicable not only to `aqd, but also to all facets of Islamic jurisprudence. 136 
132 Majallah, Articles 36,37,39 and 41 respectively. 
133 al-Nadwi op. cit. p. 65. 
14 Ibid. p. 66. 
135 Ibid. p. 65, al-Sawäý op. cit. vol. p. 108. 
136 al-Suy0fi, al-Ashbä' wa Nazä'ir (b) (Beirut: Daru al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah 1403). p. 47, al-Sawwät, op. 
cit. vol. 1 p. 108. 
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1.2 Historical Development of Al-Qawa'id al-Fiq/iiyyah 
In the modem age of Islamic scholarship, many subjects have undergone 
rearrangement. To make learning convenient, some subjects have been broken up 
from others. Historically, there are divergent opinions and misconceptions about 
whether al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah is an independent subject or part and parcel of usO 
al-figh. This is due to the assumption of some classical Islamic writers who wrote 
about the subject. In the works of Imam al -`Alai (d. 761 AH) in his book al-Ma/mu`, 
Imam Ibn 'l-Wakil (d. 716 AH), Ibn Subki, al-Suyyuti (d. 911 AH) and Ibn Nujaym's 
(d. 970 AH) al-ashbäh wan nazahir, for example, the two subjects are confused 
together. 137 Because of this misconception, it is difficult to give precise dates for the 
emergence of al-gawd'id al-fighiyyah as a separate subject in Islamic jurisprudence. 
However, it is observed that al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah has gone through three stages of 
development - primitive, florescence and mature. 
1.2.1 The Primitive Stage of al-Qawa'id al-Fighiyyah 
The first stage of the emergence of al-gawa'id al-flghiyyah can be traced back to the 
era of the Prophet and to the early period of the Täbi' (the followers of the 
companions of the Prophet). 138 The Prophet was endowed with the use of precise yet 
comprehensive and inclusive expression (jawämi ` al-kalim). His traditions are full of 
expressions of legal maxims. In spite of the status of his traditions as one of the 
sources of Islamic law, those expressions also form an integral part of the formulation 
of the Islamic legal maxims. For instance, the Ahadith "al-kharäj bi al-daman" 
(revenue and responsibility go together, i. e. a government that takes tax from its 
subject must guarantee safety for the subject); 139 "lä dara walä direr"( do not harm or 
exchange harm with harm); 140 "ma askarabu kathirubu, fagarluhu harim" (any 
substance whose large quantity intoxicates, its small quantity is also prohibited); 141 
. al-bayyinah `alä al-mudda i wa al yamin `a1ä man ankar"(The burden of proof is on 
137 al-Nadwi, All Ahmad, op. cit. pp. 39-40. 
138 al-Burnü, Muhammad Sadigqi, Mawsü `a al-Qawa`id al-Fighryyah, op. cit. p. 12. 
139 Ibn Majah, Muhmmad Ibn Yazid, Sunan Ibn Majah, Hadith no. 2243 vol. 3 p. 753. 
'40 al-Nadwi, op. cit. p. 90. 
141 Muhammad Abdul al-Rauf AI-Munäwi, Faydh al-Qadir Sharh al-JämT' al-Saghir (2"d edn. Beirut: 
Dar al-Ma'rifah li al-Tiba' 1972/1391) vol. 5 p. 420. See also, al-Tirmidh in Sunan bab al-Shurbah. 
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the claimant and the oath is on the one who denies) are few of those prophetic 
expressions that emerged as legal maxims. 142 Remarking on the nature of the hadith's 
statement regarding the prohibition of small quantities of intoxicating substances, al- 
Nadwi observes that the hadith is a maxim laid down by the Prophet for the 
prohibition of any intoxicating substance. 143 Of course, this prophetic axiom can be 
used in determining the legal status of some contemporary substances that contain 
intoxicating ingredients, once the 711ah' (cause) of prohibition has been found in such 
a substance. It was also reported by al-Bukhari on different occasions that the Prophet 
said: "Irma 1isäbib a1-hagq magäl"(indeed, the owner of the right has a say). 144 This 
hadith, as precise as it is, makes a huge contribution to the law of claim and legal 
procedure. Conversely, without any reservation, there are many examples of the 
Prophet's 'Ahadith that, without any refinement or rewording, stand as legal maxims 
and are applicable to many issues in this contemporary age. 
In the period of the Fahäbah (the Companions' generation after the demise of the 
Prophet) it was reported that Abdullah ibn `Abbas said: "kullu shayin fi al-qurän aw, 
aw, fahuwa mukhayyar" (in the Qur'an, every injunction in which many things are 
joined together with the conjunctive particle `or' (Arabic: aw) is an indication that a 
free choice is allowed among these things). 145 It is also reported that Ali ibn Abi Talib 
said: "man gäsam al-ribh fall daman `alayhi" (A profit shareholder is not held 
responsible for loss). 146 The former statement stands for the maxim of atonement in 
Islamic jurisprudence, while the latter stands for the maxim of partnership in Islamic 
transaction. 147 
Subsequently, in the era of the Täbi` (the generation after the companions of the 
Prophet) Imam al-Qadi, Shuraih Ibn al-Harith al-Kindi (d. 76 AH) demonstrated his 
juristic talent with statements that were recognized as maxims in the judicial arm of 
government. He said: "man sbarat `all nafsihi tä'i `an gbayrmukrah fabuwa `alayhi" 
142 Ibn Hajar al-`Asgaläni, Bulügh al-Maräm with translation Hadith No. 1210, p. 498. 
143 al-Nadwi, op. cit p. 90. 
144 al-Bukhär% Muhammad Ibn Isma'il ... Sahih al-Bukhäri Hadith No. 2183. las Abdul Rasäq Bn. Human al-San `aani, MusannafAbdu al-Rasäq ed. Habeeb al-Rahman al- 
A'azami, (Beirut : Mataabi' Dar al-Qalam n. d. ) vol. 4, p. 395. This maxim is inferred from chapter 2, 
verse 196, of the Qur'an. 
146 Ibid. vol. 8, p. 253. 
147 al-Nadwi, op. cit. p. 92. 
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(he who willingly gives a condition binding himself without compulsion shall be held 
responsible for it). 148 He also says: "al-nätij awli mina al-`irif"(The producer of 
something is more entitled to its profit than the claimant (of the ownership). ' 49 The 
first qä `idah denotes a maxim of agreement so that if someone willingly signed an 
agreement to supply goods at a specified time and failed to do so without genuine 
reason, he shall be held responsible for any damage caused by the breach. The second 
gä'idah stresses the maxim of making a claim for ownership. 
In the second century of Hijrah, tremendous efforts were made by leading Islamic 
jurists. This period was a landmark in the emergence of Islamic jurisprudence as 
many legal maxims were traced to the works of the Islamic jurists. One of the early 
works of Islamic legal maxims of that period was kitäb al-khardj by al-Qädi, Abu 
Yusuf (d. 182AH. ). This can be found in his discussion of the rule of discretionary 
punishment and the divergent opinions on it within his school of jurisprudence. He 
states: "al-ta `zir i1ä al-imam `all gadr `azam a1 jurm wa cigharh" (it is left to the 
leader/ judge to decide an appropriate discretionary punishment considering the 
proportionate (nature) of the offence). '5° Without doubt, this pronouncement 
establishes a unique maxim that can be used to determine the punishment to be 
awarded for a crime of a t'aztr nature and who determines such punishment. 
In the same book, Abu Yusuf also addresses the statement that establishes the 
legitimate authority of leaders over their subjects. He says: "laysa IV Imam an yakhruj 
shayan min yad ahadin i11ä bi hagqin thibit ma `arüf (it is not the right of the Imam 
(leader) to take away someone's property without an established and well-known 
right). '5' This statement has been refined to conform with the conventional norm of 
coding maxims, thus: "lä yunza `shayun min yadi ahadin i11ä bI haqq thalbit ma 
`arrif'(nothing should be stripped from someone without legal right). 152 The latter is 
more general than the former as it includes guardians, legal representatives, judges 
and leaders. 
148 al-Bukhäri, with explanation by al-Karmäni in chapter on condition of dowry in the contract of 
marriage, vol. 19, p. 111. 
'49 Abdu al-Razäq, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 277. 
'50 Ya`qub Ibn Ibrahim Abu Yusüf, Kitab al-Kharäj, ( 6" edn. Cairo: al-Matbah al-Salafiyyah wa 
Maktabatuha 1397 A. H. ) p. 180. 
151 Ibid. p. 71. 
152 al-Zargä M., op. cit. 2, p. 982. 
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Another work that has contributed to the development of Islamic legal maxims is 
Kitäb al 'Asl , written by Muhammad 
Ibn al-Hasan ash-Shaybäni (d. 189 AH). In this 
book, al-Shaybäni made many statements that later formed the basis of legal maxims 
in Islamic jurisprudence. He says, for example: "li yujma ` al-ajr Iva al-dainän " (the 
wage and responsibility cannot be combined). 153 This statement has formed a maxim 
in the Majallah, but with little rearrangement. 154 It reads thus: "al-ajr wa al-flamin lä 
yajtami'än"(the wage and responsibility cannot come toghter). The books of Imam 
Shäfi', (d. 204 AH) al-Risalah and al-ummu, are also recognized as sources for the 
formulation of legal maxims. Among many of Imam Shäfi'i's statements are: "al- 
rukhas lä yata'addä mawädi'ihd' (facilities should not be taken beyond their 
premises); '55 and "i yunsab i1ä säkit gawlu gä'il wall `aural `ämil, innamä yunsab 
i1ä kullin qawlihi wa `amalihi" (no statement or action should be imputed to someone 
who is silent , 
but a statement and action should be imputed to the one who made the 
statement or did the action). 
156 There remain many other examples of maxims that 
could be extracted from numerous books written during this stage, but the examples 
given here should suffice. 
157 
The extent of the development of al-gawa'id al-fighiyyah at its primitive stage could 
be summarized as follows: 
" It is observed that the name gawä `id or qä `idah was not specifically 
mentioned in the expressions of the Prophet, or in those of the companions and 
scholars of this period. 
" The Islamic legal maxims were scattered in various works of the early Islamic 
scholars and there was no single separate book basically on Islamic maxims. 
" The majority of maxims were memorized by heart and used when needed. 
9 Some expressions of maxims are lengthy and do not conform to the general 
principles of codification of maxims. 
153 Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan Al-Shaybäni, Kitab al Asl, cd. Abu al-Wafa' al-Afghani, (India: Matbah 
Dar al-Ma'arif al-`Uthmaniyyah n. d. ) vol. 3, p. 45 
154 See Majallah, Article 86. 
us Muhammad Bn Idris Al-Shäf i, Kitab al-Umm, (Beirut: Dar al-Ma`rifah 1381 A. H. ) vol. 3, p. 246. 
156 ibid. 
157 For the comprehensive notes, see al-Nadwi, op. cit. pp. 90-132. 
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1.2.2 The Florescence Stage 
As explained in the previous section, an independent book on the wording of legal 
maxims was never written in the first stage of the development of al-gawa'id al- 
fighiyyah. Part of the reason for this was the lack of necessity, since there was no need 
for the formulation of a school of figh during the period of the Prophet and the 
companions. It was also the case that during the time of the emerging schools, those 
scholars were extremely well endowed with knowledge and their ijtihäd was 
constructed on sound sources. There was therefore no need for taglid (imitation) 
during this period. 
A1-Qawd'id a1-Fighiyyah began to gain popularity in the middle of the fourth century 
of Hijrah and beyond when it became recognized as a separate subject from usül al- 
figh. The reason for this advancement was that when the idea of imitation (al-tagrd 
emerged in the fourth century of Hijrah, the spirit of ijtihäd (independent reason) was 
on the brink of extinction. 158 Some Islamic jurists then became concerned as to how 
they should harmonize the various issues that were discussed in a number of books 
that shared similar views on the subject. They were also concerned with the 
clarification of some issues concerning differences in judgement that these books 
expressed. 159 
Without prejudice, there is an agreement among contemporary Islamic scholars that 
the early generation of Hanafite jurists had precedence in the field of al-gawä'id al- 
fighiyyah. 160 One of the first visible works on the legal maxims is us& al-Karkhi, 
written by a Hanafite scholar, Ibn al-Hasan al-Karkhi (d. 340 AH /951AD). 16' It is 
claimed apocryphally, however, that the work of al-Karkhi was an additional effort in 
the collection of Abu Tahir al-Dabbäs, who lived between the 3rd and 4th century AH. 
It is reported that al-Dabbäs, one of the Hanafite scholars and a contemporary of al- 
Karkhi', compiled seventeen legal maxims, including the five major maxims from the 
Hanafite school of law. Later, al-Karkhi expanded them to thirty-nine and put them in 
158 This is the prevailing view, at least in a general sense. However, there were some Islamic scholars 
who maintained the status of Ijtihdd in that period, such as Abu Ja`far, Muhammad Ibn Jarir al-Tabar" 
(d. 310) al-TahAw (d. 321), and a host of others. See al-Nadwi op. cit. p. 133 note 1. 
1S9al-Burnü, al-Waj"iz, op. cit. p. 59, al-Nadwi, op. cit. p. 133. 
'60 al-Nadwi, ibid., p. 135. 
161 Ibid. p. 136, Khaleel Muhammad, The Islamic Law Maxims, op. cit. p. 196. 
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the form of a book. However, as there is no real evidence on the precedence of al- 
Dabbäs over al-Karkhi, Abu al-Hasan al-Karkh is assumed to be the first person to 
write an independent book on the Islamic legal maxims. 162 
Having said that, it is worth mentioning that the contributions of jurists from other 
schools to this field during this period are of immesurable significance. One of the 
Malikite scholars, Muhammad Ibn al-Harith al-Khushni (d. 361 All), wrote a valuable 
book entitled us0 al futyäh, in which he discussed many maxims of figh. 163 In the 
fifth century, Abu Zaid al-Dabüsi (d. 430 AH) developed the work of al-Karkhi in his 
book ta'sis al-nazar. One important point to note about the work of this century is that 
the term al-gawa'id was not used. Instead, the term al- as! or al-usril was used as 
shown in a phrase of ta'sis al-nazar. " "al-'as1 `indä Ab! Hanifali" (the principle with 
Abu Hanifah is .... ). 
164 
From the seventh to the ninth century of Hijrah, an incredible number of works 
emerged on Islamic legal maxims. Unfortunately, these cannot be enumerated here 
due to the constraints on space. Among these were works by Al-Sahlaki (d. 613AH) 
and Ibn Abdul al-Saläm Izz Din (d. 660 AH), both from Shafi'ite's school. The book 
of al-Sahlaki is solely on Shafi'ites school, while that of Izz Din Abdul Salm is a 
general work on Islamic jurisprudence. 165 Another author was al-Bakri al-Qafsi (d. 
680 AH), who wrote a book on Islamic legal maxims from the Malikite's 
viewpoint. 166 
Moreover, in the eighth to tenth centuries, there appeared many books with different 
titles from notable scholars of various schools. Among the notable Islamic scholars 
who contributed to the development of al-gawä'Id al-fighiyyah in that period were Ibn 
al-Waki1, ( d. 716 AH), al-Magarr al-Mäliki, (d. 758 AH), al-`Alai al-Shäfi'i (d. 761 
AH), Täj Din al-Subk (d. 771 AH), al-Isnawi (d. 772 AH), al-Zarkash1(d. 794 AH), 
Ibn Rajab al-HanbalT (d. 795 AH), al-GhazzT (d. 799 AH), Ibn al-Mulaqqin (d. 804 
162 al-Suy0fi, op. cit. p. 7, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. pp. 10-11. 
163 al-NadwT, op. cit. p. 136. 
'64 Ubaydullah Bn Umar Abu Zayd Al-Dabüsi, Ta'sts al-Nazar (Cairo: Matba'ah al-Imam n. d. ) p. 21. 
165 al-Sahlaki named his book al-Qawä `id fi Furü' al-Shäfi'1 while Izz al-Din named his book Qawä'id 
al-Ahkäm fi masalih al-Anäm. 
166 al-Nadw7, op. cit. p. 138. 
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AH), al-Zubayri (d. 808 AH), al-Maqdisi (d. 815 AH), al-Hisni (d. 829 AH), al-Suyüti 
(d. 910 AH), al-Tujibi al-Malik (d. 912 AH), and Ibn Nujaym al-Hanaf (d. 970 
AH). ' 67 
It is worth noting that there were many other famous scholars who did not write 
specific books on the subject, but contributed to its development. Many expressions 
relating to al-gawd'id al-fighiyyah are found in the works of Islamic jurists such as al- 
Qarrafi (d. 684 AH), Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH), and Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzi (d. 751 
AH). Al-Qarräfi, in one of his discussions on cleanliness, stated: "al-asl allä yubnä al- 
ahkäm i11ä `a1ä al-71m... " (the principle is that rules should only be based on real 
knowledge. 168 This expression formed the maxim of `certainty' and gave it preference 
over `doubt'. Ibn Taymiyyah used to explore maxims in support of his arguments. On 
one occasion he stated: "al-hu1Qn idhä thabata bi 711ah zäla bi zawälihd' (a rule that 
is established by virtue of `Illah (cause) shall expire when the cause expires). ' 69 Ibn 
al-Qayyim also said: "min gawä `id al-shar`i al-kulliyyah : annahu li wäjib ma' al- `ajz 
walä haram ma' darrirah " (among the general legal maxims (of Islamic Law is that) 
there is no obligation in the face of incapability and there is no prohibition in the face 
of necessity). 170 This is the maxim he used to explain the situation where a man could 
not find someone to stand beside him at the back of the Imam and could not penetrate 
into the formed and completed line. Ibn al-Qayyim thus asserted that such a man's 
prayer was valid. This lengthy expression establishes, indeed, the validity of action in 
the face of necessity. 
Some of the features of al-gawd'id al-fighiyyah during the second stage of its 
development are as follows: 
9 The term al-gawä'id was prevalent in most of the titles, as in gawä'id al- 
'Anäm by Izzu Din, kitäb al-gawa'id by al-Magqar , al-manthür fi al- gawä `id 
by al-Zarkashi and al-gawä'id by Ibn Rajab. 
167 The names of those contributors are briefly and chronologically mentioned because of their less 
significant to this project 
16 Ahmad Ibn Idris al-Qarrafi, al-Dakhirah, ed. Muhammad Haji, Dar al-Gharb, (Beirut: 1994) vol. 1, 
pp. 212-213. 
Ahmad Bn Abdul al-Haleem, Ibn Taymiyyah al-Harrani, MujmI' ` al-Fatäwä, (Riyadh: Mitbaa' al- 
Riyadh 1381 A. H. ) vol. 21, pp. 312-313. 
_ 170 Muhammad Bn. Abi Bakr, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzi, '1 `läm al-Muwaqq in an Rabb a! -'Aldmin, ed. 
Muhammad Muhiddiin Abdul al-Hameed (Misra: Matbah al-Sa'adah 1955/1374) vol. 2, p. 48. 
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" There were other names given to al-gawd'id such as al-ashbdh wa al-na? air 
(the similitude and resemblance) as seen in the title of al-ashbäh wa al-nazä'ir 
by al-SubkT, al-Isnawi, al-Suyüti and Ibn Nujaym. 
" Some scholars of this period were concerned with writing legal maxims on the 
opinion of their schools, without considering other schools' opinions, as in 
7d al-masalik 'ilä gawä'id al-inm Malik by al-Winsharisi (d. 914 AH) 
and al-majmü' al-mudhhab fi gawä'id al-madhhab by al-`Alä'i (d. 761 AH) 
" It has been observed that many of the works of this stage were either 
repetitions of the works of the first stage, or expansions or interpretations of 
them, as in al-gawä'id by Ibn al-Mulaqqin, and al-ashbi' by Ibn Nujaym. 
Both were extracted from the works of Ibn Subki's and others. '" Al-Suyüti 
extracted some maxims from al-W571, al-Subki and al-Zarkashi to form his 
book al-ashbä , and al-TujTb (d. 912 AH) compiled his book on al-gawä'id 
al-fiqhiyyah from various books of Malikite. 172 
" At the beginning of this stage some of the gawä `id expressions were rendered 
in excessively long sentences. For example, in the al-usO by al-Karikh there 
is a gä'idah stated thus: "al-asl anna al-mar' yu 'imil /7 hagq nafsihi kami 
aqarr bihi, walä yusaddiq `a1ä ibtäl hagq al ghayr aw ilzäm al-ghayr hagqan" 
(the fundamental principle is that a man will be held responsible for what he 
confessed to in a matter related to his right and he shall not be believed (in his 
confession) on the nullification of the right of another person or on the 
imposition of a right on another person). 173 However, this maxim was later 
reconstructed in a shorter form, thus: "al-igrarhujjah gäsirah" (confession `of 
guilt' is a binding proof only on the confessor). 174 
" In many cases al-gawd `id al-fighiyyah were often mixed up with al-gawä `id 
aI- usRiyyah. 
" Scholars were given the right of expression and codification to reframe or 
rearrange what they saw as inconsistent in the earlier works on the subject. 
171 al-Nadwi, op. cit. p. 139. 
1721bid. P. 140. 
173 Ubaydllah Bn al-Husayn AI-Karkhi, Usül al-Karkhi, with Tasis al-Nazar (Cairo Matba al-Imam n. d. ) 
112. 
74 Majallah Article 78. 
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1.2.3 Stage of Maturity 
The last stage of the development of al-gawa'id al-fighiyyah began from around the 
13th century AH/18t' century AD. One of the distinctive features of this stage is the 
establishment of maxims as a separate science in Islamic jurisprudence, while at the 
same time the formula for their codification was standardized. Just as Hanafites were 
instrumental in the development of al-gawä'id, they were also the pioneers of this last 
stage. The first treatises written on al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah were both by Hanafite 
scholars: Muhammad al-Khadimi (d. 1762 AD) and Mustafa al-Kuzilhisari (d. 1800 
AD). The former wrote ma]ami` al-hagä'q in which 154 maxims were appended, and 
the latter ran commentaries on the former's book, entitled: manäfi' al-dagä'q fi sharh 
majäm' al-hagä'q. Sulayman al-Qargaghäji (d. 1870 AD) and Mustafa Hashim also 
followed suit in writing commentaries on majäm'. Respective works, believed to have 
been published in 1822 and 1878, were not found in circulation. 175 The work of 
Mahmüd Ibn Hamza (d. 1304 AH/1887AD), the then mufli of Damascus and a 
Hanafite scholar, is also notable. The title of his work is al fara'id al-bahiyyah f1 al- 
gawä'id wa al fawäi'd al-fighiyyah. 176 
The most popular work in the 19th century on Islamic legal maxims was the al- 
Majallah al-Ahakam al-`Adliyyah. The Majallah was presented by a seven-man 
committee named "the Majallah Commission" during the era of Sultan al-Ghazi 
Abdul Azeez of Ottoman Empire. '77 This Commission was chaired by the then 
Minister of Justice, Ahmed Cevedah (d. 1895 AD). 178 The aim of the Commission was 
to codify civil rules consistent with Islamic Jurisprudence in accordance with the 
Hanafite School. The book was named under the royal decree as Ahkame Adliyah - 
The Corpus of Juridical Rules. The Majallah Commission explained the reason 
behind the book in these words: 
Lawyers who have studied the fiqh have converted the propositions of the fiqh into a number 
of universal rules. Each of these, while embracing and containing many propositions, is taken 
as evidence for the proof of these propositions being from the admitted truths in the sacred law 
"S al-Burnü, al-Walz, op. cit. p. 104. 
176 al-Amiri, R. S., Legal Maxims in Islamic Jurisprudence: Their History, Characteriristics and 
Significant. (Birmingham UK.: Birmingham University, P. hD. Thesis 2003), p. 158. 
177 a1-Nadwi, a1-Qawä `id a1-Fighiyyalz op. cit. pp. 178-179. 
178 Mahmassani, Falsafat al-Tashri' fi al-Islami (philosophy of Islamic Jurisprudence). Trans. Farhat J. 
Ziadeh, (Leiden E. J. Brill: 1961), pp. 42-43. 
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books. And, in the first place, the understanding of these rules gives familiarity with the 
propositions in mind. Therefore, ninety-nine rules of fiqh have been collected, and brought 
forward to form the second part of the preface. 179 
Despite its shortcomings, the Majallah has filled many gaps in the field of Islamic 
jurisprudence and it has been a very useful resource book in Islamic jurisprudence. 
However, it is observed that the book is rather one-sided, as the maxims and the 
opinions illustrated in it are from the Hanafite point of view only. It is also observed 
that the majority of the maxims stated in the book are related only to the field of 
transaction (al-mu`ämalät), this being only one field in Islamic jurisprudence. 180 
After the Majallah, many commentaries emerged from both Muslim and non-Muslim 
jurists. Slaim Baz (d. 1920 AD), a Christian Lawyer from Lebanon, wrote a 
commentary on the Majallah entitled Shar al-Majallah. Another commentary, written 
in Turkish by Ali Haydar and translated into Arabic by Fahmi al-Husaini, also 
emerged. However, the most popular and widespread commentary is the work of 
Ahmed al-Zargä (d. 1938 AD). al-Zarqa's work has gained credibility through its 
well-arranged and extensive explanations, and contains additional maxims to those 
included in the Majallah. '8' al-Zarqa's son, Mustafa al-Zarqa (d. 1999 AD), also 
followed suit. In his work, he observed that the Majallah's maxims are not consistent 
and that many of the maxims dealing with one topic are scattered throughout the 
book. He therefore rearranged these maxims by dividing all the maxims into two 
groups - basic universal maxims, of which there are forty in number, and subsidiary 
legal maxims, of which there are fifty-nine. '82 
However, due to the shortcomings of the Majallah mentioned above, and the fact that 
the majority of the books written on legal maxims from their earliest conception failed 
to adopt an academic approach, there exist vacuums that need to be filled. Al-Burnu 
was one of the first contemporary Islamic scholars to pay attention to the study of 
Islamic legal maxims. When the Shari'ah Faculty in Imäm Ibn Sa`üd University first 
introduced the subject of al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah into its curriculum, al-Burnu was the 
19 Majallah Article 1. 180 IChaleel Muhammad, op. cit. p. 197, al-Nadwi, op. cit. p. 156. 181 See his book Sharh al-Qawd `id p. 102,267. 182 al-Zargä, M., op. cit. vol. 2, pp. 977-979. 
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one assigned to design a teaching curriculum for it. However, he was unsuccessful in 
his search for a suitable publication to be used as an academic handbook. This 
prompted him to write his book entitled al-wajiz fi idäh al-gawä'Id al-fighiyyah al- 
kulliyyah (a concise book on the explanation of the basic general Islamic legal 
maxims). 183 The majority of the maxims included in his book are from the Majallah, 
while others are from various books written on the subject that emanated from 
different madhähib (schools). He divided legal maxims into two units. 184 
Another authority in the field of legal maxims is Ali al-Nadwi, who has published two 
books on the subject'85. His first published book was al-gawä'id al'-fighiyyyah, 
mafhümihä, nash'atuah, tatawwurhä diräsatu mu'allaf tuhä adillatuhä 
muhimmatuhä wa tatbigätuha Islamic legal maxims, their concept, emergence, 
development, and study of their treaties, their evidence, importance and 
application). 186 The second book is mawsü'ah al-gawä'd wa dawäbit al-fiqhiyyah al- 
häkimah li al-mu'ämalät al-mäliyyah fi al-fiqh al-Islami (an encyclopedia of Islamic 
legal maxims and dawabit, governing monetary transactions in Islamic 
Jurisprudence). In this, he collected 3107 legal maxims on transactions. In the first 
book, al-Nadwi focuses on the historical development of al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah and 
his approach to the subject is more or less a theoretical one. '87 Another substantial 
work on al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah is the ongoing project initiated in 1995 by the 
Islamic Fiqh Academy, a subsidiary of the Organization of Islamic Conference 
(OIC). 188 The aim of the project is to collect legal maxims from various books of 
183 al-Burnü, al-WajTz, op. cit. pp. 7-9. The approach of the author in this book is -unique and 
unprecedented. In it, a maxim is mentioned and followed by its evidence, its importance and its 
application. Occasionally, the anomaly of the maxim is mentioned and the reason for that is given. 
' 4In this book al-Burnü divides Islamic legal maxims into two units. The first unit consists of six 
maxims. The author describes the six maxims as general and grand legal maxims, including the five 
agreed upon among all scholars. The additional one is the maxim `A word should be construed as 
having some meaning rather than disregarded' (Article 60 of Majallah). However, inclusion of this 
sixth maxim to the general and grand maxims has been proved by the author. The second unit called 
`General legal maxims lesser than the former', consists of twenty five maxims. 
185 As far as I know, though other books from the author might have been published but not in 
circulation. 
186 This book was originally a dissertation presented by the author for his Master's degree at Ummu al- 
Qurä university, Makkah, Saudi Arabia. 
187 For the first book, see the author's introduction and his objectives pp. 25-34. The second book is 
published by the same author. In it, it is clear that the author's focus is on Islamic business transactions. 
This, and al-Sawwät's work on Islamic family aspects of Legal Maxims, prompted me to look at the 
criminal aspects of the subject. 
188 This project is entitled `al-Ma lamah al-Qawd'id al-Fiqhiyyah. See Amiri op. cit. pp. 163-164. 
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Islamic jurisprudence. Other dimension emerged in contemporary writing on Islamic 
legal maxims as detailed in the last chapter. 189 
Some of the distinctive features of this third stage in the development of al-gawä'id 
al-fighiyyah as a subject can be summarized as follows: (1) Most of the expressions 
used in the previous stages are re-arranged and reconstructed. (2) The gawä `id can be 
easily memorized because of their short, precise expressions. (3) Some scholars have 
chosen to research on particular maxims in a practical manner, as opposed to the 
prevailing norm. 
1.3 The sources of al-Qawä'id a! -Fighiyyah 
To justify any idea in Islamic jurisprudence, the source of that idea must be traced and 
its authenticity confirmed. The same applies to al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah being an 
important aspect of Islamic Law. By source of al-gawä'id, it is meant the fount from 
where the gawä'id are formulated. In the writing of medieval authors, no special 
attention is paid to the narration of the sources of any legal maxim. This is because at 
that time the subject had not been well established. Rather, the system adopted was to 
name a maxim and to state its root from the Qur'an or the Sunnah. Sometimes, 
maxims were attributed to an earlier author without stating the source from where he 
formulated or derived the gawä'id. 190 
However, this approach prompted contemporary researchers to adopt a different 
approach in studying the sources of legal maxims. There are two distinctive ways by 
which contemporary Islamic scholars deal with this issue. The first is to follow the 
medieval method, and the second is to provide a separate section for a discussion of 
the sources of legal maxims and their derivation. 191 The approach of Islamic writers to 
al-gawd`id al-fighiyyah in the latter method is not unique. For example, the approach 
of Rasheed al-Amin differs from that of al-Sawwat. From the former's perspective, 
the sources of al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah are studied from the status of their author. 
189 See pages 19-21. 
190 Cf. Suyü$r s and Ibn Nujaym's approaches on the sources of Islamic legal maxims in their al Ashbäh 
wa Nazä `ir. op. cit. 
191 Such as Mustafa al-Zargä al-Madhkal op. cit. vol. 2 p. 969 and al-Burnü see al-Wajiz op. c it. . 
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Thus, Rasheed divides the sources of al-gawä'id al-flghiyyah into two: namely, the 
sources of al-gawä`id al-fighiyyah according to independent mujtahid; and the 
sources of al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah according to restricted mujtahid. 192 The latter 
asserts that the sources of al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah are six in number namely; the nass 
(text of the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet), ijmCj' (consensus), 
statements of the companions of the Prophet, statements of the täb/ (the generation 
after the generation of the companions), the statement of the mujtahid and the 
extrapolation of the branch of legal issues that have the same legal consequence. 193 
However, generally, there are four main sources from which al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah 
can be derived, namely: the Qur'an, the Hadith, al-Ijmä' and the statements of 
Mujtahidi-n, '94 
1.3.1 The Holy Qur'an 
The Holy Qur'an is the most highly rated source of all the sources from which the 
gawä'id are derived. This is because it is the word of God. The maxims that are 
deduced from the Qur'an are well established, irrefutable and all encompassing. There 
are two ways in which legal maxims could be derived from the Holy Qur'an- direct 
and indirect. Legal maxims can be derived from the Qur'an directly without any extra 
effort. In such cases a layman can easily understand the obvious and direct correlation 
between the legal maxim and the Qur'anic text. Examples of this are: the Qur'anic 
text "wa aballa Allah al-bay`a wa harrama al-ribä" (And God has permitted trade and 
forbidden usury) (Qur'an 2: 275). This verse, which became a universal maxim 
guiding the theory of mu'ämalät (transactions), was revealed so that disputing 
unbelievers would realize the legal position of what is lawful and what is unlawful in 
trade. It is made to refute their claim that "Trade and Usury are alike. "195 As a 
principle, the verse has prohibited all unlawful transactions. It has made ribä the main 
192 a1-Sawwäý op. cit. vol. 1 pp. 114-121, cf, Rashed S. al-Amiri op. cit. pp. 32-45. 
193 al-Sawwät, ibid. pp. 114-120. 
194 It is possible to adopt another way of classifying the sources of Islamic legal maxims since there is 
no dogma in terminology. 
195 Qur'an 2, verse 275. 
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reason for the prohibition by looking at the magdsid al-Shari'ah (the purpose of the 
Islamic law) as a yardstick to establish that. 196 
Another Qur'anic verse that explicitly serves as an Islamic maxim is: "khudh al-`afiv 
wa'mur bi al- `urf wa'ard `an al f hili) ah" (Hold for forgiveness, command what is 
Right and turn away from the foolish) (Qur'an 7: 199). al-Qurtubi deduces three 
maxims from this verse. He says: 
This verse of three sentences consists of Islamic principles of command and forbidden viz 
kbudh al- `alw "hold forgiveness" is a maxim for having forgiveness. wa'mur bi al- `urf 
"Command what is right" ... Muslims are to command and enjoin what is right, no matter the 
condition. wa'ard `an a1jähiliyyah "Turn away from the foolish. " No attention should 
be paid to ignorance. 197 
Another Qur'anic text that stands as a general legal maxim is the saying of God: " 
mä `a1ä al-muhsinln min sabil "(... No ground (of complaint) can there be against the 
good-doers.... ) (Qur'an 9: 91). Ibn al-`Arabi comments on this part of the verse by 
saying: "This is an indisputable general maxim of Shad ah which declares that neither 
complaint nor punishment should be inflicted on a good-doer. "198 
However, apart from forming maxims directly from the wording of the Qur'anic text, 
Islamic legal maxims can also be deduced indirectly from the Qur'an. This can be 
achieved by considering the effective cause of the hukm ( the rule) with which the 
texts deal. This method is deemed to be among the ways of using ijtihi d for deducing 
legal maxims. Using ijtihäd to deduce legal maxims from the Holy Qur'an is very 
common but one needs to be conversant with the context of the Qur'anic text. 
Therefore, before one can deduce legal maxims indirectly from the texts, one must 
have reached the level of ijtihäd. An example of how legal maxims are deduced from 
the Qur'an is given in the next section. 
196 Karnali, The legal maxims of Islamic law, op. cit. p. 3. 
197 Muhammad bn. Ahmad al-Ansari, Al-Qur4ubi, al jam' li al-'Ahkäm al-Qurän, (2nd edn. Cairo 
Matba'ah Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyyah 1937) vol. 7 p. 344. 
198 Muhammad bn. Abdullah Ibn al-'Arabi, 'Ahkäm al-Quran ed. Muhammad `Ataa, (Lebanon: Dar al- 
Fikr: n. d. ) vol. 2, p. 249. 
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1.3.2 The Hadith 
The hadith, (the sayings of the Prophet), is the second source of Islamic legal maxims. 
The Prophet, as discussed previously, was endowed with the ability to dispense 
expressions that are concise, but conveying rich and encompassing meanings. To 
some Muslim jurists, some of those expressions are regarded as gawi `id Deriving 
legal maxims from the hadith of the Prophet can also be secured in two forms. There 
are a large number of prophetic expressions that stand as legal maxims, with or 
without any paraphrasing. Some examples of direct maxims from the hadith of the 
Prophet are: "kull muskirin haräm" (Any intoxicant is forbidden). 199 This maxim is a 
reiteration of the hadith which states that all substances that inebriate are regarded as 
harm, be they from grapes, dates or from other substances, since the sole effective 
cause of prohibition in this hadith is inebriety. From that, it is also analogically 
accepted that the consumption of cocaine and other similar substances is forbidden. 00 
In addition, the hadith "Ii Barar wall diräi" (Do not harm others and do not exchange 
harm)201 is one of the major maxims in Islamic jurisprudence. The Prophet, according 
to one interpretation, said: "Do not harm anybody and do not reciprocate harm for 
harn" . 
202 Another hadith that is considered as a legal maxim is the saying of the 
Prophet: "laysa li `irq; alim hagq" (No right for unjust root). 203 This hadith has been 
used in detailing with similar issues of its occurrence in Islamic jurisprudence. Al- 
Zarqa Jr. (d. 1999 AD) remarks that this hadith is a fundamental principle that 
establishes the nullification of the right of any aggressor, not only in the particular 
case that brought the hadith, but also in any case that involves usurpation. 04 
As regards the indirect way of deriving legal maxims from the Qur'an and the Hadith, 
the legal maxim: "al-masbagqah tajlib al-taysir"(Hardship begets facility)205 is an apt 
example. This aforementioned Islamic legal maxim is coded from intertextualizing the 
'99 Ibn Majah, Sunan Ibn Majah, vol. 4 p. 68, Hadith No. 3388. 
200 al-Burnil, al- Wajb op. cit p. 32. 
201 Ibn Mäjah, op. cit. vol. 3 p. 107, Hadith No. 2340. 
202 al-Burnü, al-Waj"iz, op. cit. p. 32. 
203 Abü Däwud, Sunan Abi Däwud, vol. 4 p. 24, Hadith No. 3594. 
204 al-Zargä, Al-Madkhal, op. cit. vol. 2 p. 1090. 
205 Muhammad bn. Bahadir bn. Abdullah al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur fi al-Qawaid, ed. Taysir F. A. 
Muhamuud (2nd edn. Kuwait: Ministry of Endowment and Islamic affairs, 1405), vol. 3 p. 169. 
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concepts of various Qur'anic verses and traditions of the Prophet. The maxim is said 
to have been inferred from the following texts: the verses in which God says: "... yurid 
Allah bikum al-yusr wall yurid bikum al- `usr" (... God intends for you ease, and He 
does not want to make things difficult for you... ) (Qur'an 2: 185 ); "lä yukallifAllah 
nafsan i11ä wus`ahä" (God burdens not a person beyond his scope... ) (Qur'an 2: 286); 
and "yurid Allah an yukhaff `ankum"(God wishes to lighten the burden for you ... ) 
(Qur'an 4: 28); and also from the hadith of the Prophet: "yassirü wall tu`assirf 
wabashshirü wall tuna rd' (Make things easy for people, and do not make things 
difficult for them, and give them good tidings and do not make them run away). 06 
From all of these quotations, their leading inference is that the tenet of Islamic law is 
to give facility in the face of hardship or difficulty. 
By and large, the quantum of legal maxims being derived directly or indirectly from 
the two sources of Islamic law cannot be overstressed. Ibn al-Qayyim reflects on the 
importance of the texts in deriving Islamic legal maxims and remarks as follows: 
If the followers of the madhihib (different schools of thought) have the ability to regulate the 
opinions of their madhibab by using some general sayings that encompass what is lawful and 
what is not, in spite of their lack of eloquence compared to God and His messenger, then God 
and His messenger are more capable of achieving that. This is because the Prophet pronounces 
a comprehensive statement that is considered as a general principle and a universal proposition 
that encompasses endless detail. 207 
1.3.3 Ijmd ` (Consensus) 
The maxim "al-ijtihäd lä yungad b! al-ijtih d" (A ruling established by the means of 
ijtihäd is not reversible by another ijtihäd 208 is said to have been attributed to a 
statement of the Caliph `Umar ibn al-Khattäb and is also supported by al-ijmä` (the 
consensus) of Sahäbah (the companions of the Prophet) . 
209 The maxim that emerged 
from this type of consensus is very rare. However, due to the scope of the discussion 
in this area, the analysis and the application of the above maxim will be dealt with in 
due course. 
206 al-Bukhär7, Sahih al-BukhärT, Hadith No. 69, Muslim, Sahih Muslim, Hadith No. 1732. 
207 Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawi, 'IYäm al-Muwagqrn, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 251. 
208 al-Suyüli, op. cit. p. 201, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbäh wa al-Nazd'ir, p. 115, Majallah Article 16. 
209 Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Qawaid al-Fiqh: The legal Maxims of Islamic law op. cit. p. 4. 
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1.3.4 Expressions of Mujtahldiln (Islamic Scholars) 
There are a certain number of maxims that emerged from mujtahidcin. 210 This is as a 
result of thorough investigation into details of the sources of Islamic jurisprudence. 
The expressions that form Islamic maxims could be from one of the Sahäbah, or from 
the Täbi` (the generation after the Companions of the Prophet), or from the Fugahä' 
of Madhähib (the jurists of Islamic schools of jurisprudence). One of the most famous 
maxims abridged from leading Islamic scholars' expressions is: "I yunsab lisikin 
kawlun.... " (No statement is imputed to someone who keeps silent... ) 211 This maxim 
is formulated from an expression by Imam Shäft'. 212 Another maxim, "al-`ädah 
muhakkam"(Custom has legal authority)213 is reported to have been coded from the 
saying of `Ubaydllah al-Karkhi (d. 340 AH/951 AD), as follows : "al-as! ann al-su'ii 
yamdi `all mä ta`arafa kull qawm if makinihim " (The principle is that a question 
should be based on how people understand it in their domain). 14 
1.4 Categories of al-Qawciid al-Fiqhiyyah 
During the early stage of the development of al-gawä'id a1-Fighiyyah, the notion of 
categorizing the gawä'id did not occur. Later, it appears in some works, especially of 
the late Islamic writers. From that, al-gawa'id al-fighiyyah can now be classified into 
different categories. In general, legal maxims can be viewed in three ways: (1) The 
scope of the maxims and the extent of their applications to branches and issues in 
Islamic jurisprudence (2) The stand of Islamic scholars on the content of the maxims 
in terms of whether there is agreement upon them or not. (3) Whether a maxim is an 
independent one or is a subsidiary of the general one. 15 The first classification is 
more relevant in this thesis as the two other classifications fall under it; and because 
210 al-Mu]tahid is one who is capable of giving Islamic verdicts from his his personal opinion. He must 
have attained that status of being capable to do so according to the rules and regulations laid down with 
regard to the status. 
Z" al-Zarkashi, al-Manthurfi al-Qawaid, op. cit. vol. 2 p. 206, al-Suyüfi, (b) op. cit. p. 260, Majallah 
Article 67. 
212 Muhammad Ibn. Idris Al-Shafi', al-Ummu, (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah 1393 A. H. ) vol. 1, p. 275. 213Majallah Article 36. 
214 al-Bürnü, al-WajTz, op. cit. p. 84. 215 See al-Burnü, Mawsüa' op. cit. vol. 1, p. 32 and cf Muhammad Hashim's and Khaleel Muhammad's and al-Sawwat's approaches in this regard. 
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the discussion on the applications of the subject matter in relation to criminal cases is 
to be based on it. 
1.4.1 In Terms of the Scope 
The majority of Islamic scholars have divided al-qawa'id into three categories based 
on their scope: (1) Those maxims that are wider in scope and far more applicable to 
all branches offiqh. These are called al-gawä `id al-fighiyyah al-kulliyyah (The basic 
general legal maxims). (2) The maxims that are general and universal in nature but are 
not applicable to all issues of Islamic jurisprudence. These maxims are called al-gawä 
`id al-frghiyyab al-kulliyyah al-mustagillah (Independent general legal maxims) and 
(3) the maxims that control a specific chapter of the fiqh. These can be called al- 
dawäbit al-frghiyyab (Controllers). 216 
1.4.1.1 al-Qawa'id al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kulliyyah (The Basic General Legal Maxims) 
The basic general legal maxims are the maxims that can be described as 
comprehensive and stand as the pillars of Islamic jurisprudence. These maxims in 
their nature contain numerous sub-maxims. 217 Some of the distinctive features of this 
category are: 218 
i. It must be acceptable to all schools of jurisprudence. 
ii. It must cover all or most of the scope of figh. 
iii. It must have subsidiary maxims that are either to become conditions or 
restrictions for the grand one. 
iv. It must be based on one of the three sources of Islamic law i. e. the 
Qur'an, Sunnah, and Ijmd. 
However, the numbers of these maxims are between five and seven. The early Islamic 
scholars unanimously agreed upon five, while the remaining two are stated in Suyuti's 
216 The term al-Dawäbi4 is used here to encompass those maxims that control peculiar themes in 
particular schools, as well as in different schools. It is stated that dabi4 is assumed to be a principle that 
controls similar issues in one school. However, in this thesis it is meant to be any maxim that controls 
Peculiar themes or subjects in Islamic jurisprudence, regardless of which school adopts the maxim. 
17 These sub-maxims can be conditional clauses for the major or independent maxims, or exceptions, 
such as `necessity should be proportional' al-darar tugaddir bi gadarlha which stands as condition for 
the maxim `hardship should be eliminated' al-dararyuzai, or `necessity makes prohibited things 
permissible' al-dartirät tublh al-mahziirät. 
18 a1-Suyüj, al-Ashbäh op. cit. p. 6. 
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work, al-ashbäh wa al-nazähir. 219 The five generally agreed upon maxims are (1) al- 
'umrir bi magäsidihä (Actions are judged according to the intention). (2) al yagln i 
yazcil bI al-shakk (Certainty is not overruled by doubt). (3) al-mashagqah tajlib al- 
taysir (Hardship begets facility). (4) al-darar yuzäl (Harm must be eliminated). (5) 
al- `ädah muhakkamah (Custom is a legal authority). 220 However, al-Burnu contends 
that the maxim which studies the effects of expression "I'mil al-kalim awli min 
ihmälih" (A word should be construed as having some meaning, rather than 
disregarded)221 should be classified among the basic general maxims. 222 This is 
because it has the same features like others and it will be very hard not to refer to it in 
the book of jurisprudence. In other words, it has comprehensive nature to elevate it to 
the status of basic general maxim. This research will consider the legal maxim and its 
sisters as one of the basic general maxim al-gawä'id al-fiqhiyyah not only for the 
reasons given by al-Burnu, but because of other reasons inter alia: 
" The legal maxim of effect of expression plays vital roles in Islamic criminal 
law. 
9 It gives clue on what to be given effect when there is ambiguity in expression. 
" It also reflects the stand of Islamic law in giving custom of people 
consideration in their daily utterances. 
1.4.1.2 al-Qawä`id al-Fighiyyah al-Mustaqillah (Independent General Legal 
Maxims) 
219 Ibid. p. 83, al-Burnü, al-Wajiz, op. cit p. 27, Karnali, op. cit. p. 2. 
220 Cf. al-Suyüti, al-Ashbäh op. cit. pp. 88-196, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbah, op. cit. pp. 140112, al-Nadwi, 
al-Qawd `id al-Fighiyyah... op. cit. p. 351. Except al-Burnü who includes the maxim 'I'dml al-Kaläm 
awlä min 'Ihamlih, to form a sixth, arguing that the maxim is generally and widely applicable to many 
subjects and issues in Islamic jurisprudence. See al-Burnü, al-wajiz op. cit. p. 314. 
221 al-Suyuti, al Ashbah p. 128, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbah p. 130 
222 al-Burnu, op. cit. pp. 314-315 
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These are the independent maxims that do not belong to the above category. 223 The 
differences between them and those in the previous category are that they attract more 
exceptions than the exceptions accorded to the previous category; and that there is no 
common ground on their acceptability among the schools offiqh. Some of the maxims 
under this category are: 224 al-tasarruf `a1ä al-ra `iyyah manüt bi al-maslahah 
(Governance should be of the public interest), 225 and mä haruma isti `miiuhu liaruma 
ittikb dhuhu (When its utility is forbidden, its possession is also forbidden). 226 
1.4.1.3 Dawäbit al-Fighiyyah. (Controllers or Topical Maxims) 
The maxims that are classified under the dawäbit are maxims that are peculiar to 
certain topics of figh. For example, in the chapter of ibädät (acts of worship), there are 
different topics subsumed under it. The work of däbit in regard to those topics is to 
regulate the divergent opinions among Islamic scholars on the issue in question, 
within one school of Islamic jurisprudence. For example the maxim al-`ibrah 1 al- 
`ugdd li al-magäsid wa al-ma `uni lä 11 al-alfäz wa al-mabini (The effect is given to 
intention and meaning, not to literalness and structure). This maxim is peculiar to the 
theme of contract which applies in Hanafite's school. This is the general opinion on 
the concept of dawäbit. 227 However, dawäbit are not only maxims controlling the 
rulings of one particular school. They also control particular themes which though 
attract discussion among the different schools but do not, with regard to authenticity, 
enjoy agreement among them. Examples are: al-hudi d tudra' bi al-shubhät (hudüd 
punishments are averted in the face of doubt), 228 and al-tazir i1ä al-imam bigadir al- 
jurm (The discretionary punishment is left to the Imam, and to be decided according 
to the weight of the offence). 229 These two maxims can be better classified as dawäbit 
223 They are not up to the grand general maxim but they are also widely applicable to many subjects 
and issues in Islamic Jurisprudence. See al-Barnü, al-Wajiz op. cit. pp. 330-409, al-Sawäý op. cit. vol. 1 
109, al-Nadawi, op. cit. P. 351. 
2' al-Suyüti, op. cit pp. 95 and 103. 
225 Article 58 of the Majjallah, of AI-Suyyüri, op. cit. p. 21 
226 al-Zargä, M., al-Madkhal al-Fiqh al-Amm op. cit.. vol. 2, p. 235, al-Nadawi op. cit. p. 64, al-Ahmad 
al- Zarqa,. Sharh al-Qawadal-Fiqhiyyah (2"d ed. Damascus: Dar al-Qalam 1989/1409) p. 55, al- 
Majallah Article 3. 
227 al-Sawwat, op. cit. vol. 1 p. 110. 
228 al-Suyü(i, op. cit. p. 236, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 142, al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur, op. cit. vol. 2. pp. 40 
and 225. 
229 Abu Yusiif, Ya`qüb Ibn Ibrahim, Kitab al-Khardj op. cit. p. 180. 
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of punishment on the theme of criminal law, and yet they attract discussion from all 
schools of Islamic jurisprudence. 
1.5. Importance and Roles of al-Qawä id al- Fighiyyah 
1.5.1. Importance of al-Qawa°id a[- Fiqhiyyah 
Life is comprehensive in nature. Therefore, there must be rules and principles to guide 
such comprehensiveness. Law is an essential tool in regulating human life. The 
importance of al-gawä'id al- fiqhiyyah cannot be overemphasized because of its 
connection with Shari ab and with the maxim that says: al-far' lahu hukm al-'asl (The 
branch shares the same rule as the origin). In Western Schools of law, maxims play a 
vital role in the process of judgment. The importance and the roles of legal maxims in 
Western law are observed thus: 
A general principle; a leading truth so called, quia maxima est ejus dignitas et certissima 
auctoritas atque quod maxime omnibus probetur - because its dignity is the greatest and its 
authority the most certain, and because it is universally approved by all. 
230 
By contrast, there are other modern English jurists who have disagreed with this 
opinion. They hold the belief that those legal maxims "... are rather minims than 
maxims, for they give not a particularly great, but a particularly small, amount of 
information". 231 They (the Latin Maxims) `are almost invariably misleading' and 
`mostly bad abstract' in law. 232 The cause of this disagreement stems from the fact 
that most Western legal maxims are based on common sense - and common sense is 
subject to criticism and liable to objection 233 More importantly, they do not have 
principal references. This is not to say that those maxims are not useful in the modern 
era. Indeed, because of the growth in law and its complexity, the usefulness of 
maxims is increasing and "they bring back the mind to first principles. "234 However, 
the value of Islamic legal maxims cannot be underestimated because the Islamic legal 
maxims directly and indirectly originated from the divine sources of the Qur'an and 
Hadith. It becomes sine qua non for any Islamic jurist and judge today to master a 
230 Jowitt Early and Clifford Walsh, Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law. Vol. 2 p. 1164. 
231 Ibid. quoting Mr. Justice Stephen in History of Criminal Law, 94. 
232 Ibid. 
233 David M. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law, p. 181. 
234 The Lawbook, Exchange Ltd. Latin for Lawyers, p. 
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certain level of al-gawä'Id in order to be able to dispense Islamic verdicts and to pass 
accurate judgment. It is also essential to master and memorize large sections of the 
Qur'an and Hadith. The intensive attention of Islamic authors on this subject since 
the third century of Hijrah clearly emphasizes the importance attached to it. 
Moreover, the utterances of scholars on it show the significance accredited to the 
subject. Imam al-Qarrafi (d. 684 A. H) affirms thus: 
These maxims are very important in Islamic jurisprudence, great knowledge. By it, the value 
of a jurist is measured. Through it, the beauty of Fiqh is shown and known. With it, the 
methods of Fatwa are clearly understood.... Whoever knows Fiqh with its maxims (gawä'id) 
shall be in no need of memorizing most of the subordinate parts "of Fiqh" because of their 
inclusion under the general maxims 235 
1.5.2 Roles of al-Qawä `id al- Fiqhiyyah in Islamic Jurisprudence 
From a broad study of the concepts of al-gawä'id al-flghiyyah, it is possible to 
highlight their roles in Islamic jurisprudence as follows: 
" Islamic jurisprudence is a vast discipline with many branches, and al-gawä'id 
al- fighiyyah help to bind related cases and issues of these branches together 
through the use of single expressions that enable jurists to understand the 
rulings of figh with less difficulty. It is noted that during the development of 
figh, many of the Islamic jurists produced figh literatures in piecemeal form 
and in fragmented styles. This was because the majority of those writers 
produced their works independently, without the influence of any government 
or institution that could unify the style of their presentation. From such lack of 
monitoring, allied with many other factors that could be considered as reasons 
for the wide diversity of opinion in jurisprudence literature, al-gawä'id al- 
fighiyyah emerged to produce general guidelines that articulated the scattered 
theoretical abstracts among the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence. 36 
Remarking on this important role of al-gawä'id a1- fighiyyah, al-Zargä Jr. (d. 
1322/1999) observed that "were it not for the legal maxims, the rules would 
have remained dispersed without any ideational connection. " 237 This role aids 
judges in comprehending the basic tenets of Islamic law on any contentious 
2" Ahmad Al-Qaraf, al-Furüq, vol. 1 p. 3, al-Nadwi, op. cit. P. 326. 
236 Kamali, The legal maxims of Islamic Law. op. cit. p. 4. 
237 al-Zargä, M., al-Madkhal op. cit. vol. 2, p. 935. 
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issue. For instance, if it is established in the mind of a judge that hudüd (a 
fixed punishment) is to be averted in the face of doubt, this will stand as 
significant value in identifying the aim of Islamic law in offences related to 
budüd Exploring this opportunity would also give scholars, judges and jurists 
of Islamic law the ability to deliver sound and just legal judgments. 238 
" The knowledge of gawä `id equally gives a student offiqh the ability to enjoy 
the concept of figh on intellectual grounds. Al-ZarkashT submits that if detailed 
issues that are scattered in the books of Islamic law are controlled `by the legal 
maxims', it will make them easy for memorization and comprehension. 239 
" The generality of the gawä'id gives room to compare and contrast between 
past and present occurrences. Thus, al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah helps to give 
judgment on other events that did not occur in the past. 240 For example, the 
issue of interest is linked with similar judgments on usury - riba. However, 
the system of interest today is different from the operation of ribä in the past, 
although the reason for prohibiting ribä is still present in the modem system of 
banking: we al-far`u lahu hukm al-ac1(The branch has the same rule as the 
origin). In addition, cocaine's prohibition as an intoxicant can be justified on 
the basis of the maxim: al-täbi ` täbi ` (The accessory shares the same rule of 
the root. )24' 
" Since the majority of gawäid is agreed upon among Islamic scholars, this 
agreement could give researchers a broad knowledge of the genesis of 
disagreement on issues relevant to the various schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence. It also helps them to grasp the rationale behind these 
differences. Moreover, it could enrich knowledge of the similar opinions of 
various schools. 
" Nevertheless, the subject of al-Qawä'Id creates awareness of how far Islam 
has gone in coding terminologies, principles, rulings and legal techniques 
before the existence of the common law. 
" Last but not least, exploiting the maxims, especially the maxim of arbitration 
and enforcement of custom, will accommodate the existence of non-Muslims 
238 Mawil, I, op. cit. p. 114, Kamali, op. cit. pp. 1-2. 
239 al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur op. cit. vol. 1 pp. 69-70. 
240 al-Suy0fi, op. cit. p. 31, al-SawAt, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 128. 
241 al-Suyt T, ibid. p. 117, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbäh op. cit. p. 120, al-Majallah Article 47. 
60 
in a state governed by Islamic law. In other words, considering maxim of 
custom, inter alia, will emphasize the universality of Islam and the possibility 
of ruling any society in a just manner. 
However, there is speculation surrounding the extent of the importance of the legal 
maxim. The Majallah asserts that the essence of legal maxims is to facilitate a better 
understanding of the Sharfah, 242 and that the judge may not base his judgment on 
them unless the maxim in question is derived from either the Qur'an or the Sunnah. 
This assertion is to some extent justified in the sense that if the use of maxims is 
restricted, it will curb any prejudice against SharTah in cases where maxims are 
initiated in support of one's whim. Nevertheless, this statement is deemed as 
undermining the general usefulness of the subject. Contrary to this, al-QarraB 
maintains that a judicial decision can be reversed if it contains a violation of the 
generally accepted maxim. 243 To harmonize between the two views, we would like to 
submit that if a legal maxim is derived directly or indirectly from the texts, or from 
sound consensus or completed analogy, there is no doubt that it is sufficient to be used 
as basis of judgment. However, if it is obtained from a mere general reading of the 
details, then this kind of maxim needs to be endorsed by the schools. Moreover, if the 
maxim is peculiar to one school of law and does not enjoy the support of any other 
school, it is not enough to rely or base judgment on such maxim. Therefore, it is not 
totally acceptable for jurist and law practitioners to depend on these principles as a 
primary source of evidence or to use them solely as a proof, because the majority of 
those maxims have certain exceptions. Islamic jurists are enjoined firstly to give 
judgment on the basis of the primary source i. e. the Qur'an, Sunnah, or Ijmi' before 
they can make use of gawa'Id independently. But if there is no primary source, then 
qawa `id can be utilised. 244 
It is worth stating that having coded Islamic legal maxims from generations after 
generations, that does not mean that coding legal maxims has ended. Indeed, legal 
maxims can be coded from time to time or the previous ones can be recoded if there is 
need as Majallah did to some medieval Islamic legal maxims. In this generation, new 
242 All Haydar, Durar al-Hukkäm Sharh al-Majallah.. ed. Fahmi al-Husaini (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al- 
`Ilmiyyah n. d) vol. 1, p. 10, al-ZarqA, Jnr. op. cit. vol. 2, p. 949. 
243 al-Qarrafi, op. cit. vol. 4, p. 40. 
244 al-Nadwi, op. cit. pp. 323-347. 
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or modified Islamic legal maxims can be created to cater for and to cover novel 
issues. That could be done through intertextualizing and hypertextualizing the concept 
and context of Islamic texts to extrapolate the tenet of the overall objectives of the 
Islamic law. 
1.6 Summary of the chapter 
In summary, this chapter that forms the theoretical part of the thesis has introduced 
the subject matter al-gawd'id al-fighiyyah to the readers. In it, the concepts, historical 
development, and the importance of the role of al-gawä'id al-fighiyyah have been 
demonstrated. During the discussion, it is clear that this is a subject that needs more 
attention and an in-depth study of its practical value - which this thesis aims to fill 
part of it. It is established in this chapter the systematic developments that the subject 
matter has gone through. The traditional phenomenon is that the basic legal maxims 
agreed upon are five. However, this chapter claims that what al-Burnu sees to be the 
sixth basic maxim is worth to be considered. 
The next chapters will focus on the analysis of the six Islamic legal maxims and their 
application in criminal cases, using information on some of the criminal cases 
reported and unreported in the Northern Nigerian Shadab courts. 
62 
Chapter Two 
Analysis of Legal Maxim: al- `Umtjr bi magicidiha (Actions are 
considered together with their intentions). 245 
2.0 Introduction: Action (al-'amal) and Intention (al-niyyah) in Islamic Criminal 
Law 
In Islamic Law, intention is an important criterion for determining whether or not a 
criminal act is punishable or pardonable, or whether the punishment for such a crime 
is predetermined - hadd - or discretionary - to `zir. No criminal can be found guilty 
until his intention in committing the crime has been considered. The same is true of 
Western criminal procedure as the use of mens rea (mental element) alone is not 
sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused person if it is not accompanied by act us 
reus (physical element). 246 According to Lord Kenyon C. J. in Flower v. Padget: "It is 
a principle of natural justice and of our law, that actus nonTacit reum nisi mens sit rea 
- The intent and the act must both concur to constitute the crime. s247 The Islamic 
criminal system examines the action of the accused before considering his intention. 
However, there is no way a man's intention can be investigated unless through 
knowledge of the elements with which the crime is committed, or through the state of 
mind of the alleged criminal. According to the Islamic legal maxim cited above, the 
establishment of intention alongside the action is given paramount consideration. We 
shall, in what follows, deal with those maxims in relation to criminal offences. 
245 Abdu al-Rahman Ibn Abu Bakar AI-Suynti a/-Ashbäh wa al-Na? 'ir, (Beirut: Daru al-Kutub al- 
'llmiyyah., 1403), p. 8, Zayn al-`Abidin Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Nujaym, , al-Ashbih wa 1a-Nazä'Jr `Ali 
madhhab Abi Hanlfah al-Nu'min, (Beirut: Daru al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1993/1413), p. 27, al- 
Hamawi, Ahmad Ibn Muhammad, Ghamz `Uyün al-Basä'I Sharh al-Ashbä' wa al-Nazäir, (Beirut: 
Daru al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah 1985/1405) vol. 1 p. 37, al-Majallah, Article 2, All Haydar, Durar al- 
Hukkam Sharh Majallah al-Ahk. rn, ed. Fahm al-liusayni, (Beirut: Dazu al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, n. d. ) 
vol. lp. 17, Ahmad Ibn Shaykh al-Zarq., Sharh al-Qawä'id a1-Fighiyyah, (2`b edn. Damascus: Dar al- 
Qalam, 1989/1409) p. 47, Hereinafter, the translation of al-umur bi magäsidihi will be used except if 
there is need to mention the maxim in its Arabic form 
246 Sobhi R. Muhamassani,, Falsafat al-Tashri' 1 a1-Isläm, (The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam) 
translated by Farhat J. Ziadeh, (Kuala Lumpur : The Open Press, 2000), p. 160. 
247 Turner JWC and All Armitage, Cases on Criminal Law, ( 3'd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1964), p. 1. 
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2.1. Definition and Interpretation of the Maxim al-Umilr bI Magicidlhi 
This maxim is one the basic general maxims agreed upon by Islamic scholars because 
of its consistency with, and relevance to, Islamic jurisprudence. It implies that any 
action, whether it is done physically or verbally, should be considered and judged 
according to the intentions of the doer. In fact, the whole sphere of figh is concerned 
with the rules or judgement of matters, not its essence. 48 The appropriate 
interpretation of this maxim should therefore be that the rulings to be made for or 
against a case should be in conformity with the intention of the person concerned with 
the case. 
There is no branch of figh that does not consider the niyyah, (intention) behind an act 
a sine qua non for the validity of any action. Though, while intention is considered to 
have an impact on the validity and gravity of any action, "weighing intentions would 
be a system of strict liability. "249 Strict liability in Islamic criminal law subsumes 
what is termed as quasi-intentional and unintentional bodily injuries which incur 
diyah. 250 Indeed, intention is the fundamental concept of the whole Islamic Religious 
Law. 251 It significantly figures "in Muslim approaches to acts in general, and to 
religious act in particular. "252 
Two distinctive words constitute the elements of the maxim: action and intention. 
Without considering the two elements, criminal justice cannot be carried out. The first 
word, which is umür, plural of 'amr, is literally translated as a matter, issue, act, 
physical or verbal . 
253 According to al-Asfahäni, the word 'amr, encompasses both 
action and utterances as the Qur'an says : wa mä 'amr fir'awn bi rashid `the 
command of Pharaoh was not the right guide. " (Qur'an 11, verse 97). This refers to 
248 al-Zarqa Shari al-Qawä `id.. op. cit. 
249 Paul R. Powers, Intent in Islamic Law, Motive and Meaning in Medieval Sunn7 figh, (Leiden- 
Boston: Brill, 2006), p. 173. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Schacht, J, An Introduction to Islamic Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). P. 
252 Brinkley Messick, "Indexing the Self: Intent and Expression in Islamic Legal acts" in David S. 
Powers, ed. Islamic Law and Society (Leiden, The Netherlads: Brill, 2001), vol. 8, pp. 153- 
253 Ibn Mandhtir, Muhammad, Lisan al-'Arab (Beirut: Daru $idir , n. d) vol., 1 p. 96, al-Raghib al- 
alAsfahäni : al-Mufradad 1 gharyb ial-Qunan ed. Muhammad Sayyid Kaylani (Lebanon: Dar al- 
Ma'rifah n. d. ) explained the meaning of 'Amr in verses 97and123,154, of Suwar al-Hüd, al-Imran, 
respectively. See Muhammad Siddiq Ibn Ahmad al-Burnuu, Mawsz 'ah al-Qawä'Jd al-fighiyyah 
n. p. 1416) vol. 1, p. 133. 
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his utterances and actions. 54 The second word is al-magäsid plural of magcad which 
literally means willing, the determination to do something for a purpose. 255 It is also 
synonymously used as niyyah. 256 The maxim simply means that rulings on matters, 
whether they are physical or verbal actions, shall be determined by the purpose for 
which they are carried out. 257 In other words, rulings on all actions of mukallaf (a man 
of sound mind), whether physical or verbal, shall be in accordance with the objective 
and goals for which he carried out the action. Thus, an action can be described as 
culpable and punishable only when the purpose of the perpetrator is known. 
2.2 Source of the Maxim 
There are many textual evidences invoked by Islamic jurists to justify the legality of 
this maxim. The most authentic and direct evidence is the hadith reported by many 
traditionalists, particularly by al-Bukhari and Muslim, the two authors of the most 
authoritative hadith books, in which the Prophet is reported to have said: innami al- 
'a'mäl bi al-niyyät (Actions are judged according to intentions) 258 There are also 
many verses of the Qur'an and the 'Ahadith of the Prophet that emphasize sincerity in 
all Muslims' endeavours, although most of these refer to the reward for acts that are in 
accordance with sincere intention in the hereafter. 259 This is not to say that the hadith 
is not useful in determining the punishment of a criminal act concordant with mens 
rea. On the contrary, the hadith has implications for any action -devotional, social, 
political and commercial. 260 For many interpreters, the hadith of niyyah cannot be 
undermined as it is said to serve as one-third of Islamic knowledge. 261 
254 al-Asfahani, op. cit. pp. 24-25. 
255 Ibn Mandhur, op. cit.. 
256 Ahmad Ibn Faaris al-Raazi, Mu jam Magäyis al-Lughah (ed. Abdul Salaam M. Harun (Beirut: Dar 
Ihya' al-Kutub al-Arabiyyah n. d. ) entry nawi 
ZS Muhammad Khalid Al-Atasi and Muhammad Tahir al-Atasi, Shar al-Majallah (Damuscus, Hams 
press 1349), vol. 1 p. 13, al-Burnu, al-Mawsüa op. cit. vol. 1 P. 124. 
S8 al-Bukhari, Sahih, hadith no. 1, Muslim, Sahih hadith no. 1599. 
259 al-Burnu, Muawsu'at op. cit. vol. 1 p. 133. See Qur'an 4, verses 100,134, Qur'an 17, verse 19, 
Qur'an 30, verse 39 and also al-Bukhar, Shahih al-Bukhari Hadith No. 1356,1737. 
260 Abdul Rahman Ibn Ahmad Ibn Rajab, Jami' al-Ulnm wa al-Hikam (2nd edn. Cairo: Matba 
Mustafa al-Halabi, 1369) p. 5. 
261 See al-Suynti op. cit. Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. al-Zargä, M., al-Madkhal al-Fighiyy al-tfm (5`h edn. 
Damuscus: Matba' al-Jami' al-Suriyyah, 1377) p. 96, Muhammad Siddiq al-Bumu, -al-WajIzfi 4lii 
gawä'id al-Bghiyyah al-kulliyyah (5`h edn. Beirut: Muhassasah al-Risälah 2002/1425) pp. 122-125. 
Ahmad Ibn Hajar al-`Asgalani, Fath al-&W Sharh Sahib al-Bukhari (Beirut: Daru al-Ma'rifah, n. d. ), 
vol. 1 p. p. 11-13, Yahya Ibn Sharaf, Abu Zakariya, al-Nawawi, Sharh al-Nawawi `A1ä Sahib Muslim, 
(2nd edn. Beirut: Dar Thyä' al-Turath al-Arabi n. d. ) 
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2.3 Corroboration of Action with Intention in Islamic Criminal Law 
The use of this maxim relates to matters where the legal ruling is based on both action 
and intention. Conversely, in the Islamic religious framework, there are rulings that 
can be established with only intention - such as having the inner intention of apostasy, 
or willingness to perform ritual duties. For instance, if someone died with the 
intention of apostasy, or failed to actually perform the ritual duties, he would be 
rewarded according to his or her intention, even if the intention is not overtly 
expressed. This, in fact, implies that intention can be considered without the 
involvement of action. However, in most cases, or as a fundamental principle, the 
essence of intention is ostensibly effective when it is coupled with action. Al-Sarkhasi 
emphasizes that "al-A c1 `ann al-niyyah Idhä tajarrad `an al- `aural 1 takun 
mu'athtbirah (ft al- `umrar al-duniyäwiyyah)" (fundamentally there is no effect (in 
worldly matters) on intention devoid of act). 262 This is because the intention is not 
being overtly expressed or physically executed and is applicable only to mundane 
matters. 263 Thus, if an action is coupled with intention, that act will be judged 
according to the intention. From the Islamic theological point of view, if someone has 
the intention of apostasy, it is believed that such a person has become apostate. 264 But 
even then, there is no worldly punishment for him since he did not utter the statement 
or act upon it. 
On the other hand, there are rulings that can be established by action without 
intention. For example, if someone pronounces triple divorce on his wife, his action 
will be considered as taläq b. 'in (complete divorce), even if the statement is not 
intended. Similarly, if a contract is concluded in the past form, it does not require 
intention. 265 However, there are legal rulings that heavily rely on both action and 
intention before judgement can be reached. Generally speaking, the importance of 
intention corroborated with action in criminal cases is undoubted. Therefore, a 
criminal act in most cases cannot be justifiably established without considering the 
criminal intent of the accused. For instance, if someone takes a property that does not 
262 Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Al-Sarakhasi, al-Mabsut, (Beirut : Dar al-Ma'rifah 1986) vol. 1 p. 239. 
263 al-Bumu, Mawsuu'ah op. cit. vol. I p. 159. 
264 Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba op. cit. pp. 15-21. 
265 Ibn Nujaym, ibid.. p. 18, al-Nadwi, al-gawä'id al-fighiyyab: mafhumiali... (2nd edn. Damuscus: Dar 
al-Qalam, 1998/1418) p. 398. 
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belong to him in a public domain, before his action can be considered as a criminal 
offence, his intention must be inquired into. The intention could be to save the 
property for the owner, or to acquire it illegally. Regarding the former, it can be said 
that he acted as a trustee, while for the latter it can be assumed that he committed the 
crime of theft. 266 In Western criminal terminology, actus reus (a guilty act) is a 
physical act (or unlawful omission) by the defendant. 267 It is also a collective element 
rather than a mental element, while mens rea (guilty mind) is the state of mind or 
intent of the defendant at the time of his act. 268 Before one can be charged to have 
committed a crime, there must be concurrence of the `physical act and the mental state 
existing at the same time'. In Islamic law, mens rea ('amd or gasda janä! ) may not 
have effect before one is being prosecuted once the act has been done, that is in strict 
liability. For example, if a person killed someone and stood firmly by the fact that he 
killed him, then the act has overridden the intention. 269 The classification of criminal 
liability into actus reus and men rea in the Western criminal law is for the 
convenience of exposition only, as observed by Smith and Hogan. 270 
2.4 Correlation between Intention and Action in Islamic Criminal Law 
The intention of the defendant in a murder case, for example, must concur with the act 
that constitutes the crime in question before he can be convicted of murder. There are 
two important conditions in considering the concurrence of mens rea and actus reus. 
Firstly, the intent must have driven the act. For instance, if A intended to kill B by gun 
and locked him (B) in a stuffy room, while he went to fetch the gun, but then before A 
returns, B dies, it cannot be said that a causal relationship exists between A's intention 
and B's death. The death of B does not concur with the intent of A, but from his 
recklessness or negligence. As such, A will rather be liable for manslaughter. 
Secondly, if the actus reus is a continuing act, it is enough that the mens rea exists 
during its continuance, although not necessarily at the accomplishment of the actus 
reus. For example, if A intended to kill B by inducing him with poison, but B did not 
266 Majallah , op. cit. Article 769 Ahmad al-Zarqa, Sharh al-Qawd'id op. cit. p. 49, Mahmasani , op. 
cit. p. 160. 
267 Nyazee, A. Khan, General Principles of Criminal Law (Islam and Western) online at 
infon,, nyazee. com December 7,2000, p. 80. 
268 Ibid. 
269 Ibid. 
270 See Nyazee ibid quoting Smith and Hogan Criminal Law 30. 
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die immediately from the poison and was rushed to hospital only to arrive and found 
no space for admission, and then died after a while from the poison. It can be said that 
although, the poison did not kill him instantly, it is the actus reus which caused the 
death. 271 
In Islamic law, the external standard followed to determine whether the action concurs 
with intention in homicide crimes is the object in use. To determine the inner intention 
of an accused is not only very difficult, it is, in fact, prohibited in some cases to 
investigate such an intention. 272 Thus, the only safe measure is to look at the object 
with which the crime is committed. This standard has no direct textual basis; it is 
arrived at by text-based deduction. Islamic criminal law differentiates between what is 
intentionally done (`amd), what is done by mistake (khta') and quasi intention (shibhu 
`amd). The Prophetic tradition states thus that "al-qawd bi al-sayf (al-qawd should 
be by sword). 273 There are two interpretations of this statement. The first is that when 
gips punishment is due to an offender, it has to be executed by sword. The second 
relevant interpretation here is that any homicide crime caused by a sword attracts 
gisäs (retaliation)274 The use of a sword in homicide as interpreted here stands as an 
external standard to determine the intention of the perpetrator. To be sure, a sword is 
an instrument for killing and, as such, it can be inferred from the instrumental object 
that the defendant did intend to commit the crime of homicide. From this tradition, 
Islamic jurists established a standard for intentional homicide. According to the 
Hanafites, "mens rea of murder is found when the offender uses an instrument 
designed for killing"275 This covers the use of swords, guns, knives, arrows, poison 
and lethal weapons of all kinds. 276 However, a blunt instrument such as a wooden club 
cannot lead to the conviction of someone of gatl `amd, but only to shib `amd, 
271 Nyazee, ibid. 97. This theory will be expanded in the discussion on direct or indirect causation. 
2n Especially in matters related to hudiid (in which the punishment of the crime is solely the right of 
God). See Ibn Muflih, al-Adab al-Shar`iyyah (eds. ) Shu `ayb al-Arnaut and Umar al-Qayyum, 2"d edn. 
(Beirut: Mu'assasah al-Risalah, 1997/1417) vol. 1, pp. 277-300 
273 Ali Ibn `Umar al-Däraqutni, Sunan al-Däraqutni ed. Sayyid Abdullah Hashim al-Madani, (Beirut: 
Dar al-Ma `rifah 1966/1386) vol. 3, p. 107 hadith 89, Ali Ibn Ahmad Ibn Hazm, al-Mahallah, ed. 
Lajnah Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi, (Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadid n. d. ) vol. 10 p. 372, Ahmad `Ayni, 
`Umdah al-Qäri (Beirut: Dar `Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi n. d. ) vol. 24, p. 39. 
274 Nyazee, op. cit. 
275 al-Sarakhasi, al-Mabsut op. cit. vol. 26 p. 104, Ahmad Ibn Ali al-Jassas, Ahkam al-Quran (Beirut: 
Dar `Iyah al-Tutath al-Arabi), vol. 3, p. 199-2001. 
276 Nyazee op. cit. p. 99. 
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according to Abu Hanifah 277 Thus, the ruling of Islamic jurists that whoever kills a 
person with a stick has to pay diyah of 100 camels is apt evidence to infer that using a 
stick does not indicate intentional killing, but rather to inflicting "grievous hurt". 278 
Indeed, an ordinary stick is not meant to cause death but if it does cause it, then the 
act can be assumed not to be intentional, but a mistake. The pertinent question here is: 
can we use only the standard measure stated by the traditions to set an external 
standard for determining mens rea? It is a well-established principle that Islamic law 
is universal and suitable to any generation and norm. But it is necessary to prove this 
universality in light of modern technology. Thus, if someone targets another person 
with a chemical weapon, as a result of which the victim dies, the perpetrator will be 
charged for his murderous act, even if there is no external force that necessitate the 
action. 
On the other hand, to maintain justice, if someone mistakenly kills another person, the 
killer will not be punished with gisäs because of the absence of intention. However, 
before a claim of error can be entertained, the tool used in committing the action must 
be examined. 279 In recognizing quasi intention in a crime of homicide, the tool used in 
the crime stands as a measure for determining the allegation. If someone is struck and 
dies as a result, the action will be considered as shibh `amd, as the Prophet was 
reported to have said: "Lo, the quasi intentional killing is what occurred by strip, 
stone and wood"280 However, this is not to say that there is no criminal liability. In 
the case of shibh `amd, for example, the perpetrator would be liable for diyah 
mughallaza4 (a heavy blood money) according to the part of the hadith mentioned 
above. 281 
Similarly, if a professional medical doctor made a mistake in his profession that led to 
the death or injury on his patient, he would not be given gisäs because of the absence 
of criminal intent. Rather, diyya would be awarded to the victim or his heir from the 
277 al-Zarakhasi, op. cit. Nyazee ibid. 
278 Nyazee , ibid p. 98- 279 Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd, Bidayah al-Mujtahid wa Nihayah al-Mugtacid (Beirut: Dar al- 
al-Ma'rifah 1982) vol. 2 p. 
280 Sulayman Ibn al-Ash'ath Abu Dawud, a! - Sunan (Cairo: Matba'at al-Sa `ada 1950) hadith no. 4588, 
Muhammad Ibn Yazid Ibn Majah, al-Sunan, ed. Muhammad Fu'ad Abdul -Baqi, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 
n. d. ) Kitab al-Dryaat hadith no. 2627. 
281 At the end, it is mentioned that if the case of homicide is quasi intentional, the penalty will be 
heavily imposed. See hadith of note 36. 
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government treasury. This is not the case with a non-professional medical doctor who 
commits such a crime. For him, the punishment would be diyah mughallazah as the 
Prophet was reported to have said: "Whoever practices surgery without the proper 
knowledge will be liable for compensation"282 This is because of carelessness and 
inexcusable negligence, although intent to kill may not be concluded, except if it is 
established by other means. 
2.5 Contradiction between Intention and Action 
Basically, an action, whether physical or verbal, is enough to reach a verdict in 
criminal cases as explained above, as opposed to an act of devotion in which the 
action is of no consequence unless it is coupled with intention. However, before mere 
action can be used as the basis of a verdict in a criminal act, such an action should 
have a degree of clarity and coherence so as to leave no doubt that it is intended by 
the perpetrator. For example, if someone tied another and then knifed him -and his 
action cannot be attributed to any external force such as legal impediments, insanity 
or coercion - it is sufficient to take that action as deliberate murder. There are cases 
however, where contradiction exists between what could be the intent of the 
perpetrator and his action. For example, if a parent struck his child with a stick - 
which normally does not lead to death - and the child eventually died, the action of the 
parent cannot be said to have been intentional murder since the tool in use does not 
ordinarily cause death. Convicting the parent without considering the intention would 
amount to injustice. Thus, it is necessary to investigate the intention in any such case. 
2.6 Physical and Verbal Action 
Generally speaking, before any conclusion can be made to determine whether a crime 
is committed intentionally or unintentionally, the tool and the felicity that 
circumstantiates the occurrence of the criminal act will be given consideration, 
particularly if the action is physical. However, if the action is verbal, the meaning and 
connotation of the outward expression is considered. In a case where there is a 
282 Abu Dawud op. cit. kitab diyaat hadith no 4586, and Ahmad Ibn Su'ayb al-Nasahi, al-Sunan kitab 
al-qasamah bab shibh al-amd ed. Abdul -Ghaffar Sulayman and Sayyid Kasrawi (Beirut: Dar al- 
Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah 1991) 
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contradiction between the physical criminal act and the intention, the tool in use or the 
circumstances in which the crime is committed will stand as a measure to judge the 
accused. An example of a physical act and intention in a murderous case would be if 
someone fired at someone else with a rifle which usually does not kill, but eventually 
did kill; the intention could be assumingly inferred from the tool, given that the 
accused did not intend to kill because the tool being used was not meant to kill. This 
is only in the case where the accused denies the charge. But if he confesses during 
investigation that he intended to kill his victim with the tool, then there would no 
contradiction again as to whether the intention was to kill or not. This is because the 
right of an individual is involved and, therefore, legal liability is placed on the 
accused. If the intention to kill is established, coupled with his action, the crime is 
branded as gatl `amd (intentional murder) which incurs gips. But if the intention is 
not to kill and a killing does take place, the crime is said to be shibu gatl `amd (quasi 
intentional murder), as opposed to gatl khat' (unintentional murder). The former 
incurs normal diyah compensation, while the latter attracts diyah mughallazah. The 
legal consequence in this particular issue is not to acquit the accused completely from 
punishment, but to reduce that punishment from capital gisäs (retaliation) to diyah 
(blood money) that can be paid by his `ägilah, (solidarity). 
However, there is a situation when intention outweighs action in some murder cases. 
One such situation is when the action is proved to be unintentional and there is no 
reason to believe otherwise. An example of this is when a person shoots against a wall 
or into the sky and accidentally hits someone, killing that person. This action is said to 
be gatl khat' (a mistake) which incurs diyah (not as heavy as shibh `amd). 
In criminal offences, if the verbal action accords with intention, then there is no doubt 
that the appropriate punishment will be meted out to the person who made the 
utterance. For instance, if someone said to another person `You are a bastard' or `You 
bastard' or `You are an adulterer, (zani ), or `I reject Islam', then these expressions 
would be taken as being explicit enough to reach a verdict, except where there is a 
legal impediment that could render the utterance ineffective and absolve the accused 
person of committing defamation or apostasy. In the case of defamation, the 
expression is sufficient to convict the accused because the right of man is involved 
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except, of course, if what the accused said turns out to be true. However, the same is 
not true in the case of apostasy where clarification needs to be sought before the fact 
of the matter can be established, such as giving the person time to re-consider his 
utterance. This is because the case is absolute right of God as opposed to the case of 
defamation. 
2.7 Factors that render Action Non-Concurrent with Intention 
There are factors that render action inconsistent with intention, and in effect, a verdict 
may not be reached because of these factors. Some of these factors will be discussed 
here: namely, jahl (ignorance); Ikräh (coercion); nisyän (forgetfulness); and siglhar 
(puberty). 
2.7.1 Ignorance (Jahl) 
Ignorance of the law or of the fact of the law283 has an effect in determining the 
criminal intent of the accused. Thus, Islam recognizes the effect of this detriment in 
three people: a person who is asleep, an infant, and an insane person, as the Prophet is 
reported to have said: "Recording of deed is closed for a sleeping person till he wakes 
up, and an infant till he attains the age of puberty, and an insane person till he regains 
his sense. " 284 For example, if fat man sleeps besides a small baby and rolls over on 
him, and thus suffocates him to death, the act shall not be considered as intentional 
homicide because the act cannot be assumed to have been committed intentionally. 
Any crime committed while one is asleep, or in the state of insanity or immaturity, 
shall not be deemed as intentional, because of lack of criminal intent. 285 It is reported 
that Ubaidullah, son of Umar committed zina with a woman while she was asleep, and 
the offender was punished while the woman was acquitted. 286 
283 Ignorance of the law can only be an excuse in Islamic law for someone who is a new convert or 
those who are living in non-Muslim territories. This include to some extent, those who are living in a 
remote area which knowledge of Islam has not been spread to, as opposed to ignorance of the fact of 
law which can be claimed by all and sundry of Muslims. See for details Awda, op. cit. vol. 1 p. 430 
284 Abu Dawd al-Sunan op. cit. Kitab al-Huduud, hadith no. 4398, Muhammad Ibn `Isa al-Trimithi, 
Sunan al-Tirmithi, ed. Hisham al-Bukhari, (Beirut: Dar Ihua' al-Turath al-Arabi, 1995) hadith no. 
1446, Ibn Majah al-Sunan op. cit, hadith no 2041. 
285 Abu Zayd Al-Qayrawani, al-Risalah (Beirut: Dar alFikr n. d) pp. 121-131, Abdul Rahman Doi, 
Shariah: The Islamic Law, (London: Ta Ha Publishers 1984/1404), p. 227. 
286 Abdul Rahman, ibid. 
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2.7.2 Coercion ('Ikräb) 
Action committed under duress is considered to be out of intention. This is based on 
the tradition of the Prophet: "My Ummah (nation) will be forgiven for crimes it 
commits under duress, in error, or as a result of forgetfulness. "287 Thus, if someone is 
duressed to commit any crime, it is generally assumed to be unintentional, and as 
such, no legal responsibility shall be placed on the actor/doer. However, acts 
committed under duress can be categorized in two ways: a crime involving the right 
of man, and a crime involving the right of God. In the case of the former, no one 
should allow himself to be coerced into an act, especially if that act is capable of 
terminating life, as no person's life is more precious than another. However, if the 
action does not involve eliminating life, the duressed can act upon what he was asked 
to do, especially if his life is in danger. However, he, or the duresser, or both, shall be 
legally responsible for the damage caused. The reason why the duressed is not 
allowed to act upon the threat of the duresser, and is held to be partly or wholly 
responsible for the damage, is that according to Islamic jurists, duress is of two kinds: 
ikräh mulji, and ! Ara ghayr muliji. The ikräh mulji is a kind of duress where the 
duressed has no option other than to act upon the request, as failure to do so could 
endanger his life, with the assurance that the life of the third party is not involved. In 
such a case, if the duressed acts, his action shall not be considered intentional and any 
crime resulting from that - if it is solely the right of God - means that he will be 
acquitted. But if the right of man is involved, he, or the duresser, or both, will be 
responsible for the damage. But no badd, if the crime attracts hadd, shall be awarded 
to the duressed. 
However, in the case of 'Ikrah ghayr mulji', where the person being coerced has the 
choice to either accept or reject the demand placed on him, or where his life is not in 
danger, if in such a case he should then choose to succumb to the pressure, his action 
would be regarded as being intentional. In that context, both he and the one who 
coerced him will be considered responsible. 288 In general, there are debates on 
whether the claim of those legal impediments can sufficiently render the accused 
unpunished. The fact is that if any crime is committed and one of those impediments 
287 Ibn Majah, al-Sunan op. cit. hadith no. 2045, 
288 Doi, op. cit. 227-228. 
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is involved, there are two ways to prosecute the offender. First, if the crime involves 
the absolute right of God, then the claim of ignorance, coercion and forgetfulness 
could at least commute the punishment of hadd to to `zTr. However, if the crime 
involves the right of an individual, compensation may be given in order to balance 
between the two individuals. For example, if the crime originally attracts gisa$ in the 
case of criminal intent being established, the gisäs may be reduced to diyah, simply 
because of these legal impediments. 
Consideration of intention in placing criminal liability is observed in the Zamfara 
State Penal Code Law (SPCL 2000). In section 63 of the said code, it is stated that 
"there shall be no criminal responsibility unless an unlawful act or omission is done 
intentionally or negligently". The words `intentionally' and `negligently', in that 
provision, have rendered any criminal act, in which intention or negligence of the 
perpetrator cannot be established, not chargeable. This includes any crime of hudcid, 
gips and to `zir. However, the provision does not specify what criteria from which 
intention can be inferred, or what the elements that constitute intention are. 
However, common knowledge of the `material fact' proves the intentionality of 
criminal acts, unless there is other evidence that makes it ineffective. For example, if a 
person knows that zina is a crime punishable with hadd, but has no knowledge of 
what constitutes the legal definition of zina because such knowledge is not common 
knowledge, then that person may not be punished with hadd of zina, but rather, to `zir 
may be accorded. In that case, if Safiyyatu in Safiyyatu v. Sokoto State of Nigeria, as 
a villager, claims ignorance of the details or legal connotation of zina, her conviction 
can be dropped or reversed, although she may be awarded to `zir and she may not 
depend on her previous status. The basis for this assertion is the hadith of the Prophet, 
in which the Prophet apparently casts doubt on the intentionality and acquaintance of 
Ma'iz to the crime he confessed to. 289 
The Zamafara SPCL 2000 section 64 observes this fact and states thus: 
289 Cf Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti, Adwä' al-bayan (Beirut: Dar al-Filer, 1995/1415), vol. 5 p. 386, 
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A person is presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have knowledge of any material fact if 
such fact is a matter of common knowledge. 290 
Any crime committed by negligence is presumed to have been committed 
intentionally, unless that negligence is formed involuntarily. For instance, a person 
committing unlawful sexual intercourse, theft, defamation, or murder when in a state 
of voluntary intoxication will be presumed to have committed those crimes 
intentionally. However, if that negligence is involuntary, such as one who is drugged 
and commits criminal offences in that state of inducement, then that person will not be 
originally convicted of those offences because of the absence of intention, in 
accordance with the hadith mentioned above. Thus, an induced person who has lost 
his consciousness, by analogy, is like an insane person, or one who is asleep. 
2.7.3 Mistake (Khata) and Forgetfulness (Nisyid91) 
By mistake or by accident: a mistake also constitutes the assumption of 
unintentionality of a criminal act, if the accused is believed to have committed it in 
good faith. For instance, take the case of a man and woman who have sexual 
intercourse together before `proper marriage', believing that the consent of their 
parents regarding the affair is enough proof for the legality of their relationship - 
despite the fact that they are cognisant of the fact that zina is punishable with hadd. 
Their action shall be construed as `a mistake of the fact', according to Zamafara SPCL 
2000, section 66. A `mistake of the fact', but not a `mistake of the law' renders an act 
inoffensive or innocuous. It states thus: 
Nothing is an offence that is done by any person who is justified by Law, or who by reason of 
a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law, in good faith believes himself to be 
justified by law in doing it. (cf. section 69 Zamafara SPCL 2000) 
Thus, if someone drinks a substance that he believes to be lawful, but it turns out to be 
an intoxicant, or if a man meets a woman on his bed and by mistake sleeps with her 
and has sexual intercourse with her, both such actions will not be punished with hadd. 
290 Shariah Penal Code Law of Zamfara State of Nigeria 2000, (Gasikiya Corporation Limited Zaria, 
Nigeria 15`x' June 2000) vol. 3. 
291 Forgetfulness is though considered as one of the impediments to ascertain criminal intent, that is in 
the crime solely involved God's right and also removes the punishment of the hereafter. However, 
forgetfulness cannot be an excuse for committing crimes that incur punishment for the perpetrator. This 
is because open such door will prejudice the rights of public and will also render law inactive. See 
Awda, op. cit. vol. Pp. 430-440, Ibn al-Qayyim, I`Iam al-Muwagqi in, op. cit., vol. 2 p. 140 and al- 
Ghazali, al-Mustsra vol. I p. 84 for more details. 
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In the latter case, however, mahr al-mithl, a `fair dowry', may be imposed because of 
the right of the woman involved. Similarly, if one intends to throw an arrow at an 
animal but by mistake, it hurts a person and causes his death, the thrower shall not be 
given gisäs as it was a mistake and the killing was unintentional. In the case of a 
doctor whose patient dies as a result of the drug prescribed for him, then the doctor 
shall not be convicted of murder, if that drug was prescribed in good faith, with proper 
care and caution. This is because there was no criminal intention in the act of the 
doctor. 292 
2.7.4 Puberty as factor renders action non-concurrent with intention 
As for puberty, a criminal act committed by a minor or anyone below the age of 
puberty, is believed to have been committed unintentionally, based on the hadith 
quoted at the outset of the discussion. However, in hudid related cases, if there is no 
right of the individual involved, the minor accused shall not be punished with hadd, 
but ta'zTr may be adjudged instead. But, if individual right is attached, then 
compensation such as diyah, in the case of homicide, and an equivalent value in the 
case of sariqah (theft) will be imposed. 293 
These are the general rulings in which an unintentional criminal act can be assumed. 
However, there will be concerns over section 81 of the (SPCL) in which it is stated 
that if an act is intentionally committed and causes slight injury, and such injury is not 
ordinarily significant enough to be complained about, the accused has not committed 
any offence. The concern in this matter is that if the injury caused involves an 
individual's right and the plaintiff complains, is the right of the individual still then 
valid? The fact is that if an injury is caused and it involves an individual right, Islamic 
law emphasizes the establishing of justice and the protection of people's rights by 
returning each right to the original owner, especially if it is requested, no matter how 
trifling it may be. Thus, that particular section, as stated, may prejudice the 
establishment of justice and jeopardize the rights of people. For that reason, section 82 
counterbalances the above section by stating that "nothing contained in the provisions 
292 Cf. Sec. 69 of Zamafara SPCL 2000. 
293 See Sect. 71(a) and (b) of the Zamafara SPCL 2000. 
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of section 66-99 shall prejudice the right of (giving) diyah or (of) damage in 
s294 appropriate cases. 
2.8 Some Related Maxims under the Maxim of Action and Intention. 
From the above-stated basic general maxim, scholars deduced a number of sub- 
maxims that incorporate intent in human being's activities. The sub-maxims that are 
most relevant to this research will be analyzed as follows: 
(A) Ahl al- `Ibrah 11 al-magäsid wa a1-ma `rani aw Ii al-allädh wa a1-mabän7 
(Should effect be given to intentions and meanings or the words and forms) 295 
This maxim as a sub-maxim addresses the effect of the meanings and the intentions of 
utterances in order to make a clear statement before a court of law. What a person 
utters before a court is assumed to be his intention, as if not; the illocutionary act of 
the utterance will be valueless. In other words, the utterance made by a litigant during 
oath taking should mean what is outwardly said according to the understanding of the 
judge and the other litigants whose rights depend upon the outward meaning of the 
oath. The Prophet says: "An oath must conform to the intention of the party tendering 
it. "296 As the right of the other party, be it defendant or offender, should be protected 
by law, and because any means to obstruct the course of justice should be prevented, 
the litigant is obliged to utter an explicit statement that concurs with the agreed-upon 
294 See ibid. @http: //www. zamfaraonline. com/sharia/schedule. html viewed last 25/05/09 10: 20am. In 
Zamfara Shariah Penal Code Law, 2000, section 82 it is stated that "nothing contained in the provisions 
of sections 66-69" will prejudize the right of diyah. This seems to a typographic error to which the 
website of the state government has corrected as stated above. The same error has been committed in 
Kastina State Shari `ah Penal Law as well in section 82. 
295 This maxim is re-coined from the maxim " al-'Ibrah IF2 al-`Ugid bi al-magisid wa al-ma'anllä bi al- 
Alfadh wa al-mabani - "Effect is given to intents and meaning in contracts, not words and forms", as 
agreed upon to by Hanafites and Malikites, (see Ibn Nujaym, al Ashba op. cit 207, al-Majallah article 
3) as opposed to Shafi'ites' and Hanbalites' view that gives a different opinion, depending on the 
matter arisen. At times, effect is given to the meaning, while at other times it is given to the word. (See 
Muhammad Shams al-Diin al-Ramali, Nihäyab al-Muhtäj (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 1984/1404), vol. 6 p. 
242, ), Mansur Ibn Yunus al-Buhiiti, Kashshäfal-Qinä (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1402 A. 11. ), vol. 3 p. 446. I 
incline to the opinion of separation between one issue and another in application of this maxim since 
there is no uniqueness in the forms that different issues take. 
2% Muslim, Sahih Muslim, Hadith no 1653. 
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meaning of the statement, rather than an implicit one that hides the meaning and could 
lead to confusion in giving judgement. 97 
Fundamentally, the effect of an utterance is based on the intended meaning of the 
speaker in any matter. There is agreement among scholars on the above-stated 
position, but because of the exceptional case of the requirements in a court of law, 
majority of the schools, including the Malikites and Shafites, assert that the effect of 
the utterance should be based on the intention of the one who seeks an oath (the 
judge). 298 However, the Hanafites, and an inference from the Hanbalites agree on the 
position in principle, but they disagree in practice. They state that if the one giving an 
oath is the plaintiff, the oath will be based on his intention, whereas if he is the 
defendant, the oath will be based on the intention of the judge. 299 For example, if a 
person is asked by the judge to give an oath in litigation involving a third party, then 
the statements made by the person taking the oath will be considered as understood by 
the judge, and by the other party involved, as opined by Malikites and Shafi'ites, and 
by a version in Hanbalite's school. This is because, as observed by Ibn al-Qayyim, 
giving illusive and dissimulative expression in these matters will contradict the rules 
of Islamic law that are aimed to establish justice, and will jeopardise the right of 
litigant parties whose right is attached to the oath 300 However, in the opinion of the 
Hanafites and Hanbalites, the meaning of the oath will only be understood by the 
status of the one who takes the oath. If he is the plaintiff, the meaning of the oath will 
be based on what he intends, but if otherwise, the meaning of the oath will be based 
on the understanding of the judge. 301 
297 Muhamassani, op. cit. 161, al-Nawawi, states that if the oath is taken outside the court or there is no 
right of man attached to it, then the effect will be given to the intention of the one taking the oath, not 
to the mere word and form of the expression uttered. Thus, this indicates that in Shafi' opinion, their 
question mark attached to the maxim is only relevant in issues related to man's right. If there is no right 
of man attached thus, their view agrees with the Hanafites and Malikites (al-Nawawi, Sharh a! - 
Nawawi ala Sahih Muslim, op. cit. vol 1 p. 117). 
299 Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Jizzi, al-Qawanin al-frgh yyah n. p. n. d p334, al-Suyuti, al-Ashba, op. 
cit. p. 44, Mahmassani, op. cit. p. 161, al-Bumu al-Wajiz op. cit. p. 158. 
299 Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbah op. cit. p. 53, Ahmad Ibn Muhammad al-Hamawi, Ghamz Uyun al-Basar 
(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al- `Ilmiyyah 1405) . p. 81, Ibrahim al- Dawyaan, Manar al-Sabil 
fi Sharh al- 
Dalil, ed. `Isaam al-Qal'aaji, (Riyadh, Maktabah al-Mu'aarif n. d. ) vol. 2, p. 440. 
300 Muhammad Ibn Abi Bakr Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzi, W im al-Muwagqi 7n an Rabb a]- `jflamin, 
ed. Taha Abdu al-Rahuuf, (Beirut: Dar al- Jiil, Beirut 1973), vol. 3, p. 119. 
301 In some aspects Hanafites do not agree with the opinion of other schools. It is clearly stated by al- 
Karkhi in Risalah that "fundamental consideration is given to the intention of the two litigants, not 
their apparent "expression" ' (See Ahamd al-Zarqa Sharh al-Qawa'id op. cit. p. 64 and al-Hamawi, 
Ghamz op. cit. vol. 2, p. 268) From this, it could be inferred that sometimes the opposite may be 
applied, as in the discussion above. (For a general view on this matter, see Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba op. 
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The only way to determine the compliance of the meaning with the intention is to 
refer to its denotative usage in the society where the litigation is held. Where there is 
no harmony between the connotative meaning and denotative meaning of the oath, a 
sub-maxim is coded thus: hal al-aymän mabniyyah 'all al-'urf - "Is oath based on 
custom? "302 If there is no particular form of the expression of the oath in Islamic legal 
procedure, the effect is based on the `urf. In principle, this is generally accepted by the 
schools of law. 303 The conventional norm of that particular society is paramount. 
However, if an oath is being taken under compulsion and duress, some scholars have 
approved dissimulation in such a circumstance 304 
(B) Idhi ijtama ` al-amrägam min fins wähid, walam yakhtalif al-magsüd dakhal - 
ahadhimä ff al-äkhar ghaliban (When two matters emerge from one class, group or 
category, and the purpose does not differ, in most cases, one integrates into 
another). 305 
The relevance of this maxim to the basic general maxim is to investigating the 
intention in prescribing a punishment for a particular criminal act. When two or more 
criminal acts are committed, whether by a single person or more, the term used in 
Islamic criminal law is tadikhul, (integration). The rule of tadäkhul (the integration 
of punishment) arises to study what is the intention of the Legislator in prescribing 
such punishment. If the objective to be derived in two punishments is unique and the 
perpetrator or the recipient of those punishments is a single person, scholars look into 
how those punishments could be integrated. According to al-Jurjani, (d. 816 AH) al- 
tadäkhul is the blending of something into something else, without any increase in 
cit. 207, Muhammad Ibn Bahadir al-Zarkashi, al-Manthurfi al-Qawaid ed. Dr. Taysir Fa'iq Ahmad 
Mahmud (Kuwait: Ministry of endowment and Islamic Affairs, 1404) vol. 2, p. 371, Ali Haydar Durar 
al-Hukkam op. cit. vol. 1, p. 18, al- Suyuti, al Ashba op. cit. 166, Abdul Rahman Abu al-Faraj Ibn 
Rajab, al-Qawa'id fi al-Fiqh al-Islami , (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah 1992/1413), p. 37, 
Abu 
Bakr Ibn Mas'uud Ibn Ahmad al-Kasaanl, Bada'i' al-Sanaa'i'i fl, Tartib al-Sb= 77 (Cairo: Matba'at 
Sharkat al-Matbn'ät al-'Ilmiyyah 1327) vol. 4, p. 134. ) 
302 Ibn Rajab, al-Qawaid article 121 op. cit. pp. 263-267, Ibrahim al-Dawyan, Manar al-Sabil op. cit. 
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303 Abdu al-Rahman Zadah, , Majma` al-anhar (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1998/1419), vol. 1, 
p. 548, All Ibn Sulayman al-Mardaawi,, al-Ifsäh ed. Muhammad al-Faqi, (Beirut: Dar `Ihya al-Turaath 
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size or value. 306 Tadäkhul or "integration", in Islamic criminal law is applied in a 
situation where punishments of the same class of crimes are combined in a way that 
only one punishment is imposed, rather than multiple punishments, because of their 
identical class and purpose 307 Before such procedure can be taken, it is conditional 
that the punishment of the first crime should not have been executed. Thus, if it has 
308 been executed, there could be no more integration in punishment 
The use of this rule is applicable to most aspects of Islamic jurisprudence. However, 
its importance to Islamic criminal law cannot be undervalued. The reason for this is 
because there are situations in which a culprit might have committed several crimes 
and each one of the crimes has its own punishment. In these crimes, there certainly 
must be a right of either God (hugi q Allah) or the rights of man (huquq dami). It is 
reasonable to say that if several crimes are committed by a wrongdoer, each 
punishment due must be meted out to the convicted person. However, consideration 
must be given regarding the purpose of each punishment allotted to each crime. Is the 
purpose of punishing a culprit for such crimes only to deter him or to establish justice 
among the litigants - or is it for both? Surely there are some punishments enacted for 
the deterrence, retribution and reformation of a culprit, while some are to establish 
justice among litigant parties 309 In any crime where the objectives of the punishment 
are to deter or reform the culprit, advocating for the intergradation of punishment of 
the same class is rational. However, if the purpose differs from that mentioned 
earlier, then canvassing in support of the intergradation of punishment will not serve 
any purpose. 
This is the reason why classical Islamic scholars have made an extensive study into 
what class of punishment can be interpenetrated into another, and what sort of 
punishments cannot. In doing so, they all largely agree that if crimes are not of the 
same class or if the purpose of their due punishments are the same, there is no 
tadikhul ruling over their punishments. However, if there is a similarity in the nature 
of the crimes committed by a single person, and the purpose of the punishment 
ascribed to each one of those crimes is identical, intergradation can be resorted to. 
306 al-Jurjani, Kltab al-Ta`rifated. Ibrahim al-Abyari, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Arabi, 1405), p. 76. 
307 Awdah, op. cit. }vol. 2, pp. 442-443. 
308 Ibid vol. 2, p443. 
309 E1-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law, op. cit., pp. 25,29,34,85-90. 
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Regarding the former, if Mr. A committed unlawful sexual intercourse and theft 
before the punishments were executed, he has committed defamation. Each 
punishment must be meted on him starting from the least severe upward. This is 
because the class of one punishment differs from another. Regarding the latter, if Mr. 
A committed a crime of gisäs, by intentionally killing someone and committing 
unlawful sexual intercourse (while being unmarried ), the punishment for unlawful 
sexual intercourse would be embedded into the punishment of homicide, and that of 
the homicide would be given preference. The former is aimed at deterring the public 
from committing such crimes with different measures of punishments, while the latter 
is meant for deterrence. One is God's right and the other is man's right. However, 
because the right of God is based on forgiveness, as opposed to the right of man, the 
latter is given preference in order to establish justice between the defendant and 
offender. 310 
However, if a crime of unlawful sexual intercourse is committed twice, and in the first 
instance the offender was unmarried (bikr) and in the second instance he was married 
(muhsana), should one punishment of hadd be imposed due to the fact that both 
offences are of the same class (zina) and the purpose is the same (zajr, deterrence)? 
Based on the hypothesis established above, and according to al-Shafi's assertion that 
the two crimes and their punishments are identically the same, být only the causes are 
different (ikhtiläfal-mawjib), a single punishment would be appropriate. However, if 
we have submitted that the two punishments can be unified, which of these should be 
given preference? Is it rajm (stoning to death) or jald (lashing)? It is intuitive and 
ostensible that the weightier and greater one will be given preference because the 
lesser one is only dropped for purpose, otherwise both should have been imposed 311 
The Islamic scholars also determine the punishment that can be fused together from 
studying the nature of who the punishment is attached to. They recognize that if 
310 al-Sarkhasi, al-Mubsut, op. cit., vol. 9, p. 196, Ibn Taymiyyah al-Ilarrani, alMuharrir f7 al-Rgh, 
(2nd edn. Riyadh: Dar al- Ma'arif , 1404) vol. 2, p. 165, Ibn Jizzii, al-Qawaniin al-fighiyyab vol. 1, 
p. 237, Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, vol. 8, pp. 249, vol. 9 p. 75, Ibn al-Muflih, al-Mubdi , vol. 9, pp. 54- 
57, Ali Ibn Sulayman, `Ala' al-Din al- Mardaawi, al-Insaf ft Ma `rifah al-Rajih min al-Khilaf `Ala 
Madhhab al-Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, ed. Muhammad al-Faqi (Cairo: Matba'i al-Sunnah al- 
Muhammadiyyah, 1955/1374) vol. 10, p. 164, al-Zarkashi, al-Manthurfr al-Qawa'id, op. Cit., vol. 1, 
pp. 270-276, Awdah, al-Tashri, vol. 1, pp. 744-751,2/248-250,492,505-507,628,659. 
" al-Zarkashi, ibid. vol. 1, pp. 270-276, al-Ilamawi, Ghamz, op. cit. vol. 1, pp. 397- 
398. 
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punishments are due as God's rights, it is possible to coalesce and unify them. This is 
because the right of God is based on the virtue of forgiveness and extenuation. Thus, 
if someone commits multiple adulteries, drunkenness and theft, one punishment 
would be enough to implement the purpose of the due punishment. 312 
There is a dissenting view reported from 'Uqail of the Hanbalite's School on whether 
the punishment of sariqah (theft) can be combined313 based on his assumption that the 
punishment of sariqah is the right of a human being. However, the ruling practice in 
the Hanbalite's School suggests otherwise. Ibn Qudamah states that if such a crime 
occurs in multiples, a single punishment is enough (amputation of right hand) because 
it is a right of God. 314 It seems that the view of 'Uqail is based on a crime of theft 
committed on different occasions against different people. If each of them asked for 
their right at different times, then a hand must be cut for each person. For example, 
Mr. A steals properties from Mr. B, C, and D and all report the matter to the authority 
and request that their right should be reclaimed. This could be admitted, if we have 
agreed that part of God's right and part of man's right is attached to the crime of theft. 
However, there was an occasion when the Prophet commented on theft being the right 
of God. This was when a noble woman from the tribe of Makhzumi committed theft 
and one of the Companions was hired to intercede. The Prophet said, "Do you want to 
intercede in one of the Rights of God" ? its This virtually indicates that the punishment 
of theft is God's right. 
Another divisive opinion is observed in the issue of defamation. Defaming someone 
of unchastity is deemed on the one hand as the right of man and as the right of God on 
the other. This is because, in the former, the integrity of the defamed person has been 
tarnished, while in the latter, the punishment is fixed by God. However, according to 
the majority of Islamic scholars, if defamation is made by one person on one or more 
persons on a single occasion, then one punishment is deemed enough because it is the 
right of God. This is the opinion of the Hanafites, Malikites and Shafi`ites 316 
312 al-Mardaawi, Insai, vol. 10, p. 164, Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Muharri fi al-Figh, vol. 2, p. 16, Ibn 
Qudamah, al-Mughni, op. Cit.,. 
313 Ibn al-Muflih, al-Mubdi'vol. 9, p. 54, al-Mardaawi, al-Insaf, ibid Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughm; ibid. 
314 Ibn Qudamah, ibid.,. vol. 9, p. 107. 
315 al-Bukhar Sahih Kftab al-Hudud Hadith No. 6406). 316 Ibn al-Jizzi, al-Qawanin al-Fighiyyah, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 237, al-Qarrafi, Ahmad Ibn Idris, a! - 
Dakhirah ed. Muhammad Haji, (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb, 1994), vol 12, p. 105. 
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However, the Hanbalites claim that the punishment of qadhf cannot be merged 
because it is man's right 317 al-Ghazali (d. 505) of Shafi'ite suggests that if there is a 
gap between one defamation and another, or if it has occurred on a separate occasion 
against different people, then multiple 1iadd can be inflicted 318 The root of this 
disagreement stems from the fact that the crime lies midway between the right of God 
and the right of man. To determine which right supersedes, the effect of the crime has 
to be investigated. It is obvious that the most affected persons are those whose 
integrities have been tarnished by the defamatory utterances. At the same time, the 
purpose of the punishment has to be considered, the aim of which is to restore the 
stained dignity of the victims and to deter people from committing such a crime in the 
future. However, it can be said that a single punishment can serve this purpose, thus, 
the view of the majority is commensurate with the purpose of Islamic law. 
Another debatable issue surrounding the unification of the punishment of multiple 
crimes is when there is a mixture of rights in the crimes. For instance, someone may 
have committed unlawful sexual intercourse, drunkenness, defamation, and cut off 
someone hand. In this case, there are rights of God, which are punishments of hudffd 
due for unlawful sexual intercourse and drunkenness, while the right of man is 
punishment for cutting off of someone's hand. According to majority of Islamic 
scholars, the right of man will initiate the punishment procedure, as such all the 
punishments that are due to the offender, starting with the less severe one, will be 
allotted. Thus, the culprit's hand will be cut off first because it is solely the right of 
man. This is then followed by the hadd of gadhf, then drunkenness and finally the 
hadd of zinc It is observed that these punishments must be carried out in the order 
given above because if the punishment of unlawful sexual intercourse is started with, 
the culprit may die therefore jeopardising all other rights. 19 The execution of these 
punishments is also conditional on time. The bruises and wounds sustained from each 
punishment must be allowed to heal before another is inflicted. This is to reduce the 
culprit's pains and sufferings while at the same time, ensuring justice for the victim by 
317 Ibn Qudamah al-Mughni, vol (? ). p. 107. 
318 al-Ghazäli, al-Wäsit, ed. Ahmad Mahmood, and Muhammad Tamir, (Cairo: Dar al-Salaam, 1417), 
vol. 6, p. 456. 
319 al-Murdiwi op. cit vol. 10, p. 165, Ibn al-Muflih op. cit. vol. 9, p. 55, Ibn Taymiyyah, al- 
Muharrir, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 165. 
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not allowing the termination of the culprit's life before all punishments are fully 
executed. 
Furthermore, in any multiple crimes in which God's right and man's rights are 
involved, the execution procedures are as follows: 
1. If there is no death penalty in the punishments, each punishment 
will be executed, beginning from the lesser to the greater. 
2. If there is a death penalty, the right of God will be embedded in the 
punishment, whether the death penalty is due as hudüd of God, 
such as being stoned to death for adultery if committed by a 
married man and woman, or if it is of man's right, such as gisäs, 
retaliation. Therefore, other punishments will be executed first, 
such as those for defamation, drunkenness, and theft, then 
retaliation. 
3. If two rights are due for one person and they are both for death 
penalty, as explained above, the right of man will supersede the 
right of God. Thus, retaliation will be executed for qJ'p$ and 
stoning. 320 
Furthermore, another question that may arises is: should the accused still be stoned for 
committing adultery which has been merged with the punishment of retaliation if the 
heirs of the victim who demanded retaliation then forgive the accused and opt for 
diyah instead, Or should he be freed and escape the death punishments for the two 
crimes? It seems that the former would be more appropriate in such instance, because 
if the accused is not punished, people might not be deterred from committing crimes 
and consequently, there could be break down of law and order in the society. Added 
to that is the fact that diyah is not considered as a punishment, although it can be 
considered as a remedy for the victim or the victim's relatives as it can also be 
dropped by its owner. Peters observes that "One of the indications that blood-money 
(diyah) is not a form of punishment is the fact that as a rule it is not to be paid by the 
320 Ibn al-Muflih, op. cit. vol. 9, pp. 55-56, Ibn Taymiyyah, al-Muharrir, op. cit. vol. 2, pp. 165-167. 
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perpetrator but by his solidarity group (` ägilah). "321 Moreover, diyah can be paid not 
only by the victim to impact on him, but also by his `ägilah. 
Another interesting debate is on the unification of punishments in a situation where 
one person intentionally kills another two people. There is no disagreement among 
Islamic scholars that one death penalty suffices if the relatives of the two victims 
demand retaliation. After all, it is practically impossible to kill one person twice. An 
exception is the dissenting and impracticable view reported from al-Shaft i that the 
convicted culprit should be killed for every one of the victims. 22 However, another 
controversy is in case the heirs of a victim demands diyah while the heirs of the other 
victim demands for gip-$. According to the Hanafites and Malikites, the two relatives 
of the two victims have no option other than gisäs because of the legal entanglement 
that may occur if there are different demands. This view is very close to justice, not 
only for the culprit but also for the other party who chooses gisäs. If a culprit commits 
one class of crime `fins wiiid, then the purpose of the punishment is one gasd wähl 
(if the crime of homicide is intentional). Therefore, the punishment due for each crime 
should be fused and combined 323 However, the Hanbalites assert that each relative of 
the victims has the right to choose what they find suitable. Thus, if one demands diyah 
and one demands gisäs, both will be imposed on the culprit. This opinion is based on 
the hadith of the Prophet in which he says: "If someone is killed, his relative has two 
options, either demanding for diyah (bloodmoney) or qawd (death sentence). "324 From 
this hadith, it is understood that Islam vests the choice of option on the relative of a 
victim, without any imposition. Thus, to divest this right from the owner will be 
antithetic to the purpose of Islamic law. After all, if a crime is committed 
unintentionally and another, intentionally, there is no noticeable disagreement among 
Islamic scholars on the fact that each one will be entitled to their due right. The 
punishment due for an unintentional crime - diyah - will be automatically imposed 
along with gisäs due for the intentional one. This same spirit holds for the situation in 
question. 
321 Peters, R. Crime and Punishment, op. cit. p. 49. 
322 Hamawi, Ghazu, op. cit. vol. 1, pp. 397-398, al-Zarkashi al-Manthuz, op. cit. 
vol. 11, p. 270. 
323 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, op. cit. vol. 8, p. 249. 
324 al-Bukhari Shahih kitab al-diyaat, Hadtth No. 2302, Muslim Sahib Kitab al-IIa., lj, Hadith No. 1355. 
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Furthermore, we want to say that it is very easy to rebuke the latter argument. Indeed, 
the example given is of a different issue. There is no cardinal relationship between 
what is legislated as remedy and what is legislated for retaliation. In other words, 
diyah, as mentioned above, is a measure of remedy, while gips is for retribution and 
reformation, thus they are of different purpose. Both are, admittedly, of the same 
class, namely, gatl (killing), but the purposes of punishment (magsi d al- `iqib) are not 
the same. It is pertinent to state that the issue in question here is that crimes of the 
same class and the punishments that are due for them are meant for the same purpose. 
Thus, to fuse the punishments and not allow an option for the respective plaintiffs is 
of paramount importance- a point that emphasizes the justice of Islamic law. 
In most cases where the punishments are of `diyah' or `arsh'(compensation), for 
example in bodily injuries such as an injury to the hand that affects fingers, an injury 
to the head that affects hair, an injury to the fingers that affects nails, and so on - in all 
these circumstances, one diyah will be imposed on the accused 325 The yardstick to 
determine whether one injury interlocks into another or not, inter alia, is if one is 
fixed and the other is not, or whether both are fixed. In the situation where one is 
fixed and the other is not, the fixed diyah will be enough. However, if both are fixed, 
then each diyah that is due for each crime shall be imposed on the accused. 26 Another 
yardstick proposed by the Malikites is that if the intention of a culprit in inflicting the 
bodily injuries on his victim is to cause mutilation, then he would be punished for 
each of the offences (injury and mutilation). For instance, if someone cuts the top 
joint of another person's finger and subsequently cuts the second joint of the same 
finger, the criminal's two joints, according to the Malikites suggestion, must be cut, 
one by one. 27 In this particular case, the Hanafites, Shafi'ites and Hanbalites are 
however opposed to separation of the punishments. In other words, they see tadikhul 
(intergradations) in the punishment. The Hanafite further suggests that one joint 
should be cut off for the first offence and arsh (compensation) should be paid for the 
second one, while others, including Abu Yusuf and Muhammad of the Hanafites 
Schools, consider the time of the commission of the two offences. If the second cut 
occurred before the first one has healed, the two offences are considered as one, but if 
325 al-Zarkashi, abMaathur, vol. 1, pp. 275-276. 
326 Ibid. 
327 al-Dardair aI-Shari al-Kablr, op. cit. vol. 4, p. 236, Kasazü, Badä'i` op. cit. vol. 7, p. 
301. 
86 
the second cut occurred after the first cut heals, then the two offences are separate and 
a separate punishment should be inflicted on the perpetrator. 328 
Another issue to be discussed on the maxim of integration of punishments is if the 
crime consists of hiräbah (banditry) and other crimes. The majority of Islamic 
scholars agree that there is integration in the punishment due for the crime of banditry, 
on the condition that the crimes committed are of the same nature. However, if the 
crimes committed are different, the most severe punishment will be imposed. This is 
based on the Qur'anic provision that allows four optional punishments for the 
criminal namely: death penalty, crucifixion, amputation and banishment. 329 Abu 
Hanifah suggests that if the crimes were committed at separate times and they were 
established, a separate punishment can be awarded for each crime. For example, if 
someone committed theft at one time and then committed homicide at another time, 
but committed the latter before the punishment for the former was due, then the 
culprit can be given the punishment for the theft first, followed by the punishment for 
homicide. Malik opposes this view based on the fact that the Qur'an does not state 
that if one crime is committed in banditry and another is committed separately, that a 
punishment should be imposed. Thus, if the nature of the crimes committed at the 
scene of the banditry is different, the most severe punishment will be awarded. From 
the explicit text mentioned above, the Zahm argues that the kind of punishment to be 
awarded in this case should be left for the ruler or judge to decide, regardless of 
whether it is severe or not. 330 
However, the question here is that if the crime of homicide is first committed before 
the crime of theft, should the culprit be given the punishment of homicide before the 
other one? It is absolutely irrational for anyone to suggest that, because once death 
penalty has been executed, there is no effect for the punishment of theft. Thus, the 
raison d'etre for the separation of punishment in this case is baseless. The cause of 
disagreement between Abu Hanifah and Malik, and between the majority of the 
scholars and Zahiri, stems from the function of the word "aw" (or) in verse 33 of 
Qur'an 5. Abu Hanifah construes it as an explanation, while Malik and Zahir interpret 
328 al-Kasäni, ibid 329 Qur'an5, verse 33. 
330 Awdah, ai-Tashri op. cit. vol. 2, p 659. 
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it as optional. Abu Hanifah's view is that a contradiction may arise if one is forced to 
choose between which punishments are to be executed first. On the other hand, if the 
opinion of Zahir were to be accepted, there may be injustice in some cases where a 
less severe punishment is opted for, and the rights of people are perfidiously marred. 
However, this is antithetic to the spirit of Islamic Law. Thus, the only option left is to 
accept the view of Malik that is endorsed by the majority, because if the most severe 
punishment is opted for, the spirit (magsüd) of Islamic law will have been achieved by 
reforming a criminal and deterring people from committing crimes. At the same time 
the culprit has been proportionally, but not excessively, punished. 331 
2.9 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter has addressed the importance of intention in Islamic criminal law. It 
establishes the stand of Islam in considering the intention of an accused before his/her 
criminal act can be established and the type of punishment to be awarded. Action has 
to be concurrent and correlated with intention. Any dissenting view on the 
corroboration of the two elements in criminal case will render the case discreditable or 
the punishment attached to the offence abated as we have mentioned in the above 
cases. 
There are discussions on the effect of expression and intention. Should effect be given 
to the intention of the locutor or the explicit form of the expression? To decide that, 
the rights of one against whom the crime is- committed must be established. If the 
right involved is God's right, then the effect may be given to the intention of the 
speaker but if the right involved is of human, then the explicit expression will be 
considered especially where the expression is demanded before the court of law. 
In some cases where it could be very difficult to establish criminal intention, but 
where there are clues to suggest the involvement of the accused person in the alleged 
crime, the stand of Islam is to avert the punishment when there is any iota of doubt. 
The following chapter will shed light of this important aspect. 
331 Ibid. vol. 2, pp. 443 and 659. 
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Chapter Three 
Analysis of the Legal Maxim: al-Yagln lä yaz& bl al-shakk 
(Certainty shall not be removed with doubt) 332 
3.0 Introduction 
Certainty and Doubt play vital roles in Islamic criminal law. The maxims to be treated 
under these terms will concentrate on how criminal justice could be established 
through the phenomenon of certainty and elimination of doubt. The leading maxim is 
the second among the basic general legal maxims agreed upon in principle by the 
Islamic scholars, even though there may be discrepancies in the manner of its 
applications. This maxim reflects the ease and beauty of Islam by creating a 
conducive atmosphere for Muslims with regard to the implications of their actions 333 
According to al-Zariqa snr.: "The importance of this maxim is unlimited because there 
is no part of figh to which it is not applicable 334 The maxim was first credited to al- 
Karikh in his book Tasis, in which he said: "mä thabat bi al yagin lä yazäl bi al- 
shakk"(indeed, whatever is established by certainty cannot be removed by doubt). 335 
3.1 Definition and Interpretation of the Legal Maxim 
Two contrasting words form the basis of the maxim: yagin (certainty) and shaklc 
(doubt). Yagin literally means undoubted knowledge of something that satisfies the 
sou1336 But there is no consensus among scholars on its technical meaning. For 
scholars of us171(Usulists), 337 yagin, is a strong belief that corroborates with virtual 
occurrence. This implies that probability or apparent probability cannot be regarded as 
332 al-Suyuti al-Ashba'op. cit. p. 55. Ibn Nujaym al-Ashba' op. cit. p. 59, Majallah Article 4, Ahmad al- 
Zarqa, A., Sharh al-Qawa'id op. cit. 79, al-Zarqa, M. al-Madkhal op. cit. 574, al-Burnu, al-Wajiz op. 
cit., p. 166. 
333 al-Nadwi al-gawa'id al-Fighiyyah.. op. cit. p. 354. 
334 al-Zarqa, A. op. cit. Pp. 78-80. 
335 `Ubaydllah Ibn Umar Ibn Isa Al-Dabuusi, Kitab Ta'sis al-Nadhr (Cairo: Matba' al-Imam n. d. ), 
p110, al-Burnu al-Wajiz op. cit. p. 166. 
i36 Ibn Mandhur, Lisän op. cit. vol. 13 p. 457, Muhammad Ibn Abi Bakr Ibn Abdul Qadir al-Razi, 
Mukhtar al-Shihäh, (Beirut: Mu'assasah al-Risalah n. d. ) vol. 6 p. 2219, al-Jurjäni, Ta`rifät op. cit. 
p. 116. 
33 The term usulists here refers to the scholars who are experts in the field of usr7 al-iigh. It is not 
necessary that all usulists are jurists, but it is necessary that all jurists (fagahähi) are usulist. 
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yagtn. In the view of the jurists (fugahähi), however, probability, can be accepted as 
yagin because most legal rulings are based on apparent probability. In most cases in 
Islamic legal procedure, something is assumed to be certain even if it can be 
reasonably doubted, such as the evidence of a witness that is accepted as substantive 
proof, even though the evidence may be fictitious. In the case of unlawful sexual 
intercourse, for instance, it is highly unlikely that the testimonies of four witnesses 
will be wrong, and, as such, that evidence becomes very hard to turn down. 
Contrary to their definition of yagin, jurists are in agreement with usulists that if a 
man and a woman who are not legally married emerge from a room in a condition that 
suggests that they have had sexual intimacy, this is not in itself enough to claim that 
they have committed unlawful sexual intercourse. Even if it might be assumed that 
there is little probability that they have not had sexual intercourse, the fact is that 
since the case does not infringe on individual right, and no claim by anybody is 
attached to it, the accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse will be regarded as 
unfounded. 338 Besides, because of the strict standards laid down in the Shari `ah for 
the accusation of such crime, it is unlikely that someone will be convicted on the basis 
of that probability. However, to `zir may be imposed for misconduct on the accused 
persons. Thus, the Islamic jurists comply with the definition of yagln, as stated by 
scholars of usül as in any case of hudcid 
Al-Shakk, (doubt), on the other hand, the opposite of yagin, is defined as hesitation 
regarding a decision between two things. Both the jurists and Usulists agree on this 
definition. However, the Usulists assert that if the mind tends to dwell on one of the 
things more than the other, the knowledge of such things is called tann (probable), 
and the knowledge of the thing considered less likely is called wahm (illusion). Thus, 
the categories of knowledge of such things in the Islamic legal system are yaqTn 
338 In some cases, the right of man can be involved in the case of zinc when the husband reported that 
his wife has been raped or she has committed adultery. In the former, case will be dealt with as mornal 
by producing four witnesses or by using modem technology to investigate the allegation against the 
raper if he could not get four witnesses (that is in my opinion because of the right of man involved). 
For the later, the case will be dealt with as mormal against his wife if he could produce four witnesses. 
However, if he could not produce four witnesses, the case will be resolved with li `än (five oaths taken 
by both couples to clear the allegation. See Quran 24: 6-9 and Doi, op. cit. pp. 170-171,189, Peters, 
Crime and Punishment, op. cit. p. 63 
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(certainty), zann (probability), ghalabah al-tann (most probable), shakk (doubt), and 
waham (illusion). 339 
Jurists and Usulists agree that yagin is unreservedly acceptable as the basis for 
rulings. Zann and ghalabah tann are mostly used in deciding on issues that are 
apparently or probably certain. However, shakk, is used to describe the situation when 
there are two things about which there is no preference for one over the other. There 
are some scholars who claim that shakk and tann are of the same connotation in the 
use of Islamic jurists. But this claim has been rebutted by al-Zarkash, thus: "That they 
(the Islamic jurists) do not differentiate between the two terms in the subject of 
impurity, whereas they have distinguished between them in many places. "340 In this 
case, shakk is not acceptable as a basis for establishing a ruling, especially in criminal 
cases, talk less of waham. 
The importance of this discussion lies in the fact that most of the rulings in Islamic 
law are based on probability, because it is difficult, if not impossible, to base all 
judgments on absolute certainty (yagin). Thus, recourse to probability is inevitable. 
The Qur'an also indicates that certainty could also be based on probability. In other 
words, zahn or ghalabat al-zahn, could be upgraded to yagin in the absence of the 
latter. The Qur'an says: "Those who know certainly that they will meet their Lord. 34' 
For instance, Islamic law requires that the proof of a crime should be convincing 
enough to establish the guilt of the accused. Because crimes vary in their gravity, the 
evidence required to prove one particular crime will obviously not be the same as the 
proof required for another crime. 
In some cases such as homicide and unlawful sexual intercourse, the required 
evidence is so difficult to obtain because of the harshness of the punishment 
339 Ibn Manzur, Lisan op. cit. vol. 13, p. 457, al-Hamawi, Ghamz Uyün al-Basair op. cit. vol. 1, p. 84, 
Muhammad Ibn Husayn al-Razi, al-l-Mahsill fi 'Ilm al-Usül ed. Husain Ali al-Yadri, (Amman: Dar al- 
Bayariq, 1999/1420), vol. 1, p. 101, al-Zarkashi, al-Manthür fi al-Qawä'id op. cit. vol. 2, p. 255, 
Yahyah Ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi, al-Majmil' Shar al-Muhadhadhab (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1997), vol. 1, p. 
223, Ahmad al-Zargä, Sharh al-Qawa'id op. cit. p. 80. 
340 AI-Zarkashi, al-manthur op. cit. vol. 2, p. 255, Ibn Nujaym al Ashba' op. cit. p. 82, al-Nawawi, al- 
Majmu al-muhadhdhab op. cit. 
341 Qur'an 2: 46. The word yadhunn is interpreted as yatayaqqan. See Mahmuud B. Umar, al- 
Zamakhshari, al-Kashshaaf ed Abdu al-Rasaq, (Beirut: Dar `Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi, n. d. ) vol. 1, p. 
163. 
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prescribed for those crimes. Nevertheless, the two crimes have different requirements. 
In the case of homicide, because the right of an individual is involved, Islamic law 
requires at least the most probable certainty (ghalabah al-zahn) that corroborates with 
other circumstantial evidence to convict an accused person. These include two 
witnesses who have seen the act of slaying, as well as circumstantial evidence such as 
video recordings or DNA342 to corroborate the evidence given by the witnesses. On 
the strength of the combination of these evidences, the accused will be convicted of 
murder. However, if mere tann is presented as evidence, the accusation will be 
unfounded until it is coupled with circumstantial evidence. An example of this 
situation is when someone is found standing beside a slain person with a knife in his 
hand. The suspicion may be that the bystander slew the dead person, but the 
assumption cannot be admitted until it is strengthened with other evidence. 
In the case of unlawful sexual intercourse on the other hand, since no right of man is 
involved, one of the standards of proof required to establish the guilt of the accused 
person is virtual certainty, embodying inter alia: four witnesses who have seen the act 
of unlawful sexual intercourse being committed; a description of the act in a detailed, 
explicit statement; and agreement in the statements of all the witnesses. Failure to 
fulfil these requirements will render the accusation unfounded, based on lack of 
certainty. 343 That is why it is rather surprising to find that in the cases of Safiyyatu vs. 
Sokoto State of Nigeria and Amina vs. Kastina State of Nigeria respectively, the two 
women were pronounced guilty of adultery by the Shariah Upper courts in the two 
states, even though the above-mentioned requirements were not met. Undoubtedly, 
there were some obvious grounds on which the accused women were found guilty, 
342 DNA means Deoxyribonucleic acid's which is a chemical that is found in the human body's cell. It 
determines human trait. It was developed in the United Kingdom by Sir Alec Jefferys, a Professor at 
the University of Leicester in 1984. For more details see 
http: // vww. sceintific. org? tutorials/articles/riley/reliy. html. DNA is considerd to be a circumstantial 
evidence in Islamic law. Though, there are divergent opinions among the contemporary scholars on the 
strength of such evidence. Most Islamic scholars consider any evidence branded as gara'in 
(circumstantial ) as incapable to use in rulings related to hudz d and gisäs (see Muhammad Ibn Majuz, 
Wasa'II al-Ithbatfi al-Fqh al-Islami, (al-Dar al-Bayda, 1984) pp. 13-14, Sayed Sikandar Shah Haneef, 
Modern Means of Proof. Legal Basis for its accommodation in Islamic Law, (Leiden Brill: Arab Law 
Quarterly, 20,4) pp. 344-345 
343 Peters, R., Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law Theory and Practice from the sixteenth to the 
Twenth-Fist Century, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2005) p. 13, cf. pp. 59-62. 
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such as the appearance of pregnancy and confession. But the evidence of appearance 
of pregnancy is subject to disagreement among scholars 344 
In large measure, while absolute certainty is required to prosecute and convict an 
accused in some cases, probabilities and circumstantial evidence are sufficient in 
others. However, under no circumstance is shakk (uncertainty) acceptable, regardless 
of whether the right of individual or the right of God is involved. 
Thus, the general interpretation of the maxim, according to Islamic jurists, is that what 
is established by the virtue of sound and conclusive evidence can only be aborted or 
terminated by equally conclusive or probable evidence. This is because it is illogical 
that uncertainty should terminate certainty. 345 
3.2 The Sources of the Maxim 
The maxim is rooted in the Qur'an and the tradition of the Prophet. The Qur'an says: 
"And most of them follow nothing but conjecture, certainly conjecture can be of no 
avail against the truth. "346 It is reported that Abdullah bin Yazid al-Ansari asked 
God's Messenger (SAW) about a person who he thought had passed wind during the 
Prayer (sal t). God's messenger replied: "He should not leave his sal t unless he 
hears sound or smells something. "347 Al-Nawawi in his comment on this hadith 
remarks that this hadith serves as one of the pillars of Islam and is an important 
maxim of Islamic jurisprudence. It indicates that things remain in their original status 
until otherwise established, and that there is no case for any accidental doubt 
348 
344 Ladan Muhammad Tawfiq and others, A Handbook on Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria: 
Women and Children's Rights Focus. (Kaduna, Nigeria, LEADS Nigeria, 2005) pp. 107-120. 
345 Muhammad Khalid and Muhammad Tahir al-Atasi, Sharh al-Majallah op. cit. vol. 1, p. 18, al-Zarqa, 
M., al-Madkhal op. cit 96. 
346 Qur'an 10, verse 36. 
347 al-Bukhari, Sahih Kitab al-Wudu hadith no. 137, Muslim Sahih hadith no. 362. 
348 al-NawawT, Sharh Sahih Muslim op. cit. vol. 4, pp. 49-50 cf. Hadith Abi Hurairah in Muslim 4/51. 
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3.3 Some subsumed Maxims under the Maxim of Certainty and Doubt 
3.3.1 al-'asl barä' al-dhlmmah (The fundamental principle is freedom of liability) or 
al-'asl al-`adam- (the fundamental principle is the non -existence of something) 
349 
It is fundamentally established in Islam that one cannot be held responsible for any 
claim, or be said to have obligation to others, until it is proved. All litigations have 
two sides - the one claiming the existence of the right over something, and the one 
refuting the claim. There is no justice in accepting the mere claim of the muthbit (the 
one making the claim) until the claim is proven. The assumption in justice is that a 
claim does not exist until it is proven. This position appears to be in favour of the 
offender. If someone lays claim to a piece of jewellery in the possession of a jewellery 
seller, it is apparent that the seller holds the as] (fundamental proof) and the claimant 
needs to argue his case with another proof . 
350 
Sometimes, there may be a contradiction between what is fundamental ad, and what 
is apparent, (zäbir). When such contradiction occurs, the zähir may be considered 
because it is closer to the right intention. Take the example of an impotent man who 
claims to have had a sexual affair with his virgin woman, and it is discovered that the 
woman has lost her virginity. The man's claim in this case will be considered. 
However, his claim that he has had an affair with her is a new occurrence that did not 
exist originally, 'ad . But because the woman's condition has changed, as 
demonstrated by the loss of her virginity, the zähir (i. e the man's claim) will have to 
be considered. 351 Similarly, if four witnesses testify that a man has committed 
unlawful sexual intercourse with a virgin woman and it turns out after investigation 
that the woman is a virgin, the testimony that has been regarded as ac1 will then be 
disregarded because of its contradiction with ,z 
hir, which is the state of virginity. 
Another example is that of an injured person claiming to have sustained a higher 
degree of injury than what is acknowledged by the causer of the injury. In this case, 
the latter's confession will be upheld because he holds the asl. However, if an 
349 al-Suyuti, al-Ashba' i op. cit., 52, Ibn Nujaym, al Ashba' op. cit. p. 59, al-Majallah, Article 8. 
350 al-Zarqa, A., op. cit. pp. 107-100. 
351 Ibid. p. 110 
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offender refuses to take an oath in a case where the plaintiff has established his proof, 
he would not be convicted until the plaintiff is asked to take the oath himself, because 
he holds the a# - this being a case of freedom from liability of the accusation until 
otherwise proven. Furthermore, where two witnesses are required to establish a claim, 
one witness would not be accepted because of the non-existence of the claim. And 
before the claim could be established, there must be proof. 352 
If four men witnessed against a woman that she committed zina, while at the same 
time, a number of trustworthy women witnessed that she is a virgin, no add 
punishment would be applied to her, or to the four male witnesses. This is because 
there is an element of doubt in their testimony. The accused cannot be convicted 
because al-budid tudra' bi al-shubhät, (&d0 punishment shall be averted in the face 
of doubt). The doubt in this case is the assertion of the trustworthy women that the 
accused is still a virgin. As for the witnesses, they are not to be awarded hadd 
punishment for qadhf (defamation) since they have fulfilled the legal requirement of 
four witnesses in such a case. This is the opinion of the Shafi`ites and Hanbalites, as 
well as some other scholars. However, Malikites jurist reject the witness of the 
trustworthy females in this case, claiming that the punishment for unlawful sexual 
intercourse should be accorded. Although women are not allowed to give witness in 
cases involving badd, in this particular case, there is a need for a female to testify as 
only a woman is permitted to investigate the privacy of another woman. 353 Similarly, 
if four male witnesses testify against a man accused of having committed unlawful 
sexual intercourse, and another group of four male witnesses testify that the first 
group of four men were the ones that rather committed zina, no add punishment 
would be imposed on the two parties. This, according to the Hanifites and Hanbalites 
schools, is because the reputation of the first group of four witnesses has been stained, 
while the second group is open to suspicion, and as such, the hadd should be 
dropped. 354 
352 al-Suyuti, al-Ashba'h op. cit. p. 52. 
353 Abdullah Ibn Ahmad Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni Ii Ibn Qudamah, ed. `Abdullah al-Turki and Abdul 
Fattah al-Hilu, (Riyadh, Dar `alam al-Kutub 1999) vol. 12, p. 274 
354 Ibid. vol. 12, p 376. 
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3.3.2 al-'a# bagä' mä kin `a1ä mä kani `Iiattä yaqum al-dar] `a1ä Wit' (Affairs 
remain lawful, the status quo "until otherwise proved"). ass 
This maxim emphasises that a known certainty continues to be recognized until the 
emergence of a greater certainty overrides the earlier certainty. For instance, if two 
parties dispute on an issue, judgement on that issue shall be made on the basis of what 
is already known about the issue before the occurrence of the dispute, until either of 
the parties produces other facts that can override what is already known. 
The effect of the maxim in criminal cases is that one should not be convicted on any 
allegation until the required evidence is found. However, there are cases where 
minimum or circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to prove an accused person 
guilty. Such will be the situation where the right of man is involved, where it is very 
difficult to obtain the substantive required evidence. In other words, a crime can be 
established with circumstantial evidence in cases of liabilities, but not in hudi d. 
3.3.3 al-'asl idäfah al-hädith i1ä aqrab awgätih (The fundamental principle is to 
ascribe an event to its nearest point in time). 356 
This maxim explains the previous one, and shows that the fundamental status of any 
occurrence is to ascribe it to its nearest point in time, because the nearest time is 
certain and it can be traced. Thus, if there is a dispute between two parties concerning 
the occurrence of damage, the last party to have contact with that incident will be held 
liable for the occurrence of the damage. 357 
Thus, if any defect occurs on an article after it has been bought, and the seller claims 
that the defect occurred in the custody of buyer, while the buyer claims otherwise, the 
judgement shall be in favour of the person who was last to have contact with it - in 
this case, the buyer. Thus, the defect shall be ascribed to the buyer. The buyer has no 
355 al-Suyuti, op. cit. 251, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. 57, Majallah, Article 5, al-Zarqa, A. op. cit. 87, al- 
Burnu, al-Wajiz op. cit. 172. al-Atasi, Sharh al-Majallah op. cit. 20 
356 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 64, Ali, Haydar, Durar al-Hukkäm Sharh al-Majallah.. ed. Fahm al-Husayni, 
(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah n. d) vol. 1, p. 25, al-Atasi, op. cit vol. 1, p. 32. 
357 al-Burnu, al-Wajiz op. cit. p. 187. 
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legal right to breach the term of the agreement unless the seller refuses to take an 
oath. 358 
Furthermore, if someone strikes a pregnant woman and she delivers a premature baby, 
and the baby dies a short time afterwards, in this case, the offender would not be 
responsible for the death of the baby because it is possible that the death was caused 
by some other means. It could be argued that the most current actor in this case is the 
one who struck the pregnant woman and caused the early delivery. However, as the 
baby was delivered alive, the offender will not be held responsible for his death. By 
contrast, if the baby was delivered dead and the offender claims that the baby could 
have died in the womb, this claim should not be accepted. This is because the offender 
is the nearest actor regarding the premature delivery of the pregnancy. 
3.3.4 Idha ijtama ` al-mubishir wa al-mutasabbib, yudäf al-hu1Qn i1ä al-mubasir (In 
the presence of the direct author of an act and the person who is the causer, the direct 
author is responsible thereof). 359 
On the surface level, the maxim of causation stands as a characteristic feature of 
justice in the Islamic criminal law. Distinguishing between the direct causation of an 
act and the indirect causation is inevitable in criminal cases where the aim is to strike 
a balance of justice between the two perpetrators and the victim. 
In order to determine the certainty of a criminal act and to eliminate grain of doubt, 
Islamic jurists have extensively studied who is responsible for the liability of the 
consequence of an action involving direct and indirect causers. In turn, there is no 
unanimous agreement upon who is solely responsible for a murderous act involving 
two persons or multi-accused. The reason for this disagreement is in order to give the 
indirect actor the benefit of the doubt. However, from the view of those who excuse 
him from liability, the reason given is to deter the occurrence of such an act, while 
from the view of those who opine the imposition of liability on both direct and 
358 ibid. 
359 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, op. cit. vol. 8, pp. 214,271, Majallah Article 90, Haydar, Durar op. 
cit. vol. 1, p. 80, Muhammad Ibn Ghanim al-Baghdad Mujma` al-Dhamanat.. (Beirut: Alam al-Kutub, 
1987/1407), vol. 1, p. 405, al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur op. cit. vol. 1, p. 136, al-Hamawi, Ghamz op. cit. 
vol. 1, p. 466. 
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indirect causers, this is to maintain a balance among the accused culprits. Finally, 
from the view of those who distinguish the liability of the direct accused from the 
indirect accused, this is to seek a fair outcome. 
A1-Mubäshir, (direct causer) in criminal cases, is something or someone who 
physically and directly commits a crime, regardless of the reason or the cause behind 
it, while the al-mutasabbib is something or someone, who for one reason or another, 
is indirectly involved in committing the act. For example, if someone dug a well on a 
public domain without legal permission, and another person pushed someone into it 
who consequently died. The person who pushed the other person is the mubäshir who 
would be responsible for the commission of the death. However, as digging a well on 
a public domain is an offensive act, the digger is the mutasabbib who might be 
discretionarily punished as deemed by the authority. However, pushing someone into 
the well is considered as a direct criminal offence that is tantamount to retaliatory 
punishment if the person, as a result of the action, dies. The mubäshirin this case was 
the effective cause of the death, as opposed to the mutasabbib, who dug the well. 
Thus, the mubishirwill be held responsible for the consequence of his action. 
However, if someone accidentally fell into the well without any agent, the rule would 
then work the other way. In that case, the mutasabbib would be held responsible. The 
punishment accorded to his action would differ from the one given to the mubishir 
above because of the absence of intention to kill in the action above. Hence, instead of 
gisäs, diyah would be accorded. This is in a situation where the digger of the well dug 
it illegally, as stated above. However, if he did dig with permission, or legally on his 
property, in both cases there would be no liability on him because of al jawiz al- 
360 shari i yunäfr al-damn (legal permission invalidates liability) 
A criminal act can be committed individually or collectively. In collective criminal 
acts, one can be the prime accused and another secondary, or both can be prime 
accused, depending on the involvement of each of them in the act. The proportion of a 
secondary accused could be in terms of assistance, encouragement, or even 
corroboration in the commission of the crime but the quota of his involvement is 
360 Majallah Article 91. 
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minor. However, the prime accused who directly commits the crime is the mubäshir, 
while the one who is indirectly involved is the mutasabbib 361 
One of the surprising approaches of Islamic classical scholars is that they vest so 
much effort in discussing the rules of al-mubishir, but neglect the responsibilities of 
al-mutasabbib, as apparently induced in the maxim in question. The reasons for this 
as Awdah observes are: 
" Because they are too concerned about the crimes that constitute fixed 
punishment and that of gisis - these punishments being unchangeable - as 
opposed to the discretionary punishments, the sphere of which is unlimited. 
" Because it is an established norm in Islam that fixed punishments can only be 
inflicted on those who are directly involved in the crime, except in some 
circumstances where the majority of scholars, except Abu Hanifah, consider 
an indirect causer in a crime that involves life and bodily injury as a co- 
accused. This is because the latter may be responsible for the consequence of 
the act; thus, an act may occur collaboratively between al-mubäsbir and al- 
362 mutasabbib 
The maxim of causation can be divided into two: (1) direct causation -who physically 
does the act. An example is where someone solely commits theft without the 
assistance of any other agent. (2) Indirect causation - who is indirectly and 
supportively involved in the act. An example of this is where someone leads another 
person to a location where he can steal a property. The direct causation can also be 
divided into single/individual causation and group/multiple causation. 
For direct single causation, it has no connection with the maxim in question. For 
direct multiple causation, the controversy among Islamic Jurists is on whether or not a 
group of people can be punished for the crime of life and bodily injury. According to 
the majority of Islamic scholars, all the perpetrators in gisas and diyah crimes will be 
361 Muhammad Ibn Abdu al-Baqi al-Zarqani, Sharh al-Muwatta (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 
1411), vol. 8, p10, Awda, al-Tashd'vol. 1, p. 357. 
362 Abu Hanifa consistently applies this maxim in all criminal acts by ascribing criminal liability to ab 
mubashir. Thus, in Abu Ilanifah's view, if there is any crime of hudüd and gisäs, the al-mubäshir will 
be responsible, as opposed to the majority view, including Malik, Shafi` and Ahmad in their version. 
To them, in gisäs crimes al-mutasabbib may be held responsible for a criminal act if the criminal 
procedure proves that. See Awdah, al-Tashri vol. 1, p. 358. 
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held responsible, depending on the intention of the individuals involved. For example, 
if a group of people all intentionally set fire on a house that consequently damages 
property and takes the lives of its inhabitants, all will be responsible for repaying the 
value of the house and would also be given gip5: An exception however exists only 
in a situation where the perpetrators claim that they are not aware of people's 
presence in the house. In that case, diyah will be proportionally shared on them. This 
is the opinion of the Malikites, based on the statement of Umar Ibn Khatab in which 
he was reported to have said: "If all people of Sanca' (in Yemen) are involved in 
killing him, I will kill all of them. "363 However, other scholars oppose this view on the 
basis that there is no justice in killing multiple people to retaliate the death of one 
person, because the law of retaliation is based on equity and comparing multiple 
killings to just one killing is antithetical to equity. One point that should be made clear 
at this juncture is that though equity is advocated in the law of retaliation, yet, it 
should be noted that the law is enacted for some other reasons such as retribution and 
deterrence. In Scottish criminal law, the general rule is that each person is only 
responsible for criminal liability unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that a 
group of people acted together `in pursuance of a common criminal enterprise or 
purpose. ' In such cases, all would then be punished 364 The view of other Islamic 
Jurists is that the type of punishment to be allocated can vary. However, in the 
situation given earlier in which qi$a$ should be dropped for diyah, which will then be 
shared among the perpetrators, it is assumed that there is a shubhah (doubt). Thus, the 
latter view does not disagree with the maxim in principle, but it does so in practice. 
Conversely, all Islamic scholars agree that if the crime is of hudi d, such as a group of 
people involved in raping a woman, all will be given badd, 365 except in situations 
where there is a substantial shubha, such as the involvement of the raped woman's 
father in the crime or a lack of legal definition of a criminal act. Regarding the 
involvement of the raped woman's father in the crime, the badd will be dropped 
because of the relationship of the raped women with the father, as there is a strand of 
inheritance between them 366 Regarding the lack of legal definition of a criminal act, if 
363 al-Zargani, Sharh al-Muwatta op. cit., vol. 4, p. 250. 
364 Crimes against the person p. 68, quoting O'Connel v. HM Advocate 1987, SCCR 459 at 460 and 
Sinclair v. HM Advocate (4 May 1990, unreported) CCA). 
365 Awdah, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 360. 
366 Ibid. Vol. 1, Pp. 360,363-364 
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a group of people stole a property and shared it among themselves so that the value of 
what eventually got to each of them would not reach the requirement of the crime of 
theft, then hadd punishment could be dropped. But yet, each of the perpetrators will 
be given ta`ziras deemed by the authority. 367 
However, if causation is involved in a crime committed by a single or multiple 
perpetrators, and if a crime is of a hadd nature, all Islamic scholars agree that al- 
mubishir is the only prime accused and the only one to be responsible for the 
consequences of the act in line with the maxim in question. For example, if someone 
commits an unlawful sexual intercourse involving rape, or if someone breaks into 
another's house and steals property while in both cases another person stood by as 
guard, the prime accused will be the direct rapist and direct house breaker and will be 
given hadd. However, the other two mutasabbib could be given to `zirby discretion of 
the authority for indulging wrongdoing. 68 Another example is if someone asked 
another to insult the Prophet or to defame another person. In such cases, therefore, the 
direct perpetrator will be held responsible because one is not allowed to infringe on 
another's rights without legal permission. 
On the other hand, if a crime is of gips nature, Abu Hanifah maintains that the sole 
person responsible is al-mubishir (the direct causer), thus al-mutasabbib would be 
freed. However, majority of Islamic scholars oppose this view. To them, al- 
mutasabbib would be held responsible according to the proportion of his or their 
involvement in the crime. We however wish to remark that the latter view is more 
367 Peters, Crime and Punishment op. Cit., p. 28, Awdah, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 363, al-Ramali, Nihaya al- 
Muhtaj op. cit., vol. 7, pp. 261,263, al-Shirazi, al-Muhadhdhib, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 7116, al-Dardair, al- 
Sharh al-Kabir, op. cit., vol. 4, p. 217, Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, vol. 9, p. 366. 
368 It is not clear in the judgement of the general court of Riyadh in regard to the case of Abdul 
Rahman Ibn Saeed al-Zahrani and Abdul Rahman Ibn Qassim al-Feefi whether both were sentenced to 
death based on the involvement of other in indulging wrongdoing. It is reported that two of the 
soldiers stopped a 20-year-old expatriate woman driving with her father in Riyadh. One of the two 
soldiers took her to a desert area and raped her while the other one stood with her father and 
threatening to kill him. In their case, it will be assumed that one is a direct causer of the raping while 
the other is a mutasabbib. By the maxim in question, it will be assumed that the direct causer should 
be given death penalty if it is established that he is married man while the second soldier should be 
given tazir lesser than the raper. But the judgement may only be based on hirabah rathan than to be 
based on zina and ightisab as stated in the report that the first soldier was convicted on kidnapping 
and raping the woman and the second soldier was convicted on helping his colleague to kidnap and 
rape, and threatening to murder see the full report of the case online at 
www. arabnews. com/9pa, ae=1&section=0&article=109140&d=20&m=4& 2008 viewed last 
21/04/2008) 
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practical in cases where there is complicity in the crime. For instance, if a car is 
parked in an unauthorized public place, and an incoming car accidentally crashes into 
the parked car, causing the parked car to roll towards a building and hit it, and 
subsequently the building collapses on a by- passer and kills him. According to the 
majority of Islamic scholars, the person that parked the car is responsible for illegal 
parking, while the car crasher is responsible for the collapse of the building and the 
death of the by-passer. Thus both are involved in the subsequent crimes and each one 
should be responsible for his quota in the damage caused by his particular action. 
3.3.4.1 Conditions for holding the Mubnshirliable 
The Jurists unanimously agree that a murderer who is responsible for homicide and 
subjected to retaliation, qI i, should be sane, must have attained puberty and possess 
the free will to act directly and without participation from any other agent in the act. 
There is an instance in which al-mutasabbib could be held solely or collectively 
responsible for the act committed by al-mubäshir. This is in cases where there is a 
lack of criminal intent of al-mubäshir, such as a minor who is given a knife to kill 
someone. If he does, the person who gave him the knife will be responsible. Also, al- 
mutasabbib will become the prime accused, prosecuted and be responsible if he 
coerces someone to kill another person. According to the majority of Islamic scholars, 
a commander and a coercer are considered as the prime accused because of the lack of 
criminal intent of the mubishir. As such, he (the mubishir) is like a tool used by the 
coercer for the purpose of killing 369 There is a contrary view reported from each of 
the four Imams (leaders of the four Sunni schools of thought) on the issue of al- 
mukrih (the coercer) and al-mukrah (the coerced person). Malik and Shafi', in one 
version, opine that there is retaliation for both, while Abu Hanifa and Shafi', in 
another version, are both of the opinion that there is no retaliation for mubishir with 
regard to complete coercion (ikrih tämm), because he is like a tool, rather, the 
retaliation will be imposed on mutasabbib mukrih because he is the actual cause of the 
crime. Abu Yusuf of the Hanafi school also hold that there is no gisäs for both 
because of shubhah, and that diyah should rather be resorted to. Zufar of Hanafi 
asserts that gips should be imposed on mubäshir, whether it is complete or not, based 
369 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, vol. 9, p. 331, al-Shirazi, al-Muhadhdhib, vol. 2, p. 189, al-Dardir al- 
Sharh al-Kabir, vol. 7, p. 216, Ibn Rushd, Bidayah, vol. 2, p. 479. 
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on the maxim in question. 70 Thus, the problem of contradiction stems from whether 
the ikrcih is complete or incomplete. If it is incomplete, the majority of scholars 
impose punishment on the mubäshir because his life is not more important than the 
life of others, and thus he has no right to preserve his life at the expense of others. 
A typical case is if someone holds another person so that he might to be killed by 
someone else and this is done, the direct killer will be responsible, according to the 
opinion of Abu Hanifah, Shafi' and a version of Ahmad while the Malik and Ahmad 
in another version deem both as killers responsible for the murder. This is because, 
though one is mubäshirand the other is mutasabbib, the quota of involvement of both 
is equal in the consequence of the act. 371 
Also, if an animal causes damage to a property or harm to a person, the rule is that the 
animal cannot be prosecuted based on the fact that it has no sense of belonging. The 
owner will not be responsible either because he did not directly damage the property 
or cause harm to the person. This is because of the tradition of the Prophet that states 
that damage caused by an animal is in vain. 372 This can only be construed if the 
animal is stationary in an authorized place, while it is also the norm that people should 
keep their property in the daytime, as mentioned in the discussion on `urf and 
`ädah. 373 However, if the owner of the animal has mounted it or has negligently 
stationed it in an unauthorized place, he will then be responsible for the damage the 
animal caused, although he is mutasabbib and not mubishir. However, he is held 
responsible for the damage because it is his responsibility to take care of his animal 
while the animal is in use. 374 
370 al-Kasani, Bada' Y, vol. 7, pp. 178-180. 
371 Ibn Nuj aym, al-Bahr al-Rahiq op. cit., vol. 8, p. 345, al-Ramali, Nihayah al-Muhtaj op. cit., vol. 7, 
p. 244, al-Dardari, al-Shark al-Kabir, vol. 4, p. 217 Awdad, op. cit. vol. 1, pp. 373-377, cf with the rule 
of art and part liability in Scots law in Ferguson P. W. , Crimes against the Person (Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1990) p. 68. In it, it is stated that if A supplies B with a gun with which to shoot and 
kill C, A is liable for the murder along with B. cf. HM Advocate v. Lappen 1956, SLT 109 at 110, per 
Lord Patrick. 
372 al-Bukhari, a1-Sahib hadith no. 6514. 
373 See notes 545 and 557. 
374 al-Hattab, Mawahib al jalil, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 244. 
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3.3.4.2 Complicity of Causation in Islamic Criminal Law 
Causation can also be complex in many cases. The following case earlier cited is an 
apt example: Someone parks his car in an unauthorized place and another car hits the 
parked car, causing the car to roll towards a building, striking it and destroying it in 
the process. In so doing, the building then accidentally falls on a passer-by and he 
dies. Who is responsible? In this case, according to a fictional example in the Hanafis 
School, the owner of the car that hit the illegally parked car will be responsible for all 
damages, including the death of the passer-by. This is because he is the direct cause of 
the accident, although the owner of the illegally parked car may be prosecuted for 
illegal parking, but not for the consequence of the accident. However, if we suppose 
that the illegally parked car rolled without any involvement of any other person - 
perhaps, a very severe wind set it in motion - then the entire responsibility would fall 
on the owner of the illegally parked car as he is the causer of the accident. 
Another intricate issue in accessing direct and indirect causation is if a person is 
seriously injured by someone else to the extent that the injury proves fatal. The 
injured person is taken to a hospital where all necessary fees are paid, but after 
surgical treatment, the victim dies by virtue of medical negligence. Thus, if the maxim 
is to be applied at its surface level, the authority of the hospital should be held 
responsible. But in fairness to the issue, the perpetrator must be held responsible for 
the diyah of the injury, while the hospital authority will be responsible for the diyah of 
the death. However, if the hospital has carried out all its duties responsibly, but the 
victim eventually dies, should the mutasabbib be held responsible for the death or just 
for the injury? It can be inferred from the general rule of direct and indirect causation 
that if al-mubäshirbecomes impossible to be held responsible, al-mutasabbib wiil be 
resorted to. Though, al-mutasabbib in this case did not intend killing, but his action 
led to the death of his victim, thus he will be liable for diyah. 
Another example of complexity of causation is found in a situation where one of the 
killers in a case of homicide is an intentional perpetrator and the other is not. For the 
mukhti' (unintentional perpetrator), there is consensus among Islamic scholars that 
there is no gips on him, based on the texts that exempt him from that. However, for 
the `ämid, (intentional perpetrator), the majority suggest that no gips should be 
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imposed on him because the issue has become complicated, and now resembles a 
quasi-intentional crime which none of the scholars suggest qi i for. This is the 
opinion of Hanafites, Shafi'ites and majority of the Hanbalites. However, the 
Malikites and a version of Ahmad proclaim gips for the 'imid because his action is 
identified as intentional and he is responsible for his action 375 
From the foregoing discussion on this maxim, it is easy enough to figure out the 
raison d'etre behind the disagreements and inconsistencies of the Islamic scholars in 
applying this maxim. The fact is that the Islamic scholars realize the importance of 
protecting not only the victims but also the accused and the need to ensure that justice 
is done to both parties involved. In cases like this where there is no right of any 
human being attached to the crime, the basic rule is that the mubishir will be 
considered as prime and should, as such, take sole responsibility for any damage 
caused by his action. Thus, if the prosecution has failed to establish the prime accused 
in these cases, the punishment would then be dropped. However, if there is a right of 
man in any crime, it is realized that restricting the responsibility to the mubishir could 
render the right of man in vain. Thus, the majority of Islamic scholars, including Abu 
Hanifah, in cases of complete coercion, extend liability to the mutasabbib to ensure 
that the right of man is claimed and justice is established. 
Another reason for the differences among Islamic scholars regarding this maxim 
stems from what Awda376 believes to be priority of one's causation over another. This 
can be summarized thus: 
"A situation where cause supersedes perpetration, such as in a situation where 
one falsely witnesses against another, which leads to a conviction, and then to 
a death penalty. The cause of the death originates from the false witness. Thus 
this cause supersedes the execution of the victim, because if there were no 
false witness, the death penalty would not be imposed. Although a false 
witness does not directly execute the victim, his false testimony certainly 
contributes greatly to it. 77 
375 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughnr; op. cit, vol. 8, p. 236. 
376 Awdah, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 370. 
377 al-Ilattab, Mawahib al-jalil, op. cit., vol. 6, p. 241. 
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"A situation where mubäshir supersedes the mutasabbib, such as in the case of 
someone who throws someone else into a deep well from which he cannot 
survive without rescue. However, another person, instead of rescuing him, 
uses a tool to stab him and consequently kills him. The act of mutasabbib 
might be deemed a murderous act if the victim is left there and dies. However, 
because another person has contributed to it, it has shifted the responsibility 
unto the last actor. This is because of the maxim "yudäf al-'amr i1ä aqrab al- 
waqt (matter is attributed to the closest time of the event). 378 In another 
example, if someone stabbed or cut the hand of a person, and yet another 
person came and stabbed the victim in the stomach and he died, the last 
perpetrator would be charged with murder, while the former would be charged 
for injury. 379 
" Lastly, in a situation where the involvement of the two actors is equal. An 
example of this is where someone is coerced to kill another. The opinions of 
Islamic scholars as earlier explained above differ on this. 
3.3.5 al-'as! ii al'ashya' al-Igblhafi `battä yard al-dar] `all tahrimihi a 
(The Fundamental Principle is that things are lawful for use until there 
Sao comes a proof of prohibition) 
This maxim is very important to human daily activities and offers a relief from the 
burden many people may encounter in their lives. The connection between this sub- 
maxim and the grand one is that ad connotes yag7n -certainty. Islam establishes that 
things are created for the use of human beings, except for a few things that are made 
unlawful. In the Qur'an, God says: "It is He who hath created for you all things that 
are on earth" 381 The Qur'an further states: "Say: Who hath forbidden the beautiful 
(gifts) of God which He hath produced for His servants and the things that clean and 
pure for sustenance. "382 In another verse, God emphatically explains what He has 
forbidden for man: "Say: I find not in the message received by me by inspiration any 
378 See Majallab Article 10, al- Burnu, al-Wajlz, p. 187. 
379 al-Iiattabi, Mawahib al-Jalil, op. cit., vol. 6 p. 241. 
380 al-Suyuti, op. cit. p. 60, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 66, al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur op. cit. vol. 1, p. 176. 
381 Qur'an 2, verse 29. 
382 Qur'an 7, verse 32. 
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forbidden to be eaten by one who wishes to eat it. Unless it be dead meat or blood 
poured ... "383 al-Shawkani, 
in buttressing his support for the maxim, states that: "He 
(the Exalted) made the fundamental provision to be lawful and exempted some from 
being unlawful. )9384 
There are two other opinions that contradict this principle. The first of these is 
ascribed to Abu Hanifah - as opposed to general opinion of the Hanafites - and some 
Hanbalites. They opine that the fundamental principle means that things are 
forbidden, until otherwise stated 385 The second opinion professes the cessation, "al- 
386 
tawagqu, f ', of anything until there is evidence of whether it is lawful or unlawful. 
However, every indication seems to suggest that God has created everything for the 
use and benefits of human beings. He (SWT) guides mankind through revelation and 
inspiration regarding the use of them. Thus, there must be a principle that will 
generally bind all human beings together in their actions - hence the fundamental 
principle should bring favour and facility for all. One way of facilitating this is to 
uphold that things should be fundamentally permitted (mubähab) rather than to be 
prohibited (mabztirah). Things that can be said to be permitted should be those that 
are large and unspecified in the Holy Qur'an and the Prophetic tradition, while those 
made unlawful for use should be smaller in number and should be specified. 
The relevance of this maxim to criminal law is that everything that is clearly stated as 
lawful in the texts should continually be given legitimacy with regard to their 
lawfulness, while everything described in the texts as illegal should remain as such. 
Thus, any criminal act stipulated in law such as unlawful sexual intercourse, alcohol 
consumption, and the unjustified killing of people are fundamentally haräm 
383 Qur'an 6, verse 145. 
384 Muhammad Ibn Ali al-Shawkani, 1rshäd al-fuhül ii `Ihgäq al-Haqq min `Ilmi al-Usr7l , ed. 
Muhammad Sa'id al-Badr (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 1992/1412), p. 286. 
385 al-Suyuti ascribes this opinion to Abu Hanifa, while Ibn Qudamah reports that Ibn Hamid (d 403 
A. H) and al-Qadi Abu Ya'la (d. 458), both Hanbalites, profess the same opinion, though the majority 
of Hanafites incline to the first opinion. See al-Suyuti, al Ashba' op. cit. p. 60, Ibn Nujaym op. cit. 
P. 66, Abdullah Ibn Ahmad Ibn Qudamah, Rawdah al-Nizir wa Jannab al-Munäzir ed. Abdul Azeez 
Abdu al-Rahman al-Said, (2'' edn. Riyadh: Imam Muhammad Ibn Su'ud University 1399) vol. 1, p. 
245. Their opinion is based on the Qur'an 16, verse 116, which prohibits saying something falsely e. g. 
that this is lawful and this is unlawful, in order to invent lies against God. But there is no indication that 
the verse provides clear evidence in support of their claim. In fact, it can be argued that the other 
opinion is not said through whim or caprice. 
386 This opinion is ascribed to some Hanafis and some Hanbalites (see al-Burnu al-Wajiz p. 196). 
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Paradoxically, if the view of the majority who profess the legalilty of all things is 
loosely construed, one may assume that, based on this maxim, committing other 
offences that are not stated in the texts is legal. However, if through analogical 
deduction, it is proven that what is stated in the text and what is enacted by analogy 
are similar; the latter would share the status of the former. For example, in cases such 
as intoxicant, homosexual, murder etc., it is possible for jurists by applying the 
principle of analogy to establish illegality; and once any of these is established, it 
becomes illegal. 
3.3.6. al hudüd tusgat bi al-sbubhät (Fixed Punishments should be averted 
in the case of doubt/suspicion). 387 
According to the Islamic Jurists, Islamic penology (al-` Uqübät al-Shar'iyyah) is 
divided into three: hudiid (fixed punishments), gisa c (retaliation), and ta'zir 
(discretionary punishment). The maxim above mentions the hudüd punishments and 
what can be construed as impediments to their implementation. Before giving details 
of how shubhit can be excuses for the establishment of the crime of hudcld, it is 
pertinent to briefly explain the meaning of the two words, hudüd and shubhä, as 
explained by Islamic jurists. 
The word hudid is a plural form of hadd which means boundary, standard, penalty, 
prevention and inhibition. 388 Remarking on the reflective purpose of punishment in 
Islam to the linguistic meaning of had4 Abdul Rahman Doi says that punishment is 
called hadd because it is "a restrictive and preventive ordinance, or statute of God 
concerning things (that are) lawful (hat I and things (that are) unlawful (harirn). "389 
387 al-Suyuti, al-Ashba op. cit, p. 123, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba, op. cit. p. 127, al-Hamawi, Ghamz Uyuni 
op. cit, Haydar, A, Durar op. cit. p. al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur op. cit. vol. 1, p. 400. Almost all schools 
of Islamic jurisprudence accept the maxim in principle and apply it in different ways and various 
locations. The exception is Zahiri, who object to it based on their rejection of the hadith, reported in 
respect of the maxim (see Ibn Abdul -Barr, al-Tamhid limä fial-Mu'atta'mina al-Ma`lni wa al- 
Asänid, ed. Mustafa Ahmad al-Alawi (Morocco: Ministry of endowment and Islamic Affairs 1387), 
vol. 15, p. 34, Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti, Adwa' al-Bayan, op. cit. vol. 5, p. 392, al-Sarakhasi, al- 
Mabsut, op. cit. vol 18, p. 127, Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, op. cit. vol. 9, pp. 116-119,123,259, Ibn 
Hazm al-Zahiri, al-Mahalla op. cit vol. 11, pp. 153-156 
388 Munir al-Din AI-Ba'labak, al-Mawrid, (8 edn, Beirut: Daru al-'Ilmi lil Mallayin, 1997) pp.. 455- 
456, Ibn Manzür, Lisän al-Arab op. cit. vol. 4 p. 93. 
389 Doi, A. R., Shari'ah Islamic Law op. cit. p. 221. 
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Technically, the word hudi d has been viewed in two dimensions: it is represented by 
the fact that it is fixed; and by consideration of whose right is affected. Regarding 
the former, hudi d is limited to punishments for crimes mentioned and fixed by the 
Holy Qur'an or the Sunnah of the Prophet, while other punishments called to `zlr are 
left to the discretion of the gidz (judge) or the häkim (ruler). 390 The implication of 
this view is that the crimes that are classified under hudüd include some that are called 
q/ca, these having distinct characteristics. Doi enumerates seven crimes whose 
punishments are prescribed in the Qur'an and the Sunnah: 
Penalties exacted for committing murder, manslaughter or bodily harm, punishment for theft 
by amputation of a hand, punishment for fornication or adultery -stoning for a married person, 
and hundred lashes for an unmarried person, punishment for slander by eighty lashes, 
punishment for apostasy by death, punishment for inebriation by eighty lashes, and 
punishment for highway robbery, gata' aItarlq) by death, cutting off a leg and arm from the 
opposite direction, or an exile according to the seriousness of the crime. 99391 
This enumeration is compatible with al-Mäwardi's (d. 450 AH) definition of crimes 
and in line with the majority of the classical Jurists, including the Malikites, Shafi'ites 
and Hanbalites. However, the Hanafites exclude the last two crimes from hadd 392 
The second dimension that views hadd as penalties prescribed as the rights of God, 
excludes the crime of murder and manslaughter, as well as injuries from hudi7d, on 
the ground that their punishments which are gisas or diyah, are rights of men (hagq al- 
ädamm). The proponents of this dimension consist of some contemporary scholars, 
including Abu Zahrah and 'Abd al-Qadir 'Awdah. They argue that hudi7d have 
distinctive features that make them different from other punishments such as gisäs, 
diyah and to `zlr. These distinctive features are that hudüd are enacted primarily as the 
rights of God with a view to maintaining public order. In addition, hadd punishment 
cannot be lightened or increased, nor can it be pardoned or waived by anyone, 
whether victim or ruler, once it has been reported to the judge. 393 According to this 
390 Ibid P. 221. 
391 Ibid. p. 225. 
392 Ali Ibn Muhammad Ibn Habeeb al-Mawardi, al Ahkäm al-Sultaniyyah tran. Yate A. 1996 p. 218- 
223, Ibn Rushd, Bidayah al-Mujtahid op. cit. vol. 2, pp. 424-449, Ibrahim Ibn Ali al-Shiräz"i al- 
Muhadhdhab (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr n. d. ), vol. 2, pp. 266-289, Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turuq al-Hukmiyyah op. 
cit. pp106-107, Abdu al-Qadir al-'Awdah, al-Tashn"' al-Jinä T al-Islam mugaranan bi al-gawin7n al- 
wada 7 (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi 1968/1388) vol. 2 p. 345, vol. 1, p. 105-107, Abu Bakr `Ala' al- 
Din al-Kasani, Badi'i' al-Sanä'i'BTartib al-Sharä'i'( Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi 1982) vol. 7, pp. 
33-97. 
393 El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic law, (Plainfield: American Trust Publications 2000), pp. 1-2, 
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view, murder and manslaughter are excluded from hudi d because the punishment 
(diyah) can be sought for it in lieu of gips, if the relative of the victim in a murder 
crime demands it. 
It is observed that even crimes that are punished with hudrld, such as slander and theft, 
can be pardoned by the victims prior to being reported. However, to define hudi7d 
crimes as the rights of God aimed at maintaining public order will be to exclude many 
crimes mentioned in hudi d. In other words, while only a few crimes can be classified 
as the rights of God, as in the case of apostasy, unlawful sexual intercourse and 
drinking, the punishment for drinking alcohol is not fixed by the Qur'an. In fact, even 
its status in the Sunnah is not consistent. The alternative way of assessing the meaning 
of the words of hudi d in the maxim is to follow the definition of the classical jurist, as 
maintained by Doi. This considers murder as part of hudi7d crimes because gisäs can 
also be averted in the face of doubt. This means that hudi d crimes include gips and 
diyah, but not to `zir. This is in line with al-Mäwardi's classification of crimes as 
hudz d and to `zlr. 394 
In general, it seems that the use of hudüd in the maxim above does not have the strict 
meaning of hudi d, according to the two dimensions discussed above. However, the 
hudid which can be averted in the face of doubt, includes all penalties mentioned in 
the texts, regardless of whether they are the rights of God or the rights of man. That is 
to say that the word hudüd means al-` ugibät al-muqaddar shar'an (legally fixed 
punishments) which distinguishes it from non- fixed punishments, to `zTr or siyäsah. 
This asserts that any penalty ascribed to any crime in Islamic law can be averted by 
doubt, as will be illustrated below. 
The maxim of averting hudrid in the face of doubt covers all fixed punishments 
mentioned in the Qur'an and the Hadith. Thus, the verses in which God says: "this is 
the hudid of God" can be interpreted to cover all facets of fixed punishments, thus : 
these are the punishments prescribed by God as preventive and protective measures 
for mankind. So they should not be changed or be influenced by any rulers. In 
response to the argument that q/ci can be changed by the relatives of the heirs to 
394 al-Mawaridi, al-Ahakam al-Sultaniyyah op. cit. p 220. 
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diyah, it can be held that the changing of gisäs to diyah also constitutes hudüd of God 
which have been stipulated by the Legislator. 395 
3.3.6.1 Legality of the Maxim al-I udüd tusgat bl al-Shubbst 
The maxim that hudüd should be averted in the face of doubt is generally acceptable 
among the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence. It is mostly used in criminal 
procedures of the Islamic criminal justice system. It is reported that the Prophet said: 
"Avert hudüd (punishment) when there are doubts (shubhät). s396 There are many 
instances to justify the legality of this maxim from the practice of the Prophet and his 
companions. Ibn Humam observes that when Ma'iz confessed to the Prophet, the 
latter said to him, "Maybe you kissed her" and "Maybe you touched her. 097 All these 
interpretations from the Prophet are nothing but a means to eliminate doubt and to 
allow Ma'iz to retract his confession, thereby casting doubts on the crime he 
confessed to and, by extension, to remove its conviction. Certainly, the Prophet never 
suggested to anyone who had confessed guilt over a right of debt that the debt was 
probably a trust as he did in the case related to the rights of God. This indicates that 
caution should be taken in the execution of hudcld. 398 Umar Ibn Khattab is reported to 
have said: "For me to commit an error in averting the punishment of hudi d is 
preferable than to execute it in the face of shubhät. "399 
3.3.6.2 Correlation between al-Shubhah (doubt) and Shakk (suspicion) 
The maxim here is brought to address the rules of shubhah in Islamic criminal law. 
However, it is pertinent to examine the relationship between the word shubhah and 
the word shakk in the grand maxim under which this maxim is subsumed. Shakk 
(uncertainty) has been defined above as an antonym of yagin (certainty). What 
395 As mentioned in the Quran 4: 92 
396 The hadith is reported in various ways, although all the chains of its narration have been criticized. 
According to al-Shawkani, the hadith is better considered as mawquuf, untraceable. (See al-Shawkani, 
Nayl al-Awtar (Cairo: Mustafa al-Halabi, vol. 7 p. 118, However, it is reported as marfu' from Ibn 
Abbas, in Musnad Abi Huthayfa hadith no 4, kitab al-Huduud, p. 32. According to al-Nadwi, the 
narration of Ibn Abbas is authentic. This clarifies the ambiguity surrounding the acceptability of the 
Hadith. See al-Nadwi, al-Qawaid al-Fighiyyah.. op. cit. P. 278 
397 a1-Bukhari, Sahih, hadith 6438. 
398 Muhammad Ibn Abdu al-Wahid Ibn Humam, Fath al-Qadir Sharh al-Hidäyah (Cairo: al-Amiriyyah 
Press, 1336), vol. 4, p. 139-140. 
399 al-Shawkani, op. cit. vol. 7, p. 118. 
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remains here is to define the word shubha and its relevance in this discussion. 
Shubhah is a noun of shabiha and ishtabaha, `to resemble'; that is, when something 
resembles another. It has been technically defined as something whose status is 
ambiguous, in the sense that one does not know for sure whether or not it is lawful or 
true. Thus, the difference between shakk and shubhah is that in the case of shaky 
there is no evidence that the crime is committed by the accused and, as such, 
punishment cannot be apportioned. Whereas, in the case of shubhah, there is some 
indication that the crime is committed by the accused, but the evidence put forward to 
establish the allegation is untenable, or the motive for the crime is contentious and 
contestable. 
Thus, shubhah, `doubt', which is the reverse of certainty, has a vital role in Islamic 
criminology. In Islamic criminal law, emphasis is placed on the need to prove beyond 
any iota of doubt that a particular accusation is genuine. This is because, any doubt 
suspected in litigation will be considered as an impediment to the validity of the suit 
and so provide grounds as to why guilt cannot be established against the accused 
person. 
In hudcld, in particular, it is important that shubhah should be given more 
consideration, and that the innocence of the accused should be presumed until 
otherwise proven. The reason for this is that some of the punishments that are due as a 
result of the commission of any of budrid crimes are irreversible once they have been 
carried out. In other words, credible and authentic shubhah is the way to avoid the 
punishment of hudz d in cases where the rights of God are involved 400 
Shubhah in Islamic law is what seems to be proven, but is, in fact, not. 01 One of the 
instances in which criminal cases are considered to be unproven is that of a man 
charged with committing sodomy with his wife. Since this is an act that was originally 
interpreted as one that only occurred between members of the same sex, the act is 
considered to be doubtful, meaning that hadd punishment will be averted. 02 Another 
400 al-Sarakhasi, al-Mabsut op. cit. vol. 9, pp. 151-156. 
401 Ibn Humam, Fathi al-qadir, op. cit. vol. 4, p. 140. 
402 This act is deplorable in Islam, but because of the shubha contained in it, and as the couple have the 
legitimate right to sexual intercourse, it is not certain whether reference to such instances of anal 
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example is when a person retracts his confession in a case where there is no other 
evidence than that of the confession. 403 The same can be said in a case where there is 
no other proof than that provided by witnesses who eventually withdraw their witness 
statements. 
In the case of adultery, Malik, Shafi' and Ahmad assert that if a man met a woman in 
his bed and had sexual intercourse with her assuming that she was his wife, the hadd 
would not be accorded to him, because of the shubhah involved 404 However, Abu 
Hanifah refuted such a claim on the ground that there is no shubhah in question 
because although a man can sleep in a relative's bed, having sexual intercourse with a 
female relative is emphatically prohibited 405 Stealing trivial things and things that are 
the basic essentials of life was originally permissible, and in Abu Hanifa's opinion, 
should not attract the hadd of theft. This is because people do not attach the same 
importance to them. Also, in the case of hunting animals and stealing water, there is 
shubhah in their prohibition. As such, stealing sand would not attract hadd. 
On the other hand, the majority of scholars do not accept Abu Hanifa's assumption 
because no shubhah is involved in those cases. In their opinion, if a worthless thing 
attains the nlsäb (minimum value), or if water or an animal is stolen under 
somebody's possession, &M punishment must be imposed 406 
3.3.6.3 Classification of Shubhah 
It is relevant to discuss the extent to which the Islamic Jurists consider the implication 
of shubhah in order to establish justice between litigants. The Hanafites and Shafi'ites 
schools of jurisprudence attempt to classify shubhah into various grades, while the 
Malikites and Hanbalites conceive of shubhah as one. In the Hanafite view, shubhah 
is divided into three parts. First: shubhah fil-fi 7 (doubt in action). This is when 
someone does not know whether an act is prohibited or not, because there is no 
intercourse is based on the Qur'an 2, verse 223. See al-Shinqiti, Adwa' al-Bayan op. cit. vol 1, p. 94, 
al-Suyuti, al-Durr al-Manthur Dar aI-Fikr Beirut 1993, vol. 1, p. 638. 
403 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni op. cit. vol 9, p. 119, Ibn Ham, al-Muhallaa op. cit. vol. 8, p. 252. 4°4 Ibn Qudamah Al-Mughni, op. cit. vol. 10, p. 155. 
405 Ibn Humam op. cit. vol. 4, p. 147. 
406 Ibn Humam, ibid. vol. 4, p. 327, al-Zarqani, Sharh al-Qawaid op. cit. p. 95, Ibn Qudama, al- 
Mughni op. cit. vol. 10, p. 247. 
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explicit and precise textual evidence on the issue. In this case, whoever commits such 
an offence with excuse of no explicit proof will not be punished with hadd. An 
example of this is an act of sexual intercourse with an irrevocably divorced wife while 
she is still in `iddah (the period of purification). 407 But, if such a person is aware of 
the evidence in any way and still commits the offence, then that person will be 
punished. 
The second shubhah is shubhah fi al-mahall, or shubhah al-milk (doubt of 
ownership). This class is a condition where two texts appear to be seemingly 
contradictory, such as the verse that stipulates that the punishment for theft should be 
the cutting off of the thief's hand, and a hadith which says a father owns the property 
of his son. Thus, if a father steals his son's property, he will not be punished with 
hadd, because of the doubt inherent in the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the 
property. 408 In the application of this shubhah, the Hanafites determinedly hold the 
view that a shubhah of mahall is applicable in any case where there is `legitimate 
evidence that nullifies the invalidity of the act at issue. '409 
The third shubhah is shubhah ft al- `aqd (doubt in contract). This view is solely 
attributed to Abu Hanifah and is refuted by his companions. In this case, if a man has 
sexual intercourse with his mahirim (Relatives or in-law which as stipulated in the 
Qur'an 4: 23, or in other parts of the prophetic hadith), he should not be punished with 
hadd. However, all these Hanafites proposals, including Abu Hanifahs' one, are 
rejected by other schools 410 
On the other hand, Shafi'i divides shubhah into three parts: Shubhah fi al-mahall 
(doubt of the place of the act), Shubhahfi al-fa-71 (doubt from the angle of the actor), 
and Shubhahfi al-Jihah (doubt of the legality or illegality of the act). Shubhahfi al- 
mahall is typified by the case of a man who has had sexual intercourse with his 
legitimate wife during her menstruation, or when she was fasting, or if he had anal sex 
with her. These acts revolve around the place of the act. Although the man has the 
right to have intercourse with his wife, he is not allowed to do so in certain 
407 al-Kasani, Bada'i Top. cit. vol. 7, p. 37. 
408 Awdah, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 214. 
409 Ibid. al-Kasani, op cit. 
410 Ibid. 
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circumstances. Shubhah fi al-f`i1(doubt from the angle of the actor) can be explained 
by the example of a man who was presented with a lady as his wife and with whom he 
had intercourse. Such a man will not be punished by hadd because of his doubt and 
ignorance of the act. However, if he does have such knowledge, there will be 
punishment by hadd. 411 Shubhahfi al-Jihah (doubt of the legality or illegality of the 
act) is described as a legal dispute among scholars on a particular issue. For example, 
Ibn Abbas supported, at one time, the legality of mutt `a (temporary marriage) while 
the majority of scholars disapproved of it. Abu Hanifah permitted a marriage contract 
that was concluded without the consent of waliyyi (the legal guardian of the bride) , 
412 
while Malik allowed a marriage contract without witnesses. In all of these cases, if 
someone has sexual intercourse with his wife within any of the above mentioned 
marriages, he will not be held liable for adultery. In fact, even if the perpetrator 
believes that it is prohibited, his belief is not considered because of the shubhah of 
disagreement among scholars 413 
One of the aspects of Islamic criminal justice is the level of scrutiny it attaches to 
unravelling the cause of any crime and the consideration it gives to the right of the 
victim. Hence, Islamic scholars coined a maxim thus: al-shubhah tamna ` wuji b al- 
hadd wall tamm ` wujiib al-mä1- Doubt interdicts only infliction of hadd punishment, 
but it does not interdict due financial compensation 414 
Doubt is given tremendous value in waiving hadd for the culprit. Nevertheless, in 
maintaining justice between two litigants, compensation for the victim is emphasised. 
Moreover, the cause of shubhah in criminal acts sometimes cannot be comprehended. 
However, the fact is that justice must be done. If any criminal case fails to be 
established for any legal reason bordering on doubt, it is incumbent to identify 
whether or not what is involved is the right of God. If it involves the rights of God, 
then there will be no hadd and no compensation. If it involves either the rights of God 
and man, or solely the right of man, the badd involved will be dropped, but 
compensation has to be given. The question may be asked: what is the need for 
compensation when the accusation has been quashed? The answer is that even though 
411 al-Shiribini, Mughni al-Muhtaj op. cit vol. 4, pp. 160-170. 
412 al-Kasani, op. cit. vol. 7, p. 35. 
413 Awdah op. cit. vol. 2, p. 213. 
414 al-Kasani op. cit. Vol. 7 p. 81 
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the allegation is interdicted, hadd is dropped in that case because (1) the I add is a 
right of God, and the violation of the right of God is open to forgiveness, especially if 
there is doubt in the case. (2) The right of man involved is undeniable because there is 
an element of truth in the case. Thus, if a stolen property is found in someone's 
possession and the person in whose possession the property is found claims that the 
property was found somewhere else and that he is only keeping it, such a person 
would be exempted from badd. However, the, goods must be returned to the owner. If 
he has made use of it, he must pay compensation. 
A similar situation would arise if someone slept with a woman who is not legally 
married to him and he then claims that the occurrence was a mistake. If legal 
procedure fails because of shubhah, then mahr al-mithl! (an equivalent value of 
dowry) must be paid to the woman. The same applies to homicide cases where the 
guilt of the intentionality of the accused cannot be established. In such cases, diyah 
will be resorted to because al-shubhah tamna' wujcib al-hadd wa lä tamna' wujz b al- 
mil (doubt only interdicts the implementation of badd, but not monetary 
compensation) 415 
3.4.0. Yagin (certainty) and Shakk (doubt) and the Means of Proof in Islamic 
Criminal Law 
Islamic law looks at the nature of a human being and presumed him innocent of any 
unusual alleged accusation placed on him. It does not suspect him or assume that the 
accusation he is charged with suggests that his nature is antithetic to humanity. This is 
because, according to the principle of a human being's nature, `the fundamental 
principle is non-liability'. Anything that may change this principle must be proved 
beyond any reasonable doubt. However, if a person has known connections to 
culpable action, the benefit of doubt given to him will be lesser than someone who is 
known to be pious. 
415 a1-Kasani, Bada'1 'op. cit vol. 7, p. 81, Ibrahim Ibn Shams al-Din Ibn Farhun, Tabsirab al-Hukkam 
if UsR al-Agdiyah wa Manähij al-Ahkim. (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah and Cairo: al- 
Amiriyyah Press, Cairo 1301), vol. 2, pp. 119-125, 
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There are many means of proof set out in Islamic criminal law. Some are substantial 
and scholars of Islamic jurisprudence agree on their authenticity such as eyewitnesses 
and confession; while some are circumstantial and their acceptability is controversial 
depending on the nature of the case brought before the court of justice. 16 There are 
two substantial means of proof in Islamic law namely bayyinah (evidence or 
eyewitness in a limited translation) and igrar (confession). Thus in this sections, the 
two means will be treated separately. The circumstantial means will be treated under 
al-bayyinah. 
3.4.1 al-Bayyinah as Proof to establish Certainty in Criminal Cases 
(a) al-Bayyinab `a1ä al-mudda i wa al yamin `a1ä man ankar 
(The burden of proof is on him who alleges and the oath is on him who 
denies). 417 
The maxim mentioned above is one of the maxims coded directly from the statement 
of Prophet Muhammad. Its authenticity is unanimously agreed upon among the 
traditionalists. 18 The maxim is widely applicable in establishing the genuineness of a 
claim between litigant parties. According to the maxim, the normal procedure of 
giving evidence before the court is that the onus of proof is on the plaintiff to establish 
what he alleges to be truth, while the oath is on the defendant who denies the claim. 
The mechanism of proof is to produce evidence as reflected in the first word of the 
maxim, al-bayyinah. There is an inconclusive debate among Islamic scholars as to the 
meaning of bayyinah in this maxim. The majority of classical Islamic Jurists hold that 
the meaning of bayyinah in the hadith that formed the maxim is restricted to witnesses 
alone. This is the view of the Hanafites, Malikites, Shafi'ites and the majority of 
Hanbalites 419 They argue that in most cases in the Qur'an or the Hadith, the word 
`witness' or shahädah, is used where evidence is required, as in the Qur'an chapter 2, 
verse 282 and chapter 24, verse 4, as well as in the Hadith narrated by Anas Ibn 
416 See details of acceptability of other circumstantial eveidences in Islamic law in Sayed Sikanadar Sha 
Haneef "Modern Means of Proof: Legal Basis for its accommodation in Islamic Law" in Arab Law 
Quarterly, 20,4, (Leiden: Brill NV., 2006). 
417 Majallah Article 76. 
418 al-Trimith, Sunan al-Trimid i, hadith nos. 1342 and 1356, al-Daraqutni, Sunan hadith no. 98, al- 
Bayhagi, Sunan, hadith no. 11892, Ibn Mäjah, SunaQ hadith no. 2321, Bukhari, kitäb a1-Shahädat 
Bib "a1-Bayyinah ala al-mudda'z 
419 al-Ramali, Nihäjah al-Mahtäj vol. 8, p. 314, al-Shiiiybini, Mughnl al-Muhtäj vol. 4, p. 461, al- 
BuhütI, Kashshäfal-Qinä, vol. 6, p. 378, al-Mardäwl, al-Insäf vol. 11, p, 369. 
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Malik, in which he said, "The first case of ii 'an (repudiation) that occurred in Islam 
was when Hiläl Ibn Umayyah accused his wife in the presence of the Prophet of 
having committed unlawful sexual intercourse with Shank Ibn Samhä. The Prophet 
said to him, "You have to produce bayyinah (construed as `witness' because the 
acceptable evidence in the case of zina is four witnesses), otherwise you will receive 
hadd punishment on your back". He said, "0 the Prophet! When one of us sees a man 
having intercourse with his wife, should he go and seek for witnesses (bayyinah)". 
But the Prophet insisted, saying: "You must produce evidence or you must receive 
add punishment on your back". Hiläl then said, "On Him who sent you with truth I 
am speaking truth, may God send down something that will free my back from hadd 
punishment., -A20 It is argued that the meaning of `bayyinah' which the Prophet referred 
to in this hadith is `witnesses' based on the Quranic verse that states that four 
witnesses are required in the case of zinc 410 
However, Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH), Ibn al-Qayyimal-Jawzi (d. 751 AH), Ibn 
Farliün, Ibn Hajar al-'Asgaläni (d. 852 AH), and a host of contemporary Islamic 
scholars, affirm that the word bayyinah in Islamic jurisprudence has a wider meaning 
than `witness'. The word bayyinah is any means that can be used to prove a claim. 
And to restrict its meaning to two or four witnesses would undermine the connotation 
of the word. Ibn al-Qayyim asserts that the word bayyinah, as expressed in the Qur'an 
6: 57 and 57: 25, does not only imply eye-witnesses in any case, but also indicates or 
means proof and clear signs 421 Accordingly, it is argued that the word shahädah 
(witness) is one of the means of bayyinah (evidence), and bayyinah is a conclusive 
proof that clarifies truth. 422 In other words, bayyinah is wider than shahädah, the latter 
being one of the bayyinah, but not all bayyiyah are necessarily shahädah 423 
From the foregoing discussion, it is safe to say that not limiting the meaning of 
bayyinah in this context complies with the purpose of the Shari'ah, namely, to 
establish justice on the earth. To give rights to their owners is one of the most visible 
420 al-Bukhäri, kitäb al-Tafstrhadith no,. 4747, Abu Dawud, Sunarn, hadith no. 2254, al-Trimith Sunan 
hadith No. 3179, Ibn Majah, Sunan, hadith no. 2067. 
421 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turuq al-Huluniyyah, p. 15. 
422 al-Husaii, Ahamd, 'An al-Qadi (Dar al-Kitab al-'Ara_bi n. d. ) vol. 1 p. 11 
423 Ibn al-Qayyim, `riam al-Muwagqi'in an Rabbi al-'Alamin vol. 1, p. 90, Ibn Farhuun, Tabsirah al- 
Hukk, m, vol. 1, p 161. 
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ways of establishing justice. Of course, by extending the connotation of the bayyinah 
to include any other means of evidence such as signs, DNA, forensic evidence, and 
photography would clearly enhance the establishment of justice. However, if 
bayyinah is restricted to only eye-witnesses, it will pervert the course of justice, and 
render many rights of men in vain. 
However, from a critical evaluation of the argument of the opinion of those who 
restrict bayyinah to mean only eye-witnesses, it is observed that the hadith on which 
their argument is based turns out to be on the side of the second opinion. In the 
Hadith, it is reported that the angel Jibr l revealed to the Prophet the verse: "And for 
those who accuse their wives, but have no witness except them.... ". The Qur'an 24, 
verse 6, considers liän (an oath of condemnation of the accusation of adultery 
between couple) as evidence to prove the genuineness of the plaintiffs claim and to 
prove the innocence of the defendant. Additionally, there were many ways in which 
claims had been proven during the life of the Prophet. It is reported that the Prophet 
had used gasämah (a legal procedure in which fifty people were asked to take an 
oath), gafah (a system to establish the parenthood of a child) and qur'ah, (drawing 
lots) as means of evidence to prove cases 424 This intuitively indicates that a claim can 
be proved by any just means of evidence, be it conclusive or circumstantial evidence, 
depending on the enormity and gravity of the matter. Of course, there are many means 
of evidence adventured in this contemporary age (such as photography, autopsy, 
forensic and DNA) whose efficiency is more reliable than a personal testimony that 
could be based on falsehood. Mahmassani remarks that because of the unreliability of 
eyewitnesses in their testimony, the modern legal system has been undermined 425 
The argument here is not to undermine the orthodox ways of proof. However, it is 
possible to say that bayyinah (evidence) could be restricted to eye-witnesses in cases 
that involve criminal acts, and stand as conclusive evidence if the requirements are 
fulfilled and more specifically so in cases that are solely the rights of God. However, 
in any other criminal case in which the rights of men are sought to be protected, eye- 
witnesses would be primarily sought for. If efforts to secure eye-witnesses are 
unsuccessful, circumstantial evidence could be resorted to as a secondary means of 
424 a1-Zahräni, op. cit. p. 29. 
425 Mahmassani, S. Falsafah al-Tasbri `fi al-Islam, op. cit., P. 176. 
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proof. Thus, the discussion in this section will consider this maxim in terms of its 
bayyinah, with regard to testimony, oath and circumstantial evidence. 
3.4.1.1 Shahädah (testimony of witness) as Evidence in Criminal Cases. 
(b) al-Thibit bi al-burhän ka al-thibit bi al-`iyän (What is established by 
convincing and just evidence is as what is established by an eyewitness) 426 
One of the means of evidence to prove claims in general, and in criminal liability in 
particular, is one that is considered to be conclusive - Shahadah (witness). The 
legality of shahädah is based on the Qur'an, Sunnah and consensus. 27 It is reported 
that a man from Hadramawt and a man from the tribe of Kindah submitted a dispute 
to the Prophet, who said, "Shahidäk aw yaminihi. s428 This hadith testifies to the fact 
that the use of testimony is universally accepted from the epoch of the Prophet. 29 The 
word shahs dah connotes many meanings in the Arabic language. Amongst them are 
mu`äyanah (viewing), 430 al-hudür (presence), as in the Qur'an 2, verse 185, al-71M 
(knowledge), as in the Qur'an 3, verse 18, al-half (swearing), as in the Qur'an 63, 
verse 1 and al-'Ikhbär (information). 31 Shahädah is the giving of truthful information 
for the purpose of substantiating a legal right before a court of law. 432 The majority of 
Islamic scholars pay attention to the articulation of the phrase ashhad, "I witness", 
while some scholars, including Abu Hanifah, the Malikites, and apparently Ahmad 
Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyyah, and Ibn al-Qayyim, amongst others, do not consider any 
specific word to convey testimony. 433 
It is generally considered as obligatory to stand as a witness in litigation involving the 
claims of men, and also in criminal cases that involve the rights of God. However, one 
is not morally or legally obliged to give testimony. This is especially so in the case of 
426 Majallah Article 75, Haydar, Durar vol. 1, p. 65, al-Zarqa, ibid p. 367. 
427 Qur'an 2, verses 282-283 and Qur'an 4, verse 135, Qur'an 65, verses 1-2. 
428 al-Bukhäri, $al Hadith No. 2380, Muslim, $4h, Hadith No. 138. 
429 al-Ramti, Nihäyab al-Muhtäj, vol. 8, p. 292, Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughrü, vol. 9, p. 120. 
430 See Sayyid Säbiq, Figh al-Sunnah 3/26). 
431 Ahmad Ibrahim, Turq al-Ithbat fi al-Shan'ah al-Islämiyyah, (Cairo: al-Matba' al-Salafiyyah, n. d. ) 
p. 28 and al-Zaharäni, Tara'iq al-Hukm, p. 34. 
432 Ibn Humam, Fath al-Qadir vol. 3, p 364, Ibn Farhuum, Tabsirah al-Hukkim vol. 1, p. 164. 
433 al-Kasan Badä'i, vol. 6, p. 273, Ibn Humam, Sharh fatlial-Qadrvol. 7, p 375, al-Dasuqi, Ifshiya 
al-Dasügi on al-Shar al-Kabir, vol. 4, p. 165, Ibn Farhüºn Tabsir al-Hukkäm vol. 1, p. 209, Ibrahim Ibn 
Abdullah Ibn Abi al-Dam, Adab al-Qadä', (al-Manumit IT al-Ag(fiyah wa al-Hukf nät), ed. 
Muhammad M. Al-Ruhayli, (Damascus: Dar al-Filer, n. d. ) p. 383, Ibn Qudämah, al-Mughni vol. 
9/216, Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turq al-Hugmiyyah, pp. 272-273. 
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sexual intercourse, where it is often thought commendable neither to report nor to 
witness in such a case. This is because in cases involving the rights of God, to protect 
and conceal (satar) a Muslim's defect is better than to expose him. This is based on 
the case of Mä'iz when the Prophet said to Huzäl, "Why not condone/cover him with 
your garment? " (hallaa satartah bi ridä'ik )434 The rights of men, on the other hand, 
need to be retrieved from the accused in order to protect people's properties 435 
The general conditions regarding the acceptability of the testimony of witnesses are 
puberty, sanity, liberty, sight, and faculty of speech, probity, trustworthiness, 
vigilance, precision, memory, and Islam. 436 In addition, some scholars opine that a 
testimony should be proclaimed in the courtroom in specific language, although this 
view is opposed by the Malikites and some Shafi'ites. 437 
However, in criminal cases, in order to establish certainty and to remove any bit of 
doubt, there are certain conditions stipulated for the acceptance of witnesses, 
depending on the nature of the crime. Among the controversial conditions that attract 
the attention of human rights' activists across the world is the masculinity of 
witnesses (dhkiriyyah). The opinion of the majority of classical Islamic scholars, 
including the Hanafites, is that witnesses in cases of hadd and gisäs should be 
restricted to males438. They argue that the verse of the Qur'an that allows the witness 
of females in financial cases states that the reason why two females should be sought 
for, as equivalent to one man, is because of their forgetfulness (an tadlllah). This 
would necessitate a shubhah, hudi d and gips penalty thus, in turn, would be 
revocable by any credible shubhah. Thus, to accept a female in such cases would cast 
doubt on the claim of the plaintiff and may render his claim invalid. Another reason 
put forward to justify the rejection of female witness in hadd and qi i cases is that 
434 mad, al-Musnad Hadith No. 21940, al-Bayhagi, Sunan abBayhagl abKubra, hadith no 16735. 
See also, Ibn Farhun, Tabsira, op. cit. vol 1, p. 176, Izz al-Din Abdu al-Salaam, Qawi `id al-Ahakam 
ff Maaälih al-Anäm (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, n. d. ) vol 1, p. 160, al-Shinqiti, Adwa' al-Bayan 
vol. 
8, 
p. 297. 
ass Ibn Farhün, Tabsirah al-IHukkäm, vol. 1, p. 165. 
436 al-Kasäni, Badä'f abSanä'i' vol. 6, p. 266, al-QarAB, al-Ftuüq, vol. 4, p. 97, Ibn Qudäma, al- 
Mughni, Vol. 9, pp. 164-165, Ibn Taymiyyah, Majrrrü' al-Patdwa, vol. 35, p. 409, Ibn Rushd, Bidäya 
al- Mujtahid, vol. 2 p. 452. 
437 al-Daridair, al-Sharal-Kabir vol. 4, p. 164-165. 
438 Ibn Abdu al-Barr, al-K vol. 2 p. 906, Ibn Rushd, Bidäyah al-Mujtahid, vol. 2, P. 448, Ibn 
Qudamah, al-Mughn7,, vol. 9. P. 222, Ibn Humam, Sharp Fatih al-Qad r, vol. 7, pp. 369-370, Ibn 
Nuj aym, al-Bahr al-Rä'iq vol. 7 p. 62 
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women do not normally witness gatherings where such crimes occur. Hence, their 
testimony should not be admitted. Lastly, female testimony is resorted to as a last 
option when there are not a sufficient number of men to witness 439 Thus, if women 
are allowed to witness in cases of hudüd and gips, claims may well be rendered in 
vain. 
However, Ibn Hazm al-Zahiri and a host of others accept the testimony of women in 
all cases, including hadd and gips They argue that as the Qur'an has accepted their 
testimony in financial cases, there should be no difference in cases regarding criminal 
offences. In response to the argument of the first opinion, it is argued that since the 
Qur'an has accepted women's testimonies in financial cases, despite envisaging 
subhah, the acceptance of their testimonies in other cases is undeniable. Also, the 
Qur'an does not completely nullify the acceptability of women's testimony, rather it 
conditions it with two women in lieu of one man, and this can also be applied in tadd 
and gisa$ cases. In the case of a woman who was reported to have committed zink the 
Prophet said that if she admitted "aqarrat ", then tadd should be inflicted on her for 
her sin 440 If the Prophet accepted the witness of a woman in the case of hadd, then 
their testimonies should as well be allowed in other cases. 
As regards the excuse that women do not normally witness such offences, it can be 
argued that the unavailability of women in criminal gatherings was in the olden days. 
The truth is that nowadays it is possible that women witness such incidents and it will 
be wrong not to allow or accept their testimony over incidents to which they are 
witnesses. Moreover, to say that a woman's testimony is fraught with doubt, and as 
such, her testimony should be dismissed, is just not tenable in the modem age. There 
are women who are very intelligent, and who have excellent memories and who 
would excel in giving witness. Therefore, why should such women be denied the 
opportunity to witness in a case that they may have full knowledge of? If the 
acceptability of women's testimonies in cases of hudüd and gips could be 
439 al-Kasani, al-Bada'i `vol. 6, pp. 268 and 279, al-Dardir, al-Sharh al-Kabirvol. 4, pp. 185-189, Ibn 
Abdul al-Barr, al-Kift (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1407) vol. 2, p. 906, Ibn Rushd, Bidayah 
Vol. 2, p. 448, Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, vol. 4, p. 222. 
440 al-Bukhari, Sahih al-Bukhari, hadith no 2190,2549 and Muslim, Sahih Muslim hadith no 1697 
1698. 
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established, perhaps many cases could have been won through the testimony of such 
women. 
Having said that, the reason why majority of classical Islamic jurists refuse the 
testimony of female in the cases of hudüd and gisas is not to degrade the status of 
female but to protect both the rights of the accuser and the accused. Since it is 
possible to revoke punishment offiudzid and gisac where there is a credible doubt and 
female testimony has been described as having possible doubt which is forgetfulness 
"an tadillah ibdahumä" Any of the litigants can use that element of doubt as an 
excuse to jeopardize the right of his opponent. 
It can be concluded on this discussion that if the penalty of a crime involves rights of 
God or the requirement of evidence is higher so that no iota of doubt should be 
allowed, witness of women may not be allowed because from Islamic legal point of 
view, that will allow inscribing doubt into evidence which will render the case abated. 
That will be adverse on either the plaintiff or defendant. However, if the case involves 
rights of men and testimony is needed to establish that right, recourse to the testimony 
of women is paramount 441 
The number of witnesses required in criminal cases differs according to each crime 
committed. The comparative danger of the crime necessitates the number of witnesses 
required. These numbers range from one to four depending on the nature of the case. 
3.4.1.1.1 Number of Witnesses in Islamic Criminal Case 
(a) Four witnesses 
Generally, there is an agreement among scholars that four male witnesses are required 
for the offence of zink based on the Qur'an 4, verse 15 and the Qur'an 24, verses 4 
and 13, and in the Sunnah, where it is reported the Prophet said: "Present four 
witnesses or you receive hadd punishment on your back"442 Ibn Qudamah reports that 
Muslims are in consensus that less than four witnesses in the case of zini is not 
aal al-Marghinani, al-Hidäyah, vol. 7 p. 33-96, See Baderin, A. Mashood, Intentional Human Rights 
and Islamic Law, op. cit. 102-103, for other ways of interpreting the text which equates two women 
to one man in witness. 
442 See Abu Dawud sunun, hadith no 2254 
123 
acceptable. 443 This requirement is sought for to set higher degree of certainty in such 
crime. 
However, the question of how many witnesses are required to testify adultery case 
established by the confession of the offender has to be addressed. Abu Hanifa, Ibn 
Hazm, some Malikites, Shafi'ites and one version of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, all approve 
of two witnesses, based on the general agreement on the numbers of witnesses in 
confession. However, in another version of Hanbalite, some Malikites and Shafi'ite 
opine that four witnesses are required for confession. They argue that if confession in 
the case of zinä is required to be uttered four times before it can be accepted, then by 
analogy, witnesses to the confession should number four. Moreover, if hadd 
punishment cannot be executed other than by four confessions, then hadd cannot be 
executed unless there are four witnesses to that confession 444 There is an extraneous 
view reported by al-Hasan al-Basri in which the distinguished scholar opines that four 
witnesses are required in the case of gisJs This is because of the severity of the 
punishment; and by analogy, the same should apply to the offence of ziniwhich can 
also lead to capital punishment (itläf nafs). The type of testimony required in the 
crime of zink therefore, should also be applied to the prosecution of murder. 
(b) Two witnesses 
The majority of Islamic jurists add crimes such as the false accusation of adultery, 
wine-drinking, defamation, theft, brigandage, highway-robbery, armed rebellion, 
apostasy, and the case of murder that leads to gips, to the list of cases that can only 
be proved by two witnesses who have fulfilled the aforementioned general 
requirements. This is the opinion of the Hanafites, Malikites, Shafi`ites and 
Hanbalites. 445 
443 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni vol. 9, p. 148. Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turq al-Hukniyyah p. 126. 
444 Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid. p. 127. 
445 al-Kasäni, al-Bada'i' vol. 7, pp. 33-96, Ibn Humam, Sharh Fath al-Qadir, vol. 7, pp. 370-372, 
Malik, al-Mudawwan, vol. 16, p. 443, al-Zargani, Sharh al-Muwatta' vol. 4, p. 178 al-Shafi', al- 
Ummu, vol. 6, pp. 16-19, Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughnivol. 8, pp. 230-236. ( See also Ibn Nujaym, a1-Bahr 
al-R, 04, vol. 7 p. 62 and 66, Ibn al-Juzay', al-Qawanin, p. 298, Ibn al-Humam , Sharp 
Fatb aI-Qadlr, 
vol. 7 pp. 369-370, al- Shawkani, Nayl al-Awtar, vol. 7 pp. 181-183, al-Bahtitl , Kashshäfal-Qinä vol. 6 p. 434. 
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The admissibility of two witnesses is based on the Qur'an and the Hadith. The Qur'an 
says: " ... And get two witnesses among your own men... s446 It is also reported that 
the Prophet said in two litigations to the plaintiff: "shihidükaw yaminihi" ('provide' 
your two witnesses or you take an oath). 447 In this category, the admission of female 
witnesses is contentious based on the disagreement on the legality of the admissibility 
of females in hudüd and glsäs offences. Accordingly, those who would allow the 
testimony of females in any case suggest that two females would be accepted in lieu 
of one male, in line with the verse that states "... one man and two women. "448 It is 
reported that `Atä' Ibn Rabäh and Hammäd Ibn Sulaymän accept three male and two 
female witnesses in a crime of adultery. 449 In the case of murder punishable by gisäs, 
Ibn Hazim, of the Zahiri school allows two trustworthy Muslim males, or one Muslim 
male with two females, or four females, arguing that such flexibility is as acceptable 
as the composition of witnesses in cases of financial compensation. 450 
The fundamental question in this provision is why should two women equal one man? 
Is there, in fact, any equality of rights in Islamic legal procedure, as professed by 
Islam? The fact is that as Islam acknowledges the equality of men and women as 
human beings, and ensures its enshrinement in all facets of human life, it does not, as 
Baderin observes, "Advocate absolute equality of roles between them"451 Baderin 
further maintains that the equality of women is recognized in Islam on the principle of 
"equal, but not equivalent. "452 
It is also argued that except in the case of contractual matters, where Islamic law 
requires two women in lieu of a man, there is no other section of the text in which this 
446 Qur'an 2, verse 282, cf. Qur'an 5, verse 106, Qur'an 65 verse 2. 
447 al-Bukhari, Shablh, badith No. 2380, Muslim, Sabih, hadith No. 138, And in criminal liability, al- 
Nasai, Sunan, hadith No. 5992, al-Bayhaqi, Sunan al-Kubra, haditb No. 20995, both in financial 
litigation. 
448 Qur'an 2, verse 282. 
449 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni vol. 8, pp. 198-199. 
450 Ibn Hazm, al-Muhallab vol. 11 p. 143. This opinion is ascribed to al-Awzä i (d. 157 A. H). Sufyän 
al- ThawrT (d. 161 A. H). and'Atä (d. 114. ) see al-Shawkäni, Nayli al-Awtär op. cit. vol. 7, p. 182, Ibn 
al-Qudamah, al-Mughn!, op. cit. vol. 8, pp. 97- 98, Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turq al-Hulrnliyyah p. 133. 
45 1 Baderin, M., Intemational Human Rights, op. cit. p. 60. 
452 Ibid A similar view has been echoed by Qutb M. Islam, the misunderstood Religion (Dacca: 
Adhunik Prokashani, 1978), p. 129, and al-Faruqi I. R. and al-Faruqi L. L. See The Cultural Atlas of 
Islam (New York: Macmillan, 1986), p. 150. 
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restriction is mentioned. This indicates that female witnesses should not be 
conditioned to the provision made in contractual matters. EI-Bahnassawi submits thus: 
It should be borne in mind that Islam attributed this differentiation between the sexes to their 
respective natural disposition, though it had acknowledged their creation from the same origin 
and essence. It is not indicative of woman's inferiority but touches directly on people's 
interest and the safeguarding of justice 453 
In general, women are allowed to stand as witnesses in cases that involve bodily 
injuries that are not punishable with gicac. According to Malikites doctrine, women 
can bear witness in cases of non-intentional homicide and intentional bodily injuries 
because both only incur pecuniary compensation as arsh. As such, if women testify 
with men in the crime of al-munaqqilah (an injury whereby a bone is displaced) and 
al-ma'mumah (a head wound reaching the cerebral membrane), their testimony will 
be accepted because the outcome of the punishment of the two commissions, with 
regard to their being an intentional or an unintentional act, is the same. 454 Thus, one 
man and two females are accepted in such crimes with testimonies that include the 
plaintiff's exculpatory oath. 455 
(c) One witness with oath 
Generally, the minimum standard of witness is two witnesses. However, because of 
the abnormal situation that demands that justice has to be established, one witness 
coupled with his oath is advocated. There are two different opinions on whether this 
standard should be accepted in judicial procedure. Islamic jurists unanimously agree 
that one witness and his oath is not acceptable in any case of strict hudi d as it 
involves the right God. However, Malikites, Shafi'ites and Hanbalites accept one 
witness and his oath456 based on the opinion of Ibn Abbas, in which it is reported that 
the Prophet adjudicated with one witness and his oath. However, Hanafites 457 
ass El-Bahnassawi, S., Women between Islam and World Legislation, (Safa: Dar-ul-Qalam, 1985), p. 
132. See also other contributors to this matter, Doi. A. R. Woman in Shariah (London: Taha 
Publishers, 1987, al-Faruqi, L., Women, Muslim Society and Islam, (Indianapolis: American Trust 
Publications, 1988). 
454 Ibn Abd Al-Barr, al-Ki , (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1407), vol. 2, pp. 906-911 ass Ibn Rushd, Bidayah, vol. 2 p. 453, al-Qarafi, al-Furugvol. 4 pp. 87-91. 456 Ibn Farlinn, Tabsirab, vol. 1, p. 215, al-Qarafi, ibid., vol. 4, p. 146, al-Shiribini, Mughni al-Muhtäj 
vol. 4, p. 443, Ibn Qudamah, al-Mugb&, vol. 9, p. 151. 
457 Muslim, Sahih, hadith No. 1712, Abu Dawud, Sunan, hadith No. 3610. 
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maintain that one witness and his oath cannot be admitted in any case because the 
Qur'an has never stated that and the authentic hadith does not require the plaintiff to 
take an oath. Rather it is the defendant who is supposed to take the oath. 58 It is not 
possible to accept the stand of the Hanafites on this issue since there is a sound hadith 
that indicates that one witness can be accepted, coupled with his oath. It is an 
acceptable principle in usül that a text that is deemed to contradict another text can be 
merged with its contradicting text. If possible, that does not indicate the abrogation of 
any text but it stands rather as extra evidence 459 Al-Qarafi and Ibn Farhun of the 
Malikite School enumerate cases in which one witness and his oath can be admitted. 
Some of these are: in pecuniary claims including sariqah, (theft), ghasb (usurpation), 
igrar (confession), wakälah (warrants) or `sureties', gips, (retaliation) in bodily 
injuries, and al-khul t, (a financial transaction), as in trade 460 
3.4.1.2 Oath 
An oath is one of the means of settling disputes between the litigant parties in the 
Islamic legal system. Its legality is derived from various Qur'anic verses such as 5: 89 
and 2: 77; and from the ahadith of the Prophet. Among the ahadith is the hadith of Ibn 
`Abbas in which he said that the Prophet of God stated: "If every people have been 
given their claim (without evidence), some people might have claimed other people's 
properties, but the oath is on the defendant. "461 There are five ways in which an oath 
can be applied. (1) An oath is used as a defence for an accused in cases where the 
plaintiff has no evidence (i. e. no witnesses). (2) An oath can also be used to rectify a 
claim of da `wä, (claims) such as an oath taken by the plaintiff with one or two males 
or two female witnesses. (3) An oath that is taken by the plaintiff after the refusal 
(nukrii) of the defendant. (4) An oath taken by the plaintiff after full evidence in order 
to finalize the judgment. (5) An oath taken by the defendant as gasämah where the 
defendant has no conclusive evidence but only circumstantial evidence (al-lawth) 462 
ass al-Kasani, Bad? `vol. 6, p. 225. 459 al-Amidi, al-Ihkam B Usul al-Ahkam, vol. 4, p. 175. 46° al-Qarafi, al-Funiq vol. 4, p. 90, Ibn Farhun, Tabsirah, vol. 1, p. 215. 461 al-Bukhari, Sahib al-Bukhari, hadith no. 2477. 462 Ibn Farhun, Tabsiral-Hukkam, vol. 1, p. 147, al-Zahrani, Tara'iq al-Hufen op. cit. p 192. 
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The first is unanimously agreed upon among the scholars as the principle in question 
states. The second procedure has been debated between the majority of Islamic jurists 
who support it in some matters but the Hanifites reject it, arguing that the hadith that 
supports its legality is weak 463 But the majority of scholars assert that the hadith of 
Ibn Abass mentioned above, in which it is reported that the Prophet gave judgement 
with one witness and oath (of the plaintiff), is authentic and does not invalidate the 
normal procedure, but is an additional way of establishing fact. 464 The third is also 
contended between the majority of Islamic scholars and the Hanafites. The majority of 
Islamic scholars approve of it, while the Hanafites disprove it based on their argument 
in the second procedure mentioned above. 465 However, this procedure is only 
applicable in matters with testimony that clearly involves the rights of men. On the 
other hand, there has been a long debate on the legality concerning a fourth way of 
taking an oath in the Islamic legal system i. e taking an oath by the plaintiff after he 
has presented two witnesses. However, the conclusion is that this system is totally 
unacceptable in budcid, and as they are absolutely the rights of God, neither the 
plaintiff nor the defendant should be asked to take an oath 466 
However, if there is suspicion surrounding a claim that involved the rights of men - 
for example, if someone claims that his property has been stolen and provides fake 
evidence, or if someone claims that someone else committed adultery with her slave 
in order to take her dowry, the plaintiff would be asked to take an oath. For example, 
Ali Ibn Abi Talib asked a plaintiff to swear an oath beside his two witnesses. When he 
refused, Ali said, "I will not adjudicate to you for which you do not take an oath. "467 
It is reported that judge Shurayh asked the plaintiff to take an oath due to the 
dissemination of an allegation. When people asked him on what basis he innovated 
such procedure, he replied that because people had innovated novel problems, he had 
to contrive a new means of evidence 468 Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751) remarks that this 
463 al-Shawkani Nayl al-Awtarvol. 9, p. 191. 
464 al-Shawkani ibid vol. 9, p. 195, Ibn Farhun, Tabsirah vol. 1, p. 215. 
465 al-Sahafi' al- Umm vol. 6, p. 241, Ibn Farhun, ibid., vol. 1, pp. 154 -155 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni 
vol. 9, p. 235. 
466 Ibn Qudamah, ibid, vol. 9, p238, Kasani, Bada'i' vol. 6, p. 226, al-Gazali, al-Wajiz, vol. 2, p. 
159, Ibn Farhun, Tabsir, vol. 1, p. 157. 
467 Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turq al-Hukmiyyah p. 113. 
468 Ibn al-Qayyim, ibid. p. 113. 
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procedure is not too far from the precept (spirit) of Shari `ah, particularly in the case of 
probability of indictment 469 
However, none of the scholars approve of such a procedure in any case of hudrid and 
gips, especially in cases that are absolutely the right of God, such as those dealing 
with adultery and drinking alcohol. If someone confesses and then retracts that 
confession, no punishment will be inflicted on him and he will not be asked for any 
oath. Therefore, not to ask for such an oath would be preferable in cases where there 
is no confession, 470 unless in monetary disputes, as there are disagreements among the 
scholars on its legality. 471 
3.4.1.3 Qasimah 
The legal procedure before a judge is that the defendant has first to prove that his case 
is genuine, while the accused is responsible for the damage, according to the maxim 
in question. However, if the accused denies all the charges, then he will take an oath 
to exculpate himself. However, there are circumstances in which the procedural 
system changes. These are in cases where the defendant is asked to take an oath but 
refuses, or where the plaintiff has no proof, but only suspicion based on some' factual 
elements - such as a deceased person being found in the company of a group of 
people, where, although no one is arrested, there is existing enmity between the two 
groups. This is called gasämah fi dimä' (gasämah of blood), as in a case where armed 
robbers storm a house and loot what is in the house in the presence of witnesses, 
although these witnesses do not see exactly what is taken from the house. This is 
called al-gasimah fr al-amwäl (gasimah in a financial claim or property claim. ). Ibn 
al-Qayyim argues for the legality of the latter so that if gasämah in the case of 
homicide can be established because of lawth (circumstantial evidence), then, this 
should also be accepted, as it is even more conclusive than the former. That is because 
there are witnesses for the commission of the offence, and only the details are absent. 
469 Ibid p. 113. 
470 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mugimi, vol. 9, p. 238. 471 Ibn al-Qudamah, ibid., vol. 9, p. 238, al-Zahrani, Taribiq aI-hukm p. 205. 
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In this situation, any means can be used to substantiate the genuineness of the 
claim 472 
The meaning of gasimab, which was known and practised in the life time of the 
Prophet, is a number of multiple oaths used to substantiate or refute claims of 
homicide that corroborate with lawth (circumstantial evidence). 73 It is a method of 
proof in Jihiliyyah (the period before the advent of Islam), which the Prophet applied 
in the case of Huwaisa. The Majority of Islamic Jurists including the Hanifites, 
Malikites, Shafi'ites and Hanbalites approve it as legal procedure in a case of murder 
where there is no substantial evidence, but only circumstantial, although474 it is 
opposed by some Islamic scholars 475 
The legal ground for this system is the Hadith reported by Sahl Ibn Abi Hathmah in 
which the Prophet said to them: "Would you take an oath and entitle you to the blood 
of your fellow? "476 The antagonists of this system argue that this procedure 
contradicts well-established norms of the Islamic legal system that require the plaintiff 
to give evidence. They argue that gasarnah is not bayyinah (evidence) to prove a 
claim. 77 As such, the use of gasämah should not be admitted. However, it can be said 
that gasiinab is not conclusive evidence, and, but for the fact that the Prophet used it 
as an adjudication in that case, it may not have become an additional means of 
adjudication in Islam. Further, the claim of homicide is not conceivable solely with 
gasitnah, except if there is lawth (circumstantial evidence that leads to suspicion 
regarding the genuineness of the case). Conversely, if qas hnah is to establish justice 
among litigants -especially in a matter involving men's rights-there is no doubt that it 
is in the spirit of Islam to accept such a system. 
However, because of insufficient proof that hinders the use of gasämah, the legal 
procedure should be changed, according to the majority of scholars, including the 
472 Ibn al-Qayyim, aI-Turq al-hukmiyyah, pp. 110-112 
473 Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, Fatih al-Bari vol. 7, p. 156. 
474 Kasani, Badä'i; vol. 7, p. 286, Malik, al-Muwatta, vol. 5, pp. 186-187, al-Shiribini , Mughni a! - 
Muhtäj, Vol. 4, p. 101, al-Bahüti, Kasbäf'al-Qina', vol. 6, p. 74. 
475 al-Shawkirü, Nay] al-Awtär, vol. 7, p. 186. 
476 al-Bukhar, Sahib, haidith no. 6898. 
477 al-Zahrani, Tarä'q al-Hukm, p. 218. 
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Malikites, Shafi'ites and Hanbalites 478 The procedural norm is that the oaths of 50 
men will be shared by the relatives of the victim, and that the offenders involved in 
the death of their relative will be entitled to the following, as stated by the Prophet: 
to 11ifün khamsin yamin wa tastahigqtin dam sähibikum aw gätilkum' (You take 50 
oaths and you will be entitled to the blood of your accused or those who killed (your 
relative) 479 
The Hanafites hold a contrary view. They stand by the normal procedure that the 
defendant has to take an oath. They even support their stance with another version of 
the hadith, saying: "You will bring evidence against those who killed him, " to which 
the reply was, "We do not have bayyinah (an eye-witness). The Prophet then said they 
should take oaths. The reply was that they were not pleased with the oath of the Jews - 
and, because the Prophet did not want the right to go in vain, he adjudicated a hundred 
camels for them. 80. It is inferred from this that the defendant did not take an oath and 
thus the normal procedure should be adhered to. 81 The fact that the oath was not 
taken as proposed by the Prophet in this case does not imply that it is not legal to use 
the procedure. 
3.4.1.4 Other circumstantial evidences 
It is worth noting that gasämah procedure cannot be administered unless there is 
circumstantial evidence, as exemplified above. However, what constitutes 
circumstantial evidence in such a situation has no unified definition among the 
Islamic scholars. 82 But it can be said that any circumstantial evidence such as 
photography, fingerprints, tape recordings, confidential documents, and DNA can be 
used in a number of criminal cases to support substantive evidence that lacks the 
necessary legal requirements. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental principle that the use 
of circumstantial evidence in any hvdid crime that is absolutely the right of God is 
not accepted, because the rights of God are based on forgiveness and are pardonable if 
478 Malik, Muwatt4,, al-Shiribini, Mughni a -Muhtaj, vol. 4, p114, Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, vol. 8, p. 
65, Khalil. Ibn Ishaq, Mukhtasaral-Khiragi, ed. Ahmad al-Harakat, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1415), p. 186. 
479 al-Bukhari, Sahib, hadith nos. 3002 and 6769, Muslim, Sahib, hadith No. 1669. 
480 al-Bukhari, Sahib, hadithNo. 6502. 
481 al-Kasani, Bada? vol. 7, p. 287. 
482 al-Kasani, ibid., vol. 7, pp. 287-288, al-Sarkhasi, al-Mabstit, vol. 26, p. 108 Malik, al- 
Muwatta , vol. 5, p. 187, Shafi', al-Umm, vol. 6, p. 79, Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, vol. 8, p. 68. 
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they are not reported to the authority. However, if the crime is partly the right of God 
and partly the right of men, circumstantial evidence can then be used to establish the 
right of men. If the legal consequence is mainly pecuniary, such as diyah, 
circumstantial evidence can be used inasmuch as the plaintiff can present some 
substantial evidence that needs to be elevated to a higher requirement. However, if the 
legal consequence is punitive, as in the case of sariqah, qadhf, and even gisäs - 
according to Hanafites, but contrary to the majority view- then circumstantial 
evidence cannot be used for fixed punishments. In other words, circumstantial 
evidence cannot be used to inflict hadd and qi$a$ punishments, although it can be used 
to award discretionary punishments. 
Another burning issue surrounding the admittance of circumstantial evidence 
concerns the appearance of pregnancy as an item of circumstantial evidence. It is 
reported that Umar Ibn Khatab affirmed that pregnancy is one of the yardsticks for 
convicting an unmarried woman of adultery. In his documented reports he states: "I 
fear if time passes and one said: we do not see stoning (to death) in the Book of God 
and consequently they will go astray by abolishing obligation revealed by God. Lo! 
Indeed, stoning (to death) is a right (of God) on any one who committed adultery and 
he/she is muhsin (married -before) if there is bayyinnah (witness) or pregnancy 
(appeared) or confession established. 9-A83 Remarking on this assertive opinion, al- 
Suyuti said: "Using the appearance of pregnancy as a factor for determining the 
adulterous status of a woman is attributed to Umar and adopted by Malik. "484 This is 
contrary to the opinion of the majority of Islamic scholars, including Hanafites, 
Shafi`ites and Hanbalites, because it is not necessarily the case that once a woman 
becomes impregnated through sexual intercourse that it be deemed as adultery. It 
could be through insemination, or by other means known to the modern age. In fact, 
the woman could have been sexually abused or raped while she was asleep. In all of 
these cases, there is agreement that a woman cannot be punished with hadd because of 
the shubhah involved and as a principle, hudi d should be averted in the face of 
shubhah. 485 A woman is said to have been brought before Umar accused of adultery 
because of her pregnancy while she was unmarried. The woman explained that she 
483 al-Bukhari, Sahib, hadithNos 6441,6829. 
484 al-Shinqiti, Adwa al-Bayan, vol. 5, pp. 319-321 
485 al-Tirmidhi, Sunan, hadith No 1456. See al-Shinqiti, ibid. 
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was asleep while a man raped her, thus she was acquitted. In another story, a woman 
was brought before him for the same reason and she explained that she was coerced, 
and thus she was acquitted. 86 This is the reason why criticism has been heaped on the 
judgement of the Shariah court of Sokoto and Kastina States of Nigeria, in which 
Safiyyatu and Amina were convicted of adultery because of the appearance of 
pregnancy, while not legally married. 
To sum up the stand of Islamic scholars on acceptable evidence, it is clear that 
bayyinah is not only restricted to witnesses, as perceived by the majority of Islamic 
scholars. It is also the case that witnessing by any suitable means to establish justice 
among litigants can be deemed as evidence. In general, female testimonies are not 
acceptable in crimes that are solely the rights of God because women are often 
assumed, inter alia, not to be present at such criminal scenes. Regarding these rights, 
concealment of the wrongdoing and admonition of the wrongdoer is encouraged. In 
any criminal case in which female witnesses are accepted, two women are equivalent 
to one man if we draw from the textual evidence prescribing that. However, in cases 
where male witnesses cannot be found, a woman's evidence is admissible in 
corroboration with other circumstantial evidence. 
It is a debatable point among classical and contemporary Islamic scholars whether 
circumstantial evidence and modem investigative technology can be used in Islamic 
law in general, and in Islamic criminal law in particular. The majority of Islamic 
scholars approve any circumstantial evidence that is sought to establish justice in 
general, 487 as opposed to Ibn Nujaym and al-Ramli, who opine that circumstantial 
evidence is not admissible. 88 
It is argued in support of the acceptability of circumstantial evidence that, at times, 
circumstantial evidence could be stronger than traditional substantive evidence. An 
example of this could be in a case where four witnesses claim that someone 
486 al-Shinqiti, ibid p. 392. 
487 Ali Ibn Khalil al-Tarabilsi, Muin al-Hukkam funs yataraddad bayna al-Kbacimayn mini al- 
Ahkärn, (Cairo: Matba' al-Halabi, 1393) p. 166, Ibn `Abidin, Hashiya Ibn `Abidiin, vol. 5 p. 354, Ibn 
Farhun, Tabsira al-Hukkaarn , vol. 2 p. 93, al-Qarrafi, al- Furuq, vol. 4 p. 167, Izz al-Din Abdul al- Salaam, Qawä'id al-Ahkä n. Vol. 2 p. 107, Ibn Qayyim, al-Turq al-Hukmiyyah p. 4, and 'Ain a! - 
Muwagq3n vol. 1 p. 103. 
488 Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba', p. 248, 
133 
committed adultery, but eventually it is proved that the woman concerned is a virgin. 
There may also be other stronger evidence proving the claims of the witnesses to be 
false. In that case, circumstantial evidence will render the claim abated 489 
Generally speaking, there are cases where it is necessary to resort to circumstantial 
evidence. These cases include all human rights cases that claim to be divested from 
the owner or any case where aggression is meted unjustly on human beings. In such 
cases, resorting to circumstantial evidence in the absence of substantive evidence, or 
in corroboration with it, is deemed paramount. This is because Islam's intention is to 
establish justice among mankind and any means of achieving that can be considered. 
However, there are some cases where such investigations are not necessarily required. 
Such cases include any case involving an absolute right of God, such as a case of 
adultery or drinking alcohol. Other uses of circumstantial evidence are generally 
acceptable in cases of civil liability, in claims of rights and in cases of tazirart, where 
the use of fingerprints, autopsies, DNA, photographs, and audio recordings have 
become established. All such technologies can be used in cases in which the aversion 
of punishment by the means of doubt is not required 490 
489 al-Zahrani, Tara'iq al-Hukm p. 341. See also Ibn Farhun, Tabsira, vol. 2 p. 93, Ibn al-Qayyim, al- 
Turq al-Hukmiyyah, pp. 26,83-84. 
490 For further references on witness, oath and circumstantial evidence, see al-Alwani, T. J. `Judiciary 
and Rights of the accused in Islamic Criminal law' in Mahmood, T. et. Al., (ed. s) Criminal Law in 
Islam and the Muslim World (Delhi, Institute of Objective Studies, 1996) pp. 256-263, Lippman M. 
et. Al. (eds. ) Islamic criminal law and procedur .: an Introduction, (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 
1988), Ibn al-Qayyim, al-Turuq al-Hukmiyyah, op. cit. p. 218, al-Mäwarid, al-Ahkin al-SuJtaniyyah, 
trans. Yate A. 1996, pp. 69-73, Awad A. M. `The rights of the accused under Islamic Criminal 
procedure' in Bassiouni M. C ed. The Islamic Criminal Justice system, (New York: Oceana 
Publications, 1982), pp. 91-107 see also Baderin, International Human rights and Islamic lard 97 and 
Peters, Rudolph, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law.. op. cit pp. 12-19 
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3.4.2 Confession as a Means of Proof in Islamic Criminal Law 
(a) a1-Igrarhujjah gäsirah (Confession is an intransitive evidence). 491 
(b) al Mar'mu'äkhadh biigrärihi (One is responsible for his confession) 492 
Confession is one of the prima facie to establish the liability of a criminal act, 
especially if the crime is of disclosure. In fact it is believed to be the highest evidence 
of guilt. 493 The culprit is said to be innocent until it is proved beyond any reasonable 
doubt that he is guilty of the alleged crime, actori incumbit onus probandi 494 
However, to establish justice and at the same time, to balance the right of the 
defendant and the offender, Islamic law enacts the legality of confession. There are 
many cases in which evidence can be somewhat unattainable. These cases could 
involve both the rights of God and men. In the right of God, confession may not be 
commendable as the right of God is based on forgiveness and is pardonable. However, 
in the rights of men, confession is seen as paramount and as an indispensable means 
of proof, especially where there is a deadlock of evidence. By confessing, the 
confessor is bound by it and retraction from it is only accepted in claims that 
absolutely involve the rights of God, such as a claim of adultery and drinking, or those 
that are partly the rights of God and the rights of men such as theft. In the former, a 
dowry is mandatory while for the latter; compensation of the value of the stolen 
property is accorded to the plaintiff. 495 Thus, the maxim above indicates that one is 
legally held responsible for one's confession and that confession stands as legally 
effective evidence that cannot be refuted in the rule of law. 
The legality of confession is based on the Qur'an, 496 the hadith, and on consensus and 
rationality. It is reported that Ma'iz and Ghamidi confessed to adultery during the life 
time of the Prophet and punishments were inflicted on them on the basis of their 
" Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba' p. 255, al-Sarakhasi, al-Mabsut, vol. 4, pp. 225-226, Majallah Article 78, al- 
Zarqa, al-Madkhal, p. 667. 
492 Majallah Article 79, Haydar, D(urar, vol. 1, p. 70, Ibn Hajar, Fathi al-Bari, vol. 8, p. 476, al-Zarqa 
Sharh al-Qawa'id p. 401, and similar codification in Suyuti, al-Ashba', p. 464. 
493 Peter Mirfield, Confession, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1985) p. 49 
494 Islamic Law emphasizes on this principle under the doctrine of istisha7ý (presumption of 
continuity). See Kamali, M. H. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence op. Cit. pp. 297-309, Baderin, M. A. 
International HumanRights and Islamic Law, op. Cit. p. 103 
495 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni vol. 5, p. 164, Ibn Farhun, Tabsirah al-Hukkäm vol. 2, p-54- 
496 Qur'an 3, verse 81, Qur'an 4, verse 135 and Qur'an 9, verse 102. 
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confession. 497 There is no disagreement among Islamic scholars on the general 
acceptability and legality of confession. By analogy, if witnesses can be accepted, 
then confession is more acceptable and reliable than a witness. It is irrational that 
someone would confess against himself when knowing the severe consequence of that 
confession. 98 To eliminate the benefit of doubt in the validity of confession, Islam 
stipulates some conditions, these being: the confessor must have reached puberty, be 
sane, and of sound mind. Thus the confession of a minor, an insane person or a person 
who has been coerced is not valid. Moreover, the confessor must not be under 
suspicion in his confession and the statement of confession must be explicit. If 
someone is to confess to adultery he must use the legal terms of adultery such as, "I 
had sexual intercourse with her" as opposed to "I slept with her" or in the case of theft 
"I stole the property of a person"499 as opposed to "I took the property. " 
Confession is defined linguistically and technically as a piece of information given by 
a person to state his involvement in an alleged offence; and someone has a right on 
him. 50° This definition comprehends a civil right and criminal liability. By stating 
involvement in the offensive act, that person indicates he is liable for the consequence 
of the offence. By stating that a person's right is in his own hands indicates the 
liability to return the property. This nature of evidence is the most highly proven 
before the court. However, there are many maxims of confession discussed in 
different ways in different jurisprudence books, all of which could be summarized 
under a few headings. We will quote primarily from the ones included in the book of 
maxims, with reference to other maxims mentioned in other books. We shall try to 
bind up those maxims in such a way that will be easy to analyze. 
497 See note on hadlth of Maiz and Ghamidi in al-Naysaburi, Muhammad Ibn Abdullah, al-Mustadrak 
'ala Sahihayn, ed. Mustafa A. Ata' (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1990/1411) hadlth no. 8077, 
vol. 4 p. 402. 
498 al-Burnu, Mawsua ` al-Qawa `id al-fighiyyah vol. 2, p227. 
499 Ibn Qudam, al-Mughni vol. 5, p 149, al-Kasan, Bada'i' vol. 7 p. 222, al-Shiribini, Muhgni al- 
Muhtaj, vol. 2 p. 245, al-Sawi, Ahmad Ibn Muhammad, Bulghat al-Sälikvo. 2 p. 176, al-Dardair, al- 
Sharh al-Kabir, vol. 3 p. 397, Abdu al-Karim Zaydan, Nizärn al-Qadä' al-Sharjah al-Islamiyyah, 
(Baghdad: Matba' al-- 'Aril, 1404) p. 157 and Taraiq al-Hulan, p. 173. 
500 al-Räzi, Muhammad Ibn Abi Bakr, Mukhtasar al- Sihaah ed. Muhammad Khatir, (Beirut: Maktabah 
Lebanon, 1995/1415), p. 529, al-Fayyumi, Ahmad Muhammad, al-Misbäh al-Munir(Beirut: Maktabah 
al-Ilmiyyah, n. d. ), vol. 2, p. 681, al-Fayrusabadi, Muhammad, al-Qamus al-muhiit (Beirut: Muhassasah 
al-Risalah, n. d. ), p. 593, Ibn Farhun, Tabsirah, vol. 2, p. 53, cf. With English definations of 
confession, see Kaufman, Fred, The Admissibility of Confession, (3`a edn. Toronto, Canada: Carswell 
Company Limited, 1979), pp. 4-5, cf. Fred Kaufman, The Admissibility of Confession, (3`d Toronto, 
Canada: Carswell Company Limited, 1979), 4-5. 
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As confession stands as evidence and a way of testimony in the court, it is assumed 
that the confessor is being truthful with regard to what actually happened. For that 
reason, he is bound by his own admission. This admission is not transferable to any 
other accused. For instance, two persons or more were being accused of murder. In 
the first instance all denied the charges. Later, one of them came forward and 
confessed his involvement in the crime - without any duress or circumstance beyond 
his capacity- and said that the offence was actually committed by him and some other 
people. In such a case, his confession would be taken on his own account, so that the 
other co-accused would not be convicted by that confession until some other proof 
emerged to establish their involvement. However, if the offence is adultery and he 
confessed his and others' involvement in it - and it later turned out that his 
incrimination of the others was untrue - he would be punished for the said offence and 
for the offence of gadhf. 
One of the reasons for convicting Safiyyatu and Amina Lawal of the Sokoto and 
Kastina States Governments respectively was that the accused confessed to 
committing the alleged crime of adultery. However, the questions posed regarding this 
conviction are: were their confessions made under duress or not? Did they willingly 
confess or were they forced to do so? What was the procedural ground for their 
confession? All of these questions will be clarified by the maxim below. 
3.4.2.1 Condition binding Acceptability of Confession 
(c) Maxim: al-Ikräli yamna `sihhab al-igrir (Coercion prevents the validity of 
Confession). 50' 
It is generally acceptable that a healthy confession made without force, or any other 
unusual condition, shall be accepted. However, a question arises on whether or not a 
confession made under coercion and by any other means of compulsion should be 
acceptable as proof in court. The opinions of scholars differ. The majority of jurists 
hold the view that confession should be made voluntarily and any confession subject 
501 Ibn Humam al-Haj, al-Tagrir wa al-Tabbir (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1996/1417) vol. 2, p. 42, cf al- 
Nafrawi, Ahmad, al-Fawakih al-Dad, (Beirut: Dar al-Filer, 1415), vol. 2, p. 178. 
137 
to coercion, duress or any conditional forces is invalid502. This opinion is based on the 
Qur'an, the hadith and logical conclusion. 
In the Qur'an, God says: "Except under compulsion his heart remains firm in faith". 503 
Al-Shiribini in his commentary canvasses that if an utterance made under compulsion 
is not regarded as the nullification of one's faith, then the same should be applied to 
confession made under coercion. 504 God also calls Muslims to witness, even if it is 
against their own selves: "Ye who believe! Stand firmly for justice, as witness to God 
even as against yourselves". 505 The words used in the verse `witness ... against 
yourselves' refer to confession. It is unanimously agreed upon among scholars that 
any false witness is unacceptable in establishing fact, thus a confession made under 
compulsion should not be considered as it could be false. 506 
In the hadith, the Prophet says that "God will ignore what men think in their minds to 
do till they do it or talk about it, and also He will leave out of the reckoning, man's 
acts under compulsion. , 507 The hadith categorically dismisses any act of compulsion. 
Thus, any confession made under coercion shall not be accepted. From a logical 
perspective, confession is regarded as one of the valid forms of evidence that should 
not proportionally contain errors, if it is based on the natural will of the confessor. 
However, if it is based on coercion, there is a probability that the confessor may lie, 
which will not serve the purpose it is meant for. 
However, a few jurists hold the view that confession in any case should be accepted. 
This is based on the fact that the woman who Hatib bn Abi Balta'ah sent to the pagans 
of Makkah with a letter, was compelled and forced to produce the letter after her 
denial. Against this latter opinion, it could be argued that the evidence that the woman 
carried a letter was a divine revelation from God to His messenger. This revelation 
cannot be denied by any human being and is accepted by all faithful Muslims. That is 
why those whom the Prophet sent to her had taken all measures to secure the fact. 
502 Peters, R., Crime and Punishment, op. cit. P. 9 
503 Qur'an 16, verse 106. 
504 al-Shiribini, Mughni al-Muhtaj, vol. 2, pp. 240-241. 
505 Qur'an 4, verse 134. 
506 al-Kasani, Bada'i ` vol. 7, p. 223. See also, Inban F. F. And Reid J. E. Criminal interrogation and 
Confession, (Baltimore USA: The Williams and Wilkins Company 1967), p. 143 
507 Ibn Majah, Sunan, hadith No. 2043, cf. al-Bukhari, Sahih, hadith No. 4968. 
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In the case of Safiyyatu, the first procedural error that led to her confession was that 
someone reported the case to the police, though concealment is recommended in such 
case. It is reported by Ibn Umar that God's messenger said: "Avoid these filthy things 
which God has forbidden, and if anyone commits any of them, he should conceal 
himself with God's most High Veil and turn to God in repentance... "508 
Thus, the interrogation of someone regarding the crime of adultery is questionable. 
This is because all the adultery offences in the life of the Prophet had punishments 
that were based on voluntary confession, rather than enforcement or imposition. In 
addition, if someone confesses to this crime, the benefit of doubt should be given - 
and that is absent in the case of Safiyyatu. It is reported on the authority of Imran Ibn 
Husain that a woman of Juhaina (tribe) came to the Prophet when she was pregnant 
due to fornication, and said, "0 God's messenger, I have committed something for 
which a prescribed punishment is due, so execute it on me. " God's messenger called 
her guardian and said, "Treat her well and when she delivers, bring her to me". It is 
also reported in the hadith reported by Abu Hurarah that a man among a group of 
Muslims came to the Prophet in the mosque and called, "0 God's messenger, I have 
committed adultery. " The Prophet turned away from him. The man confessed to that 
four times and when four people witnessed his claim, the Prophet asked him, "Are 
you insane? " The man replied, "No", and then the Prophet asked him, "Have you been 
married before? " He replied, "Yes", and then the Prophet ordered him to be stoned. 509 
From the two traditions, it is clear that in such situations, it is the right of the 
confessor to be given the benefit of the doubt and it is the responsibility of the judge 
not to admit the confession in the first instance. 
508 Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalaani, Bulugh al-Maram hadith no. 1048. 
509 al-Bukhari, Sahih Hadith no 6747, Muslim, Sahib Hadith no. 1691. 
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3.4.2.2 Retraction of Confession 
(d) al-Igrär fi huqüq al- `ibäd 1ä yahtamil al-rüju `(Retraction of confession is 
not allowed in rights of men). 510 
The retraction of confession is one of the interesting issues deliberated under the rule 
of confession in Islamic criminal law. It emphasizes the importance of establishing 
criminal justice in Islam to protect the rights of victims, and at the same time to 
prevent inflicting severe punishment on an innocent accused. In the realm of 
confession and its retraction, it is fundamentally important to identify the nature of the 
crime and the punishment accorded to it. In doing so, it will be easy to decide whether 
retraction is allowed or not and when it is allowed. 
By looking into the nature of the liability involved, crimes are separated into three 
categories. 
One: Crimes that solely involve the violation of the right of man, (hagq al-ädam) e. g. 
as in murder and defamation. This kind of crime means that the victim or his relatives 
may pardon the culprit, and this pardon will be efficacious. Regarding this, the jurists 
unanimously agree that once a confession is made in such a sensitive case, the culprit 
has no right to retraction. Of course, if the confession is made through his own free 
will without any force and all requirements are met, thus, retraction is ineffective. 
This is because if it were to be allowed, there would be a prejudice against the 
people's rights and justice would not be established. 51' For example, if someone 
confessed that he had killed someone and later retracted his confession, his retraction 
would not be heard because of the right of the individual involved and the 
acceptability of retraction in such a situation would jeopardize criminal liability. 
Two: Crimes that solely involve the violation of the right of God, (bagq Allah), such 
as for example, adultery and intoxication. There is disagreement among scholars on 
the acceptability of retraction in this category. Most scholars approve of the retraction 
510 al-Kasani, Bada'i'vol. 7, pp. 216-233. 511 al-Kasani, ibid vol. 7, p. 61, al-Ramali, Nihayah op. cit. vol. 7, p. 431, Ibn Qudamah, a/-Mughni, 
vol. 5, p. 288, al-Sarkhasi, al-Mabsut, vol. 17, p. 189. 
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of confession if the crimes solely involve the violation of the rights of God. They 
argue that: 
9 When Ma'iz ibn Malik came to the Prophet confessing his commission 
ofadultery, the Prophet said to him: "Probably you only kissed (the lady) or 
winked or looked at her! " He replied, "No, 0 God's apostle !,, 512 It can be 
inferred from the Prophet's question that he meant to give Ma'iz a chance of 
retracting his confession. 513 
" When Ma'iz fled and was caught and stoned to death, the Prophet was heard to 
say: "Why didn't you leave him? Perhaps he may repent and God will forgive 
him. 514 This comment from the Prophet denotes that repentance made after a 
confession stands as a retraction. 
" Because confession is an information that involves truth and falsehood. For a 
person to retract shows a contradiction, and contradiction raises doubt, while 
the principle is to avert add punishment if doubt exists. 515 Ibn Abdu al-Barr 
(d. 463) reports that there is consensus among Islamic jurists on the invalidity 
of a confession or testimony that has been retracted in any hudi d 
punishment. 516 
Another opinion claims that when a crime solely involves the violation of the right of 
God, then retraction is not accepted. They claim that: 
" If retraction is allowed, the companion must have been ordered by the Prophet 
to pay diyah compensation for the killing of Mu'iz. Thus, the absence of such 
judgment indicates that retracting a confession is not acceptable. 517 
9 It is reported by Abu Hurayrah that a father accused a woman of committing 
adultery with his son. The Prophet said to Unays: "0 Unays, go to this woman 
512 al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrakala Sahihayn, badithNo. 8077, vol. 4, p. 402. 
s" al-Kasani, op. cit. vol. 7, p. 233, al-Shiribini, op. cit. vol. 4, p. 150. 
514 al-Nasai, Sunan, hadith No. 7207, al-Darimi `Abdullah Ibn `Abdu al-Rahman, al-Sunan ed. 
Fawwaz Ahmad and Khalil al-Alami, (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al- `Arabi, 1407), hadithNo. 2318. 
515 al-Sarakhasi, al-Mabsut, vol. 9, p. 49, al-Bahuti, Kashshaf, vol. 6, p. 85, Ibn Humam, Sharh Fatih 
al-Qadir, vol. 5, p. 408. 
516 Ibn Abdu al-Barr , al-Istidhkared. Salim M. Ata, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 
2000), vol. 7, 
p. 503. 
517 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni, vol. 10, p. 167. 
141 
in the morning and if she makes a confession then stone her". 518 It is 
canvassed that if a retraction is accepted the Prophet must have explained that 
to Unays, as there is probability that the woman might want to retract her 
confession. 
" If retraction is not allowed in the crimes involving man's right, then logically 
519 it should not be allowed in the crimes involving the right of God. 
However, it can be said that the argument for the latter opinion is by no means 
unacceptable, as in the first claim the Prophet must have asked them to pay diyah. 
However, the Prophet did not ask them because Ma'iz had not made clear his 
retraction and, as such, we cannot assume that his running away from the punishment 
denotes his retraction. In the second claim, there is a probability that the Prophet did 
not tell him about the retraction as he might have known all the conditions relating to 
confession, including that of retraction. The last claim can be rebutted on the basis 
that the two rights are very different in principle. The right of God is based on 
forgiveness and remission, while the right of man is based on contention. Therefore, 
in the right of God, one can escape its punishment by means of repentance and 
forgiveness from God, while in the right of man; an effort must be made to balance 
justice among mankind. Furthermore, one is not obliged to make a confession in any 
crime involving the right of God, as opposed to the right of man, in which a 
confession is favorably required. 520 
In the case of Safiyyatu, it is argued that she retracted her confession and thus she 
should have been acquitted on that ground. However, the retraction of Safiyyatu is 
said to have been made not by herself, but by her legal representative. Based on that, 
her retraction was undermined. Moreover, the State counsel argued that the retraction 
of a confession can only be made in the case of gJci according to section 166 and 
188, 
_(1), 
(2) of the SCPC. But this is not true. According to the maxim above, 
retraction is only unacceptable in cases that involve man's right, and the case in 
question is the absolute right of God. 
518 al-Bukhari, Sahih, hadith No. 2190, Muslim, Sahih, hadith No. 1697. 
519 al-Sarakhasi, al-Mabsut, vol. 9, p. 49. 520 al-Mäwaridi, al-Hawi al-Kabir, vol. 13, pp. 210-211. 
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Three: crimes that involve the violation of both the Right of God and right of man. 
Due to the disagreement on the legality of retracting confession in the category 
discussed above, there is a slight disagreement as to whether retraction is allowed in 
crimes involving both the right of God and the right of man. This disagreement could 
be summarized as follows: 
If retraction is made in a crime involving both rights, the hadd punishment should be 
dropped. This is because of the shubhah that is embedded in it. But the right of man 
should be claimed back from the confessor if it can be established that his confession 
was made when he was of sound mind, and that the confession was not extracted by 
means of force. However, if the crime is of qadhf (an accusation of unchasteness), his 
retraction stands as the reclamation of the accused's reputation, and as a kind of ta'zir 
that can be accorded to the proclaimer of the defamation. 521 
Examples of crimes that can be classified as involving the rights of both God and man 
are defamation and theft. According to the majority of Islamic scholars, if someone 
confesses to defamation, the punishment due for the crime must be meted out and no 
retraction should be accepted. This is because the right of man prevails in that crime. 
However, if the accused confesses to theft and later retracts the confession, it is 
agreed that the punishment will be dropped, not only because it is the right of God, 
but also because that retraction has constituted shubhah in that confession, and thus 
the accused cannot be justly convicted. However, the right of man that is involved in 
this matter has to be reclaimed from the confessor, because the right of man cannot be 
undermined and, as the confessor is not forced to confess, he is thus responsible for 
the claim. 
Another important issue to round off the discussion on confession is that the effect of 
confession is only binding on the confessor. This means that if someone confesses on 
himself and on another person, the effect would be given to the confessor alone, and 
not on the co-accused. This is because the evidence of a confession is supposed to be 
made voluntarily, but obviously this is not so in the case of the co-accused. For 
521 Ibn Muflih, al-Mubdl `vol. 10, p. 368, al-Kasani, Bada'i `vol. 7, pp 232-234. 
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example, if someone admitted to killing someone but claimed that another person was 
involved in it, his confession will take effect on him alone, but not on the alleged co- 
accused. However, the co-accused may be found guilty in the case from another 
source of evidence but not by the alleged confession forced on him by the 
confessor. 522 
This maxim has been observed in the case of Safiyyatu and her co-accused (Yakubu 
Abubakar) in which the Upper Shariah court of Sokoto State of Nigeria turned down 
the alleged accusation of Safiyyatu that Yakubu was the one who impregnated her, 
and thus Yakubu was acquitted. 523 Although it could be argued that since the prime 
accused (Safiyyatu) implicated another party in this same accusation, it is the right of 
the authority to summon the co-accused and investigate the allegation thoroughly. 
Indeed, the authority did summon Yakubu regarding this allegation - which Yakubu 
denied - but there is no doubt that the authority failed to carry out a sufficiently 
thorough investigation. 
Another way of turning the case to balance the equation is to regard the matter as one 
involving shubhah and thus a hudz d punishment can be averted. This is because in the 
crime of adultery, as pointed out earlier, a single person cannot commit such a crime. 
This is one of the reasons why the Qur'an mentions both genders when prescribing 
the punishment, although it can be said that a confessor of adultery during the period 
of the Prophet was punished on his own, without any questioning of his co-accused. 
This indicates that a single person can be punished for adultery. Of course, Mu'iz and 
al-Ghamidi were punished on their own, and the Prophet did not question their co- 
accused as they had already voluntarily confessed and did not allege that anyone else 
was involved. Thus, their cases are quite different from the case of Safiyyatu and 
Yakubu 
522 See, Muhammad Waqar-ul-Haqq, Islamic Criminal Laws (Hudood laws and Rules with up to date 
commentary) (Lahore, Pakistan: Nadeem Law Book House, 1994) p. 152, al-Burnu, al-Mawsu'a vol. 
1, p. 233. 
523 See the report of Safiyyatu's case in WACOL, 2003. 
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3.5 Summary of the Chapter 
Legal maxims of certainty and doubt and its related maxims are very important in 
Islamic criminal law. Indeed they are the core element from which criminal justice 
can be achieved. In this Chapter, the maxim and its related ones have been extensively 
treated. The central message in all the discussions is that human being is assumed to 
be innocent of any accusation until the otherwise is proven. Any allegation that lacks 
credible evidence shall not be entertained. Any iota of doubt plunged into evidence 
shall render such evidence invalid. Confession as one of the substantial evidences can 
be considered valid in as much as the confessor has not retracted it especially where 
the crime is of badd nature and involves solely the right of God. This is because the 
right of God is based on forgiveness. However, it may be difficult to attain certainty in 
all cases, thus, where a case involves the right of human being, it is espoused that 
circumstantial evidence should be sought for in order to regain the right of the human 
being involved. 
In most of the cases judged in the Northern Nigeria Shari `ah saga from 1999 to 2007, 
many flaws are noticeable in the legal procedures. These flaws are more prominent in 
all the cases of theft exposed in this chapter. It is observed that the rule of certainty in 
all ramifications is undermined. This could be as a result of inexperience of the judges 
in the courts of first instances (Lower Sharia Court and Upper Sharia Courts); or that 
those cases have political undertone. Thus we want to suggest that in cases involving 
hudid, proper steps must be followed so that the Shan `ah is not made a target of 
criticism. 
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Chapter Four 
Analysis of the Maxim: al-Mashagqah tajlib al-Taysir 
(Hardship begets Facility) 524 
4.0 Introduction 
One of the beauties of Islamic law is its recognition of fallibility of human beings in 
carrying out their spiritual and mundane activities. In addition, it comprehends the 
difficulties they will face in achieving both spiritual and mundane objectives. Thus, 
Islamic law endorses breaching some certain rules in any dire necessity. The maxim 
which establishes this and supported by sound evidences from the Quran, hadith and 
consensus is al-mashagqah tajlib al-taysir. 
4.1 Definition and Interpretation of the Maxim al-Mashagqab tajlib al-Taysir 
The maxim "hardship begets facility" is one of the basic general maxims agreed upon 
among Islamic jurists. It is applicable to almost all issues and branches of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Because of its important role in Islamic law, it is now being recognized 
as a fundamental maxim. 525 It is a maxim used as a legal concession for any 
recognized hardship in Islamic law. Thus, it serves the purpose of Islamic law in 
lessening and removing burdens from people. 526 
The origin of the maxim is derived from a deep study of the Islamic textual 
injunctions of removing hardship, (raf al-haray). It is clearly stated in many Qur'anic 
and traditional texts that Islam enjoins facility and leniency in any case that leads to 
difficulty. God states in the Qur'an: "God intends for you ease, and He does not want 
to make things difficult for you... "527 He further states in another verse: "... and (He) 
524 al-Suyuti, al Ashba' wa al-Nazar op. cit. p. 76. Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba' wa al-Naaa'ir op. cit. p. 
74, al-Zarkashi al-Manthur fi al-Qawa'id op. cit., vol. 3, p. 169, Ahmad al-Zarqa, Sharh al-Qawa'id p. 
157, Mustafa al-Zarqa al- Madkhal. Par 598, Mahmassani, Falsafah al-Tashri.. op. cit. p. 152. 
525 Ibrahim Ibn Musa al-ShatibT, al Muwalagät Ii üsFd al-Sban'ah ed. `Abdullah Duraz, (Beirut: Dar 
al-Ma'rifah 1975) vol. 2, pp. 136-156, al-Suyüti al-Ashbäh op. cit. p. 55, Ibn Nujaym al-Ashbäh op. cit. 
84, al-Zarkhashi al-Manthur op. cit. vol. 3, p 170. 
26 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 85. 
527 Qur'an 2, verse 185. 
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has not laid upon you in religion any hardship... "528 and "God wishes to lighten (the 
burden) for you; and man was created weak"529 There are many other verses that give 
Muslims a way out of any difficulty. 530 Although the verses are different in context, 
they are identical in implication, which is to ease difficulty and hardship whenever it 
exists and to make the legal ability of human beings commensurate with their legal 
responsibility. Thus, their similarity lies in the fact that there is nothing in Islamic law 
that goes beyond the capacity of human beings. 531 The Prophet is reported to have 
said: "The religion is very easy and whoever overburdens himself in his religion will 
not be able to continue in that way. "532 
Conversely, of course, some of the legislation in Islamic criminology may appear hard 
and severe for mankind. But that is not enough reason to brand them as `barbaric' or 
`relics of antiquity'. This is because the majority of daily human activities such as 
eating, drinking, having affairs with one's legal wife etc. may not be perceived as 
hardships to mankind because of the enjoyment derived from those activities, but yet 
there are proportions of hardships in them. 533 
The relevance of this maxim to Islamic criminal justice lies in the fact that even if 
there is no excuse in committing crimes such as adultery - because Islam has provided 
alternative ways of relieving one's sexual motivation; intentional homicide - because 
it is utterly prohibited; and theft - because it is someone else's property, it is, however, 
permitted to drink alcohol in an extreme situation or to take food if in dire need. 
Nevertheless, if a fundamental rule is broken due to necessity and the right of an 
individual is involved, compensation is recommended. One of the proofs that if in a 
dire circumstance a rule can be breached is what happened during the period of Umar 
Ibn Khatab. It is reported that Umar Ibn Khatab suspended the punishment of hadd 
during the period of famine in Madina. This does not mean that the crime is legalised 
528 Qur'an 22, verse 78. 
529 Qur'an 4, verse 28. 
530 cf. Qur'an 5, verse 7 and Qur'an 2, verse 286. 
53' Ibrahim Ibn Musa al-Shatibi , al-Muwifaqit if Uczi/ al-Shari `ah, ed. `Abdullah Daruz, (Beirut: Dar 
al-Ma'rifah 1975) vol. 2, p. 119. 
532 al-Bukhari, Sahih Kitab al-Iman, hadith no 39. 
533 al-Shatibi, op. cit. vol. 2, pp. 425 and 434. 
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or `fiscalised', but that the punishment is waived or reduced, depending on the 
circumstances of the perpetrator. 534 
Most of the verses that stand as legal evidence for breaching rulings in the state of 
hardship are related to forbidden edible property. However, this does not mean that 
what can be breached in the state of necessity is restricted to food alone. Al-Jassas (d 
370 AH) remarks that if the wisdom behind allowing prohibited things in the state of 
necessity is to save life, then this wisdom is present in all kinds of prohibited matters. 
Thus, the ruling must include all cases of existing necessity. 535 It can be inferred from 
this remarkable statement that the rules that can be breached when illegal acts are 
committed in order to repel necessity subsume the commission of prohibited acts and 
the omission of obligatory acts. 
Therefore, the maxim implies that for any of the Islamic obligations that in some 
cases cause hardship and inconvenience, the Shari `ah has given facility for such 
hardship. There are two kinds of hardship envisaged in human beings' activities. The 
first one is the hardship caused due to the natural limitations of mankind. This is the 
hardship that is inseparable from `Ibädah (an act of devotion). It is compulsory to 
endure such hardship, like striving to acquire spiritual reward, striving to seek for 
knowledge, performing prayer in a standing and posture and fasting during hot 
weather. These hardships are not given facilities as they do not pose a threat to life. In 
other words, they are the inexorable and inevitable hardships of human beings. The 
second hardship is the type that extends beyond the capacity of human beings. This 
varies from one person to another. 536 The recognized mashaqqah in the latter 
category is the one that can claim lives, or inflict permanent disability on the body. 537 
534 Doi, op. cit. 225. 
535 Abu Bakr Ahmad Ibn All al-Razi, al-Jassas, Ahkäm al-Quran ed. Muhammad Sadiq al-Qamhawi, 
(Beirut: Dar `Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi, 1405) vol. 1, p. 129. 
536 a1-Nadwi, Ali Ahmad, al-Qawa `id. op. cit. p 428, Umar Ibn Muhammad al-Khabbasi, al-Mughni 
fi Usul al-Fiqh, ed. Muhammad Mudhhar Baqaa, (Makkah: Ummu al-Qura University Press, n. d. ), p. 
225. 
537 al-Suyuti al-Ashba' op. cit. p. 80, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba' op. cit. p. 82. 
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4.2 Hardship recognized in Islamic Law and their Facilities 
It is noted that all facilities provided in Islamic law are based on this maxim. Suyuti 
(d. 91 IAH) refers all facilities that are legally approved in Islamic law to seven 
reasons538, each of which is applicable to some subjects of Islamic jurisprudence. 
4.2.1 al-Safar (Journey) 
Journeys attract facilities on religious duties in the form of reduction in the number of 
raka `ät (pillars of prayers) to be said. For example, this might change four raka `ät 
prayers to two, such as ? uhr (noon prayer), `acr (afternoon prayer) and `ishd' (night 
prayers). It also allows for travellers to break their fast in Ramadan, to wipe wet hands 
over their socks instead of washing their feet during ablution, to leave Juni `ah (Friday 
prayer) and to eat an animal slaughtered in an unlawful manner. 
This facility is hardly applicable in Islamic criminal theory. Indeed, a traveller does 
not enjoy any facility when he commits a crime that attracts the punishment of 
retaliation grsäs No one, whether on a journey or at a residence, is allowed to kill 
another person, as the texts prohibiting killing give no exception in that regard. Thus, 
if some people are on a journey and they encounter the hardship of starvation, or are 
attacked by armed robbers, they cannot ward off that hardship by sacrificing any 
member of the group. In addition, it is not acceptable in the spirit of Islam for a group 
to throw one of its members out of a boat in order to guarantee the safety of others. If 
such an action is committed, all those involved in the criminal act will pay diyah. 539 
However, while on a journey, one is permitted under legal concession (rukhcah) to 
drink alcohol, eat unlawful animals, and use other people's belongings without their 
consent, but only in dire circumstances. In such cases, one will not be charged or 
accused of committing religious offences or criminal acts inasmuch as those acts are 
committed in good faith and within the limits of the allowance given to the 
538 The seven reasons are, safar (journey), marad (illiness), ikrih (cocercion), nisyin (forgetfulness), 
jahl (ignorance), nags (defect/disability) and 'usr wa humi m al-balwä (difficulty and general 
necessity). Nisyan and jahli have been treated under the maxim of intention and action. Thus, the 
remaining five will be mentioned here to avoid repetition. 
539 a1-Suyuti, al Ashba' op. cit. p. 77. 
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perpetrator. In some cases where the commission of an act involves man's right, as a 
standard rule, the perpetrator will be asked to pay compensation to the owner of the 
damaged property. This is because, according to the maxim, a1-idrir1ä yubtilltagq al- 
ghayr (Necessity does not invalidate the right of others) 540 as opposed to the right of 
God which, if violated as a result of mashaqqah, will attract no penalty because the 
right of God is based on forgiveness and is pardonable. 
However, the question arises whether it is possible to say that the facility given to 
travelers could be extended to also allow adultery and false accusation. There is no 
suggestion that such an act is permissible, whether by classical Islamic jurists or 
contemporary ones. However, what can be termed as adultery that is excusable on the 
part of the perpetrator is when a female traveler intends to marry, but has no parents 
or legal relative who can stand as her waliyy, as required by law. It is allowed in this 
situation under the rule of hardship for such a woman to marry in the absence of any 
of her parents, although she has to have a male representative among her co-travelers. 
To this question, Al-Shafi'i responded that it is possible because idhä Vq al-'amr 
ittasa' (When a matter becomes difficult, its rule becomes expanded). 541 
4.2.2 al-Marad (Illness) 
Illness is also counted as one of the reasons for which facilities can be given in 
Islamic law. If someone is ailing, there are a number of religious rites that can be 
reduced, suspended or replaced with alternative ones due to health reasons. These 
facilities include performing sand ablution in lieu of water, particularly if the latter 
could cause severe damage or increase the sickness; leaving congregational prayers; 
breaking or leaving fasting while paying back the missed days at a later date or by 
giving another person sustainable food for each day in the case of an elderly person, 
or replacing the missed days by fasting after regaining full health. Ha] and `Umrah, 
can also be performed by proxy. Similarly, healing can be performed with impure 
substances and alcohol, while, according to some schools, it is legal for a male doctor 
540 Ibn Rajab, al-Qawa'id op. cit p. 36 article 26, Majallah article 33, Mustafa al-Zarqa Al-Madkhal. 
Para. 602. 
541 Ibn Nujaym op. cit 84, al-Suyuti, al-Ashbah, op. cit. p. 83. 
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to carry out a medical investigation on the private parts of a woman and vice versa. 
These are all included in this facility. 542 
In Islamic criminal law, the use of illness as an excuse to commit crimes has little 
credibility, even though there are some ways in which sickness can be considered as 
an impediment to the conviction of someone for committing a crime. In a classical 
example, using alcohol for medication is an inconclusive issue among scholars. Some 
Hanafites approve of the use of alcohol for healing during dire situations, while 
another version disapproves of it. 543 In fact, illness can cause a murder conviction to 
be averted if such an illness causes insanity in the accused. However, such claims 
have to be verified by experts to ensure that the rights of victims are not jeopardized. 
In any case, the claim cannot invalidate the right of the victim. 
By and large, there are other ways in which illness can be used as a legal reason to 
give facility in religious offences committed by people. For instance, it is prohibited 
for a male, even a doctor, to look at the private parts of a foreign woman, but if there 
is no female to do the task, then employing the service of an unknown male, possibly 
a doctor, to carry out the task is permissible under the facility of illness. 544 
4.2.3 al-Ikrnh (Coercion) 
Ikr h literally means coercion, a compelling force that makes a person do what he 
would ordinarily not do. 545 Ikrih has been recognized as a legal reason to justify the 
commission of offences, or of the omission of obligatory duties. In Islamic criminal 
law, the effect of krah- is a subject of controversy, especially in crimes involving 
men's rights. In crimes that warrant gips, ikräb is not seen as a convincing excuse for 
killing or injuring anyone. Thus, if someone is compelled to kill another person, if he 
chooses to kill, he, as the direct actor, and the other who forced him to kill, would 
both be executed in line with q/ is This is the view of the majority of Islamic 
542 al-Suyuti, ibid. p. 77. 
543 Ibn Nujaym, ibid p. 75. 
544 Ibn Nujaym ibid t. In this case, there must be maximum precautions taken to block any chance of 
an offence being committed. Thus, if a male doctor has to treat a female in that way, it is recommended 
that the husband of the woman or a male relative male should be with them. 
545 Mansur Ibn Yunus Al-Bahuti, Kashshäfal-Qinä `An Matn al-Ignä ` ed. Hilal Muslihi Hilal, 
(Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 1402 A. H) vol. 4, pp. 1631-1632. 
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scholars. They assert that the compelled is held responsible for committing the killing 
in circumstances where he could do otherwise, and that the compeller, who is the 
cause of that killing, should also be held responsible. 546 This is because no one's life 
is considered more valuable than anyone else's. However, Abu Hanifah maintains that 
no gips should be accorded to the compelled, rather that he should receive a 
discretionary punishment, while the compeller must be held responsible. He based his 
argument on the fact that the compelled was made to act against his willl; he was like 
a tool used for the killing and the compeller is the doer. 547 These views are based on a 
situation where the coercion is a complete one (ikräb tim). But if the compulsion is a 
mere threat, there is no doubt that the direct causer of the killing (the compelled) will 
be fully responsible. 
In the case of someone who is compelled to destroy another's property, and then 
chooses to do so - whether the compulsion is complete one or not - both he and the 
compeller, or the compeller alone, will be held responsible for the damage. This is 
because the preservation of life is more important than that of property. 548 
However, in budüd crimes, there are certain cases in which ikrab can lead a person 
to violate legal rules. For instance, if a woman claims to have been raped or sexually 
abused, she will be acquitted from adultery. This is in light of the Qur'an 24, verse 33 
that states that no sin is incurred by a compelled women. 549 She may claim she 
consented in order to escape punishment. This is enough reason to treat the case as 
having been infiltrated with shubhah, "doubt" based on the legal maxim: "al-hudiid 
tudra' bi al-shubbät "hudi d' (punishment should be averted in the face of doubt). 
Despite the legal rule which commutes the hudi d punishment in the face of doubt, the 
Malikites do not accept such a claim completely. They assert that the woman's claim 
should be substantiated with convincing evidence, such as her screaming or shouting 
while she was being raped, or by traces of bleeding on her body to show mutilation of 
her vagina. It is reasonable to assume that rape would not be committed in an open 
546 Ibn Qudamah al-Mughni op. cit vol. 8 pp. 266-267, al-Suyuti, op. cit. p. 13. 
547 al-KasanT, Bada'1 'op. cit vol. 7, p. 177, Ibn Humäm Fath al-Qadir op. cit. vol. 7, p. 307. 
548 Al-Bahuti, op. cit vol. 4, p. 639, Ibn Rajab, al-Qawa'id op. cit. p. 309, al-Suyuti, al-Ashba' op. 
cit. p. 134. 
549 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni op. cit., vol. 9, pp. 59-60. 
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place. Thus, it may be suggested that some modem means of detection could be used 
to ascertain the claim. But because there is no right of man involved, there is perhaps 
no need to employ such means. However, if the victim accuses someone of having 
committed the rape, clarification is then required to establish the accusation. In such 
cases, the accused may deny the authenticity of the modem tool, and, in that case, 
to `zlr instead of budüd may be awarded to him. 
By nature, women do not forcibly coerce men into raping them. However, if by 
chance men are forced to commit adultery and the coercion is complete, no hadd 
punishment will be accorded, according to the Hanafites. They argue that the claim of 
coercion in that case has rendered it doubtful and hudi d, according to the hadith of 
the Prophet, should be averted in the face of doubt. 55° However, the Malikites and 
Hanbalites maintain that men should be given hadd punishment because such an act 
would not have occurred without the choice and desire of men. 55' This view is ill- 
conceived as there are many occasions in which men can become victims of rape, 
particularly in the modem age. There is a general mentality, perhaps the relic of an 
older generation that tends to believe that a female cannot take sexual advantage of a 
man, but recent history has proved otherwise. In the case of Debbie Lane (offender) v. 
Scottish CSC, the Sheriff observed that a "prison-based sex offender programme had 
been designed for men". As such, he sentenced Lane to one hundred hours of 
community work instead of sending her to jail for the sexual harassment of a 13-year- 
old boy. 552 This mentality has been criticised by Alayne Frankson-Wallece, a UN 
prosecutor who objects thus: 
It is too naive to suggest that a woman cannot be the perpetrator of acts of sexual violence 
against a man. Further, that women have not, and do not take sexual advantage of men in 
situations where the question of consent has been nullified by the operative circumstances, " 
she said. "Similarly, an act of rape, in the sense of non-consensual sexual intercourse, can be 
committed by woman against woman and man against man. 553 
"0 Hadith remit the hadd from Muslims as much as possible, because if a judge were to commit a 
mistake in executing the punishment, that would be far better than committing a mistake in enforcing 
the penalty. Cf. with note 316. 
55 1 Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni op. cit. vol. 6, p. 187. 
552 Reported in Scottish Metro, March 8,2007, p. 11. The same mentality is enshrined in most world 
legislations, see Priya Patel vs. Justices Arij it Pasayat and S. H. Kapadia. The hornourable justices refer 
to section 375 of the IPC which emphatically states that "rape can be committed only by a man" thus, 
Priya was acquitted of the charge of gang rape on the basis of this section. See 
www. hind. com/2006/07/14/stories . 551 See www. jamaicaobserver. co. /news, last viewed 14th March, 2007 at 16: 14 pm. 
153 
The honourable prosecutor's submission on the issue presents the need for 
reformation of such an outlook. 
Ikräh can also necessitate, in any way, a violation of the rights of God in as much as 
the coerced has a sound and firm faith. The Qur'an says: "... except him who is forced 
thereto and his heart is at rest with faith.... 19554 Thus, if one is compelled to make a 
statement revoking Islam, which forms the crime of apostasy, he will not be 
considered an apostate and will not be punished. The same applies to drinking 
alcohol. If someone is compelled to make a confession, that confession will not be 
admitted in a court of law. Recognizing whose right is involved in crimes committed 
under duress is very important. Of course, the rights of men are undeniable and 
incontestable, but the rights of God are based on forgiveness. Al-Sarakhasi (d. 490 
AH) explains: "And if it is said `an ill treated person has a right to resist injustice in 
whatever way he can, `we say:, yes, but an unjustly treated person cannot commit 
injustice against others'. "555 This indicates, as we shall explain in detail later, that 
one's right is protected by all means, and no necessity can invalidate it according to 
the maxim al-Idrir la yubtil hagq al ghayr (Necessity cannot invalidate the rights of 
others). 
4.2.4 alNagf (Defect or Disability) 
Defect or disability attracts facilities such as not imposing cal t on infants; not 
compelling women to pray in the mosque; exempting old people from fasting during 
Ramadan etc. 556 However, because of disability or a natural defect, should a minor, or 
an insane person commit any criminal offence, in Islam there will be no hadd or glsas 
adjudged for them. In the case of adultery, gadhf, drinking alcohol' and related 
offences, there is also no hadd. However, in the case of hudi d offences, a minor may 
be given to `zir to reprimand him and to reprobate the act in case of future 
occurrences. But the proportional punishment commensurate with the gravity of the 
offence is left to the authority to decide. Although there is no q/cic in the case of a 
minor or insane person who commits a murder, diyah must be paid to the relative of 
554 Qur'an 14, verse 106. 
555 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni vol. 7, p. 384, al- Kasäni, al-Badä'i' vol. 7, p. 181. 
556 al-Suyuti, al-Ashbah op. cit. p. 76. 
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the victim by the solidarity of the criminal (a1-` ägilali) . Being female is also a factor 
for which facility can be sought under the terms of disability or defect. Thus, females 
are not required by law to share in the blood money of their relative who commits a 
murderous crime, whether the blood money is due as a result of unintentional killing 
by an adult, or as a result of intentional killing by an infant or an insane person. 557 
4.2.5 al-`Usr wa Humrun al-Balwa Difficulty and General Necessity) 
The broad use of facility subsumes under general necessity and insurmountable 
difficulty. Islam recognizes the nature of life and realizes that life is full of ups and 
downs. Provision is made for situations where there is pressing difficulty and where a 
man may have to commit an act or omit a religious rite to surmount enormous 
difficulty. This comes under the rule of al-mashaqqah of which `usr and humz m al- 
balwä are among the causes. Caution should be exercised to ensure that this provision 
is restricted to what is permitted under the law. Al-Burnu observes that difficulty and 
general necessity are only considered where there is no text. 558 Of course, to make a 
law effective, some restriction has to be made in the use of concession. What is 
considered to be difficult in one situation may not be so in another. Taking this into 
consideration, h umwn al-balwä, (general necessity), is incorporated to expand the 
facility given to mankind. 
Many of the legislations enacted in Islam, whether from direct texts or implied 
meaning, are based on this concession. 559 In the criminal aspect of the law, it is 
allowed for a destitute person to take the minimum portion of any unlawful thing to 
sustain his life. A male doctor is allowed to examine the private parts of his female 
patient if there is no alternative. Also, a man is allowed to look at his proposed wife 
before agreement on marriage can be decided. 560 
Imam Abu Hanifah extensively expands the use of this facility to cover the 
permissibility of marrying a girl without her waliyy, and without fulfilling the 
557 al-Zarqa, Sharh al-Qawaid op. cit. p. 161. 
558 al-Bumu, al-Wajiz op. cit. p. 228. 
559 lbid 
560 Ibn Nujaym op. cit. p. 80. 
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condition of `adälah (trustworthiness) of the witnesses. 561 In addition, the Hanafites, 
as opposed to other schools, do not stipulate any specific marriage formula during the 
consummation of the marriage rite, expressly to prevent the occurrence of an 
allegation of adultery. 562 Based on the facility given to general necessity, judges are 
pardoned for any mistake they commit as a result of their personal opinion, ijtihäd 
This is because if they were to be held responsible for their mistakes, other people's 
rights would be jeopardized as, in some cases; it is difficult to obtain conclusive 
evidence. The same is applicable to professional doctors when they commit surgical 
mistakes. 
Furthermore, under difficulty, which is the bedrock of necessity, the witness of 
women can be admitted in matters that are traditionally exclusive to women, such as 
when someone accused of raping a virgin girl denies the accusation and claims that he 
only caressed her. In such a case, the testimony of a woman who examines the 
virginity of the girl will be taken into consideration, although other circumstantial 
evidence may be used to strengthen the testimony in order to make the case 
potentially tenable in a court of law. 
In all cases that provide legal reasons for breaching the rules in Islamic criminal law, 
the concessions allowed range from abolishment, reduction, substitution and 
advancement, to deferment and alteration of the punishment 563 In the case of gisis, if 
someone commits any criminal offence, then a reduction, substitution, alteration or 
abolishment of punishment can be applied. Thus, if one kills by mistake, gisäs 
punishment will be abolished and substituted with diyah. It is even possible that the 
diyah may be abolished in consonance with the verse that enjoins people to forgive 
others in such a situation "Whoever forgives his brother of any (of the punishment) 
"5M shall follow it with kindness. 
561 Ibid 
562 ibid. 
563 al-Suyuti, op. cit. 
364 Qur'an 2, verse 178, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. 
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4.3 Subsidiary Maxims under the Maxim of Hardship and Facility. 
There are many maxims that, in one way or the other, form subsidiaries of the basic 
general maxim. Some of them are explanations of, expansions to, or conditions for the 
basic one. However, in this section, we shall discuss those maxims in light of their 
relevance to criminal offences in Islamic law. 565 
4.3.1 'Idk däq al-'amr ittasa' wa idhä ittasa' däq (Whenever the circle of an 
affair narrows, it is widened and whenever it widens it is narrowed). 566 
This maxim is a further explanation of the grand maxim that facility should not be 
abused. The two sentences are very close to each other. They lay emphasis on the 
grand maxim and give more information on how it is to be applied. The summary of 
this maxim is that if there is an apparent mashaqqah (hardship) in any matter, there 
should be facility for it. And as soon as that mashaqqah disappears, the matter should 
reverse to its original rule. As al-Zarqa snr. (d. 1357 AD) puts it in this way: "If 
necessity and hardship cause facility, the facility should be enjoyed till the condition 
changes, then one should revert to the normal rule". 567. 
The first part of the maxim is more or less the meaning of the general maxim and the 
subsidiary maxim to be discussed below. And all that has been mentioned with 
respect to the applications of the above maxim are also applicable to this. al-Shafi'i 
(d. 204) has been credited with the coinage of the maxim when a female who had lost 
her guardian while on a journey asked him if she could appoint another man to be her 
guardian "waliyy". Al-Shafi'i agreed saying: "because if the circle of matter narrows, 
it is widened. " This indicates that one of the aims of Islam is to make things easy for 
its adherents and to make them avail of the facility when there is difficulty. 568 The 
563 There is no consistency in the classification of these maxims. There are some maxims mentioned 
here that are classified under the following grand maxim. This is because of the correlation between the 
two grand maxims in terms of the issue both are dealing with. In this research I see al-Burnu's 
classification as sensible and cohesive to my need. Cf. al-Burnu, a! -Wajiz pp. 230250, Ibn Nujaym, 
Fg. 77-84. 
al-Suyiti al-Ashbah p. 83, Ibn Nujaym op. cit. p. 84. al-Majallah mentioned the first part of the 
maxim in article 18, Al-Zarqa Sharh al-Qawaid p. 165 al-Zarqa al-Madkhal Para. 599 al-Burnu, al- 
Waj"cz p. 230. 
567 al-Zarga Sharh al-Qawaid, p163, al-Burnu al-Wajiz p. 230. 
568 al-Zarqa. al-Madkhal para. 599, al-Burnu, al-Wajiz 230. 
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second part of the maxim concerning the extent to which a breach of rules can be 
legally accepted under the room of necessity will be dealt with after the next 
subsidiary maxim. 
It is clearly expressed in the Qur'an that in the wake of difficulty during war, Muslims 
are allowed to shorten their obligatory prayers, so that four rakä `at (pillars of prayer) 
can be reduced to two. But if the situation no longer exists, the prayer should be 
performed as normal. (Q 4: 101-103). It is also reported that the Prophet prohibited 
the storage of the meat of 'adhä (the festival) for more than three days because of 
villagers who came to visit the people of Madina. But when that situation had ceased, 
they were allowed to store it for a longer period. 569 
It can be deduced from the Qur'anic verse and the Prophetic tradition referred to 
above that when there is difficulty facing the public in any of their daily activities or 
in the legislation, it is in the spirit of the Islamic law to find a way out for the masses. 
Although the references mentioned above are particular to certain issues in Islamic 
jurisprudence, their applications are not restricted to those issues because al- `Ibra bI 
umuüm al-Iafz I bi khusüs al-sabab (Consideration is given to the generality of the 
word, not the peculiarity of the cause (of revelation). 570 Those references form the 
basis for the legality of ensuring facility for the public, and once the difficulty ceases, 
the rule returns to the status quo. 571 
4.3.2 al-Dar&, it tubihu al-Mahzrirät (Necessities make Unlawful Things Lawful) 572 
This maxim is itself a broad principle in spite of its being classified under the grand 
maxim and as a popular maxim among the jurists. Its interpretation is not very 
different from that of the grand maxim stated above. However, its popularity, together 
569 Muslim, Sahih, hadith No. 1971, Abu Dawd, Sunan, hadith 2812,2813, al-Nasal, Sunan, hadith 
2032. 
370 al-Shinqiti, Adwa' al-Bayan op. cit. vol. 2, pp. 302,360, Muhammad Ibn Yusuf Abu Hayyan al- 
Andalusi,, Tafsir al-Bahr al-Muhit, ed. Adil Ahmad, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2001/1422), 
vol. 3, p505, Shihab al-Din al-Alusi, Ruh al-Ma'ani, (Beirut: Dar `Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi, n. d. 0 vol 6, 
p. p 120-122, Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub 
al-`Ilmiyyah 1413), vol. 1, p. 236, Muhammad Ibn Bahadir al-Zarkashi, al-Bahr al-Muhl! IT Usül al- 
Figh, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah 2000/1421) vol. 2, p. 367. 
571 al-Bumu al-Waj p. 232. 
572 al-Suyüti, al-Ashba' p. 83, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba' p. 85, Majallah Article 21, al-Zarqa Sharh al- 
Qawa'id P. 185, al-Burnu, al-Wajiz, p. 234. 
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with the grand maxim, is connected to the fact that they derive their sources from the 
Qur'an. God says: "... He (God) hath explained to you in detail what is forbidden to 
you except under compulsion of necessity. 573 
When man is faced with necessity, he is allowed to use what is forbidden until he 
secures a lawful one. Broadly speaking, the necessity recognised by Shari `ah could be 
of three categories. 
First: The necessity that can change the legal status of an action from 
forbidden to permissible, such as eating dead meat and pork. In this situation, 
one is permitted to take unlawful meat; else he may be punished if he refuses 
to do so for the safety of his life. 
Second: The necessity that cannot change the rule but that can be carried out 
when the condition warrants, such as taking a fellow's property without his 
permission. This can be done, provided that the harm caused to the owner of 
the property is less than the harm caused to the perpetrator if he does not act 
that way.. However, compensation must be given to the owner of the property 
because the principle of necessity cannot nullify another person's right 
(al'ia! tirirlä yubtrl hagq al ghayr). 
Third: The necessity that is not recognized in Islam and permission is not 
given to take such a facility, such as the killing of a fellow Muslim under the 
pretext of compulsion, or committing adultery under the pretext of sexual 
emotion. These offences cannot be legally justified. 574 
The attention given to this maxim by both classical and contemporary Islamic 
scholars should not be underestimated. However, what is controversial about it is 
whether it is a subdivision of the grand maxim al-mashaqqah tajlib al-taysir, or that 
of the grand maxim al-daran yuzäl- a question that will be discussed later. This is 
because the word dariirah in this maxim is used interchangeably with al-mashaqqah 
and al-darar. To the classical Islamic jurists, the maxim of al-dartirah is a subdivision 
sn Qur'an 6, verses 119,140, Qur'an 5, verse 3, Qur'an 2, verse 173. 574 al-Burnu, al-Wajiz pp. 236-237 
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of the maxim J Barar, while the maxim Iä dararand al-mashaqqah are synonymous or 
interwoven "m utadäkhil and muttahid" : However, al-Burnu affirms that there is no 
unity between the two legal maxims but that, rather, they are interwoven. He observes 
that the legal maxim al-darf rät emerged to affirm the legality of tayslr (facility) in the 
face of difficulty. Thus, it is appropriate to consider it as a sister of the maxim al- 
mashaqqah. On the other hand, the maxim of 1i Barar or al-darar is an independent 
maxim, which explains the need for eliminating any Barar (harm) posed by someone 
against another. Although al-Burnu recognizes the interchangeability of the two grand 
maxims, he asserts that one maxim focuses on general difficulty encountered by 
mankind, while the other concentrates on the prohibition of initiating harm or 
inflicting it on another. Furthermore, if such harm is forced on someone by another, 
the maxim states the rules for eliminating it without prejudice. 575 Therefore, the 
maxim of al-mashaqqah and its sisters are more applicable to the facility given to 
natural difficulties that are not necessarily caused by any human being, whereas the 
maxim of al-darar juzäl is specific to any Barar caused by human transgression on a 
person's life, body or property. 
However, there are difficulties, although with different causes, in both maxims. The 
effect of the maxim of al-danirat in both is that the elimination of that hardship or 
harm is legally approved if all conditions laid down for their elimination are observed 
and adhered to. It is allowed for one to drink alcohol during the mashaqqah, provided 
there is nothing else to drink, while it is also allowed for someone to kill or injure a 
burglar in the defence of his property and family under the maxim of eliminating 
Barar. 
4.3.2.1 Definition of Darürat and its Application in Islamic Criminal Law 
Dariirät is the plural noun of darrirah or Barar which means unavoidable injury, 
hardship and harm. Daran is the opposite of nafi'(benefit), and al-mudtart is the one 
who is forced and compelled to do something that he does not wish to do or is capable 
of doing. So, if someone acts unwillingly (as a result of a physical or mental 
impediment), such as someone with trembling hands, he would not be called or 
575 Ibid. p. 234. 
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described as mudtarrin the Arabic language. 576 Only someone who sustains an injury 
that leads him to act unusually, or someone who avoids injury is so called. 577 
Furthermore, daran can also be a situation whereby someone reaches a limit where, if 
he does not take a prohibited thing, he will apparently die or almost die. 578 In 
addition, daran is also described as a way of preserving lives from being lost or from 
being badly injured. 579 These definitions have been criticized as having been 
narrowed down to preserving life alone, whereas the factors of necessity are more 
than that. According to contemporary Islamic scholars, daran (necessity) is beyond 
preserving lives. To them, Barar, which makes someone act contrary to the law, can 
also be applied to the preservation of lives, religion, offspring, material wealth, and 
reason. Thus Barar is defined as "a compelling situation where one has to commit an 
sao illegal act" to preserve the five fundamental necessities. 
The disparity between the classical and contemporary definition of darar is that the 
classical state of necessity is restricted to the preservation of life which the 
contemporary Islamic jurists say includes the other four states of necessity stated in 
their definition above. The excuse that can be given for this restriction of the classical 
definition is either that it defines necessity only in the context of the discussion, or 
because darar, `necessity', is discussed in the Qur'an mostly in connection with the 
issue of starvation. 581 This is not to say that the progenitors were ignorant of the fact 
that the state of necessity goes beyond preserving life alone. Many of the classical 
Islamic jurists have discussed the sate of necessity in a wider scope than is defined in 
the Qur'anic context. Al-Ghazali (d. 505 AH) has discussed the state of necessity in 
his various books in which he includes all of these five preserved necessities. 582 
576 Muhammad Ibn Abdullah Ibn al-'Arabi: Ahkam al-Quran, ed. Muhammad Ata' (Lebanon: Dar al- 
Fikr, n. d. and Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 1972) vol. 1, p. 55. 
577 Ibid 
57$ al-Zarkash7, al-Manthur vol. 2, p319, al-Suyutt, al Ashby, p. 61. 
379 al-Dardir, al-Sharh al-al-Kabir ed. Muhammad Ulaysh, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr n. d. ), vol. 2, p. 183, 
Ibn Qudamah, al-MughnT vol. 8, p. 595. 
580 Haydar, A., Durar al-Hukkäm op. cit. vol. 1 p. 38, al-Zargä al-Madkhal. vol. 2, p. 997, Wahbah al- 
Zuhayli Nazariyyah darura pp. 67-68. 
581 Mansour Al-Mutairi, Necessity in Islamic Law, (Edinburgh UK: University of Edinburgh, PhD 
Thesis, 1997) p. 13. 
592 al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa, vol. 1, p. 174. Not only has he mentioned this. There are a host of classical 
Islamic scholars who, to a lesser or greater extent, have discussed it and included all five as paramount 
necessities to be preserved. See Mahmud al-'Ayni, (d. 855) Umdah al-Qari, (Beirut: Dar `Ihya al- 
Turath al-Arabi, n. d. ), vol. 2, p. 85. 
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There are some controversial issues surrounding the use of this maxim in Islamic 
criminal cases. Among them is the issue of committing adultery in the face of Barar, 
caused by starvation. For instance, can a destitute woman whose life is in danger 
commit adultery with a man who uses that as a condition for helping her? It is 
reported that Umar Ibn Khattaab pardoned a woman who committed adultery under a 
similar circumstance. 583 However, there is no classical or contemporary Islamic 
scholar who approves of this illegitimate practice. Although this is a possible 
scenario, allowing such an excuse could open the door to fasid, illicit practices. In 
addition, it is certain that there are many other ways that remedy could be sought for 
such situation rather than adultery. Such a woman could find a job to do, even if that 
violates her matrimonial status, she could also solicit help from the government. At 
worst, she could take out a loan, even if she has to pay interest under the principle of 
lesser evil. All of these avenues could be exploited instead of committing such a grave 
offence. This, of course, depends on the faith of the actor to choose what is 
appropriate for his or her faith. 
Another contemporary issue concerning the application of this maxim is the question 
of whether it is allowed for a pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy because of 
difficulty. This claim has been interpreted by some in this generation as incapacity to 
feed the baby after birth, a genetic disease affecting the baby, (such as sickle cell 
disease), incapacity of the woman to deliver the pregnancy successfully, and fear for 
the unborn baby's life. The position of the law on the termination of pregnancy is that 
it is a prohibited act if the termination takes place after 120 days of conception 584 
However, before this period, it may be terminated on condition that the termination 
poses no danger to the health of the mother. Moreover, using unfounded excuses as an 
113 See Ashhab Ahmed, Criminal liability in Islamic law, (Tripoli, Libya: The World Islamic Call 
Society, 1994/1404) pp. 185-186. The author quotes Bahnasi, Ahmed Fathi in Criminal liability p. 257. 
According to the report a woman was brought to Omar, having been accused of committing adultery 
`because she was thirsty and saw a shepherd, who refused to give her a drink till she committed 
adultery, and she did. " Omar consulted people to decide whether he should penalise her (by stoning). 
All said: (")This woman was (is) in case of necessity and (she) should be released. (And) Omar 
released her. "If the report is true it may be accepted as ijma' of shahabah, which at the time was an 
evidence, as discussed in usul It is possible to accept it under necessity but the question is, does 
preserving her life supersede her act of adultery? This will be referred to in the hierarchy of preserving 
the five necessities, as suggested by al-Ghazali. 
584 al-Burnu, al-waju p. 240. This is because after that period the foetus has completely formed into a 
human being and terminating it at that stage is considered to be a grave sin. See Qur'an 17, verse 41. 
al-Bukhar Sahih kitab Bad' al-Khalq hadith no. 3036, Muslim, Sahih, kitab al-Qadar hadith no. 2643. 
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excuse for the termination of pregnancy is unacceptable in Islam. This is the reason 
why the termination of pregnancies for such reasons could lead to criminal charges. 
4.3.3 Mi ubi4a 11 al-dari rit yugaddar bi gadarihe (What is permitted by the virtue 
of necessity should be estimated according to its quantity) S85 Or al-daizirät 
tuqaddkrbIqadaribi (Necessities are estimated according to their 
quantity) . 
586 
The two maxims are phrased differently but denote the same meaning. The former 
was coined by classical Islamic jurists, while the latter was rephrased from the former 
by modem jurists. The two maxims are set as conditions and restrictions to regulate 
the use of the provision of facility in the case of necessity. As mentioned above, the 
Qur'an has categorically stated that the only acceptable excuse for breaking rules is 
reasonable and genuine necessity "ghayra bägbin wall `ädin" (without willful 
disobedience, or transgressing due limits)587 Thus, any facility given should be 
minimized, as some people may abuse the facility under the pretext of necessity. This 
is an indication that he who abuses the chance will be guilty of disobedience. Where 
conditions warrant that the law would be breached, there must be a mechanism in 
place to block the occurrence of evil. For example, if a male doctor has to be used as a 
midwife in the absence of a female, a female assistant should be with him under the 
rule of sadd al-"a (blocking evil). Failure to provide a female assistant in such a 
situation could lead to a criminal offence in Islam that attracts a discretionary 
punishment. The same applies to using a male doctor who has access to a woman 
patient's private parts in the absence of a competent female doctor. This should 
however not be unduly exploited. Under the proportionality of necessity, if someone 
is allowed to drink or eat a prohibited substance, then that person is not allowed to 
take the substance in excess because of al-dariurah tuqaddar bi gadrihi Moreover, it is 
not permitted for a person to steal a large quantity of flour on the ground of necessity, 
whereas the same is not true for someone who steals a loaf of bread because of 
extreme hunger. The former is not allowed and not legally justifiable because his 
robbery went beyond the limit of necessity, while the latter is excusable under the rule 
... al-Suyüt7 al Ashba; op. cit. p. 83, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 86. 
sah al_Majallah article 22, al-Zarqa, al-Madkhal para. 601, al-Burnu, al-Wajiz p. 239. 
587 Cf. Qur'an 2: 173,6: 145,16: 115. 
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of necessity. 588 The yardstick for determining the proportion of the facility to be 
granted under the pretext of necessity is what is recognized by law, namely, the five 
necessities of religion, life, dignity, offspring and property, and what would be 
required to preserve them. 589 However, it is also worth noting that the amount to be 
taken from these prohibited things in order to protect these five necessities is relative. 
What is deemed to be a sustainable portion for one may not be sustainable for another. 
4.3.4 Mä jnzil `udhurbatala bl zawälibl (What is permissible by the virtue of 
excuse becomes invalid with the expiration of the excuse). 590 
This maxim is similar to the above but its focus is on the duration of the licence given 
to break the rules. The duration set for the expiration of the reprieve granted to break 
the law in the face of necessity is when that hardship or the cause of the hardship 
disappears. The phrase used in the verses of the Qur'an on the permissibility of 
unlawful things in the face of necessity is "neither craving nor transgressing" and, as 
such, has placed a clear limitation on the exploitation of the provision. Thus, this 
indicates, as al-Razi (d. 604 AH) states: "If the reason for the permission contained in 
the verses legalising a violation of rules ceases to exist, the permission is no more. "591 
Thus, if one is given facility to drink alcohol in the wake of thirst, or to eat unlawful 
animals in the wake of starvation, then when that thirst and starvation cease to exist is 
the point at which the law returns to its status quo. This is because ma jaz li `udhr 
batala bi zawälih. Based on this maxim, it is allowed to admit a witness on behalf of 
one who is not present, but that permission ceases the moment the right person 
returns. 
588 Mahmassani, Falsafa op. cit p. 155. 
589 See al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa op. cit. vol. 1, p. 139-140, Muhammad Muslehuddin, Philosophy of 
Islamic Law and The Orientalists' (2°d edn. Lahore Pakistan: Islamic Publications Ltd. 1980) p. 163. 
590 al-Suyuti op. cit. p. 85, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 86, Majallah Article 23. 
591 Fakhar al-Din Razi, al-Tafsir al-Kabir, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah n. d. ) vol. 2, p. 13. 
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4.3.5 al-bäjab tunazzYmanila al-darrirah, 'nab kinat awkbnssab 
(Need, whether of public or private nature, is considered as necessity). 592 
The previous maxims are on necessity. The maxim here includes any other need, be it 
an individual or public one. Thus, the meaning of al-häjah is a need which is a lesser 
degree than necessity. Strictly, what Islam aims to provide for humanity can be 
classified into three: 
One: What is termed al-darrirab, (necessity). al-dar&ah is a situation where if 
a person were to refuse to commit an unlawful act, then his life, dignity, 
religion, offspring, and property would be endangered. For this, he is allowed 
to violate the rules to protect those things. 593 
Two: What is termed as al-bäjab (needs). This is a situation whereby a 
person could be in difficulty or hardship if he does not commit what is 
unlawful, although his life may not be in danger. It is recommended that that 
difficulty should be prevented by committing what is unlawful. Ibn Qayyim 
(d. 751 AH), in an attempt to draw a demarcation between darr7rah and häjah, 
opined that al- fi jah is what is prohibited as a preventive measure - "sadd al- 
dhari "- becomes permissible in the public interest, while what is prohibited 
with definite purpose can only be permissible by virtue of necessity. 594 
However, according to the maxim in question, bäjah is regarded as dariirah in 
some circumstances. 595 
Three: What is termed as al-kamRiyyah or al-tabsiniyyah (a luxury). This is 
exemplified by a situation in which a person seeks something excessive to 
maximize the enjoyment of his life. In criminal law, looking at a foreign 
592 al-SuyütT, al Ashba' op. cit. p. 88, Ibn Nujaym p. al-Ashba' op. cit. 91, Majallah, Article 32, al 
Burnu, al-Wajiz, op. cit. p. 242. 
593 Ali Haydar, Durar al-Hukkam, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 38, al-Zarqa, al-Madkhal vol. 2, p. 997, Wahbah al 
Zuhayli, Nazariyyat al-Darura al-Shariyyah pp. 67-68. 
sva Ibn Qayyim, 71am op. cit. vol. 3, p. 119. 
595 Cf. al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat vol. 2, p. 8, al-Ghazali, al-Mustasfa vol. 2, p. 481, Ali Ibn Muhammad 
al-Amidi , al-`Ibkim 
fi uO al- `Ahkiin ed. Sayyidi al-Jumayli, (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi 1404), 
vol. 3, p. 393-396, Muhammad Ibn Husayn Fakar al-Din al-Razi, al-Mahsv`I fi `Ibn al-Used. Taha 
Jabir al-'Alawani (Riyadh: Imam Muhammad Ibn Su'ud Islamic University, 1399), vol. 2, p. 578. 
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woman outside one's own family is prohibited in order to complement the 
preservation of offspring and to complement the enforcement of that law. 596 
The first and the second categories are the rights protected by Islam, and facilities are 
enacted for them. The last category, however, is not for discussion. Thus, if a law is 
broken in order to enhance a life of luxury, the perpetrator will be subjected to 
criminal charges. 
In considering al-häjah `needs' as a supportive element of necessity, if a situation 
becomes problematic, either publicly or privately, facility can be given to redeem the 
situation. The only marked difference between al-häjah and al-dariira is that in the 
case of the latter, the commission of an unlawful act to prevent envisaged damage or 
injury is obligatory, whereas in the former, one can choose not to prevent it. It is 
pertinent to remark that in any case of necessity or need, it is not allowed for a person 
to choose what will harm and endanger his life, or affect any other preserved rights of 
his life. Al-Shatibi stresses that "it is not the right of a capable person to inflict on 
himself strenuous and harsh burdens by doing exhausting deeds. But he should aim to 
perform legitimate deeds in order to be rewarded. "597 Choosing a difficult deed that 
could be injurious to life in order to be close to God is not part of religion. Ibn Abdu 
al-Salaam observes that such strenuous deeds are not considered as a glorification of 
God and that engaging in one renders the act non-rewardable. 598 
4.3.6 a! - 'Idtirr rlä yubtilIfagq al-Ghayr (Necessity does not invalidate the Right of 
Others). 599 
Another measure designed to curb the abusive use of the provision of facility is the 
protection of people's rights. Despite the fact that it is allowed for someone to damage 
or use other people's property in the state of necessity - provided that the damage 
would not result in equal or greater harn for the owner - Islamic law does not divest 
the right of people. The Qur'an categorically denounces all ways of taking people's 
596 al-Shatibi, op. cit vol. 2, p12.. 
597 Ibidi vol. 2, p. 119, Ibn Abdul Salaam, Qawa `id a! -Ahkarn op. cit, p. 30. 
598 Ibn Abdu al-Salaam , ibid. 59 Ibn Rajab, al-Qawa`id op cit. p. 26, Majallah Article 33 al-Zarqa, al-Madkhal para 602, al-Burnu, 
al- Wajiz p. 244. 
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property illegally (Q. 2: 188, Q, 4: 2,28, ). Whether the reason for breaching the ruling 
is of natural (samawr) hardship, such as starvation, or in defence of one's rights, or 
because of a non-natural cause, such as complete compulsion, the rights of the 
affected fellow are always protected under Islamic law. The Prophet is reported to 
have said: "It is unlawful to take the property of a Muslim without his express 
consent. "600 Thus, if someone takes another person's belongings in order to save 
himself from dying, it is incumbent on him to restitute the value of what was taken. 
Restitution of the value could be paid by the perpetrator himself, as held by the 
majority of Islamic scholars or by the guardian of the perpetrator, or from the treasury 
of the government if the person cannot afford to pay. Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751 AH) 
affirms that the restitution should be borne by the government because it is the 
responsibility of the Muslim Ummah to preserve the life of the populace. In other 
words, because it is the duty of the Islamic government to cater for its people when 
one of them is in such a situation as to warrant taking another person's belongings, it 
is the responsibility of the government to refund what has been taken. The only 
waiver given to the perpetrator is that he can plead not guilty of stealing. The right of 
the owner, therefore, cannot be in vain. This is because the property is his right and 
depriving him of his right would contradict the fundamental principle of Islamic 
justice. By divesting people's belongings without any restitution, even if the reason is 
to rescue someone else's life, would amount to eliminating harm with harm, which is 
antithetic to the spirit of Islam 601 
4.4 Summary of the Chapter 
In this Chapter, we have explained the stand of Islam in considering hardship which 
constitutes necessity as raison d'etre in creating facility for human beings. The 
chapter also not only enunciates those factors that necessitate giving facility, but also 
demonstrates how these factors can be utilized in criminal cases. In any case, the 
emphasis in this chapter is that in any dire situation, there is facility for redemption 
not only for the victim but also for the culprit. 
600 Cf. Muslim, Sahih kitab al-Iman hadith no. 108, and Muhammad Abadi, Awn al-Ma'abud babfi al- 
Sulh ( 132nd edn. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah 1995), vol 9, pp. 373-374. 
601 al-Burnu, al-Wajiz op. cit. p. 244. 
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The right of a victim can never go in vain because al-idtirär !ä yubtil lzagq al ghayr 
(necessity does not invalidate the right of other). However, if the right of other was 
violated because of dartirah, generally the perpetrator would not be punished under 
the provision of al-darürät tublh al-maliz&ät (necessities render unlawful things 
lawful). However, any excessive use of this provision will warrant incriminating the 
perpetrator because al-darrirah tuqaddar bi gadarihä (necessity is estimated according 
to its quantity). While there are three categories of provisions aimed to facilitate lives 
of human being viz; necessity, needs and luxury, the second one is graded to the level 
of necessity for both individual and public because at times they are inseparable. 
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Chapter Five 
Analysis of maxim of Prohibition and Elimination of Harm: 
Lä Barar wa lä dirar(No injury or harm shall be inflicted or 
reciprocated). 602 
5.0 Introduction 
The fourth maxim, which is a tradition of the Prophet and which is considered to be 
one of the basic general maxims, is the maxim of the prohibition and elimination of 
Barar: It encompasses many subjects of Islamic law and is widely applicable to any 
matter relating to the occurrence, the averting and elimination of harm in Islamic 
obligatory duties. Of course, the rules of Islamic jurisprudence are laid down to attract 
benefits and to repel hardship 603 This includes repelling hardship in order to protect 
the five necessities recognized by Islam - religion, life, offspring, property and 
reputation. 604 The maxim emphasises the purpose of Shan `ah and the actualisation of 
these purposes by means of averting all evils, or minimising their occurrence. 605 
5.1 Definition and Interpretation of the Maxim La Barar wa lä dIrir 
Some Islamic scholars prefer to coin the maxim thus: al- daran yuzäl (Harm should 
be removed) citing the above maxim as a legal evidence. 606 Others scholars make the 
tradition the grand maxim, and other maxims its subdivisions. 07 The reason for this, 
according to al-Burnu, is that the tradition encompasses all ways of inflicting daran, 
whether by transgression or in reciprocation. And in fact, using the tradition as a 
maxim strengthens its status. 608 Al-Zarqa snr. distinguishes between the two maxims 
thus: "The maxim stated by the tradition of the Prophet stands as a prohibition of 
602 Majallah Article 19, al-Atasi, Sharh al-Majallah op. Cit. vol. 1, p. 52, al-Zarqa, al-Madkhal op. cit. 
P. 586, al-Suyuti, al-Ashbah op. cit., p. 83, Ibn Nujaym, al Ashbah op. cit. p. 85. 
603 al-Nadwi, op. cit. p. 287. 
604 al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat op. cit.. 
605 Ibn Najjar, Sharh al-Kawkab al-Munir op. cit. vol. 4, p 
6W al-Suyüt al-Ashba, op. cit. p. 83, Ibn Nujaym op. cit. p. 85. 
607 cf. Majallah Article 19, al-Zarqa, Sharh al-Qawaid, p. 165, al-Zarqa, al-Madkhal p. 586, al- 
Burnu, al- Wajiz, op. cit. p. 251. 
609 al-Burnu, ibid. p. 251. 
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inflicting Barar and the other one indicates that if Barar occurs for one reason or 
another, it should be removed v)609 Thus, the two maxims are characteristically 
distinct. 
Preventing harm is a fundamental principle generally agreed upon and widely applied 
in Islamic jurisprudence. The Qur'an prohibits giving property to an infant who 
cannot manage his affairs in order not to cause harm to him in the future as he might 
destroy the property before attaining puberty. 610 
Furthermore, on many occasions, God has warned against causing harm to another 
without justification. He, the Exalted One says: ".... After payment of legacies and 
debts, so that no loss (harm) is caused (to any one)1,961 1 He further states: "But do not 
take them back to injure (harm) them. ' 612 In addition, He states: "No mother shall be 
treated unfairly (cause harm) on account of her child, nor father on account of his 
child. °7613 
It is reported that a man came to the Prophet complaining about another man who had 
planted a tree on his land, thus causing harm to the owner of the land. Because of this, 
the Prophet asked the man to pay compensation to the owner of the land or to give 
that plant to the owner of the land as a gift. The man refused both options and the 
Prophet asked the owner of the land to destroy the plant and said to the owner of the 
plant, "You are harming someone. 11614 
This maxim has been interpreted in different ways. Some scholars interpret the two 
words as synonyms, asserting that the latter is nothing more than an emphasis on the 
former, while some scholars hold that the two words have a different meaning 
because establishing a new meaning is preferable than emphasising "al-ta'sis awli 
mina al-ta'kid". However, there is no unique interpretation given to each of the two 
609 al-Zarqa, op. cit. p. 166. 610 Qur'an 4, verse 5. 
611 Qur'an 4, verse 12. 
612 Qur'an 4, verse 12. 
613 Qur'an 2, verse 233. 
Eia Abu Dawuod, Sunan with Sharh vol. 15, pp. 321-322, Ibn Taymiyah, Majmu'al-Fatawa, op. cit. 
vol. 4, p. 479, vol. 28, p. 104, Ibrahim Muhammad Ibn Muflih, al-Furu' ed. Abu Zahra Hazim (Beirut : 
Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah 1418), vol. 4, p. 219. 
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words. The most common interpretation states thus: the word Barar means inflicting 
harm on another person, while dirirmeans inflicting harm on another person, beyond 
what is legally approved. In order words, Barar is to harm someone who does not 
harm you, and diräris to harm someone who could have harmed you. 615 Ibn Abdul 
Barr (d. 463) in Tamhid gives an interesting distinction between the two words: "Barar 
is harm inflicted on another and from which the perpetrator derives benefit, while 
diraris harm inflicted on another from which no one benefits"616 
Drawing from theses different interpretations two ways of inflicting dararon someone 
can be inferred. (1) Inflicting daran on someone without any legal reason or 
justification. (2) Inflicting Barar on someone with legal reason or justification. The 
former is further divided into: (a) dararthat has no benefit other than mere intentional 
transgression, such as killing people at random, which stems from a whim or caprice. 
This sort of practice is utterly abhorrent in Islam and anyone who perpetrates such an 
act will be prosecuted. (b) Barar from which the perpetrator derives benefit, such as 
one who sets fire to his garden and accidentally hurts a neighbour, despite having 
taken every precaution. Such an action is not considered as criminal act but 
compensation has to be paid to the victim. However, if there is negligence from the 
side of the actor, the actor will be prosecuted for the damage and to `zir could be 
awarded. 
Even where harm is legally justified, opinions differ on the types of harm. There are 
measures in the form of punishments that are meant to deter malicious people from 
committing crimes. These punishments include the following: the death penalty for 
intentional homicide and banditry; stoning to death for adultery when committed by a 
married person; the amputation of hands for theft; the flogging for fornication 
committed by an unmarried person, or for alcohol consumption, or for the defamation 
of a chaste person. The implementation of these fixed punishments is also harmful as 
they could result in severe injury. However, despite there being a margin of injury in 
these punishments, they are not recognized as an injury that should be eliminated or 
prevented. Rather, they are preventive measures against harm as required by Shari `ab 
615 al-Hamawi, Ghamz 'Uyün op. cit. p118, al-Burnu, al-Wajiz p. 252. 
616 Ibn Abdu, al-Barr, al-Tamhid, ed. Mustafa Ahmad al-Alawi, (Morocco: Ministry of Endowment and 
Islamic Affairs, 1387), vol. 20, p. 158. 
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law in order to protect citizens from further occurrences of clarar emanating from 
vicious and wicked people. Thus, to interpret the word wa lä diräras "and not harm in 
reciprocation" could be misleading. This is because an offender who is punished for 
his crime could come under the prohibition of reciprocation. However, since the harm 
to be prevented by applying the punishment is greater than the benefit to be gained if 
an offender is left undeterred, no legal system would exempt an offender from 
punishment, though there could be discrepancies on the amount or severity of the 
punishment to be accorded. This is because the benefit sought in inflicting injury to an 
offender is to prevent and protect the public, as the convicted criminal is an individual 
who poses a threat to the public. To secure public security and protect people's lives 
is the paramount task of the government. That is why Islam recognizes this public 
interest and enacts appropriate punishment to that end. 
In addition, the one who initiates harm and injury deserves punishment. Although, the 
traditional maxim states that wa i dirir "and not reciprocate Barar" (for those who 
hold that interpretation), that does not contradict the rules laid down to protect the 
masses, for the following reasons: (1) Someone should not inflict injury by himself in 
revenge for harm received from another person. That is why Islam advocates recourse 
to the authority so that people do not take the law into their hands. (2) Someone who 
poses a threat to the public deserves no protection. The Prophet states: "laysa li `irq 
zälim hagq" (A transgressor has no right). 617 Lastly, (3) in some cases, Islam 
recommends settlement through the payment of blood money in lieu of revenge in 
cases of gisäs, as stated in the Qur'an 2, verse 178. It also encourages forgiveness in 
cases related to defamation, as contained in the Qur'an 24, verse 22, and recommends 
that people's mistakes in any situation that attracts budüd should be concealed . 
618 This 
does not contradict bringing wrongdoers to justice, as, particularly in cases related to 
God's right, there is room for forgiveness if the offence is concealed and even if the 
wrongdoer is subsequently punished, that punishment will serve as expiation. 619 
61 Muhammad Ibn Isa Al-Trimith, Sunan al-Tirmidh oral-Jämi`al-Saghired. Hisham al-Bukhari 
(Beirut: Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-Arabi 1995) hadith no. 1394, Abu Dawud, al-Sunan hadith no. 3073. 
618 Al-Bukhar, Sahih, hadith no. 2310, Ibn Majah, Sunan kitab al-Huduud, hadith no. 2544, Abu 
Dawuod Sunan, hadith no. 4893. 
619 al-Zarqa, al-Madkhal op. cit., p. 586, al-Burnu, al-Wajiz, p. 255. 
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Be that as it may, on the basis of this maxim, according to various interpretations, 
there are three ways by which harm could be prevented. First, one should not allow 
oneself to be harmed, but in any situation that harm does occur, it should not be 
repelled as to cause harm to another. Second, if one is harmed by any means, revenge 
should not exceed the proportion of the original harm. Third, it is legally allowed to 
avert anticipated harm, but that is subject to the two conditions stated above. But even 
if harm is revenged, it is recommended that it should be minimised. In his comment 
on the hadith, Al-Shatibi says that, although the hadith is not sound enough, it 
embodies all kinds of harms that are prohibited in Islam. Other prohibitions include 
aggression against lives, properties, reputation and offspring. 620 
5.2 Some Maxims subsumed under the Maxim of Prohibition and Elimination of 
Harm. 
5.2.1 al-Dararyuzä (Injury should be removed) 621 
The basic general maxim discussed above prohibits unjustified harm against fellow 
human beings. The present maxim addresses the position of the law when the harm 
has occurred. It is intuitive that not every human being adheres to rules, thus, if Barar 
occurs by someone against another, whether the occurrence of that daran harms the 
public at large or an individual, it is required by law that the Barar should be 
eliminated. For instance, if someone builds a house on a public path that could cause 
danger to passers-by, or affect neighbours, the government has the authority to 
demolish such a house. 622 All legislation enacted to facilitate the smooth running of 
people's lives is included in this maxim. If the Barar has occurred, it must be 
eliminated within the limits of the law. However, in the process of doing that, certain 
conditions have to be observed, these being the focus of the following maxims. 
620 a1-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat op. Cit.. 
621 al-Suyuti, al-Ashba p. 83, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba p. 85, Majallah Article 20. al-Hamawi, Ghamz, 
vol. 1, p. 37. 
622 al-Burnu, aI-Wajiz P. 258. 
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5.2.2 al-Dararyudfa bigadral-'Imkrin (Dararshould be prevented as much as 
Possible). 623 
It is one of the fundamental principles of Islamic law that any means to prevent the 
occurrence of Barar should be sought. This is because it is better to prevent than to 
cure harm. It is legally preferable to eliminate dararwithout causing any further Barar, 
but should that prove difficult to achieve then the harm must be proportionate. 
Preventing Barar as indicated in this maxim could be achieved in two ways: first, by 
preventing its occurrence in the first place, and second, by preventing further 
occurrences of it if it has already occurred. Islamic criminal law legislates that any of 
the stipulated offences referred to in the texts should not be committed as a means of 
preventing harm, while the style of the textual injunctions indicates the seriousness of 
the offences. In addition, it enacts all precautionary measures to dissuade people from 
committing that offence. For instance, looking at the face of a women outwith one's 
own family, or even being in seclusion with her, is prohibited. In the same way, the 
production of alcohol is prohibited. The former could lead to adultery and the latter to 
alcoholism. In order to prevent further occurrences, Islam prescribes certain 
punishments for each of the offences. Some of these punishments are severe and some 
are light, depending on the gravity of the crime. Thus, hadd (punishment) of stoning is 
enacted for married couples who commit adultery because of the serious 
consequences that can be brought on society. Discretionary punishments are 
prescribed for common errors, perhaps because of their insignificance. 
Measures put in place to prevent the occurrence of Barar should be in accordance with 
the principle of public interest that conforms to the spirit of Islam. 624 The Qur'an 
directs Muslim leaders to fortify themselves with any means of power in order to 
prevent any harm that enemies can cause. This evidently shows that it is in the best 
interests of Islam that a person should prevent any occurrence of harm being inflicted 
on him. To that end, all measures to prevent the occurrence of crimes have to be 
sought both by the government and the citizens. In fact, this maxim is considered in 
the Islamic principle of jurisprudence as sadd al-dbar7'ah (blocking means of evils) 
623 Majallah Article 31, al-Zarqa, al-Madkhal p. 587, al-Burnu, al-Wajiz, p. 256. 
624 al-Burnu, al- Wajiz, op. cit p. 256. 
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Based on this maxim, it is allowed for someone to defend himself against any 
aggression that could endanger his life or inflict damage on his body or his property. 
In the process of pursuing this defence, any damage caused to the aggressor would not 
be considered, as long as it was proportionate. It is reported that the Prophet said: 
"Whoever unsheathe a sword against Muslims has made his blood unprotected. s9625 it 
is certain that such action is harmful and dangerous, and it is for the attacked person to 
defend himself, even if that brings harm to the aggressor. 
The same applies to a person who is subjected to rape, as if she prevents the rape by 
killing the rapist she will not be convicted of murder, based on the rule of preventing 
daran: Although it might be said that killing is worse than rape, in fact there are two 
dangers in the action of the rapist. First, the unlawful action that involves adultery and 
baghy (spreading evil on the earth) and second, taking another by force, which 
includes the violation of that person's right. In that case, there is no protection for 
such a person in Islam. 626 
It is worth observing that the maxim under consideration differs from the sub-maxim 
al-darzirah tuqaddar bi gadariba. The latter is peculiar to the measure of allowance 
given for eliminating natural difficulty, while the maxim here deals with the 
proportion of allowance given to someone to be used for eliminating the Barar placed 
on him by another person. 
It is legally preferable that harm does not occur in the first place. But where it does, 
any measure to prevent it in accordance with Islamic Law is recommended and is, 
indeed, preferable to having to cope with its aftermath. For instance, the use of CCTV 
to check vehicles speeding is to prevent the occurrence of an accident that could claim 
the lives of people; thus, arresting a suspect to prevent information being divulged, or 
detaining an alleged criminal can all be justified under this maxim. It may be that 
these measures constitute justice, while posing restrictions on people's liberty on the 
one hand, but they (the criminals) also violate the fundamental principle of Islamic 
625 Zadah, Abdu al-Rahman, Muntaqa al Abhur fi Sharh Multagci al-Abhor (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al- 
`Ilmiyyah, 1998/1419), vol. 4. p. 320. 
626 
al-Trimidh Sunan, hadith 1394, and 1396, Abu Dawd Sunan hadith 3073, Ibn Rushd, Bidaya, op. 
cit., vol. 2, p. 
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law on the other. The Qur'an says on this: "0 ye who believe! Avoid being overly 
suspicious... "627 Yet, it has become apparent that leaving a suspect unchecked may 
trigger grave danger to society. Thus, if there is a high probability of danger to the 
public, it is in the interests of Islamic law to prevent such an occurrence, even if it 
inflicts some damage on a minor right. We can infer from the above verse that some 
suspicions are sins. This, pragmatically, presupposes that some may not be sinful. It 
is reported that Hatib Ibn Abi Balta'a, a companion of the Prophet, gave a letter to a 
woman to give to his relative in Makkah in which he divulged the plan of Muslims to 
conquer Makkah. The Prophet sent Ali Ibn Abi Talib, Zubayr and al-Miqdad to stop 
the woman and to retrieve the letter from her. When they met her on her way, they 
searched her thoroughly until the letter was retrieved. 628 From this story it can be 
inferred that someone can be suspected and investigated if there is high degree of 
suspicion, although in this case as the Prophet was given inspiration regarding Hatib's 
letter, perhaps this should not have been considered as suspicion. Abu Hurayra also 
narrated that after a father had accused a woman of committing adultery with his son, 
the prophet sent Unays to investigate the allegation. 629 
However, if suspicion and investigation are justified in the circumstance of 
eliminating daran, it should be proportional to justify such a fundamental principle in 
Islamic law. But if the allegation turns out to be false, the right of the accused has to 
be protected. This could be achieved by compensating the accused if the mistake was 
committed by the government, as no single person could be held responsible for that. 
Furthermore, if the allegation is of a type that could lead to a badd punishment, the 
accuser must then be punished by obliging him to compensate the accused, given that 
there is no specific punishment laid down in Islam 630 
However, if the accusation leads to another crime, such as suspecting one wrongly of 
adultery, the accuser will be awarded the punishment of defamation. This can be 
627 Qur'an 49, verse 12. 
628 al-Bukhari Sahih, hadith 6540. 
629 al-Bukhari, Sahih hadith no. 2549,2575,6466, Muslim, Sahih. hadith no. 1697,1698, al-Trimith, 
Sunan, hadith nos. 1454,1458. 
630 Baderin, M. International Human Rights and Islamic Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), pp. 109-110, see al-Alwani, T. J., `Judiciary and Rights of accused in Islamic Criminal law' in 
Mahmood T., et. al. (eds. ) Criminal law in Islam and the Muslim World (Delhi: Institute of Objective 
Studies, 1996), pp. 256-263. 
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inferred from Abu Hurayra's narration cited above. According to al-Nawawi (d. 676), 
the investigation of the accusation was not to punish the accused (because such an 
accusation is not admissible in Islam), but, rather, it was conducted to establish the 
false accusation against a chaste woman in that malicious act 631 
In any case, under no circumstances does Islam recommend that someone should be 
suspected or accused of any crime that is duly and solely a right of God. This is 
because God's right is open to forgiveness and pardon. This by no means suggests 
that Islam condones sins; rather, it secures privacy and protects mankind. At the same 
time, Islam condemns any act of evil and denounces any spread of malice on the 
earth. Thus, if one is suspected of harbouring women in a house for the purpose of 
prostitution, or there is the odour of alcohol on someone's breath, or the sound of 
screaming emerges from a house where there is presumed to be an incident of rape, or 
murder, then it is acceptable to suspect the occurrence of such actions in order to 
prevent a taboo. 632 The Prophet is reported to have said: "Whoever commits sin (of a 
right of God) should keep it secret to himself. If he discloses it we will impose the 
haddpunishment of God on him. "633 
In any case, the maxim of preventing harm in as many cases as possible is widely 
applicable to many matters in which there is an occurrence of harm, or danger, as well 
as to the elimination of it after the occurrence. Based on this, it is allowed for 
someone to defend himself and his family in the case where a bandit forcibly enters 
his house and attempts to kill any member of his household. In such a case, a person 
would be exempted from compensation, or would not be subjected to punishment. 
The Prophet said: "man shabar all al-muslimin sayfan fagd aballa damub" (Whoever 
draws a sword on Muslims his blood has become legal). 634 
631 Yahya Ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahih Muslim (Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi, 1392) vol. 
11, p. 207. 
632 al-Mawarid, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah op. cit. p. 314. 
633 Malik, al-Muwatta op. cit. vol. 4, p. 146, Ahmad Ibn al-Husayn al-Bayhaqi, al-Sunan al-Kubra, ed. 
Muhammad Abdul Qadir, Ata, (Makka: Maktabat Dar al-Baz, 1994) vol. 8, p. 326. 
634 See the above note 235. 
177 
5.2.3 al-Dararls yuz l bi Mitblihi (Harm is not repelled by its Like). 635 or 
al-Dararle yuzi1 bi al-barar Harm is not repelled with Harm). 636 
In the course of eliminating daran, one important measure should be considered, 
namely, that the means of averting Barar should not cause another Barar. However, 
causing another Barar can exceed the present daran, or, in fact, cause an equivalent 
Barar. The maxim in question particularly emphasizes the aversion of an equivalent 
Barar. It stands as a check and balance for the legality of eliminating clarar. 
However, in the course of eliminating daran, it is expected that - in one way or 
another- Barar is likely to emerge from it. The two are harmful, but one has a higher 
degree of harm than the other. If the two evils or harms are of the same degree, an 
actor is given the choice to select which is suitable for him, provided no other 
person's right is affected. But if one of the two is lesser than the other, the lesser one 
should be committed in order to avoid the greater one, as the next maxim will 
demonstrate. 637 
It would appear that the law of retaliation in Islamic penal law contradicts this maxim 
if the word gips is translated as meaning "retaliation with equivalence. " It is stated in 
the Qur'an thus: "0 you who believe retaliation is prescribed for you concerning 
murder; the freeman for freeman, the slave for slave; and the female for female.... " 638 
Some scholars assert that retaliation in intentional homicide should be executed in the 
same way as the crime was committed, while others oppose this view. 639 In either of 
the two views, there is equivalent harm in punishing the criminal, although Shaltut 
holds a contrary view to the Malikites and others who claim complete equivalence. 
For him, any means that could lessen the pain of killing should be adopted. 64° 
635 al-Suyuti, al-Ashba' p. 86, Ibn Nujaym, p. 87, Ibrahim Ibn Muhammad Ibn Muflih, al-Mubdi' 
Sharh al-Muqni' (Beirut: Dar al-Maktab al-Islami 1400), vol. 4, p. 301, al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur, op. 
cit. vol. 2, p. 321, Ibn Taymiyah, Majmu' al-Fatawa vol. 29, p. 189. 
636 Majallah Article 23, al-Zarqa, al-Madkhal p. 589. 
637 Haydar Ali, Sharh al-Majallah, vol. 1, p35, al-Ataasi, Durar op. cit., vol. 1, p. 63. 
638 Qur'an 2, verse 178. 
639 Regarding the manner of retaliation, the Malikites, Shafi'ites and Zahiri schools assert that the 
killing should be in the same manner that the victim was killed, as opposed to the Hanafites and 
Hanbalites schools. See Malik al- Mudawwa vol. 4 pp. 495-496, al-Shafi', al-Umm vol. 6p 54, Ibn 
Hazm , al-Muhalla vol. 
10 pp. 370-373 al-Jassas, Ihkam al-Qur'an vol. 1, pp. 160-161. 
640 Muhmud Shaltut, Islam 'Aqida wa al-Shari'ah p. 383, cited by Mohammed S. El-Awa Punishment 
in Islamic law, op. cit. p. 72. 
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However, the reality is that execution, though painful and harmful, is set to prevent 
the furthering of harm that could erupt from leaving a criminal unpunished 
proportionately, or if the relative of the victim has not been given satisfied justice. 
That is why God has said: " walakum ft al-gicic häyatun" - There is life for you in the 
law of gisäs ..., . 
641 
Is it permissible for a group of people aboard a ship to throw a member of the group 
into the sea in order to save the lives of the rest out of fear that injury may occur 
because the ship is in danger of capsizing? The majority of Islamic scholars oppose 
such a measure for a variety of reasons. First, there is no certainty that the ship will 
capsize. Second, there is no guarantee that if one of the people on the ship were 
thrown overboard the danger would be averted. Third, there is no preference of one 
life over another. Thus, it is not permissible to eliminate daran, presumed of its 
occurrence, as it is not acceptable to eliminate dararwith equivalent harm. 
Similarly, if one is aboard a burning ship and cannot swim, he is left with two options 
- to stay on the ship, or to jump into the water. In this case the actor, if he dies, would 
not be deemed to have committed suicide - whichever option he chooses - because the 
two evils are equal and neither one has preference over the other. Moreover, if a 
pregnant woman is told that one of the two unborn babies in her womb should be 
terminated before she can deliver, or else both would die; it is not permissible for her 
to consent to the request because one life is not superior to the other. However, if she 
is told that if the pregnancy is not terminated, her life would be in danger, there are 
divergent opinions on whether she can abort the pregnancy. The bone of contention is 
whether the life of the mother is preferred to that of the unborn baby, or whether both 
lives are equal. 
641 This is a truth that cannot be undermined. The cases of Hunter and Robert McCartney testify to this. 
Despite all the efforts to pacify the family of Robert, the relatives of the victim have demanded equal 
justice that could mean executing the perpetrator as well. In fact, many Western countries, including 
the US, see retaliation by execution as an equitable and just punishment. The jury in the case of Rahna 
Arshad stated thus: "The jury have convicted you on overwhelming evidence of the brutal and horrific 
murder of your wife and children, " Mr Justice Clarke said. "The only sentence permitted by law is life 
imprisonment on each count. You killed your entire family in circumstances of great brutality. Life 
imprisonment in your case means life. " (See www. guardian. co. uk/crime/article last visited 16/03/07 at 
11: 55. ) This statement could indicate that if there was a severe enough alternative in punishment 
allowed by British law it would have been inflicted on the defendant. 
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The sensitivity of this issue lies in the fact that Islam denounces all ways of ending 
life, including unborn lives, once they have been adjudged to be human beings. 642 
However, the life of the mother is known and active, while the life of an unborn baby 
is unknown, thus preventing the death of a known and existing life is preferred 
logically. Thus, one evil cannot repel another. In any case, the woman would not be 
held responsible for not consenting to the request if both babies die. 643 
5.2.4 al- Dararal-'Ashadd yuzäl bl al-Darara! -'Akhaf (Greater Injury should be 
prevented by committing Lesser Injury). 44 or 
Yukbtrir `Abwan al-Sharrayn aw 'Akhafal-Dararayn (Lesser evil or injury 
should be preferred) bas or 
Idbä to `riradat Mafsadatrin rü `iya A zamabumä Dararau bi irtikäb 
Akhaffuhuma (If Two Evils clash, the Greater One should be prevented by 
committing the Lesser One) 646 
As discussed above, harm should not be removed with the same harm. The only legal 
way to eliminate harm in the face of necessity is to consider which of the two evils- 
darar- is lesser. When the lesser is identified, it becomes legally binding on the actor 
to choose the lesser evil in order to repel the greater one. The maxims quoted above 
are identical and point to the same rule. That is, if there is a situation that constitutes 
two harms or hardship, and one is greater than other, the legal solution is to commit 
the lesser one in order to prevent the greater one. One reason for this is that what is 
prohibited becomes permissible in a dangerous situation, provided it is used 
proportionately, and does not exceed the margin of allowance. 647 
The Qur'an unequivocally states thus: 
They ask you concerning fighting in the sacred month. Say, fighting therein is a great 
(transgression) but greater (transgression) with God is to prevent mankind from following the 
642 Omran, A. R. Family Planning in the Legacy ofIslam, ( London, Routledge, 1992) , pp. 8-9 643 al-Zarqa, Sharh, p. 196. Giving mothers choice of selecting "unwanted pregnancy" is emphasized 
in the CEDAW Committee (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discremination Against 
Women. See Joseph S, Schultz, J. And Castan, M. The International Convenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Materials, and Commentary, 2000 p. 137 This is contrary to the Islamic view that prohibits 
abortion in certain period of gestation. See Omran above and Baderin 2003 p. 74 
644 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 88, Majallah Article 28. 
645 Majallah Article 29. 
646 al-Suyuti, al-Ashba' op. cit. 87, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. 89, Majallah, Article 28, Ibn Rajab, al- 
Qawa'id p. 112. 
647 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 89, al-Atari, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 68, Haydar Ali, op. cit,. vol. 1, p36. 
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way of God to disbelieve in Him to prevent access to the sacred mosque and to drive out its 
inhabitants and oppression is worse than killing (Q. 2: 217) 
The verse came as a refutation of the claim of Makkan pagans that Muslims had 
violated the sacred month by fighting in that period. But the Qur'an draws comparison 
between the two offensive acts - fighting in the sacred months, and persecution and 
oppression. Thus it concludes that violating the sacred month is a lesser offence than 
oppression. 648 
From the above, it can be deduced that if someone is forcibly ordered to drink alcohol 
or to commit adultery, then according to this maxim it is preferable to drink alcohol. 
This is because, for a number of reasons, the crime of drinking alcohol is lesser than 
that of committing adultery. Among these is that the punishment for drinking is less 
severe than the punishment for adultery. Also, there is no right of man affected by 
drinking alcohol, whereas committing adultery involves the violation of the right a 
person committed adultery with. This example applies to any of the criminal acts 
prohibited in Islam. However, it can be further argued that, if someone takes a drink, 
he may lose control of his senses and thus commit a second greater crime. That is a 
possibility, but the fact remains that the commission of the greater crime is uncertain, 
whereas the present situation demands choosing one out of the two. 
It is also allowed to throw heavy luggage from a ship into the sea to save the lives of 
those on board, should the ship be about to sink. However, compensation has to be 
made to the owners of the destroyed property, because necessity does not invalidate 
people's rights. 649 
Contrarily, if a group of people are on a journey and face difficulty through starvation, 
and their only solution is to kill a member of the group, this would be illegal. It is a 
criminal offence if they do so because such a situation does not warrant that such a 
crime should be committed, there being no disparity between the lives of any of the 
648 Mansour al-Mutairi, Necessity in Islamic Law, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University PhD. Thesis 1997) 
R. 
966. Ibid. p. 56, al-Burnu, al-Wajiz op. cit. p. 261. 
181 
group members, as stated in Regina v. Dudley and Stephens650 and U. S. v. Holmes, 1 
Wallace Junior 1 . 
651 
The question might be asked as to what to do if someone is asked to either jump from 
a height, or to be killed. Is there any difference between the two harms? The opinions 
of scholars differ. Abu Hanifa suggests that he has a choice - to jump as instructed, or 
to disobey, even if he is killed. To him (Abu Hanifah) the harms are equal and one 
cannot be committed to repel another. However, Abu Yusuf, one of Abu Hanifah's 
companions, asserts that it is better to refuse to jump and be killed than to throw 
oneself to one's death because opting for the second option would constitute suicide, 
which is a greater sin than to be killed 652 The latter opinion is deemed to be in line 
with the objectives of Islamic law. If someone is killed, there is a legal liability placed 
on the killer, unlike in a situation where it is difficult to decide whether an act is one 
of suicide or indirect homicide. Therefore, the legal liability of the act is between the 
issuer of the threat and the one threatened. 653 
However, if someone faces hardship and has to commit a prohibited act to secure one 
of the five fundamentals preserved in Islam, it is important that he gives preference to 
one over another. For example, it is also allowed under this maxim to pay a ransom to 
free a Muslim captive. Leaving the captive with the enemy is considered to be a grave 
evil as the right of the captive Muslim may not be protected. Lastly, it is permissible 
to operate on a woman so as to deliver her baby, given that she has experienced 
difficulty in delivering the baby by herself. This is because the envisaged damage, if 
the baby is left in her womb, is greater than that envisaged in the operation. Although 
the life of the woman is at risk, and that of the baby, there is a probability that the 
operation would be successful, but there is no guarantee that she would be able to 
deliver the baby safely. 654 
650 L. R. 14, Q. B. D. 273, quoted in Mahmassani, op. cit. p. 158. 
651 Mahmassani ibid. 
652 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 90. 
653 Ibid. al-Burnu, op. cit. p. 262. 
654 al-Bumu, al- Wajiz op. cit. p. 261. 
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5.2.5 Yutabammal al-Dararal-KbäsBdaf Darar `Am (Personal Injury should be 
incurred to prevent General Injury) 655 
The harm to be repelled could be lesser or greater or it could be general or peculiar. 
The previous maxim, in section 52.4, addresses the rules of lesser and greater forms of 
harm. However, the present maxim aims to explain the rules of general and peculiar 
forms of harm The generality and peculiarity of Barar depends on the number of 
people to be affected if the harm is repelled or the crime is committed. The purpose of 
Shari'ah is to protect the fundamental principles - these being the necessities of life. 
Thus, when a conflict arises as to which of these necessities should be protected first, 
a choice has to be made on the basis of quantity. As the maxim indicates, it is allowed 
to kill a Muslim who is used as a shield by unbelievers. 656 
Furthermore, the maxim can be applied to the legality of prohibiting all criminal acts 
of hudid and gisäs, as the consequence of committing any one of these crimes could 
endanger the public. For instance, zina is prohibited and a severe punishment is 
prescribed for it in order to prevent the spread of disease that could kill millions of 
people. Thus, punishing an individual who commits such a crime, if proven, is 
preferable to endangering the public health. 
The same applies to the legislation of retaliation, this being decreed to prevent the 
spread of killing and enmity among mankind. This also encompasses any restriction 
deemed by the government to protect the public interest, even if individual interests 
will be infringed. Thus, the government can outlaw the consumption of some products 
or some acts if they are proved to be harmful to the public. In this regard, cigarettes 
and the like can be banned to protect public health. Although there is no precise or 
affirmative prohibition against smoking, it is in the best interests of Islam to protect 
the public against danger and harm. Thus, if someone violates a smoking ban he 
should be punished under to `zir. 
655 Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba' op. cit. p. 87, Majallah Article 26, Haydar Ali. op. cit. vol. 1, p. 36. 
656 Ibn Nujaym, ibid. p. 87. 
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5.2.6 Dar'u al Mafasid awls min falb al-MaFiIi I (Preventing evils is better than 
attracting Benefits) 6s7 
The discussion on the previous maxim focused on situations of conflicting evils. 
However, the maxim here deals with the question of preference in situations where 
both maslah (benefit) and mafsadah (harm) exist. According to the maxim in 
question, preference is given to warding off evil over the acquisition of benefit. The 
Qur'an states the reason for the prohibition of alcohol thus: 
If they ask you (0 Muhammad SAW) concerning alcoholic drink and gambling, say: "In them 
is a great sin, and (some) benefits for men, but the sin of them is greater than their benefit".... 
(Q.: 2: 219) 
This verse stands as evidence that if there are evils (which is inferred from the word 
ithm) and benefits (manäfi ), the evil should be obviated by not acquiring the benefit, 
except where the benefit is greater than the evil. This is because the verse explains 
that the ithm is greater than the manäfi 6.658 Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH) sheds light on 
this maxim by saying that if an injury or benefit contradicts each other, then the better 
of the two should be sought. If commands or prohibitions meant to benefit mankind or 
to prevent injuries are in conflict, the one that secures more benefit or has lesser injury 
must be upheld. The criterion for choosing the most beneficial or the least harmful 
should be sought from Shari `ah. Therefore, the Islamic texts should be considered 
when deciding on these issues. 659 
Islam attaches more importance to what is prohibited, al-manhiyät, than what is 
required to be done, al-ma'mürät. In the words of the Prophet: "If I ask you to do 
something, do of it as much as you can, but if I forbid you something, you should 
refrain from it. " 660 
657 al-Suyuti, al-Ashba' op. cit. p. 78, Ibn Nujaym, al Ashba' op. cit. p. 90, Majallah, Article 30, al- 
Zarkashi, al-Manthur, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 348, cf. Majallah Article 46, al-Qarafi, Anwar al-Buruq fi 
anwa' al-Furuq ed. Khalil Mansur, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-`Ilmiyyah, 1998/1418), vol. 4, p. 369, al- 
Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat op. cit. vol. 3, p. 190. 
658 al-Burnu, al-Wajiz, p. 275. 
659 Mansour, Necessity op. cit. p 65. 
660 al-Bukhari, Sahih, hadith no 6858, Muslim Sahih, hadith no. 1337. 
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5.2.7 Idhä to `arad al-Mini ` wa al-Mugtadie yugaddim al-Mini `ills idbä kina 
al-Mugtadl A`azam (If a Prohibitive Injunction contradicts with what seems 
to be Permissible, the Prohibitive is given Preference over the 
Permissible) 661 or 
Idha ijtama `al-Hall wa al-Harim aw al-Mubih wa a1-Mubarrim gbullib al- 
Harim (If Lawful and Unlawful Things conjure, Preference will be given to 
the Unlawful) 662 
Similar maxims to the one discussed above are the maxims of the preference between 
obligation and recommendation. The aim of the maxims here is to look at the 
imperative statement of the texts in contrast with the negative instruction. There could 
be a situation where a man faces some difficulty in obeying a textual order. In that 
case what should be the yardstick for acting upon the contradicting orders? To make it 
clearer, one text may forbid drinking alcohol and another may allow it in the face of 
necessity. The preference will be given to the one that prohibits it, except, as 
mentioned above, in a dire need. In fact, the maxim reflects what is known as 
precaution in Islam. One is not allowed to excessively exploit any provision given in 
exceptional circumstances. 
Regarding this, it is prohibited for merchants to trade in any prohibited substance such 
as alcohol, harmful drugs, and so on, even though there is benefit in them for traders, 
and Islam does recommend trading. 663 However, because there is a text prohibiting 
their consumption, it is not allowed to take that advantage over the prohibitive text. 
The same applies to a situation where someone cannot identify who it is lawful for 
him to marry among a set of women. Here, it is in the best interests of the actor not to 
attempt to marry any of them, even though it is his right to marry. 6M However, 
because there is a text prohibiting marriage with certain women, 665 it is said to be 
preferable not to marry any of the unidentified women. 666 Presumably, if a person 
661 al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur, op. cit. vol. 1 p. 348, Majallah article 46, al-Zarqa, al-Madkhal, par. 595. 
662 al-Zarkashi, ibid. vol 1, p. 125, al-Suyuti, al Ashba'op. cit. 105, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. 109. 
66' Qur'an 2, verse 275. 
664 Qur'an 4, verse 3. 
665 Qur'an 4, verses 22-24. 
666 al-Burnu, al-Wajiz p. 267. 
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prefers the recommended rather than the prohibited, he could be warned by means of 
a to `zir for violating a prohibited thing. 
However, these maxims cannot be applied to all situations. There are cases where 
more benefits are derived if prohibition is given preference over recommendation. For 
example, if someone's properties are mixed between what is lawful and unlawful, it is 
suggested that if the quantity of what is lawful is more than what is unlawful, the 
owner can make use of them. This is because if he were to give up all the properties, 
then he could be put into a difficult situation, and Islam has recommended that in a 
difficult situation one is given facility. Having said that, it is also recommended that 
one should take all precautions to extract what is unlawful from the properties. 667 In 
addition to the exception made from the maxim, a person is allowed to tell a lie to 
settle a dispute between two litigants based on the hadith of the Prophet. This states 
that one cannot be branded kadhdhäb for telling one party a story different from what 
he tells another, if his aim is to settle a dispute. 668 Based on this, if one were to be 
faced with a transgression from a usurper who demands to take properties entrusted to 
him, it is the right of the trustee to tell a lie in order to protect the properties. 669 
5.3 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter has elucidated the stand of Islam in prohibition and elimination of daran 
whether in terms of aggression or in reciprocal. It is a settled rule in Islam that harm 
must be removed. In removing it, there are two major conditions that must be 
observed. (1) daran must not be removed by its like (2) greater cdarar must be 
prevented by committing lesser Barar 
However, if there are two things and the Barar in both is of the same level, the other 
way to decide which one should be given preference is to look at the structure of 
them. If one is a prohibitive injuction and other is a permissible, preference will be 
given to prohibitive one over the persmisible as the maxim states thus : idha to `grad 
al-mini' wa al-mugtad! yugaddam al-minn` This is because, in Islamic law, it is an 
667 Ibid. 
668 al-Bukhar, Shahi al-Bukhari kitab al-Sulh, hadith no 2546, Muslim, Sahih Muslim, kitab al-birr, 
hadith no. 2605. 
669 Haydar Ali, Durar al-Hukkam. 
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established principle that "preventing evils is better than acquiring benefit" (dar' a! - 
maläsid awlä min falb al-masälih) 
In spite of this principle, there are undermining attitude towards this provision by 
some Shari `ah judges in those states implementing Islamic law in Northern Nigeria. 
This cases in which elimination of daran is absent and which subsequently leads to 
inflicting unjust Barar and imposing undue punishment on accused persons will be 
exposed in the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
187 
Chapter Six 
Analysis of the Maxim: al- `ädah muhakkamab 
(Custom is authoritative) 
670 
6.0 Introduction 
Customary usage is recognized in Islamic law as an authority on which judgment can 
be based. Despite the number of books written on Islamic jurisprudence, it seems 
there is no book devoted to the effect of ` , dah and `urf in criminal law. The recourse 
to custom dates back to the epoch of the Prophet and was later exploited by the 
Companions and others. There are many cases reported in which rulings in Islamic 
law are based on the customs of the people. Malik Ibn Anas considered the `urf of the 
people of Madinah (`amal ahal al-Madinah) as the source of Islamic law whenever 
there was a dispute in law making. Though, Malik view on `aml ahal al-madinah 
suggests that `amal ahal al-Madinah is not only `urf of people of the Madinah but a 
practical exercise of what the Prophet left behind which no one should go against it. 71 
But the fact of the matter is that while Madinan's scholars enjoyed originality by 
receiving knowledge directly from the Prophet and his companions, there is 
continuum of issues that were based on the iftihäd (personal reasons) of people of 
Madinah. 672 
In addition, al-Shafi`i had no option than to change his opinion in Egypt, contrary to 
his view in Iraq, because of the disparity in the customs and circumstances met in 
670 al-Suyuti, al Ashba' p. 89, Ibn Nujaym, al Ashba p. 92, Majallah, Article 36, Haydar Ali, Durar al- 
Hukkam op. cit. vol. 1, p. 40, al-Zarkashi, al-Manthrir, vol. 2, p. 356, al-Zarqa, Ahmad, Sharh, op. cit. 
p. 219, al-Zarqa, Mustafa, al-Madkhal op. cit., p. 604, al-Hamawi, Ghamz, op. cit. vol. 1, p. 37. 
671 See Yasin Dutton, The Origins of Islamic Law, The Qur'an, the Muwatta' and Madinah `amaa 
(Richmond, UK: Curzon, 1999), pp. 39-41. 
672 `Amal ahal al-madinah has different connotations. Malik used two terms to indicate what constitue 
'ama! ahal al-Madinah; sunnah and amr. When Sunna is used it could be refered to "that derives from 
a normative practice of the Prophet" "or sometimes a pre-Islamic Madinah custom endorsed by the 
Prophet (without any element of later ijtihäd). " Whereas 'amr is used sometimes to refer to what 
originates in the "practice of the Prophet, nevertheless contains at least some element of later 
ijtihäd. "Ibid, pp. 39-41 
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Egypt. 673. Undoubtedly, `ädab/`urf is considered as an authority in all legal 
systems. 674 
6.1 Definition and Interpretation of the Maxim al-`AdahMuhakkamab 
`Adak (Practice) or `urf (custom), are used synonymously and interchangeably in 
Islamic jurisprudence. `Adab is derived from the Arabic letters ayn, waw, and dal 
which means "return". It also denotes the custom, manner, and habit that people 
constantly return to, time after time. 675 It is defined as "practices that have been 
penetrated deep among people by recurrence and are acceptable to people of sound 
nature, "676 or as "a repeated matter which has no connection with reason". 677 
`Urf on the other hand is said to be synonymous of `ädah as they resemble each other 
in definition and concept. `Urf is a noun form derived from the verb `arafa, which 
means to know. 678 It is technically defined as "what is established in life from reason 
and acceptable by sound natural disposition. "679 al-Zarqa jnr. in his effort to 
distinguish between `adab and `urf,, describes `urf as "the behaviour of a group of 
people in their saying and doings. 9680 From this, `urf can be viewed as lesser in scope 
than `ädah because it is a custom of a group, although, for `äda4 it could be a custom 
of individuals, such as the custom of menstruation in women, or in groups of people, 
such as the terms used in a large set of people. So it can be said that all `urf is `ädah, 
681 but not all `ädah is `urf. 
As expressed above, the use of `ädab and "urf is controversial. However, one can 
categorically say that they are often used interchangeably. Ibn `Abidin, (d. 1252 AH), 
remarks that habit is derived from frequency and recurrence because it happens 
673 Abu Zaharah, Muhammad, Usül al-Fiqh [Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, n. d. ] p. 128,90, Karnali, 
Hashim , Principle of 
Islamic jurisprudence op. cit. p. 361. 
674 Mustafa al-Zarga, al-Madkhal 1/132. 
675 al-Husayn Ibn Muhammad al-Raghib al-Isfahäni, ial-Mufradit 17Ghar'b al-Quran ed. Muhammad 
S. al-Kaylani, (Lebanon: Dar al-Ma`rifah n. d. ) p. 302. 
676 al-Zarqa, M., al-madkhal 2/83 8. 
677 Abu Sannah, al-'Urf wa al- Adah fi ray al fugha 1992, p. 8, al-Jurjani, al-ta'rifat op. cit. 1988, p. 
149. 
678 Ibn al-Manzhur, Lisan al-Arab op. cit. vol. 9 p239, al-Fayruzabadi, Muhammad Ibn Ya `qub, al- 
6Qamus 
al-Muhiit [Beirut, Muhassasah al-Risalah, 1996) vol. 3, p. 179. 
9 al-Jurjäni, Tarim op. cit. p. 154. 
680 al-Zarga, M., al-Madkhal vol. 1 p. 131. 
681 Mohmad Akram Laldin, The Theory and application of 'Urf in Islamic Law, (Edinburgh, 
University of Edinburgh, PhD Thesis, 1995), p. 22. 
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frequently and in succession. This then becomes well known and becomes a well- 
established practice in souls and minds. It is received without any connection and 
factual evidence as a customary fact. `Adab and `urf imply the same meaning despite 
their conceptual dissimilarity. It is also important to state that for `urf to be accepted 
and applied in Islam, it should be of sound nature as not all custom, especially in the 
modern age, can be accommodated in Islam. 
Giving custom a legal ruling in Islam is inevitable due to the nature of its law. Islamic 
laws that deal with universal mankind and the norms of ethnicity vary considerably, 
however. This is an inevitable consequence of custom being intuitively rooted in 
people's lives, and in their daily activities and utterances. Thus, judges need to have 
recourse to the customs of people before giving any conclusive verdict in any case of 
litigation. 
6.2 Huji)yah (Legality) of the Use of (al-`Adab)Custom in Islamic Law 
Many Islamic jurists recognize `ädah and `urf as supportive sources of Islamic law. 
The justification for the legality of `ädah is traced in the texts, although there is 
nothing in these texts that stands as direct justified evidence for the purpose. 
However, there are derivative statements that form inferences for the recognition of 
custom. There are various sections in the Qur'an and the Hadith of the Prophet in 
which the use of custom could be inferred. In the Qur'an 7, verse 199, for example, 
God enjoins four things as `urf (literally translated as good). According to Ibn 'Arabi 
(d. 543/1148), the meanings of `urf in this verse indicate what it is meant in this 
context. 82 There are four interpretations given to the meaning of `urf in the verse. 1-it 
is synonymous of ma'rüf, kindness; 2-it means there is no god except God; 3-anything 
known to be part of religion 4-anything that is good, not rejected by people and 
endorsed by Shari `ah. 683 Al-Qurtubi further explains the relevance of the word in 
question saying, " `urf, ma'rüf and marfah is anything that is good and is approved of 
682 Muhammad Ibn Abdullah Ibn al-Arabi, Ahkdm al-Quran ed. Muhammad Ata', (Lebanon:: Dar al- 
Fikr, n. d. ), vol. 2, p. 823 
683 cf. Ibn Qutaybah d. 276 A. H Tawil Mushkil al-Quran p. 4. 
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by reason and acceptable by mankind684 Al-Zarqa Jnr. maintains that the word 'urf in 
this verse forms the proof for the legality of 'urf in this context, because the 
customary practice of people is normally a good practice and reasonable accepted bas 
In Qur'an 4, verse 19 the word ma'ruf, as an objective noun of `urf, is used to 
indicate the authority of custom and culture in the Islamic legal framework. Ibn 
Kathir, (d. 774) in his commentary on this verse also canvasses that ma'ri (here is a 
custom of any good character that is reasonable and satisfactory to the soul686 
Regarding this verse, al-Nadwi also observes that God enjoins both couples to live 
together and give each other their due rights based on their custom and culture. Such 
interpretations, therefore, certainly change according to different nations and different 
people. 687 
In another verse, custom is referred to with regard to the father of a child whose 
mother was being divorced. (2: 233 Qur'an) This indicates that where there are no 
established limits, the custom and practice of people should be the yardstick. 688 
Another typical example of `urf legality is the verse in the Qur'an which reads thus: 
0 you who believe, Let your slaves and slave-girl, and those among you who have not come 
to the age of puberty, ask your permission (before they come to your presence) on three 
occasions: before fajr (morning) prayer, and while you put off your clothes for noonday, and 
after the `isha (night) prayer. These three times are of privacy for you... " (Qur'an 24: 58) 
What can be inferred from this verse is that those three specific times were times 
when people of that era used to take off their clothes, and that custom was to be 
adhered to at that time. Intuitively, the ruling is based on the people's customs and 
culture. 689 
In many traditions of the Prophet, there are instances of giving customs authority and 
arbitration. The adjudication of custom can be found in the case of Barra' Ibn `Azib's 
who came to the Prophet and asked about a camel entering the garden of a man and 
684 Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Ansari al-Qurtubi, al-Jimi'! i Ahakäm al-Qur'ärr (Cairo: Dar al-Sh'abi, 
n. d. ) vol. 7, p. 344, The same opinion is expressed by al-Qarafi (d. 684/1285). (See al-Furüq 3/149, 
and Abu Sannah al-'urf wa al-'ädah fi Ray al-Fugah p. 29) 
685 al-Zarqa, M., al-Madkhal vol. 1 p. 137, Karnali, Principle oflslamicjurisprudence p. 37. 
686 Ismail Abu al-Fida Ibn Kakhir, Tafsir al-Quran al-Azim, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 1401), vol. 1, p. 466 
687 al-Nadwi, op. cit. 294. 
688 Ibn Abdu al-Salaam, Qawa'id al-Ahkam fi masalih al-Anam op. cit., vol. 1, p. 61. 
689 al-Nadwi op. cit. p. 297, Muhammad lb Ahmad al-Qurtubi, al-Jämi `Ii Ahkärn al-Qur'an, (Cairo: 
Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyyah, 1936), vol. 12, p. 304. 
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destroying it. The Prophet said: "The safety of the property is to be borne by the 
owner of the property in the day and the safety of the animal is to be borne by the 
owner of the animal in the night. " In another version he said: ".... And the owner of 
the animal must be responsible for what their animals destroy in the night. , 690 
From these two narrations, the jurists adjudicate that if animals destroy property in the 
day there is no liability on their owner, but if property is destroyed during the night, 
the owner will bear the liability. This is because the existing custom of that time was 
that the owners of animals used to leave their animals to look for food during the day. 
However, acting contrary to that norm will lead to an imposition of compensation on 
the perpetrator. 691 Remarking on the effect of this hadith, Ibn-Najjar says: "This is the 
cogent and best ever proof of considering `ädah in Islamic rules. , 692 
Undoubtedly, Islam gives room for custom, whenever there is no explicit text, or even 
where there is a text, but there is no precise limit to the application of that text, or if 
there is divergent interpretation of it in the language. This is evident in the advice 
given to a woman by the Prophet when she asked him about the inconsistency of her 
menstruation. The Prophet referred her to the custom of her contemporary female 
companions and with what she was used to before the inconsistency. 693 Another 
hadith directive that has attracted controversy regarding its authenticity is the hadith 
in which it is reported that the Prophet said: "What the Muslims deem to be good is 
good in the sight of God. "694 Scholars have disputed the authenticity of the hadith. For 
example, some say that it is mawqüf, (the hadith that the chain stops at the companion 
and is not attributed to the Prophet). However, al-Amid-1 and al-Suyuti claim the 
690 al-Nasai', Sunan, hadith, no. 5785, Abu Dawd, Sunan, hadith no. 3570, al-Bayhaqi, Sunan, hadith 
no. 17461, `Ali Ibn `Umar al-Daraqutini, al-Sunan, hadith no. 217, ed. Sayyid Abdullah Hashim al- 
Madani, (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah 1966/1386), vol. 3, p. 155, Ahmad Ibn Anbal, Al-tllusnad, hadith no. 
18629, (Cairo: Muassasah Qurtub, n. d. ), vol. 4, p. 295. 
691 Ibn Abdu al-Barr, al-Tamhid, op. cit vol. 11, p. 89, Muhammad Shams al-Din Abadi, Awnu al- 
Ma'bud Sharh Sunan Abi Dawud, ( 2nd edn. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1995), vol. 9, p. 350, 
Muhammad Ibn Ismail al-San'ani, Sub! al-Salim Shari Bulügh al-Maram, ed. Muhammad al-Khawli, 
(4`h Beirut: Dar `Ihya al-Turath al-Arabi, 1379), vol. 3, p. 264. 
692 Ibn Najjar, al-Kawkab al-Munir op. cit., vol. 4, p. 40. 
693 al-Shawkani, Muhammad, Nayl al Awtar, (Beirut: Dar al-Jil, 1973) vol. 1 p. 341, al-San'an, Subul 
al-Salam op. cCit. hadith no. 118. 
694 Ahmad, al-Musnad op. cit. vol. 1, p. 379, Mahmud Ibn Ahmad al-Ayni, `Umdate al-Qäri Shari Sahib 
al-BukhýW, (Beirut: Muhammad Amin Damj, n. d. ) vol. 23, p. 266. 
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hadith to be muttasi, (attributed to the Prophet). 695 Whether it is mawgiif or muttasil, 
the implication of the hadith confirms the authority of `ädah and `urf in Islamic law. 
The Companions of the Prophet were trusted and deemed to be rightly guided ones, so 
for them to invoke what contradicts the text undermines their status. It is also narrated 
by Aisha that Hind, the daughter of 'Utbah, wife of Abü Sufyän, came to report her 
husband for being a miser. The Prophet advised her to take what was enough to 
maintain herself and her son according to `urf. 696 
Furthermore, the legality of `urf and `ädali is also established by the consensus of both 
classical and contemporary Islamic scholars. They all agree in principle that `ädah 
and `urf are important sources in solving problems that arise in Islamic law. 697 The 
formulation of maxims related to `ädah by those scholars signifies the form of Ijmä ` 
698 on the authority and legality of `ädah and `urf. 
Thus, however, there are many ways in which customs can be admitted as authority in 
Islamic law. Among others these are: 
" Giving judgments on issues where explicit evidence cannot be found in the 
primary source of the Shan`ah, as what is established by the virtue of custom 
is akin to that established by text. 699 
" Specifying the meaning of text or exerting a restriction on the absolute nass 
700 (text). 
" Establishing legal rules and conditions regarding people's daily interactions, 
and utilising presumptive indications in settling disputes among people on 
certain matters that are pre-dominated by `urf. pol 
695 al-Amidi, al-Ihkam, op. cit, vol. 4, p. 166, Ibn Hazm, al-Ihkam, vol. 6, p. 194, al- Suyuti, al-Ashbäh 
p. 89. 
696 alBukhari, Kitab al-Nafaqat and Muslim, kitab al Aqdiyah hadith no 5049, Ibn Majah, hadith no. 
2293. See the remark of Ibn Hajar al-Asgaläni. d. 975/1567 on this hadith in Fath al-Bari sharh sahih 
al-bukhari vol. 9 pp. 509-510. 
697 Badran Usul p 226, Karnali, Hashim, Principle of Islamic Jurisprudence op. cit. p. 372, Abdul al- 
Kareem Al-Zaydan, al-Waj z fi Sharh al-Qawa'id al-Figh yyah fi al Sharrah al-Islämiyyah, (Beirut, 
Mu'assasah al-Risalah 1997) p. 254. 
698 Cf. al-Ramali of Shafi' Nihayah al-Muhtaj Dar al-Fikr Beirut 1984/1404 vol. 8, p. 42, Ibn Abidin, of 
Hanafis, Hashiyah, Dar al-Fikr Beirut 2000/1421, vol. 6, p. 423, Haydar Ali, Durar al-Hukkam op. cit 
vol. 1, p. 40, al-Dasuqi al-Maliki, Muhammad Arafa, Hasiyah, ed. Muhammad Ulaysh, (Beirut: Dar 
al-Fikr n. d. ) vol. 2, p. 4al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat op. cit. vol. 2, p. 142, al-Qarafi, Sharh Tanqih al- 
Fusül p. 322. 
699 Majallah Article 45. 
70° `Awda, A. S. Atharal-'Urffi al-Tashri' al-Islami, 1997, pp. 348-367, al-Zarqah, al-Madkhal, p. 893 
701 Muhammad Al-Shalabi, Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami, 1968, p. 326. 
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There are many maxims that are classified as subdivisions of the grand maxim. Some 
are relevant to our focus in this thesis, while others are not. Thus, in this section those 
that are relevant will be dealt with. 
6.3. Some related maxims of custom and its effect. 
6.3.1 Istl`mäl al-nis4u jab yagbib al-`aural bibs (People's practice is 
authoritative and should be reckoned with). 702 
Generally, custom and the practices of people have to be given consideration in any 
matter that is not detailed, or if its verdict is based on the `urf and `ädah of the people 
who use it. In regulating the extent of the application of `urf in Islamic law, jurists 
have unanimously agreed that if custom contradicts the explicit nass (text of the 
Qur'an and hadith), then that customary rule should be discarded. Thus, custom is of 
no use when there is a factual text. 
However, the relevance of the above maxim is to widen the authority of enforcing 
custom in Islamic law. If a custom does not contradict a text, then it is enforceable. Of 
course, the maxim also includes all kinds of `urf, be they general, individual, practical 
or verbal custom. The Islamic jurists unanimously agree that if a custom is general it 
means that it is not restricted to a particular set of people, place or time. An example 
of this is in the contract of manufacturing, (istisnä`). This type of contract contradicts 
the general principle of Islamic contracts, but it is allowed because it is a custom 
known to the people since the first epoch of Islam. 703 Contrary to the general practice 
of `urf and `ädah, there is disagreement among scholars on the effect of an individual 
`ädah `urfiyyah - the practice which is known to a particular region, or to a set of 
experts. 704 The majority of Islamic jurists, including Hanafites and Shafi`ites, do not 
consider individual custom as specifying general principle. Individual `urf therefore, 
has no effect in identifying the meaning of a text or of the general principles of 
Islamic law. This is because if the individual `urf of one particular region is 
considered to be specific to the text, the other individual custom would be 
702 Ibn Rajab, al-Qawa'id pp. 121-122, Majallah Article 37, al-Zarqa al-Madkhal p. 60, al-Burnu, al- 
Wajiz, p. 292. 
703 al-Burnu, al-Wajiz, p. 277. 
704 Ibid. p. 278. 
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undermined. However, it can be asserted that if the individual custom has to be given 
effect in specifying a text, the use of it should be restricted to the people involved, and 
it will not become a binding rule on the other region where there is another custom in 
place. 
6.3.2 al- `ädab aw al- `urf`amali (Practical Custom): 
(a) al-ma `rrif `urfan ka al-mashrtlt shartan. (What is known by the virtue of 
custom is as a stipulated condition). 705 
(b) al-ta yin bi al `urfix ka al-ta yin bi al-nas (What is stipulated by the 
virtue of `urf is as what is stipulated by the text) 706 
Custom can also be practical, that is, it can be a physical action. The two maxims 
above consider the effect of such `urf on people's activities. Thus, they consider `urf 
as a measure to determine the conditions that bind a human's 'activities and 
engagements with other people of the same custom, even if those conditions are not 
stipulated at the time of the engagements. For example, if a visitor eats his host's 
food, he should not be charged with theft, if it is customarily known that a visitor has 
been given the right to utilize his host's property without permission. It is also the 
case that the `urf of some regions stipulate that a dowry is divided or suspended until 
a specific time known to them. This stands as a condition, even if it is not expressed 
as such during a marriage engagement. Thus, if one of the inhabitants of that region 
conducted a marriage without the full dowry being paid, his marriage should not be 
invalidated, and any affair between the couple will not be deemed as adultery. 
However, the Hanafites consider practical or physical customs to be specifying texts if 
the custom is a general custom, as opposed to the majority who do not endorse `urf to 
be specifying texts, unless that `urf is verbal. 707 It is pertinent to mention here that if 
there is an indication of another stipulating condition contrary to the known custom 
during or before the initiation of a contract, then effect will be given to that new 
specific condition. For example, if a host specifies that his visitor should not use his 
705 al-Suyuti, al-Ashbah, p. 92, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbah, p. 99, Majallah, Article 43, al-Burnu, al-Wajiz, 
306. 
'106 Majallh, Article 45, al-Zarqa, al-Madkhal p. 612 al-Burnu, al-Wajiz, p. 306. 
707 al-Burnu, ibid. p. 280. 
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phone but he does, then his visitor has breached the condition of hospitality and will 
be liable to pay compensation of some kind. 
6.3.3. al- `Adak aw al- `Urf al-Qawli (Verbal Practice) 
(a) al-Haglqah tutrakbiDalälab al-`Adak (Real Meaning shall be left out for 
Denotation of al-'Adab) 708 
(b) al-Kitsb ka al-Khitäb (A Written Document is like an Expression) 709 
(c) al-'Isbrirät al-Ma`hi dah 11 al-Akhras ka al-Bayan bi al-Lisen (A recognized 
Indication of a Dumb Person is considered as an Explicit Expression). 10 
Having explained the practical custom, the opposite of it is verbal or expressed 
custom. The `urf gawli is a conventional term used by a group of people for a specific 
meaning, which when it is used is intuitively understood among the people who use it 
without any linguistic indication. In other words, the verbal custom is a custom that is 
used in lieu of the original language, while often the original word and real meaning 
has become obsolete and derelict. 71' There are four types of hagiqah; lughawiyyalz 
(linguistic) shari`iyyah, (legal), `urfiyyah `ämmalz (general custom), and `urfiyyah 
khäsah, (particular/individual custom). The first maxim indicates that if there is a 
contradiction between the language in use and the `urf, then preference will be given 
to the indicative customary meaning. An apt example is the use of dirham and dinar 
today as opposed to its use in former days. Moreover, the language that constitutes 
defamation can be considered as `urf gawli. Thus, if the language in use is regarded as 
defamation in one norm, and as otherwise in another norm, the outcome will be 
affected by where it is considered to be offensive. Thus, someone can be charged for 
insulting if he uses language that is deemed to be offensive in one place, though it 
may not be deemed offensive in another. 
However, the second maxim considers the effect of what is written, compared to what 
is expressed. As the verbal `urf is considered to be effective in giving legal verdicts, it 
is also important to consider what is written for those, as many people find it difficult 
to express their thoughts clearly in the legal system. Before a written document can be 
708 Majallah, article 40. 
709 a1-Suyuti, al Ashba' op. cit., p. 308, Majallah, article 69. 
710 Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba' op. cit. p. 343, Majallah, article 70. 
711 al-Burnu al-Wajiz p. 281. 
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legally tenable it should be clearly understood, and the handwriting of the presenter 
should be known. 712 Thus, if someone wrote a statement deemed to be insulting and 
offensive, even if such person is dumb, his writing can be admitted as evidence of 
committing an offensive statement. As such, his written document is tenable as 
evidence in legal procedure. 
Another sign representing expression is the recognized sign of a dumb person and this 
stands as a clear statement, verbally expressed. To recognize this sign is one of the 
ways of establishing justice in human activities. This is because custom - as in the 
way a dumb person expresses his thoughts - is recognized and thus a legal effect is 
attached to it. This sign is considered in confession, witness, contracts, swearing, 
defamation, apostasy, and so on. 
However, the sign of a dumb person is not given status in a case that involves the 
absolute rights of God. This is because of the doubt attached to it and because of the 
maxim that says, "al-hudrid tudra' bi al-shubhät" (a fixed punishment should be 
averted by means of doubt). If a dumb person commits a crime that involved the 
absolute right of God, he should not be punished, and if he claims or witnesses that 
someone else committed the crime that constitutes hadd, then, as such, hadd would 
not be executed because of the averting of hudüd in the face of shubhah. 
6.3.4 Maxims stand as Conditions binding the Enforcement of Custom 
It has already been stated that an acceptable custom has to be reasonably endorsed by 
people of good and sound behaviour, but there are other conditions that have to be 
met before custom can be authoritative and acceptable as a supportive source of 
Islamic law. Thus, the sub-maxims below stand as conditional maxims regulating the 
enforcement of custom. 
712 al-Atäsi, Sharh al-Majallahop. cit., vol. 1 p. 190 al-Burnu, al-Wajiz op. cit., p. 302. 
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(a) Lana al-`Adak tuhkam firm lä Qabt labu Sbar'an (`Ada!: is enforced where 
there is no Legal Detail) 713 
(b) Innami tu`tabar al-`Adak idbs ittaradat awghalabat (Effect is only given to 
`Adab that is Regularly Occurring and Universally Prevailing) 71° 
(c) AI-`Ibrab li al-Gbälib al-Sbe'i' lä al-Nadir (Effect is only given to a 
Prevailing Widespreading Custom, not a Rare One) 715 
(d) Li `Ibrabli al-`urfal-tiri'(No effect for an Emergent Custom) 716 
The four maxims above include some of the conditions to be considered before 
custom can be authoritatively enforced. The four maxims as conditional criteria of the 
enforcement of custom can be divided into two parts: One: custom and texts. Two: the 
nature of acceptable custom. Regarding the former, the ostensible and uncontroversial 
condition set for the legality of `ädah and `urf is that there should not be contradiction 
between it and the explicit texts. However, there are many ways in which `ädah and 
`urf can contradict texts or what is established through texts. First, when `ädah 
contradicts a text in any form, such as in the `ddah regarding nudity in some parts of 
the world; the engaging in usury in most of the banks of the world; the legalization of 
manufacturing and drinking alcohol; the legality of prostitution in some countries of 
the world. All of these `ädät and a`aräf are vehemently prohibited in Islamic 
countries so that if anyone engages in any of the above customs in a region where 
Islamic law is being practised, he shall be deemed to have committed a sinful act, 
punishable under Islamic law. Second, when `ädah or `urf contradicts a text in some 
way, such as a general text and the ruling derived from it through means of analogy. 
In this case, if `urf is general it can be considered against the text as `urf `ämm that 
explain the general text. Third, when there is a text that has a ruling based on `ädah 
and `urf. There are some scholars who opine that such a text can be left for `urf, if the 
`urf has changed, 717 although others opine that it cannot be changed. 718 Fouth, 
713 al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur op. cit., vol. 2, p. 356 al-Burnu, op. cit., p. 282. 
714 al-Suyuti, al Ashbah p. 93, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbah p. 99, Majallah, Article 41-42, al-Zarqa, al- 
Madkha, pp. 606-607, al-Burnu, op. cit., p. 295. 
715 Majallah Article 42, al-Zarqa, al- Madkhal p. 607, al-Burnu, op. cit., p. 295. 
716 al-Burnu, ibid., p. 297 cf. al-Suyuti, al-Ashba' op. cit. p. 96, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashba' op. cit., p. 101. 
717 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughn, iop. cit., vol. 2, p. 66, Ibn Muflih Muhammad, al-Furü' op. cit., vol. 4, p. 
157. 
78 See Ibn Qudamah, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 64, al-RamalT, Nihayah op. cit., vol. 3, p. 417. 
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when"urf contradicts issues that have been established by ijtihad of Islamic scholars, 
that verdict would then be changed according to the change in the custom. 719 
Another way in which 'urf can contradict text is when the language - not the whole 
text - of a text contradicts the language of 'urf. In such cases, if the meaning of a word 
of 'urf denotes a different meaning in the sense of the text; one should consider 
whether the word in the text has any legal effect, if not, 'urf may then supersede it. 
This is apparently applicable in the swearing of oaths. The language used in an oath 
will be given consideration in a court of law according to the 'urf of that language 
because oaths are based on the custom of the one taking the oath. 720 For example, if 
someone swears not to do something, but the word has to do with a legal ruling such 
as to swear not to pray - and the accused had recited a prayer known in Islam - then 
the legal usage will be enforced. 
There are three conditions that can be inferred from the last three maxims, namely: al- 
Idträd, continuity, al-ghlabah, predominant, and al-shuyü', prevailing of `ädah. 
Before custom can be authoritative, the three conditions have to be fulfilled. An 
enforced custom must be constantly in use. This means it should be generally in 
practice. If it is a common and constant custom of a tribe to delay the dowry of a 
married woman during her marriage ceremony until a particular time, this will be 
enforced and cannot be considered as nikäh bätii `invalid marriage', as this could be 
construed as adultery. However, in a case where the woman or her guardian 
pronounced a contrary condition, and if marriage or sexual intercourse occurred 
before the specified condition was met, it may constitute an adultery that is legally 
punishable. In addition, before a custom can be considered to be binding in any event, 
it should be predominant and prevailing i. e. the custom must be well known to the 
majority of people who are affected by that custom . 
721 
The essence of these conditions lies in the fact that if a custom is ämm `general', even 
though it is prevailing, it may not be practised by the majority of people. Thus, relying 
on this prevalent nature may not be admitted in giving legal judgment. On the other 
79 This issue will be elaborated under the maxim lä yunkar tagbayyur al-ahkim bi taghayyur al- 
azruän. 
720 al-Burnu, al-Wajiz, p. 287. 
72! al-Suyüti, al-Ashbil, p. 92. 
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hand, however, if a custom is khäs, `personal/individual', despite it is not being 
prevailing and predominant, but is common and recurrent among certain people or 
professionals, it may then be given consideration when there is a dispute among the 
people who use it. By and large, these conditions are set to balance justice among 
litigants in issues that are based on `urf. For instance, if someone is accused of 
offences that are recognized as offences in one place but not in another, difficulty will 
arise in determining the yardstick to apply in giving a legal ruling. The dilemma 
would be whether the norm of the accused should be considered or the custom of the 
accuser. However, the only way to settle such a matter is to disregard the custom and 
to give no ground to the case. 
Another condition that confines the use of custom is that it should be consistent, 
commonly known and prevailing among the users. If a custom is not well known or is 
sometimes not in use, then recourse to it will be confined to those who use it. For 
example, if it is the custom of a particular society that the payment of the dowry be 
suspended during the marriage until it is convenient for the groom to pay, then this 
custom has to be known to every adherent of that custom. It should also be commonly 
in use. If this condition lapses and the marriage is conducted without a dowry, it could 
be regarded as adultery and become punishable. However, if the `ädah and `urf 
conform to the texts, it is mandatory to enforce it, as in that case it is the text that is 
given enforcement, and the `urf serves only as reference. 722 
In some cases, an offence may have occurred in the distant past, prior to the case 
being brought to court. In this instance, if the `urf of the past is no longer in use, and 
the accused has already admitted to having committed the crime in accordance with 
the past `urf, the authoritative custom would concern the past `urf, and not the present 
one. For example, if a person admitted that he stole a hundred pounds 20 years ago, 
naturally, the value of the stolen property would not be the same as at the time of 
confession. His admission would then be based on the value of the stolen sum at the 
time of the offence, and this would have no connection to any present-day custom. 
722 al-Burnu, al-Wajiz, p. 282. 
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In summary, the effect of the custom and culture of people does count in deciding the 
nature of a crime not stipulated in the text. Some of these customs include criminal 
offences legislated to controlling security and the safety of public, and their 
punishments are discretionary ones. Customs also take into account the nature of 
historic offences, where often the punishment was predetermined by texts, but custom 
was left to determine the legal requirements before such acts could be deemed 
criminal. An example of this can be seen in what is considered as hirz(a well-fortified 
place), in which, before a theft charge can be arraigned, the amount of money stolen, 
and the circumstances, have to be considered first. 
Custom also determines the equivalent of the amount stipulated in sunnah for the 
diyah. Thus, what is considered to be the equivalent of one hundred camels in one 
country may be different from the amount in another. 723 In hudrid crimes, `ädafi 
determines whether someone has committed adultery in a case where a dowry or 
marriage ceremony, (warimah), is concerned, or in a case where one of the 
requirements of `aqd nikah, (the marriage contract), is not fulfilled.. The same applies 
in the crime of defamation `urf gawli determines the offence of defamation, and of 
apostasy. Finally, `urf and `ädah can be used to determine an appropriate 
discretionary punishment. 
One can now ask: can custom change rulings in Islamic law? To pose the question 
slightly differently, can Islamic rulings change or be changed because of changes in 
the custom of the adherents of Islam? The maxim below will reveal detailed accounts 
of what has been said and represented as fact in certain aspects of criminal Islamic 
law. 
723 Johonson Barbe, `Legal literature and the problem of change: The case of the Land rent' in Chibil 
Mallat (ed. ), Islam and Public Law: Classical and Contemporary Studies, (London: Graham and 
Trotman, 1993), pp. 29-47, Weal B. Hallaq, Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 166- 235. 
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6.3.5 Changing of Rulings to Effect Changing in Custom: 
Läyuakartaghayyura1-Ahkäm bl taghayyural-Azman(It is undeniable that 
Rules change as Times change). 724 
The Islamic law (Shari `ah) is said to be universal. One aspect of its universality is that 
it is flexible and rigid. Its flexibility lies in the fact that some of its rulings can be 
changed according to changes in time, place, circumstance and culture, while its 
rigidity lies in the fact that some of its rulings cannot be changed, castrated, altered or 
mutilated. These rulings have been fixed and ordained, with consideration given to 
their fitness in all circumstances. 
One of the unresolved controversies between the Islamic orthodox school and 
reformists is whether the rulings of Islamic law - regardless of them being fixed or 
deducted from text - can be changed. The question often posed is: does Islamic law 
need to be reformed or changed as time changes? This question involves the 
codification of the maxim in question. This maxim first appeared in the form quoted 
above in the Majallah of Ottoman Empire, article 39. But some of its interpreters have 
inserted the words `urfiyyah or ijtihädiyyah into it to make it safe from criticism. 725 
Nevertheless, the maxim of a change of rules according to changes in time has faced 
criticism from different angles. This is because of a loss in the codification of the 
dictum ab initio, as we shall explain in the next paragraph. Muslihudeen is one of its 
critics who expresses that the maxim cannot be taken at its face value. 726 He argues 
that any rules derived from the Qur'an and the sound hadith, or deducted by analogy 
based on the two sources, are everlasting. He further explains that if laws based on 
the aforementioned sources are subjected to change "the law would have ceased to 
exist long ago. " On this hypothesis, Muslehuddin asserts that "no changes in rulings" 
that are derived from the texts. 727 
724 Majallah Article 39, Haydar, Durar al-Hukkam, op. cit., vol. 1 p. 43, Fakhr al-Din Uthman al- 
Zayla'i,, Tabyin al-Haqa'iq, (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah, 1313), vol. 1, p. 140, al-Zarqa, Sharh 
al- Qawa'id al-Fighiyyah, op. cit. pp. 227-229, Al-Nadwi, al-Qawa'id al-Fiqhiyyah, p. 158, al-Burnu 
a! - Wajiz p. 310. 725 Haydar Ali, Durar op. cit., al-Zarqa Sharh al-Qawa'id op. cit. al-Nadwi, op. cit.. 
"6 Muhammad, Muslihuddin, Philosophy of Islamic Law and The Orientalists, (2"d edn. Lahore, 
Pakistan Islamic Publications Ltd, 1980) p. 176. 
727 Ibid. 
202 
However, to some extent, what Muslihudeen has said is a fact that cannot be belittled, 
although there have been some rules derived from the Qur'an and hadith that are 
subject to change as times, places and customs change. An apt example to illustrate 
this fact is that of the verse of the Qur'an which reads thus: "0 you who believe! Let 
your slaves and slave girls and those among you who have not come to the age of 
puberty ask your permission... 028 There is also the hadith in which the Prophet is 
reported to have said: "It is the responsibility of the owners of properties to take care 
of them in the day and the responsibility of the owners of animals to restitute for what 
their animals destroyed in the night. -)9729 
However, if the custom or time has changed, or if existing rules in another nation 
differ from the one set in both the sources, can the rules be changed? Saeed Ramadan 
in his book Dawäbitu al-Maslah, 730 and Muslihudeen in the Philosophy of Islamic 
law731 point out that a ruling that can be changed is restricted to custom. However, 
they fail to admit that that customary ruling could be based on the Qur'an, hadith or, 
by analogy that based on both. Muslihudeen also asserts that Islamic law cannot be 
changed but "yet (it) is possessed of amazing capacity to accommodate change. "732 
And in referring to Moore's contribution on the subject matter, he posits that any 
change in rules can only be met on the basis of the rule of necessity and need. Thus, 
any invention, new discovery or cultural contract that necessitates changes in the rules 
can be accommodated, as in a welfare society, under the rules of necessity and 
need. 733 
By and large, taking the maxim above at its face value may create the impression that 
all rulings of Islamic law can be changed. Nevertheless, it is certain that the condition, 
needs and circumstances of mankind cannot be static. There must be dynamic 
recycling in life as generations recycle. Thus, the preceding rulings have to be 
728 Qur'an 24, verse 58. 
729 Ibn Majah, Al-Sunan, hadith no. 2332, Abu Dawud, al-Sunan, hadith no. 3569, Malik, al-Muwatta, 
hadith no 677. 
730 Muhammad Saheed Ramadam al-Buti, Dawabit al-Maslah fi al-Shari 'a al Islamyyah, (49' edn. 
Beirut, Mu'assasat al-Risala, 1982/1402) pp. 411-413, 
731 Muslehuddin, M., op. cit., 
732 Ibid. pp. 242-243. 
733 Ibid. p. 243. 
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compatible with the phenomenon of life. Having said that, Islam has emphasized that 
its religion and the facets that go with it have been completed and perfected. 734 It also 
affirms that revelation leaves nothing, without it having been explained. 735 If that is 
the case, why do the preceding rulings have to be changed? In order to strike a 
balance between canvassing for change and campaigning against it, it is important to 
state that there are some rulings that cannot be changed because they are explicitly 
ordained. These include explicit rulings on prohibited acts in Islam, the number of 
lashes due for the hadd of adultery, and accusations of unchasteness made against 
innocent people. All such rulings cannot be changed in any circumstance and cannot 
be rationalized because they are irrationally ordained "ghayr ma `qulah al-ma `na ". Of 
course, there are other rulings that can be subjected to change as time and 
circumstances change. Ibn al-Qayyim emphatically canvasses that "Ahkäm are of two 
types: a type that does not change from one state ... regardless of time, location or the 
ijtihad of four Imams, and another type that changes according to time, location and 
circumstances". 736 
The rulings that change according to changes in time and circumstances can be found 
in two forms. One is ruling based on custom and culture, and the other is based on 
personal exertion, ijtihad. 
6.3.5.1 Rulings based on Custom `Urf and `Adak 
If a ruling is based or enacted according to the custom, then that ruling can be 
changed if the custom changes. In other words, if a ruling in the texts considered 
customary value in its enactment thus, those rulings can be changed. However, 
reconstructing the maxim to alter what it is coded for will delineate and delimitate the 
extent to which one can apply the maxim. Thus, it will be appropriate before any 
further illustration to add the word " `urfiyyah " (customary) or the word 
"ijtihädiyyah" (personal exertion). That is to say: lä yunkar taghayyur al-abkäm al- 
`urfryyah aw al-ijtih dyyab bi taghayyur al-azmin (changing rulings based on 
customs or personal exertion with changes in times or circumstances cannot be 
734 Qur'an 5, verse 3. 
"s Qur'an 6, verse 38. 
736 Muhammad AI-Zar`i Ighath al-Lahfat, ed. Muhammad Hamid al-Faqi, (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifah, 
1975/1395) vol. 1, p. 330-331. 
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denied). 737 Of course, it is emphatically stated in Durar al-Ilukkäm Sharih al- 
Majallah that the meaning of the maxim with regard to changes in rulings is peculiar 
to the rulings based on `urf and `ädah, but `firm rules based on the text shall not be 
changed'. 738 This additional inclusion will eliminate misuse of the maxim. 
The reason why rules based on customs and culture must be changed as times change 
is that as times change, the needs of people change as well. If law is constructed to be 
static it will create hardship and constraint in the lives of people. Examples are given 
in the classical books to illustrate the effect of this maxim. For example, in the past 
the inspection of a house similar to the one a person proposes to buy, was enough, and 
such an inspection stood almost as a guarantee that the actual house would be bought. 
This is because, in general, houses were built in the same way, but in this 
contemporary age houses are built in different styles, so a prospective buyer would 
prefer to view the particular property he wishes to buy. Other examples include the 
private and public recommendations of witnesses, the imposition of compensation on 
the usurper of an orphan's property and endowment, and the closing of mosques for 
fear of thieves. 739 Emphatically, there are verses of the Qur'an and the traditions of 
the Prophet in which rulings were based on the custom of the generation of revelation. 
As exemplified above740 
It is worth noting that to preserve the divinity of the text, and to curtail the open-ended 
mutilation of divine rulings, the text that is categorized as muhkam (unambiguity), 
should not be subdued nor be subservient to the customs and culture of people. 
However, there are some instances provisionally legalized in Islamic law for the 
changing of rulings, as in the cases of necessity and need that emerged from hardship 
and difficulties - as, for example, when Umar ibn Khatab suspended the punishment 
of theft in a time of drought. As explained in the discussion on maxims of necessity, 
these situations cannot be construed as the changing of rulings but not the wording of 
the divine texts. 
737 al-Nadwi's observation in al-Qawaid al-frghiyyah, op. cit., as opposed to al-Burnu. See al-Wajiz, p. 
311. 
738 Haydar Ali, Durar, vol 1, p. 43. 
79 Ibid. al-Zayla' Tabyin al-Haqa'iq op. cit. vol. 1, p. 140, Ahmad Ibn Hajar al-Asgalani, Fath al-Bari 
Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari,. ed. Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib ( Beirut: Dar al-Ma `rifah, n. d. ), vol. 2, p. 450 
Tao See pages 209 and 210, and notes 726-729 
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6.3.5.2 Rulings based on Ijtihäd 
The second way in which rulings can be changed is when a ruling is established by 
ijtibäd or personal exertion, whether this exertion is deduced directly from the texts 
or indirectly. For example, what constitutes prohibited wine is debatable between the 
Hanafites and the majority of the fugahd . Hanafites hold that prohibited wine is the 
wine brewed from grapes; thus, drinking any amount of wine fermented from grapes 
is prohibited, but in any other wine the intoxicating amount only is prohibited. By 
contrast, the majority of Islamic scholars maintain that all kind of intoxicating drinks 
are prohibited as they take into account the general implication of the verse and the 
tradition that supports the prohibition of all intoxicants. 
Islamic scholars use personal exertion to arrive at verdicts, and these verdicts may or 
may not have become consensus. If the ijtihäd has reached consensus and the `illah, 
(the cause effect) on which the ijithäd is based is no longer effective, or needs to be 
changed, the rulings arrived from that ijtih d have to be changed. For example, Umar 
Ibn al-Khatäb initiated paying the diyah of the culprit from the Diwan, (public 
treasury) which was contrary to the existing practice in the era of the Prophet and Abu 
Bakr. Normally, the diyah was paid by the heir or solidarity of the culprit's ägilah. 
The practice of Umar has become consensus because the `fllah, for the `agilah no 
longer exists. 741 
Rulings may also be from an ijtihäd of scholars extrapolated from the purpose of 
Shari `ah. One such ruling was invented by the two companions of Abu Hanifah, 
namely Abu Yusuf and Muhammad. Their ruling concerned the recommendation of 
witnesses and opposed the ruling upheld by Abu Hanifah during his time. 742 
In the field of Islamic criminal law, there are ways, including those mentioned above, 
in which rulings could be changed to suit the needs of the public. Indeed, there are 
large numbers of punishments in Islamic law that are left to the authorities to deal 
7.. This is the view of Hanafites . However, there are other opinions regarding the use of diwan for the 
diyah. See al-Sarkhasi, al-Mabsüt, op. cit., vol. 27, pp. 124-125, Wahbah al-Zuhayli, al-Fiqh al-Islams 
wa Adillatuhu (4t' edn. Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1997), vol. 6, pp. 322-323. 
742 al-Burnu, al-Wajiz, p. 312. 
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with due to variations of time and place. This can be seen as a sign that Islamic 
criminal law acknowledges these changes and renders it possible to accommodate 
them. Ta `zir punishments also vary due to changes in time, place and circumstance. 
A to `zir punishment enacted in one place may not be appropriate in another place. 
However, there is a bone of contention regarding some substantive law issues, such as 
the number of lashes, stoning to death, etc., can they be substituted with other 
measures of punishment like imprisonment in lieu of jald, due to changes in time and 
circumstance? It is outrightly rejected by all scholars that any substantive punishment 
can be removed or changed. But, interestingly, it is reported that Umar held a 
moratorium on the penalty for theft in a time of drought, although it is said that it was 
based on necessity. However, that necessity was as a result of changes in the 
behaviour of people, or of changes in the circumstances of the period. 
It is worth emphasizing that the maxim of changing of rulings was first introduced in 
the Ottoman Majallah. This forms the basis for the criticism of innovation in Islam 
and the systematic derogation of divine Law to suit the whims and caprices of the 
Ottoman regime. 743 However, there were a number of innovations in the Ottoman 
Criminal Code (OCC) that indicated a positive suspicion of this maxim. It is reported 
in the OCC that instead of flogging, a fine should be imposed. This is according to 
Articles 20 and 67, which state: 
If (a person) kisses (another) person's son or approaches him on his way and addresses 
(indecent words) to him, (the gads) shall chastise (him) severely and a fine of one akce shall 
be collected for each stroke. 
If (a person) steals a purse or a turban or towels-unless his hand is to be cut off, the cadi shall 
chastise (him) and a fine of one akce shall be collected for (every) stroke (or one akce shall be 
collected for each stroke). 44 
This gives the notion that Shari `ah had been derogated or `fiscalised : However, from 
the two articles mentioned above it can be inferred that the purpose of the articles 
does not support that claim. Rather, as Peters observes from the latter article, it is 
meant "to regulate a case in which a person has stolen, but cannot be sentenced to the 
fixed punishment for theft", and to legislate for any other offences that the Shari 'ab 
X43 Peter, Rudolph, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law op. cit. pp. 69-74. 
744 Ibid. p. 74. 
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does not specify punishment for. 745 The OCC article 67 has a condition therein stating 
that unless the hand of the convicted person is to be cut off, once the charge is proved 
and the accused is convicted, only the punishment of to `zir will be inflicted. This 
removes the misconstruction that any Islamic regime can twist the fixed Islamic law. 
And because Islamic fixed penalties were rarely enforced during that regime does not 
necessarily mean that the hudüd offences were abolished, or that they had become 
superannuated and outdated. However, they are still active and suitable for all 
generations. 
6.4 Summary of the Chapter 
Chapter six has explained the legality of custom in the Islamic legal system and how it 
affects the way legal rulings change according to the time and circumstances. It is 
discussed in this chapter that custom that is given authoritative could be `amar or 
gawr (practical or verbal respectively) some maxims are explored to that effect. In 
any case, whether custom is practical or verbal, there are certain conditions to be met 
before custom can be given significant effect, inter alia; it must not contradict explicit 
texts, it must be regularly occurrence and universally prevailing. 
To explore customary provision in the full implementation of Shan-ah in Northern 
Nigeria, it could be argued that some practices, which became unlawful and 
punishable in penal codes of the states implementing Shari `ah were the prevailing 
custom and practices of some people in those states such as consenting for sexual 
intercourse before marriage, utterance of some expressions deemed defamatory 
offence and the taking of someone's property without intending theft. Thus, people 
need to be enlightened before enforcing the penal codes. 746 
las Ibid. pp. 72,74. 
746 The in-depth study of the cases in which customary practices were ignored under the full 
implementation of Shari `ah in the Northern Nigeria can be found in pp. 239-240 
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Chapter Seven 
Analysis of the Maxim of Effect of Utterances 
I`mäl al-kalam awlä min ihmRih (A Word should be construed 
as having Some Meaning, rather than disregarded). 46 
7.0 Introduction 
The maxim of the pragmatic value of an expression is considered to be one of the 
most famous maxims in Islamic jurisprudence, as it is cited in many of the books of 
Islamic legal maxims. This probably explains why al-Burnu considers it one of the 
basic general legal maxims. He asserts that because of the many applications to which 
the maxim is put in Islamic jurisprudence, most Islamic scholars agreed upon its 
content. al-Burnu also said that this maxim has many subdivisions and deals with all 
human activities, and because it is much more concerned with the perlocutionary acts 
of mukallaf, (legally responsible person), it deserves to be included among the basic 
general maxims. 747 
Since all Muslims' activities are based on either physical or verbal actions, to 
diminish this maxim will be tantamount to diminishing half of the Muslims' actions. 
Thus, I concur with al-Burnu's view on this maxim and based on that, I consider the 
maxim the sixth among the agreed upon maxims in Islamic jurisprudence. 
7.1 Interpretation of the Maxim 
In general, speech is meant to serve a purpose. This purpose can be meaningful to the 
recipient or not. In the first instance, the recipient ought to look for the meaningful 
purpose of the illocutionary acts of utterances. According to this maxim, it is in the 
best interests of Islamic legal rules to identify the illocutionary and perlocutionary 
746 al-Suyuti, al-Ashbah p. 128, Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbah p. 130, al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur, op. cit. vol. I 
183, Majallah, Article 60, al-Bumu, al-Wajiz, op. cit. p. 314. 
47 al-Burnu, op. cit. pp. 314-315. 
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acts and to act upon them, as required, rather than to neglect them, especially if the 
speech is uttered by a mindful person. 748 
There could be a multitude of meanings embedded within every speech. In that case, 
the most useful meaning has to be enforced. Let us assume that someone is asked as to 
whether a certain item in his possession is a stolen item and he replied by saying: "as 
alleged. " Such a reply, if misused could jeopardize the claim of the accuser. Thus, it 
will be assumed that the accused person has confessed to the allegation. This is in a 
case where someone's right is attached to the locution. However, it is said that the 
purpose of the utterance should rather be determined by the intention of the speaker. 
But in this regard, there is an exception which is emphasized and that is: if the 
utterance is demanded before a court of law, the effect will be given to the purpose of 
the question magäsid al-lafz `all niyyah al-lift i11ä 'Inda al-gädhi (The purpose of 
utterance is based on the intention of the locator, except if it is demanded before the 
court). 749 This is opposed to the effect that would be given to a speech where there is 
no right of man attached and caution is needed. For example, if someone accused of 
adultery is asked whether the allegation is true on not and he replies in the manner 
aforementioned, then the perlocutionary act of the utterance would be disregarded. 
The reply may sound positive, but caution is required in such a case. 
All legal texts regarding criminal issues have to be handled as stated. For example, the 
words `fajlid" `fag! "' have to be construed as "flogging" and "amputating" 
respectively, without substitute or dereliction. Although where is an external factor 
necessitating that the words are given another interpretation such as when there is lack 
of evidence that may be done. On the other hand, the expression required from a 
witness in an adultery case must be explicit for it to be admissible. Thus, a statement 
such as, "I saw him putting his penis into her private part, " is admissible rather than, 
"I saw him sleeping with her", which has no legal effect in an adultery case. This is 
because there is no right of man attached to the offence and the situation requires it to 
750 be concealed. 
748 al-Burnu, ibid.. p. 135. 
749 a1-Suyuti, al-Ashba' op. cit., p. 44, al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur op. cit., vol. 3, p. 312, Muhammad Ibn 
Yusuf, al- Tij wa al-1 111 Mukhtacar al-Khalil, (2nd edn. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1398), vol. 3, p. 287. 
750 Peters, R., op. cit., pp. 13-15. 
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However, Islamic jurists have spoken of some maxims that are deemed as 
subdivisions under the above maxim. These maxims will be discussed as their 
relevance to the pragmatic value of speech in Islamic criminal law is explored. 
7.2 Some Maxims Related to the Maxim of Effects of Utterances 
7.2.1 al-Acl fi al-KalAm al-Hagiqah (The Original Condition of Speech is that of 
Being the Real Meaning. 75' 
In any speech there are two locutionary acts from which the utterance can be 
understood. One is the real meaning of the locution and the other is its metaphoric 
meaning. Al-hagiqah in linguistic terms is a word meant to denote the meaning given 
to it originally, 752 as opposed to al-majiz, which has another meaning. 753 According 
to the maxim herein, the normal thing is to first construe a word to have its real 
meaning, rather than giving it the metaphorical meaning. Thus, any utterance of the 
Lawgiver, contractual parties or any oath taken should be construed as real meaning, 
if there is no other indication that suggests otherwise. For instance, the word fajlid 
should not be construed as fadrib. The former literally means "flogging" while the 
latter means "beating". The implication of shifting the real meaning from its original 
to the metaphorical sense is that the punishment could be changed from flogging to 
imprisonment, meaning the divine law would be degraded, commuted or distorted. 
Moreover, if someone said to another person, "You are an adulterer, " and failed to 
prove it as required by law, the speech would be considered as qdhf (defamation), 
until otherwise proven. 
751 al-Suyuti, op. cit. p. 62, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 69, Majallah Article 12, al-Qarraf i, Ahmad Ibn Idris, 
al-Amniyyah 1i Idrak al-Niyyah, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1984/1404), p. 11, al-Razi, 
Muhammad Ibn al-Husayn, al-Maisil/fl `Ilm al-`Usül ed. Taha J al-Alawani, (Riyadh, Imam 
Muhammad Ibn, Suud University, 1400), vol. 1, p. 475. 
752 al-Jurjani, Ali, Kitab al-Ta`rifat, op. cit., p. 121. 
7531bid. p. 257. 
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7.2.2 Idbä ta`adhdbaral-Hagiqab yusärIi al-Majäz(If a Real Meaning becomes 
Impossible, the Metaphoric Meaning should be Resorted to. 54 
As stated regarding the last maxim, a word can have a real meaning or be a 
metaphorical one, and it is established that the real meaning should be considered first 
before the metaphorical. Metaphor linguistically means "a figure of speech in which a 
word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another 
to suggest likeness or analogy between them. "755 For instance, if someone said to a 
man, "You slept with a woman, " the meaning of this utterance could be real or 
metaphoric. In the first instance, the real meaning should be considered, (which is 
accusation of adultery) except if the locutor denies real meaning and explains instead 
what he means by the utterance. Because the right of others is involved on the one 
hand which is the allegation of unlawful sexual intercourse, and because of the severe 
consequence the speech carries on the other, Islamic law seeks for a balance between 
the two meanings. Thus, even if budi d is averted, as in the case of the example 
mentioned above, discretionary punishment could be meted out to caution the accused 
of the sensitivity of such a statement. 
7.2.3 Idba to `adhdharl `mä1 al-Kalem yuhmal (If Giving an Effect to a Speech 
becomes Impossible in Any Way it will be Neglected. 56 
The original condition of utterances is that the real meaning or the metaphorical 
meaning should be given an effect, rather than consider the utterance redundant. 
However, according to the sub-maxim in question, if it becomes impossible for an 
utterance to be effective in any of the two ways mentioned above, then negligence 
becomes paramount. The occasions when this occurs are as follows: if the intention of 
the locutor cannot be inferred from the two meanings "real and metaphorical 
meaning"; if the word consists of two meanings and one has no one preference over 
the other; if the utterance is invalid in law; if the utterance is flawed and contradicts 
what is apparent, as in "zähir" - such as a person who pronounced a statement of 
754 Ibn Nujaym, op. cit., p. 135, Majallah Article 61, al-Zarqa, al- Madkhal op. cit., p. 617, al-Bumu, 
al-Wajiz, op. cit., p. 319. 
Iss al-Jurjani, op. cit. p. 257, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Massachustts, U. S. A., 
Merriam-Webster Inc. Publishers, 1991) , p. 746. 756 Majallah Article 62, al-Burnu, al-Wajiz, op. cit. p 321 
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apostasy, but who still prays and observes all obligatory duties, or a person who 
claims that someone stole his property, and then the property is found in the 
claimant's possession. All of these statements should be disregarded because of their 
inconsistency with the apparent situation. Another way of considering a statement to 
be flawed is if it contradicts, or is not in compliance with the rule of law, such as the 
statement of one who accuses someone else of adultery, but whose statement is not in 
compliance with the requirements of the law. In the case of the latter, the accuser will 
be charged with another offence, particularly if the case requires the concealment of 
the accusation. 
7.2.4 Dhi1rBa`dMä Lä Yatajaa'Ka DhakrKulllh (Pronouncing Part of an 
Indivisible Statement is Like Pronouncing the Whole. 757 
The essence of this maxim lies in the fact that some statements may be intended as 
whole, while others may not. In the former, someone may confess to manslaughter, 
but not murder, or confess to wrongdoing for example, being secluded with a woman 
but not having sexual intercourse or even a sexual romance with her. In this case, his 
confession would be effective for the part he confessed to, but he would not be found 
guilty of adultery if there were no substantial evidence to prove the accusation, or if 
the case were the absolute right of God. In such a case, the statement cannot be split, 
but has to be taken as a whole. 
Al-Zarkashi (d. 794 AH) referred to such a situation by saying that there can be no 
division of a statement, as admitting part of it is deemed as admitting the whole, and 
renouncing part of it is the same as renouncing the whole. 58 The effect of this view is 
that any statement deemed indivisible and made before a court of law shall be 
considered as a whole statement and making any exception from it is invalid. For 
instance, if someone admits killing half of a person, or admits having half illegal 
sexual intercourse with a woman, such admissions would not be accepted because the 
acts are not divisible. 
757 a1-Zarkashi, al-Manthur op. cit., vol. 1, p. 153, al-Suyuti, op. cit. p. 160, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. 162, 
Majallah, Article 63. 
758 al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur, op. cit. vol. 3, p. 153. 
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However, the case of pecuniary liability is an exception to this maxim. For instance, if 
a person is accused of defamation, can such a person be given partial punishment 
because his victim forgave him part of the punishment? From the Shafi`ites point of 
view, there is no division in the punishment of defamation, although other schools see 
it differently. The basis of the dispute stems from whether the punishment for 
defamation is solely a right of God or a right of man (the accuser). From Shafi`ites 
point of view, the punishment of defamation is seen as absolutely a right of God. 759 
7.2.5 al Mutlaq Yajri Als Itligih Mä Lam Yaqum Dali! al-Tagyld Nassan aw 
Dalälab (An Unrestricted Word Should Remain as it is, Unless the Evidence 
of Restriction is Textual or Connotative. 760 
Al-Mutlaq is a word or group of words in which its implication is unrestricted, as 
opposed to al-mugayyad, in which its implication is restricted. 761 This maxim is 
invoked by the Hanafites School, and is more applicable and acceptable, in particular, 
762 to Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, the two companions of Abu Hanifah. 
The general meaning of the maxim is that a general word or phrase should be given a 
wide capacity of implication and application unless elements of restriction are applied 
to it. This restriction could be explicit, textual, or connotative and denotative 
evidence. Abu Hanifah did not accept customary indication as an evidence for 
restriction. By and large, the essence of the maxim to criminal law is more apparent in 
many utterances of Islamic textual evidence in the course of criminalizing some 
actions deemed as offences, and punishing the perpetrators. Take, for instance, all the 
words in the phrases "al ziniyah wa zini fajlid ku11a wibid minhumä m'iab jaldah "in 
the Qur'an chapter 24, verse 2 and the phrases `ova al-säriq wa al-särigah fagt`r1 
aydiyahumi' in the Qur'an chapter 5, verse 38. These should be given unrestrictive 
effect in application unless there is evidence of restriction. In the former, the words 
759 Ibrahim Ibn Ali Al-Shirazi, al-Muhadhdhib (Beirut : Dar al-Fikr, n. d. ), vol. 2, pp. 272-274. The 
same opinion has been expressed by Malik. See Malik Ibn Ana, al-Mudawwanah al-Kubra, (Beirut: 
Dar Sadir, n. d. ) vol. 16, pp. 224-225. 
760 Majallah, Article 64, al-Zarqa, Sharp a1-Qawä `id a1-Fighiyya4 op. cit. P. 323. 
761 al-Shawkani, Muhammad Ibn Ali, Irshäd al-Fuhri1 ed. Muhammad Said al-Badri, (Beirut: Dar al- 
Fikr, 1992/1412), p. 278, Ibn Qudamah, Abdullah Ibn Ahmad, Rawdah al-Nizir wa Jannah a1-Munäzir, 
ed. Abdu al-Aziz Abdu al-Rahman al-Said, (2nd edn. Riyadh: Imam Ibn Su'ud University, 1399), p. 
259. 
762 al-Burnu, al- WajTz; p. 324, 
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"al-zäniyah "and "al-zani , "an adulteress" and "an adulterer, " should be understood 
from the denotative meaning, whether legally, linguistically, or customarily. 
Regarding Islamic legal definition, an adulterous action is when there is complete 
sexual intercourse between two members of different sexes who are not legally 
married. Thus, any practice other than that will not be regarded as zina 763 
Furthermore, jald (lashed), can only be construed as denoted in the language, as 
giving it another meaning will undermine the explicitness of the text. Thus, jald 
cannot be construed as darb, (beating), because beating is different from lashing. 
Lashing has a restrictive meaning as opposed to beating, in which the tool for beating 
can be anything. Furthermore, the words "al-siriq"and "al-snrigah ; "a male thief' 
and "a female thief', have to be construed as defined by law. And before one can be 
branded as sariq or sirigah, there are conditions stipulated by law that have to be 
strictly followed. 7M 
An example of applying unrestricted words or phrases in criminal law is if someone 
said to his visitor, "You are free to take anything in my house, " and the visitor went 
further into the household's storage and took the owner's valuable property. In this 
case, the expression used by the host denotes an unrestrictive future. However, should 
the visitor be considered a thief? From the maxim set by the two Hanafite scholars it 
seems that the act of the visitor is "illegal". However, it can also be deduced from the 
maxim that if the custom of the society considered the act as theft, the action would 
then be classified as theft, unless the customs of the two parties are different. This is 
opposed to the view of Abu Hanifah who did not see custom as having any effect in 
restricting an unrestricted phrase. Thus, in the example given above, the perpetrator 
would not be considered as a thief, unless the action was suspicious or deemed a 
breach of trust. 
"63 As stated in most of the Shariah criminal codes of Zamfara State, Kastina State, (SPCL 2001 
section 124) Kano State (SPCL 2000, section 124) and a host of other states who implement Shariah 
penal law. 
"' For the general condition of theft see Doi, A. R. I, Shariah the Islamic Law op. cit., p. 257, El-Awa, 
Punishment in Islamic law op. cit., p. 2-5, Peter, Rudolph, Crime and Punishment in Islamic law, op. 
cit., p. 55. 
215 
7.2.6 al-Su'äl Ma `äd f al-Jawib ... awka al-Ma `nd 1i al-Jawab (An Inquiry Should 
be Concurrent to the Answer). 65 
The concurrence of an answer to a question is useful in settling disputes between 
litigants before the court. Inconsistency or dissimulation will on occasion render the 
process of justice unachievable. That is why Islamic law considers deception as an 
offence on its own, especially in oath taking. The Prophet is reported to have said: 
"An oath must conform to the intentions of the party tendering it. 066 Thus, if 
someone is asked, "Did you kill a person? " and he replied, "Yes", his response would 
be held as confession to the alleged crime, except if the confession is obtained under 
duress. In that case, his reply would be regarded not as a reflection of his wish but 
rather as a result of the duress. The same applies to any criminal interrogation in 
which fact is sought to establish justice or to settle a dispute. 
7.2.7 La Yunsab Qawlua I1ä Sikit- Waläkinna al-Suhlt FI Ma `rad al-Bayia Bayin 
(Word shall not be Imputed to One who is Silent--but a Silence where 
Explanation is required is Considered as an Explanation. 67 
The first part of this maxim is the fundamental principle in any activity, except in 
activities where a clear expression of consent is very necessary, whether for clarity of 
the ambiguity involved, in which silence may be an obstruction to the realization of 
facts, or for purpose other than that. Thus, if a person saw someone stealing property, 
his silence should not be taken as permission for such an act, although he is required 
to inform the authorities about the crime in order that he is not charged with 
complicity. 768 The silence considered herein is subject to the ability of someone to 
talk, although he may choose not to talk for one reason and another, as in the case of a 
thayyib (a previously-married woman), who has the right to express her own consent 
to a proposed marriage. In such a case, her silence is considered rejection of the 
proposal. This is opposed to the second statement in which silence is deemed bayäu 
`a declaration' of consent, as in the case of bikr (a previously unmarried woman) 
765 al-Suyuti, al-Ashba p. 141, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit., p. 153, Majallah, Article 66. 
766 Muslim, al-Sahih 5/87 and al-Nawawi, Sharh 11/117. 
767 al-Suyuti, op. cit p. 142, Ibn Nujaym, op. cit. p. 254, al-Zarkashi, al-Manthur vol. 2, p. 206, 
Majallah, Article 67. 
768 al -Zarga, Sharh al-Qawa `Id al-Figh yyah, p. 337. 
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whose chastity impedes her wish to express herself. Her silence is considered a 
declaration of her consent, as reported by Aisha who said to the Prophet: "0 the 
message of God the unmarried woman shies", to which the Prophet replied, "Fier 
"769 silence is her consent. 
Thus, in criminal cases, if an accused is silent when he is being asked to take an oath 
as defendant, his silence will be deemed a declaration of acceptance of the alleged 
claim. This is the view of Abu Hanifah and Ahmad. 770 However, Malik and al- 
Shafi`i771 oppose that view and assert that the defendant's silence is deemed an 
objection to the claim. The former opinion considers the silence of the accused a 
declaration and acceptance of the allegation because the situation warrants an 
objection to the accusation that the accused is expected to respond to. It is also 
assumed that the accused is not an introvert who just cannot express himself. In 
addition, the tradition of the Prophet has laid down the procedure in such cases that 
the onus of proof is on the one who claims, while in the case of an oath the onus is on 
the one who denies. 772 
However, the latter view considers the fundamental principle that for someone to be 
responsible for an action, especially in a criminal case; his expression has to be 
ascertained. In addition to that, because of the sensitivity of criminal liability, silence 
is not considered an admission of guilt in criminal cases. Similarly, a dumb person 
will not be convicted of an accusation, except if he has shown noticeable or 
identifiable signs that denote his admission. This is referred to by another maxim that 
states: Ishirah al-ma'hi dah Ii al akharas ka al-bayin bi al-lisin (an identifiable sign 
of a dumb person is like a declaration with tongue). 773 
769 Muslim, Sahih, hadith no. 1421, Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani, Fath al-Baar, op. cit., vol. 9, pp. 199-200. 
770 al-Sarakhasi, al-Mabsut, op. cit., vol. 17 p. 29, al-Kasaani, Badaa'i' op. cit., vol. 6, pp. 224-225, 
Ibn al-Muflih, al-Furu' op. cit. vol. 16, p. 58, Ibn Qudamah, al-Kafi fi Fiqh Imam Ibn Hanbal (2nd edn. 
Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami 1979), vol. 4, p. 465. 
"' Salih Abdu al-Sami' Al-Azhar, af-Tbarnaral-Ddn7, Sbarh'Risälah a! -Qayrawinl (Beirut: al- 
Maktabah al-Thagafi, n. d. ), p. 605, Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Khatib al-Shiribini, al-Ignafi Hall Alfaz 
Abi Shujja 'i (Cairo : ar al-Ma'arif, n. d. ), vol. 2, p. 628. 
772 Malik, al-Muwatta Hadith 844. 
773 Majallah, Article 70. 
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7.3 Summary of the chapter 
Chapter Seven, being the last chapter, focuses on the effect of utterances in Islamic 
criminal law. It explains the importance of making expression effective rather than 
disregarding it. It establishes that the norm is to construe perlocutionary act of speech 
to have carried real meaning and metaphoric meaning is to be resorted to only if real 
meaning becomes impossible. And speech becomes derelict if it is impossible to be 
effected. In any circumstance where speech carries general meaning (mutlaq), that 
meaning should be stuck to until otherwise proven. 
The chapter also explains the norm in Islamic law regarding the implication of speech 
in a situation whereby one is requested to respond to a question before the court of 
law. It is a settled rule that an answer should correspond to the question. Though 
word should not be imputed into the mouth of someone who is silent, but silence 
where explanation is demanded shall be considered as an explanation. Verdict can be 
pronounced against or in support of one who is silent where he/she is expected to 
answer to a question posed to him/her before the court of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
i. General Summary of the Thesis 
Islamic law as a subject developed gradually through the emergence of the schools of 
jurisprudence notably the four Sunni and Shia schools of thought. The primary 
sources of this law in the first half of the era of Islam were Qur'an and Sunnah. This 
does not mean that other sources were not resorted to as reported in the narration of 
Mu'az Ibn Jabal when the Prophet sent him to Yemen as a judge. 
Sticking to the literal meaning of the two sources deemed to be hard-line to the idea of 
universality of the Islamic law. Thus the scholars of Islamic jurisprudence had 
recourse to other sources such as 'IJm i, (consensus) and Qiyii (analogy) based on 
and derived from the two sources. Moreover, other terms emerged through 
extrapolation of the aims and objectives of Islamic law (Magäsid al-Shar`ah) to solve 
novel issues such as 'istihsän, maslaha al-mumalah etc 
The emergence of the subject of 'Usul al-Fiqh in which many technical terms 
emerged was an addition hallmark to the intellectuality of the Islamic scholars in 
those days. These technical apparatus were undoubtedly essential tools devised to 
solve many of the novel issues in Islamic law. Consequently, Islamic Legal Maxims 
emerged later as a subject and another intellectual apparatus to unify the scattered 
thoughts of different schools in their various literatures. 
The nitty-gritty of concept of al-Qawa `id a1-Fighiyyah dominates the discussion in 
chapter two; historical development, the legality, the roles and importance of the 
subject are extensively analyzed. It is asserted that though al-Qawi'id a1-Fighiyyah 
have been varied defined by many classical and medieval scholars and their 
successors but it has been observed that there is no link between their definitions and 
the core role of the subject. It is not until recent time when, both Karnali and Mawil 
herald that al-Qawä `id a1 Fighiyyah are to serve the overall of Islamic law (Magäsid 
al-Shari `ah). This insight create new dimension of how legal maxims could be applied 
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to the novel contemporary issues which will, without deserting divine texts, foster the 
tenet of Islamic law. 
During the course of discussion on the concept of al-Qaiv `id a1-Fighiyyah it is 
established that the science of al-Qawä`id al-Figbiyyah is an independent subject of 
its own as opposed to the view that it is part of science of ' Us& al-Figh. There are 
other terms and subjects that create illusion to the subject of al-Qawvi `id a1-Fig1Vyyah 
inter alia are; däbit and nazariyyab. The former is, though occasionally used 
synonymous of qä `idalz said to be less applicable to some issues in Islamic 
jurisprudence as it is a principle meant to control a particular subject in Islamic 
jurisprudence as opposed to gi'idab which can be applied to many, if not all subjects 
and issues in Islamic jurisprudence. As regard to the latter term, the cardinal 
difference between it and gawä `id is that gawä `id are coined in a precise phraseology 
and their particulars need not to be detailed. However, a1-Nazariyyah is a novel style 
of writing details of a particular theme (topic) of Islamic jurisprudence. 
Furthermore, the chapter looks at the emergence and development of the subject- 
matter. It reveals that gawä `id fighiyyah went through three stages before it became 
an established subject viz; primitive, florescence and mature stages. In the primitive 
stage, though there were expressions reported from the Prophet and his companions 
which later developed into maxims, but these were neither treated as independent 
maxims nor recorded down as such. Rather, the Qawä `id were only memorized by 
scholars. The second stage is described as landmark in the establishment of the 
subject, due to the widespread of tagrd (dogmatism or following one school of 
thought blindly) while the spirit of'ijtih dwas on the brink of extinction. From there, 
the subject of al-Qawä`id al-Fighiyyab was enshrined and literatures on it sprang in 
different dimensions. The last stage consolidates the efforts of its preceding stages 
with standardization of the subject. 
Though it is claimed that the subject has reached the peak, there are however many 
vacuums still left unfilled. These vacuums include; studying the subject academically 
and empirically. The Ottoman Civil Codes (al-Majallab al-'Ahkäm al-`Adliyyah) 
appears to be an empirical study of the subject but lacks of academic protocol. 
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The chapter also enumerates the sources, categories, roles and importance of Islamic 
legal maxims. The sources of legal maxims are Qur'an, Hadith, 'Ijm, ý and 
expressions of Mujtahidun (scholars who have attained level of 'ijtihäd). Having 
various sources from which legal maxims are derived necessitate having different 
categories of legal maxims viz: The grand general maxims (al-Qawä `id al-Fighiyyah 
al-Kulliyyah), independent general maxims (al-Qawi'id al-Kulliyyah al-Mustagillah) 
and topical legal maxims (dawäbit). We however wish to contend that the topical 
legal maxims could be classified as legal maxims subsumed under both grand general 
and general independent maxims as opposed to the prevailing idea of separating 
dawäbit from others. It is also asserted that the more sources are explored to codify 
legal maxims, the more the maxim will be powerful and encompassing. It is further 
established that any maxim derived from the Qur'an and Hadith is regarded as 
authoritative though it may not enjoy the status of encompassment. 
Lastly, in the first chapter, the roles and importance of Islamic legal maxims are 
firmly resonated. Islamic scholars unanimously agree that Islamic legal maxims play 
vital role in grasping many issues scattered in the books of jurisprudence and aiding 
judges in comprehending the basic tenet of Islamic law on any contentious issues; yet 
whether or not legal maxims could be used as primary evidence in giving verdict in 
Islamic law has for long been an issue generating heated debate among them. Our 
submission is that if a legal maxim is derived directly or indirectly from the texts (i. e 
Qur'an and authentic hadith), or from sound consensus or completed analogy, there is 
no doubt that such maxim is sufficient to be used as basis of judgment. 
The contents of chapter two to seven constitute the central part of this research. The 
emphasis in chapter two is the need to examine the intention of a culprit before 
passing verdict and awarding punishment to him. Failure to consider the intention in 
Islamic criminal law could lead to injustice being perpetrated against the innocent. 
Intentionality in Islamic criminal law ranges from overt expressed utterances of 
perpetrators which could be in forms of confession, defamation and blasphemy to 
physical objects used for committing a crime. For the overt expression, there is need 
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for further clarification in the case of straight forward and clear grammatical usages. 
Problem would only arise when the language used to express criminal act is 
ambiguous. In that case, to determination of commission of a liudi d or qisis crime 
would also become a matter of controversy. 
The question generated from the object form of criminal intent is that since the object 
mentioned in the tradition of the Prophet confined stick as a yardstick to infer criminal 
intent of alleged perpetrator in homicide crime, can this be extended to cover other 
modern means of killing such as chemical weapons, gun, missiles etc? The opinion 
given in this thesis is that since Islam is a universal religion and its law is universal, it 
should accommodate all means of killing since the aim and the result are the same. 
There are some tactics used to make criminal offences doubtful such as jaliälah 
(ignorance), 'ikrih (duress), nisyin (forgetfulness) etc. All these tactics are imbed in 
the discussion on maxims in chapter three 
The third chapter examines the effect of doubt in certainty. It is affirmatively 
propounded that certainty cannot be repelled with doubt. In the doctrines of scholars 
of figh and ' us, 1, al yagin is considered as a strong proof while al-shakk is lower than 
that of yagia Though scholars of figh attempt to elevate al-zann (probability) which 
is a category between al yagm and al-shakk to the position of al-yagin since it is 
unlikely to obtain certainty in all cases. However, al-zahn cannot be accepted as 
substantive evidence in criminal cases which involve solely the rights of God. 
In criminal cases where there is contradiction between certainty (termed al-Asl9 and 
apparent (termed al-zahir3, apparent may take the rule because it is closer to justice 
and the spirit of Islamic law. The ruling of certainty should be given continuity until 
otherwise is proved. This elucidates the maxim referred to as actori incumbit onus 
probandi or principle of presumption of continuity. That is why it is inline with 
natural justice to ascribe criminal occurrence to its nearest point in time. 
Under the rule of certainty, there is unresolved issue on the originality of things; are 
they originally permitted or prohibited? The position of scholars is of three varying 
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folds namely: permissibility, prohibition and middle course (tawagquJ). The relevance 
of discussion on this issue is to identify what is 'ac1(certainty) which if committed 
would not amount to incrimination. If it is accepted that the fundamental principle is 
that things are originally permissible (mubäli), then it follows that the commission or 
omission of any action other than the one explicitly prohibited or made compulsory by 
texts would not be criminalized. 
Shubha (doubt) is also said to be another mechanism in diminishing the strength of 
hudid punishment as the maxim states al hudi d tudra' bl al-shubhät (capital 
punishment should be averted in the face of doubt). It is argued in this thesis that not 
only the predetermined punishments (budrid) could be averted in the face of doubt but 
also the gips (retaliation) because both have serious damaging effect on the alleged 
culprit. 
One is assumed to be innocent of any accusation until otherwise will be proven. Any 
allegation that lacks of credible evidence shall not be entertained. Any iota of doubt 
plunged into evidence shall render such evidence invalid. However, it may be 
difficult to attain certainty in all cases, thus, where a case involves the right of a 
person, it is espoused that circumstantial evidence should be sought for in order to 
regain the right of a person involved. 
Chapter four details the stand of Islam in considering hardship as raison d'etre in 
creating facility for human beings. The chapter enunciates not only those factors that 
necessitate giving facility, but also demonstrates how these factors can be utilized in 
criminal cases. In any case, the emphasis in this chapter is that in any dire situation, 
there is facility to redeem the right of not only the victim but also the culprit. 
The right of a victim can never go in vain because al-idtirir I yubtil hagq al gbayr 
(necessity does not invalidate the right of other). However, if another person's right is 
violated because of darrirab, generally the perpetrator would not be punished under 
the provision of al-darürät tubih al-mahzürät (necessities render unlawful things 
lawful. However, any excessive use of this provision will necessitate incriminating the 
perpetrator because al-darürah tuqaddar bi gadaribä (necessity is estimated according 
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to its quantity). While there are three categories of provisions aimed to facilitate lives 
of human being viz; necessity, need and luxury, the second one is graded to the level 
of necessity for both individual and public because at times they are inseparable. 
Chapter five has elucidated the position of Islam in prohibition and elimination of 
Barar whether in terms of aggression or in reciprocal. It is a settled rule in Islam that 
harm must be removed. In removing it, there are two major conditions that must be 
observed. (1) cdarar must not be removed by its like (2) greater Barar could be 
prevented by committing lesser daran: 
However, if there are two things and the Barar in both is of the same level, the other 
way to decide which one to be given preference is to look at their structure. If one is 
of prohibitive injunction and other is of permissible, thus, preference will be given to 
prohibitive one over the permissible based on the maxim that says: idhä to `grad al- 
mäni` wa al-mugta( yugaddam al-mini` This is because, in Islamic law, it is an 
established principle that "preventing evils is better than acquiring benefit" (Dar' al- 
malisid w1i min falb al-masälib) 
Chapter six explains the legality of custom in Islamic legal system and how it affects 
the way legal rulings change according to the time and circumstances. It is discussed 
in this chapter that the custom given authority could be `amar or qatvri (practical or 
verbal respectively) and that some maxims are explored to that effect. In any case, 
whether custom is practical or verbal, there are certain conditions which must be met 
before custom can be given significant effect. The conditions are that the custom must 
not contradict explicit texts while it must enjoy regular occurrence and must be 
universally prevailing. 
The last chapter focuses on the effect of utterances in Islamic criminal law. It explains 
the importance of making expression effective rather than disregarding it. It 
establishes that the fundamental principle is to construe locution of speech to have 
carried real meaning and metaphoric and that metaphoric meaning is to be resorted to 
only if real meaning becomes impossible; and that speech becomes derelict if it is 
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impossible to be effected. In any circumstance where speech carries general meaning 
(mutlaq), that meaning should be stuck to until otherwise is proven. 
The chapter also explains the norm in Islamic law regarding the illocutionary act of 
speech in a situation whereby one is requested to respond to a question before the 
court of law. It is a settled rule that an answer should be correspondent to the 
question. Though words should not be imputed into the mouth of someone who is 
silent, but silence where explanation is demanded shall be considered as an 
explanation. Verdict can be pronounced against or in support of one who is silent 
where he/she is expected to respond to a question posed to him/her before the court of 
law. 
In the cause of carrying out this research, certain observations are made which require 
suggestions and recommendations for future and further researches. Such 
observations and our recommendations are as follow: 
" There are insufficient English materials on Islamic Legal Maxims. Even the 
available ones have disparity and deficiency in translation. Thus, it will be of 
general advantage to standardize the translation of Islamic Legal Maxims. 
" There is need for application of Islamic Legal Maxim to some other field of 
Islamic jurisprudence such as Islamic family law, Islamic politics and Islamic 
Transactions. We here wish to acknowledge the efforts of al-Sawat and al- 
Nadwi who have both written books on the applications of legal Maxims in 
Islamic family law and Islamic transactions respectively. Yet, those books do 
not enjoy wide readers because they are mainly in Arabic while they also do 
not consider contemporary issues in their application. This is a very serious 
vacuum that needs be filled 
" In many Islamic countries that implement full or part of Islamic law, there is 
need to consider the overall objectives of Islamic Law (Magäsid al-Shari'ah) 
in dealing with some sensitive issues posed on Islamic law either internally 
or externally. Some of the ways in doing so is to inter-textualize the textual 
evidence of Islamic law to extrapolate the wisdom of Islam and its overall 
objectives in legislation. Undoubtedly, Islamic legal Maxims have some of 
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these features and undermining them will be deemed as undermining very 
useful tools in achieving this noble goal. 
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ii. General Survey of the Cases Judged in the Northern Nigerian Sbad`ah 
Implementation in Lights of Islamic Legal Maxims 
This research has exposed some criminal cases worth investigating and criticizing in 
the light of the Islamic legal apparatus "al-Qawä `id a1-Fighiyyah" (Islamic legal 
maxims). Our finding has revealed that some scholars and judges in Northern Nigeria 
refute the existence of legal maxims in Islamic law. This has contributed to some 
irregularities and miscarriage of justice in some cases brought to the Shari `ali courts. 
The seven basic legal maxims treated in this thesis pose question of whether the 
overall of the objectives of Shan `ah has be observed in the criminal procedures of the 
cases brought before the Shari `ah courts of those states implementing Shari `afi The 
first legal maxim is the corroboration of intention with action. Without doubt Islamic 
criminal law attaches importance to the assessment of the intention of an accused 
person before an appropriate punishment can be decided. This is because if one were 
to be punished unlawfully, it is possible that the punishment may cause irreparable 
damage. 
The cases of Amina lawal v. Katsina, Safiyyatu Husseini v. Sokoto and Bariya 
Magadisu v. Zamfara States of Nigeria775 could be argued on the basis of lack of 
intentionality in committing the alleged offence. This is because they live in a society 
where traditional practices, norms and values have significantly intertwined with the 
Islamic Legal tenets and produced sometimes legal results which are fundamentally 
outside Islamic law. 
The accused persons were villagers and as such, they might not have intention of 
violating the Islamic rules, but rather, following the dictate of the society they live in. 
It is the responsibility of the courts as representative of the Government to verify this 
core objective of Islamic Law; criminal intent before passing any &M punishment on 
"S See Amina Lawal vs. Kastina State Government in Northern Nigeria Law Report 2003 p. 496, 
Human Rights Watch, Political Shari 'ah op. Cit. p. 35, Safaiyyah vs. Sokoto State Government case 
can be found in Human Rights Watch, ibid. p. 34 See Bariya's case at Human Rights Wath, ibid. P. 61, 
and appendix 9. The first two accused were eventually acquitted while the last accused was flogged in 
public. Among the reasons for acquitting the two accused women was that they were ignorant of the 
fact of the law, as will be explained in the following maxim. 
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them. 775 Had criminal intention been investigated properly, those accused women 
might not have been convicted in the first instance; moreover, Section 63(2) of 
Kastina State Sharia Penal Code Law 2001 provides that one shall not be found guilt 
of an offence without criminal intention. 
In the case of Attorney General of Zamfara State (complainant) v. Lawal Akwata 
R/Doruwa (defendant), the defendant was charged on suspicion of committing 
defamation against one Ibrahim Sabo which is an offence under section 323 of Sharia 
penal code of Zamfara State. During the trial, the locutionary act of the defendant 
could not be ascertained; this is because the two witnesses could not establish the 
abusive phrases. Thus, his intention to have allegedly abused the offended person is 
uncertain. However, upon that, the Upper Sharia Court handed its judgment by 
convicting the defendant and sentenced him to six months imprisonment or 
#10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Naira). The justification for the ill-conviction is doubtful 
and unknown. 776 
The reports of Human Rights Watch that dozens of theft related cases have been 
judged in some of the Northern States of Nigeria during the period of re-enforcement 
of Shan-n `ah"7. According to the Human Rights Watch reports and a hard copy of the 
case obtained by the researcher, Jangebe, who was convicted for theft, refused to 
employ the service of a lawyer. He adamantly wanted the amputation of his hand to 
be executed. All efforts by the Governor to relieve him of the punishment were to no 
avail. 778 In situations such as this, it becomes pertinent to ascertain the sanity of the 
accused. Sanity is one of the criteria to be looked at to identify intentionality of a 
criminal act. In Buba Bello Jangebe's case, it could be strange materially that one in 
his right senses will commit a crime and yet confess to it knowing full well that its 
consequence is permanent deformation. But in actual fact, it is believed in Islam that 
for one to be punished of his/her crime in this world prevents him/her to be punished 
in the hereafter. However, failure of the court to ascertain the mental status of the 
775 See Aliyu Musa, issues in defending Safiyyatu Husaini andAmina Lawal in Jibrin Ibrahim op. cit. p. 
201 and the submission of the counsel to Amina Lawal see NNLR 2003 p. 496 where it is reported that 
Amina claimed to have been deceived by her cohabitant. Having claimed deception in committing the 
alleged act has rendered the action unintentional. 
776 See appendix 6 for the details of the case. 
"' Human Rights Watch op. Cit. p. 36. 
77' Ibid. P. 38 
228 
accused puts detriment on the validity of the conviction. Albeit, Jangebe's case was 
one of the first cases tested under the re-enforcement of full Shari `ah penal law in the 
Northern Nigeria; and that perhaps might account for why all these strategies were not 
taken cognisance of. 
In contrast, intentionality in committing theft was observed in Isiya Alh. Aliyu and 
others v. State (Zamfara). The said accused persons were convicted of stealing 3V2 
sacks of Millet from Alhaji Danjimma' s house. During the first trial, the accused 
were convicted of theft and sentenced to amputation of their right hands by Upper 
Sharia Court, Gummi, Zamfara State. The accused persons appealed and their appeal 
was successful on many grounds inter alia that the prime accused (Isiya) has been 
given free access to the house where the property was claimed to have been stolen. 
Thus, perhaps, he may think that the prior permission stands as authorization to take 
from his friend' belongings and as such, that assumption rendered his action 
unintentional. 779 
The second legal maxim is the implications of shakk and shubhah to certainty in 
Islamic criminal law. This can be found in many discussions on criminal penalties and 
liabilities in Islamic literature. Although the approach of each school in applying the 
maxim may be different, there are some aspects that are common to all of them. In the 
case of defamation, for example, if someone accuses another falsely of being unchaste 
and the accused denies this but refuses to take an oath before the court, the accused 
will not be punished with hadd because the issue attracts hadd and the fundamental 
principle is the innocence of the accused. 780 
In the case of Shalla and others v. State, the accused were found guilty of murdering 
their victim; Abudullahi Alhaji Umaru on a mere information that the victim insulted 
the Prophet. The utterance of insulting the Holy Prophet was not said in the presence 
of appellants (Shalla and others who lodged appeal against the decision of High Court 
of Kebbi State). In other words, there was no certainty in what appellants considered 
to be defamation of the Prophet before they assailed the man and murdered him. 781 
779 See Appendix 1 
780 Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni op. cit. vol. 12, p. 409. 
781 Weekly Law Report of Nigeria 30, August 2004 p. 47 
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To emphasize on the importance of certainty in Islamic criminal law, the learned 
Judges in the above case affirmed that: 
It is also a settled law that a provocation act or utterance offered or reported by one person 
cannot be a ground or jurisdiction (justification) for killing a third party (or person) who did 
not offer the act or was not heard to have uttered the alleged words against the accused 
person. 782 
Of course, it is a principle in Islam that information spread against someone must be 
ascertained before action can be taken against the accused. 
If a group of people steals a property, the hadd punishment will be dropped because of 
shubhah. The shubhah in this case is that if they were all to be punished with hadd 
there would be an injustice because if the value of the stolen property were to be 
shared equally among the thieves, what each of them would gain would be less than 
the minimum value of stolen property that is adjudged to attract hadd under the law. If 
one of the thieves were punished, then he would be a victim of injustice. 
It is a settled rule in Islamic criminal law that if group of people involved in stealing a 
property and the share of each one of them in the value of the property is less that the 
nisäb, hadd punishment should not be applied but rather, to `zir. This is because of 
uncertainty of whether the accused persons have committed a crime attracted hadd 
punishment. This is the opinion of Hanafites, supported by Ibn Qudamah of Hanbali 
school, while other Hanbalites hold the view that all should be punished with add 783 
In most theft cases judged under the full implementation of Shari 'ab in the Northern 
States of Nigeria, there were absence of certainty in the value of nisäb before the 
courts declared the amputation of the thieves' right hands. Take for instance the case 
of Hashimu Galadima Maberaya (complainant) v. Abdul-Rahman Isahaka and two 
others (defendants). In that case, it is observed that the total amount of the allegedly 
stolen property by the accused persons was #12,328.00 which was equivalent to $102. 
The value of gold then was $862.15 of which its'/4 was $215.53. The exchange rate of 
dollar was $1 = #120. Thus the nisäb for which one can be convicted of theft in 
782 Ibid. p. 51 783 Ibid. vol. 12, p. 468. 
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Islamic law then would be $215.53 multiplied by #120 (Naira) which is equal to 
#25,863.6 (twenty five thousand, eight hundred and sixty three Naira, six kobo). Thus, 
this figure shows that the total amount of the value of the stolen stuff had not reached 
nisäb for theft in Islamic law for a single person not to say two accused if the amount 
were to be divided. Despite that the accused were put in the prison between 20th of 
February 2002 to 6th July, 2002 and subsequently, their rights hands were chopped 
off. Indeed, if the certainty of the value of the stolen stuff were thoroughly 
investigated, their hands should not have been amputated. 784 
In contrast, the case of Jamilu Isaka (complainant) v. Abukakar Abdullahi Kaura 
(defendant)785 reveals that showing the investigating officers where the stolen 
property was kept, and indeed retrieving the property where it was kept constitutes 
element of certainty that the accused person intentionally committed the act of theft 
which is punishable in Islamic law with amputation. But, what may not be ascertained 
in this case is whether the accused was tortured before his confession. 
Undoubtedly criminal investigation is necessary in this case because it involves right 
on human being. But when the right of man has been returned, is it necessary to carry 
the prescribed punishment? It could be said that all the provisos for convicting the 
accused are being fulfilled; the stolen goods were recovered from where the accused 
kept them, photography was taken while he was retrieving the goods, two police 
officers testified to his confession during the interrogation and the amount of the 
stolen property reached nisäb; #30,350.00 (thirty thousand, three hundred and fifty 
Naira) which is equivalent to $252.91. Thus, the judges convicted the accused person 
and his co-offender under the provision of section 144 punishable under section 145 
of Zamfara State Sharia Penal Code 1999 (ZSSPC 1999) 
In Attorney General (Zamfara State) v. Surajo Mohammed's case, there are similar 
irregularities, not only on the basis of lack of requirement of nisäb but also on the 
procedural error. Surajo Mohammed was accused of stealing a she-goat worth 
784 See Appendix 7 for the details of the case. The same argument is observed in Attorney General 
(Zamfara State) v. Ibrahim Suleiman. The accused person is convicted of theft under section 144 
punishable under section 145 of ZSSPC 1999) The total amount of what it was reported to have been 
stolen was #2 1000.00 equivelent to $175 while the nisab was estimated as $215.53. 
785 See Appendix 2 for the details of the case. 
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#2,200.00 (two thousand and two hundred Naira only) by the first valuer and 
#1,800.00 (one thousand and eight hundred Naira only) by the second valuer. 787 The 
decision of Upper Sharia Court (USC) of Gusau Zamfara State of Nigeria was taken 
to the appeal court. During the appeal, it was learnt that the appellant was suffering 
from mental derangement. Beside, his lawyer observed that criminal procedures were 
violated during his cross-examination. The counsel for the appellant submitted that 
the USC erred in law for not producing witness for the confessional statement on 
which the conviction was based. But the respondent counsel rejected the submission 
on the ground that witness to confession is only needed in civil matter and not in 
criminal matter as stated in the book of Islamic jurisprudence of Malikite school. 788 
Since the conviction was based only on confessional statement which has been 
considered non-compliant with rule of justice, it would be suggested that the appeal 
should be granted in accordance with the traditional statement which states thus: you 
should avoid executing judgement if there exist doubt no matter how minute. 789 We 
however wish to commend the wisdom of the Honourable Kadis of the Sharia Court 
of Appeal, Gusau, Zamfara State, who vividly studied the argument of each party and 
concluded that there were irregularities in the procedures of the USC and thus 
quashed its decision. 
Some modem Islamic writers have suggested that modem methods of crime detection 
such as DNA, laboratory analysis, photography and sound recording could be used in 
establishing criminal offences, instead of claiming shubhah. They claim that those 
means are more reliable and efficient than verbal testimony. 790 One of the reasons on 
which this assertion is based is that the means of securing the objectives of Islamic 
law are `flexible and remain open to consideration. ' This hypothesis could be used in 
the case of Amina Lawal, Safiyyatu Husseini and Bariya Magadisu. Since the crime 
797 See Appendix 4 for the details of the case. 
788 As stated in al-Adawi p. 307. 
789 See appendix 4p6, Cf. Dahiru Gambo (Appellant) v. State (Respondent) (Kano) where the value of 
the stolen property was valued at #3000.00 (three thousand naira) and the Upper Sharia court sentenced 
the accused to 2 years imprisonment and 50 lashes. However, the convicted person appeal against the 
judgement and his appeal was succeeded (see Appendix 10) 
Noorslawat, Sabtu, The Basic Principle of Shari'a for the enforcement of hadd punishment for theft 
(Birmingham UK, Birmingham University, M. A. dissertation 1977) pp. 16-17. 
232 
of adultery can never be committed unilaterally, and the co-accused persons in the 
three cases denied their involvements in the allegation, it would be worthwhile to 
suggest using modem evidence to ascertain the genuineness of the allegation; and not 
ascribe hadd punishment indiscriminately on these helpless women. 
In Bariya's case, the learned judges based their verdict on her confession and 
appearance of pregnancy. The first point of observation is whether pregnancy can be 
used to convict a single lady of fornication or not. 790 As earlier argued, there is no 
evidence to support acceptability of pregnancy as reliable evidence for fornication. 
Among the schools of jurisprudence, only Malikites accept such circumstantial 
evidence as proof of fornication while others have contrary view. 791 The reasons why 
pregnancy cannot be accepted as evidence for fornication among others are: it only 
proves evidence of intercourse not of consent because; a woman could be raped while 
she was conscious or unconscious. She may even have impression that that contract is 
legitimate as temporary marriage which is considered lawful by some shi `ah and as 
reported by Ibn Abbas. It may also be that she is one who does not consider the 
consent of the guardian as a condition for the validity of marriage contract, thus she 
gave herself for marriage without the consent of her guardian (waliyy). Or, she 
became pregnant without coitus in which case a man's sperm goes through her vagina 
by means other than sexual intercourse as debated on Nigerian Television Authority 
(NTA)' Newsline of Sunday 18th March 2001 where a ten year old virgin girl was said 
to be pregnant. 792 All these constitute shubhah against the acceptability of pregnancy 
as sole evidence to convict a woman of committing adultery or fornication. 
The second point of observation of the learned judges in Bariya's case is whether in 
such case, the confession of an accused person could be taken without given right of 
retraction or benefit of doubt. It is reported that the Prophet gave Ma'iz the chance to 
retract his confession as well as al-Ghamidi when both came to him confessing their 
guilt of adultery. Throughout Bariya's case, there was nowhere the judges 
790 Class gender and the political economy of Sharia... online at 
httn: //www. nip, erdeltacongress. com/carticles/class%20izender%2Oand%2Othe %... 03/05/04) p. 4 of 7) 
791 Ibn Qudamah al-Mughni vol 10 p. 192, M. Abu Hasaan, Ahkam al-Jareemah wa al-'Uqubah fi al- 
Shari'ah al-Islamyyah pp. 257-258. 
' Class Gender and the Political economy of Sharia op. cit. p. 5 of 7 
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systematically gave her the benefit of doubt or introduced to her right of retraction as 
the Prophet did for the two companions. 
Third, if the co-accused persons have denied their involvements in the alleged crime, 
should Bariya alone be convicted based on the two evidences knowing full well that a 
single person could not commit such crime. To this, it could be said that during the 
life of the Prophet, there were many instances that single persons were punished for 
adulterous acts. The bottom line is that, it is possible to convict a single person on the 
ground of valid evidence of which confession is one. But, since there is allegation of 
doubt in the procedure from which the confession was deduced, thus, the verdict is 
considered invalid. 
In Safiyyatu's case, one of the reasons given by her counsels was that the actual date, 
time and where the offence was committed were not stated in the court procedure. 
This legal procedural error and others cast gnawing doubt on the credibility of the 
verdict. 793 Also, the issue of acceptability of pregnancy as evidence to convict an 
accused is contestable and tainted with doubt. Even in Malikite school of thought, one 
may conceive pregnancy lasting for seven years, thus, Safiyyatu might have 
conceived her pregnancy when she was in the custody of her former husband and 
there was no evidence to prove otherwise before the court handed its judgment. 794 In 
other word, it is possible that the baby which Safiyyah gave birth to could be fathered 
by her former husband. All these constitute what the Shan-'ah terms as shubhah which 
must be considered in averting hadd punishment. 
In Aminal Lawal v. State, there is a contention on whether a retraction of confession 
made by accused/defendant representative is acceptable or not. It is reported that the 
representative of Amina Lawal made retraction of her confession at Upper Sharia 
Court, Funtua. But this retraction was dismissed on the ground that it is made not by 
the accused /appellant. This disagreement will lead us to inquire into the locus standi 
of legal representative and his action, and to investigate whether retraction can be 
made even at the last minute before the execution of the sentence. For the latter, it can 
793 Aliyu Musa Yawuri, "issues in defending Safiyyatu Husseini and Amina Lawal", in Jibrin Ibrahim 
(ed. ) Sharia Penal and Family Laws in Nigeria and in the Muslim World: Rights Based Approach, 
(Nigeria: ABU Press Limited, 2004) p. 196 . 794 Peters Rudolph, re-Islamization, op. Cit. p. 236,. 
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be inferred from the word of the Prophet when Ma'iz was chased by his executors, 
"why not you leave him, perhaps, he may repent" that retraction of confession in such 
case (adultery) is acceptable. For the former, the action of legal representatives is as 
if it is done by the sole concerned person and restricting acceptability of retraction of 
confession to the accused alone will undermine the essence of legal representative. 
Albeit, as a result of the arguments that trail the basis for Amina's conviction, the 
judges should have taken cognizance of the objective of Islam and as such consider 
the allegation doubtful and consequently avert the hadd punishment. 796 
Furthermore, the legal procedure followed in Amina's case also casts doubt on the 
credibility of the allegation. In the response of the Sharia court of Appeal, Kastina, the 
learned judge poses some credible questions to discredit this allegation: 
i. Why did these police men, who witnessed an offence being committed before 
their eyes failed to arrest the accused until after 11 months? (This is inferred 
from the case filed against the two accused persons, in which it is stated that 
they were in cohabitation for 11 months) 
ii. Notwithstanding the knowledge of the policemen that Amina and Yahaya 
committed the alleged offence for a period spanning 11 months, did the 
accusers catch them in the actual act of (ZINA) or were they informed? 797 
It is remarkable to state that doubt may be created in an admission where the 
admission has lost any of its validity. 
It is important in Islamic Criminal law and its procedure to call for witness in the case 
where confessional statement is the sole evidence in convicting accused person. This 
is referred to in Isiya and others v. State798 where the USC relied on their confession. 
The accused persons denied the confession, thus the evidence deduced from it was 
nullified on the basis that the USC failed to call for witnesses during the trial as 
796 Northern Nigerian Law Report (NNLR 2003, p. 498 
79' See NNLR 2003, pp. 498-499 
798 See Appendix I for the details of the case 
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required by law. In rejecting the decision of USC, the learned judges referred to what 
is stated in Bahaja vol. 1 p. 137: "Conviction of an accused cannot stand without the 
testimony of just witnesses. " Not only this, inconsistency in what is written in the 
court procedural book p. 5 para 14 casts doubt on the evidence relied upon in 
convicting the accused persons. 
The third legal maxim considers the effect of hardship in criminal law and the 
provision of facility given to the perpetrator. As discussed earlier that, under the 
maxim of giving hardship provision of facility, illness and general necessity among 
others are factors that warrant facility for the perpetrator in Islamic criminal law. 
These factors are undermined in some cases judged under the full implementation of 
Sbat7'ah in Northern Nigeria. Take for instance, in the case of Abukakar Abdullahi 
Kaura (defendant) v. Jamilu Isaka B/Magagi (complainant), the Upper Sharia Court 
K/Namoda found the defendant guilty of theft. It was reported that the said accused, 
on the 20th of November 2000 at about 3: 30 am, broke into a shop belonging to the 
complainant and stole stuff of clothes worth #30.350.00 (thirty thousand, three 
hundred and fifty Naira). But however, in this case, it is observed that the accused 
person would have been given lesser punishment (ta `zir) instead of amputation of his 
right hand, as decided by the court, because of his conditions. He explained before the 
court that he was ex-prisoner and a family man without means of sustenance; and 
perhaps, he might have had mental ailment as a result of his long stay in prison. All 
these constitute what could be termed as hardship that warrants facility in Islamic 
criminal law. 798 
Similarly in the case of Commissioner of Police (Zamfara State as Complainant) v. 
Buba Bello Jangebe (Defendant), facility given to ignorance of the fact of law was 
undermined. The accused person was convicted of theft of a cow in the earlier years 
of re-introduction of Islamic penal law in the Northern Nigeria. On 21st February, 
2000 he was charged for conspiracy and stealing of a cow belonging to one Dan 
Mande Matuna. It is astonishing that, the accused person was arrested by vigilante 
group not by the owner of the cow. Also, it was policeman Shafi Garba who 
prosecuted him instead of the owner of the cow. If the theft crime will be considered 
799 See Appendix 2 for the details. 
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as right of man, it will be legally inappropriate for the accused to be charged since no 
one complains of the crime. However, if the crime were to be accessed as right of 
God, then, the property needs not to be returned, and perhaps, punishment would not 
be meted. But, in digesting the case, it is not clear in which way, the case is viewed. 
Our observation concerning the case is that, since the case was one of the first cases 
tried under full implementation of Islamic penal law, there were irregularities in the 
legal procedures from the outset which account for many erroneous judgments. Apart 
from that, it was claimed that the herdsman was ignorant of the fact of the law, which 
is one of the factors that render punishments of offences of that nature abated. In 
addition to that, there were no adequate infrastructures in place to enlighten the public 
on the severity of the punishment as a result of their confession to such crimes. The 
poverty level of the people in the society before the re-enforcement of shari `ah could 
also be a justification for the claim of necessity leading to the commission of the 
crime. If sanity had fully returned to the society before the introduction of the penal 
codes, perhaps people like Jangebe and others might have not embarked on such 
vicious crimes. 799 
The prohibition and elimination of daran in Islamic criminal law is also given less 
consideration in some of the cases judged under Northern Shari `ab Law. Islam 
denounces any unnecessary infliction of harm and injury. It prohibits any unjust 
affliction of punishment and penalty on human beings. It also strives to eliminate the 
occurrence of such dararwhether it occurs through aggression or in reciprocal. If that 
is one of the overall objectives of Islam, some of the cases judged in the Northern 
Nigeria during the re-enforcement of full Shad `ab will be subject to criticism. 
In the case of Attorney General of Zamfara State (complainant) v. Lawal Akwata 
R/Doruwa (defendant), from the literal meaning of the maxim and it source, this case 
could be considered as inflicting unnecessary harm on someone. The prosecutor was 
not directly involved in the dispute. The direct victim has forgiven his accused person. 
'" See Appendix 8 for the details of the case and Opeloye, Muhib O. , The Sustainability of Shariah in 
a Pluralistic and Democratic Nigeria, 5th Faculty of Arts Guest Lecture Series, (Lagos State University 
24th August 2005) 
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In fact, he did not initiate any case but rather, one Lawali Sani Dauda on behalf of 
commissioner for justice Attorney General of Zamfara State that lodged the case. At 
the end of the trial, the Upper Sharia Court found the accused guilty of the offence 
and sentenced him to six months imprisonment or #10,000.00 (ten thousand Naira = 
$83.33). However, putting the suspect in prison for such a petty offence is another 
unjust inflicting of harm on a person. 80° 
Similarly, in the case of Hashimu Galadima Maberaya (complainant) v. Abdul- 
Rahman Isahaka and two others (defendants), it is observed that the total amount of 
what those accused persons were alleged to be stolen was #12,328.00 (equivalent to 
$102). Putting those accused in the prison between 20th of February 2002 to 6th July 
2002 and the judgement of amputation does not commensurate with their offence. 
Thus the handed punishments are considered as inflicting unjust punishment on 
them. 801 
In the case of Bariya, to eliminate the harm she might have suffered as a result of 
allegation of defamation imposed on her and the demands of her co-accused, alleging 
them of fornication; it could be worthwhile to consider DNA. Of course, to determine 
the right of human being which attached to the case would be in the best interest of 
Islam in establishing justice among mankind. Thus, DNA must be accepted to clear 
the air for Bariya not to be convicted of gadhf. 
When there is contradiction between al yagr'n (certainty) and al-zähir, (apparent) such 
as the appearance of pregnancy and a claim of the absence of four eye witnesses in the 
case of adultery, the best interest of Islam would be to establish whose rights are 
involved in this case. If there is no allegation of rape in such a case, the higher proof 
would be accepted; that is four eye witness in order to eliminate the dararin executing 
the hadd punishment. That is why, to me, considering pregnancies in cases of 
adultery is less privileged to Islamic law since no human right is attached to the crime. 
Also investigating cases like adultery, drinking alcoholic and apostasy - if they were 
not committed publicly - can be considered as infringing on human rights since those 
goo See Appendix 6 
so' See Appendix 7 
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offences do not affect human beings directly. In other words, any crime that does not 
directly involve human rights is not subject to investigation, and investigating it is 
considered as inflicting undue daran on the accused. In Bariya v. Zamfara police, 
Safiyyatu v. Sokoto State and Amina Lawal v. Kastina, the way their cases were 
reported was considered to be impinging on the rights of the accused persons, which 
is considered to be inflicting harm on them. 803 
It is argued that challenging Amina Lawal of conceiving pregnancy is an act of 
inflicting unwarranted harm on her, since it is a settled law even in Malikite school 
that "a woman may carry pregnancy for five years before delivery. "804 Thus, Amina 
Lawal divorced her former husband less than five years ago, (at the time of the case) it 
gives her the provision of benefit of doubt. 
The fifth legal maxim centralizes on authoritativeness and effects of custom in Islamic 
criminal law, if an accused believes that the custom of the land permits him to take 
certain amount of goods from his/her host's property without intending an offensive 
act, he shall not be convicted of a criminal act. In Isiya and others, (appellants) v. 
State, (Zamfara, as respondant), the appellants believed to have been given free access 
to the accuser's house. This is one of the arguments put forward to the appeal court 
805 before the appeal was granted. 
Under the use of language in a particular custom, it was argued that since Safiyyatu 
Huseini is a Hausa native speaker, it is the responsibility of the court to explain the 
meaning of zina and its conditions and what the Shari'ah penal code says about it and 
the consequence of committing the offence. In other words, since Safiyyatu does not 
speak Arabic, to justify the validity of the verdict, the word must be interpreted into 
her customary language. 
But this has been rebutted by the co judge in Amina v. State where it was remarked 
that the term zina "is no longer an Arabic word. It is basically Hausa word. As such 
803 See the submission of Safiyyatu Husaini's counsel in Rudolph Peters, Re-Islamization.. op. cit p. 
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804 See NNLR 2003 p. 496 
805 See Appendix I 
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Hausa people have no suitable word than this. "806 Of course, the word zina has been 
localized and it could be very hard to prove that Muslims do not know the connotation 
of the term. However, it could also be argued that while the term is known literally, 
the legal ingredients and consequences may be unknown to the vast majority of 
Nigeria Muslims. 
In Amina Lawal's case, there is the assumption that Amina accepted sexual 
intercourse with Yakubu807 in the belief that custom allowed it. The modul operands 
before the full implementation of Shari `ah was to give consent before proper 
marriage808 
The last maxim studies the stand of Islamic law on the effect of locution. There are 
many ways to explore the maxims of effect of expression in Islamic Criminal law 
especially in the scenarios of implementing penal codes of Islamic law in Northern 
Nigeria. Before the implementing full Shad 'ab law in this region, it could be assumed 
that the Shari `ab legal terms had faded out in domain and that people might not be au 
fait with consequence of crimes committed. Take for instance the cases of Safiyyatu 
Husseini, Bariya Magadisu and Amina Law, it was reported that the accused women 
confessed to the adulterous crime in the trials of first instance. In addition, they all 
claimed to know the meaning of zina. That statement of confession and claim of 
knowledge of the meaning of zina must be effected by the judges and indeed that was 
what happened. For the courts to decline the statements and render the claims 
ineffective, will form the basis for a bad judicial precedent. In page 2 para 3, of 
Bariya case, it is stated that when Bariya was asked whether she understood the 
charge "she said I heard what they said and it was true I was pregnant and it was Ado 
Mamman Sani and Hamisu that committed adultery with me. "809 And in para 6 of the 
same report, the court asked Bariya whether she understood the meaning of zina and 
she replied "Yes I know. "810 Her utterance locutionarily denotes a statement of 
confession which must be taken into an account by the court. But, her co-accused 
806 See NNLR, 2003, p. 513 
807 Her co-accused who later denied the accusation and was discharged on unfounded evidence to 
convict him) 
808 See Aliyu Musa, Issues in defending Safiyyatu Husaini andAmina Lawal, op. cit. p. 197 
809 Appendix 9 p. 2 
810 Ibid. P. 2 para 7 
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persons denied the accusation. When one of the co-accused was asked whether he 
understood the charge against him he replied "I heard but it is no true, I did not 
commit adultery with her. , 811 The maxim says "lä yunsab li al-säkit gawluri' (word 
shall not be imputed to one who is silent... ). That is why it was difficult to convict all 
the co-accused. 
However, in an in-depth study of the case, Bariya did not unequivocally say that she 
committed adultery. Rather, what she said was that she was pregnant; "It was true that 
I am carrying pregnancy. "812 This also negates the maxim prohibiting imputing word 
of confession into her mouth because lä yunsab Ii al-säkit gawlun (No word shall be 
imputed to one who is silent... ). 
However, while the court considered the implication of her statements, knowing that a 
single person cannot commit such crime, it should have considered the invalidity of 
her statement based on the fact that idbä ta'adhdhara `ibmäl al-kaJ m yuhmdal (If 
giving an effect to a speech becomes impossible in any way it will be disregarded). 
Thus, the way to establish justice in this case is to cast doubt into the evidence so as to 
mitigate the punishment of zinc when all the co-accused persons could not be 
convicted. 
Furthermore, in the case of Shalla v. State, in which some people were accused of 
murder of one Abdullahi Alhaji Umar of Ranadali Village in Kebbi Local 
Government, Kebbi state because of a rumour that the victim (Abdullahi) insulted or 
defamed the Holy Prophet. At the High court of Kebbi State the people were charged 
with criminal conspiracy, abetting and culpable homicide punishable with death 
contrary to sect 85,97, and 221(a) of the Penal Code of the Federation. The convicted 
culprits appealed against the judgement of the High Court. One of the bases of their 
appeal was that the High Court failed to consider the claims of justification and 
provocation available to the appellants before convicting them. In rejecting this 
ground of appeal, the learned judges dismissed issue of provocation because the claim 
of provocation is only acceptable if the act or utterance by the deceased was made 
directly against the appellants. It is a settled rule in Islamic criminal law that to rule 
811 Ibid. P. 2 para 4 
812 Appendix 9 p. 2 para 3 
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against someone for insulting God, His Prophet or any angel, the meaning of his 
utterances must be verified to determine the gravity of the offence. Sometime, the 
utterance may necessitate killing and sometime it may only require chastisement for 
correction or may not attract any punishment at all. 813 
Under the maxim of liyunsab 11 al-säkit kawlun it is observed that the murderers 
acted on rumour that their victim has defamed or insulted the Holy Prophet. Neither 
the exact utterance nor the source of information or rumour was ascertained. Perhaps, 
the locutionary act of the deceased may not warrant the punishment they meted on 
him. 
Similarly, the case of Attorney General (complainant) v. Lawal Akwata (defendant), 
shows lack of respect for the effect of expression. When the wording of the 
defamation was not established in the case, the locus- standi for the court to reach 
verdict in this case is arguable. Though, the punishment awarded to him is of to `Zir 
nature (six months imprisonment or #10,000.00), however, the argument is that the 
case has no locus standi. If the case was brought to the court as public disorder 
offence, the two persons involved in the case should have been prosecuted. But, rather 
only one accused person was convicted. 814 
813 Shalla v. State Weekly Law report of Nigeria (WLRN) (2004) 35, p 54-55) 
aua See Appendix 6 for the details 
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iii. Recommendations 
In writing this thesis critical analysis, observations and evaluations have been made. 
There is a need for "intertextualizing" and "hypertexualizing" the concepts and the 
contexts of Islamic texts in order to bring about a comprehensive codification which 
will cater for the novel issues in this generation. It is time to depart from sticking to 
one madhhab by adopting the systems of talfiq and lakhyir -the two systems 
incorporate the broad range of strategies required to deal with the sensitive issues 
which may arise in any state adopting full implementation of Shari `ah (Islamic Law). 
There is a need for highly qualified Islamic jurists in Islamic Sban'`ah courts and 
Legislative assemblies. There is a need to appoint dynamic, broad minded jurists who 
can view issues in their broader context. This should help reduce the level of criticism 
about the suitability of Islamic law in the modem age. 
There are many ways of achieving criminal justice in Islamic law 
" Applications of legal maxims which are based on the tenet of Magasid 
Shaff'ah (the overall objectives of Islamic law). 
" Evaluations of the socio-economic status of the accused before he/she can 
be convicted of the accusation. 
" Evaluations of the socio-political context of the accusation to determine 
both the benefits and the evil underlying the prosecution of the accused. 
The Prophet exemplified for us two different ways of dealing with two 
similar issues in different contexts. In al-Makhzum's case she was reported 
to have stolen someone's property and, because of her tribes status in the 
society, an intercessor was sought to plead with the Prophet not to 
prosecute her. The Prophet vehemently refused the plea and said: "if 
Fatima the daughter of the message of Allah stole, the Prophet will cut her 
hand (amputate her hand according to Shan'`ah). And yet, in another 
scenario, The Prophet refused the confession of Ma'iz in the first instance 
in order to give him the chance to repent. 
The seven basic legal maxims have summoned Islamic criminal jurists and judges to 
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establish the overall objectives of Shari `ah in a quest for justice in each criminal case. 
This is because the ultimate goal of Islamic law is to "promote the benevolent nature 
of Islam, especially where the reasoning for such ... is commensurate with prevalent 
"815 needs of social justice and human well-being. 
Nigerian Shari `ah council needs to establish different arms in order that each can act 
as a counter balance to and keep watch over the activities of the other. Justice can be 
achieved through judicial professionalism and qualified judges. It is expected that 
professional and qualified judges "demonstrate a clear rational perspective of issues 
based on evidence placed before them and not on to be biased by emotions and 
zealousness °'816 These different arms would, to some extent, help curb miscarriages 
of justice and block blind criticism of the legal system of the states. 
As we have seen through a detailed analysis of cases judged in the states 
implementing full Shari `ah law in northern Nigeria, some of those cases were quashed 
when they were brought to the appeal courts. Had the defendants sought not to apply 
to the appeal court, they would have been unjustly punished. It is a settled rule in 
Islamic law that a judge who has used his personal exertion to deliver a judgment, 
based on what his exertion dictates for him, should be rewarded. If the judgment 
subsequently turns out to be wrong, however, and consequently affects the rights of 
human beings, the remedy should be provided for the affected person from the 
government who employed the service of the judge. This would ensure that while the 
judge is not held responsible for any miscarriage of justice because of his fallibility, 
justice would be done to the victim of the miscarriage of justice. 
Equally, there is a need for all Shari `ah implementing States to ensure that all 
infrastructures are put in place before embarking on full implementation of Shari `ah. 
That would accord with the practice and strategy of the Prophet in transmitting 
Shari `ah from purifying stage to punitive. The social welfare of the members of the 
states is paramount to minimizing their criminal activities. As Sanusi notes, Shy `ah 
critics point out that in the absence of any change in the "material living conditions of 
813 Baderin, M. A, International Human right and Islamic law, op. cit. p. 220 
816 Ibid. P. 224 
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... "all appearances of change are cosmetic"817 the masses of the population...... 
To justify the execution of criminal convictions, there must be an extension of justice 
to government officials. If Islamic states allow malpractice in public office such as the 
embezzlement of public funds and no action is taken against the government officials 
responsible, then undoubtedly there will be more criticism of Shar3`ah from all 
spectrums of the world. 
Human rights watch and human rights activists should understand that while there 
may be miscarriages of justice in some cases, human beings are not infallible. Thus, 
imperfection in their actions is inevitable. This does not mean that there should be no 
criticism at all. Indeed, with constructive criticism based on good intentions, 
imperfections could be put right and it is not permissible to leave an imperfection to 
prevail in the mistaken belief that there is no way of redressing it. 
The negative attitude expressed when describing Muslim legal codes such as the 
punishment of adultery, theft, etc., and the undermining approach of "cultural 
relativism" towards Islamic doctrines will stand as a blockade against admitting 
constructive criticism given by Shari'ah opponents. As Sanusi observes, those 
negative descriptions "are considered value judgments reflecting certain elements of 
cultural arrogance and unacceptable claims of superiority... (which make) dialogue 
"818 difficult if not impossible. 
I am not esprit de corps with those who try to use Shad 'ah as a political weapon to 
destabilize the regime of Obasanjo, but I do believe that miscarriages of justice 
occurred in some criminal cases, in their first judgments in lower Sbari `ah courts. If 
we are ever to get a clear picture of what is really going on, political vendettas and 
journalistic smearing need to be set aside when criticizing any element of Islamic law. 
81 Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, "The West and the Rest: Reflection on the Intercultural Dialogue about 
Shari `ah, in Ostien, Philip, et. al. (eds) Comparative Perspectives on Shariah in Nigeria op. cit. p. 255 
818 Ibid, P. 262. 
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Glossary of Arabic Terms 
`Adah -Custom/Practice. 
`Adah aw `urf Qaw1T -Verbal practice. 
`Adak aw `urf `amali -Practical custom. 
`Adhä -the Muslim festival celebrated on the 1Ot1 of dhul Hijj of Islamic calendar. 
`Adälah - Trustworthiness. 
`Amal -Action. 
`Amal/urf ahal al-Madinah - the custom/practice of the people of Madina. 
`Amd -Intentional. 
`Amid- Intentional perpetrator. 
'Aqilah -Solidarity/blood relatives. 
AsI -Fundamental. 
Bayyinah -Evidence. 
Bikr Unmarried before. 
Darar - Harm/ injury. 
Darürah (pl. Qarürät) - Necessity. 
I? irär -Inflicting harm on another person, beyond what is legally approved. 
Da`wä, -Claim. 
Da'if- Weak chain. 
I ibit (pl. Dawäbit)- Maxim that controls particular subject. 
Dhküriyyah- Masculinity. 
Diyah- Blood money. 
Diyah mughallaz -Heavy blood money. 
Fasäd -Illicit practices. 
Fiqh - Islamic jurisprudence. 
Ghalabah al-zann -Most probable. 
Ghälib akthar'i- Preponderant majority rule. 
Ghayr ma'qulah al-ma'na -Irrationalized. 
Ghalabah, Predominant. 
Häjah -Needs. 
Hagiqah -A word meant to denote the meaning given to it originally. 
Majäz- A word which has another meaning. 
Hadd (pl. Hudüd) - Fixed punishment. 
haqiqah lughawi: Linguistic meaning. 
Haräm -Prohibition. 
Hiräbah -Banditry. 
Hirz, -A well-fortified place. 
Hudür -Presence. 
Hudüd God- God's rights. 
Hukm -Ruling. 
Hukm Aghlabi preponderant ruling. 
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Humüm al-Balwä- General necessity. 
I jugtiq al-Adami - Rights of Human Being. 
Ibädah -An act of devotion. 
Idträd, -Continuity. 
Ijmä' - Consensus. 
Ijtihäd Personal exertion. 
Ijtihädiyyah- Personal exertion. 
Ikhbär - Information. 
Ikhtiläf al-Mawjib -Difference in the cause. 
Ikräh ghayr mulji- Incomplete coercion. 
Ikräh mulj - Complete coercion. 
Ikräh - Coercion. 
Ikräh tam. - Complete coercion. 
`Illah- Cause. 
`Ilm - knowledge. 
Igrär- Confession. 
Istihsän - Preference. 
Istisnä'- Contract of manufacturing. 
Itläf nafs- Capital punishment. 
Jahl -Ignorance. 
Jald -Flogging. 
Jins Wähid -Same group. 
kamäliyyah (or) al-talisiniyyah- A luxury. 
khäs, -Personal/individual. 
Khat' Mistake. 
Kulr Muttarid -Consistent general rule. 
Lawth -Circumstantial evidence. 
Li`än - Repudiation. 
Ma'mümah -A head wound reaching the cerebral membrane. 
Ma'mürät - Commandments. 
Mahr al-mithl -A fair dowry. 
Makrü' -Detestable. 
ManhiyAt, -Prohibited. 
Mansik, Abrogated. 
Maqasid al- Shan`ah - Overall objectives of Shari'ah. 
Magsad (Magäsid) -Purpose, Willing. 
Magsüd al-`Igäb - Purpose of Punishment. 
Marad -Illness. 
Maslah -Benefit. 
Mafsadah -Harm. 
Mashaqqah - Hardship. 
Mu`ämalät -Transactions. 
Mubähah -Permitted. 
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Mubäshir -Direct causer. 
Muhkam - Unambiguity). 
Mul ana -Married before woman. 
Mukallaf Sound mind/ legal responsible person. 
Mukha' - Unintentional perpetrator. 
Mukrah -Coerced person. 
Mukrih -Coercer. 
Munaqqilah -An injury whereby a bone is displaced. 
Muqayyad - Restricted. 
Mursal - Omission of some of the transmitter. 
Mustahabb -Desirable. 
Mut'a -Temporary marriage. 
Mutasabbib -Indirect causer. 
Muthbit -One who makes the claim. 
Mutlaq - Unrestricted. 
Nafy -Exile. 
Nags - Defect or Disability. 
Nask ; Abrogation. 
Nazariyyah - Theorem. 
Nazariyyah al-fiqhiyyah - Theorem of Islamic Jurisprudence. 
Nikä batil, -Invalid marriage. 
Nisab -Minimum value. 
Nisyän Forgetfulness. 
Niyyah -Intention. 
Nukül -Refusal to take oath. 
Qadhf -Defamation. 
Qadi judge. 
Qadiyyah Proposition/theorem. 
Qafäh -A means used to establish the parenthood of a child. 
gasämah fi dimä' -Qasämah in blood. 
gasämah fi al-amwäl -Qasämah in a financial claim or property claim. 
Qasämah -A legal procedure involves 50 oaths to establish involvement of an 
accused person in homicide crime. 
Qasd wähid - Same intention/ purpose. 
Qati' al-tanq -Robbery. 
Qatl Khat' -Unintentional murder. 
Qawä'id ämmah -General Maxim. 
Qawä'id (sing. Qä'idah) -Legal Maxims. 
Qawä'id al-Usuliyyah - Maxims that relate to principles of Islamic jurisprudence. 
Qawä'id al-fiqhyyah - Islamic legal maxims. 
Qawa id khäsah -Peculiar maxims. 
Qiyäs - Analogy. 
Qur'ah - Drawing lots. 
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Ra'y -Rationalization. 
Raf al-haraj - Removing hardship. 
Rajm- Stoning to death. 
Rakä't -Pillars of prayers. 
Ridda -Apostasy. 
Sadd al-dhan`a - Blocking evil. 
S afar - Journey. 
Sarqah -Theft. 
Shahädah, - Witness. 
Shakk -Doubt/ suspicion. 
Shari`!, Legal. 
Shibu `amd -Quasi intention. 
Shubha fi al-'aqd - Doubt in contract. 
Shubha fi al jihah -Doubt of the legality or illegality of the act. 
Shubha fi al-mahall (or) shubha al-milk -Doubt of ownership. 
Shubha fi al-fi'l - Doubt in action. 
Shubhah fi al-fa`if -Doubt fro the angle of the actor. 
Shuyü`- Prevailing. 
Siyasah -Politics. 
Sunnah -Tradition of the Prophet. 
Taläq bä'in -Complete divorce. 
Ta'zir - Discretionary Punishment. 
Tadäkhul, -Integration of. 
Takhayyur - Selection of rules from difference schools. 
Talfiq -Combination of elements of rules from various schools. 
Tagid -Sticking to a particular school of thought. 
Tawaqquf - Cessation. 
Taysir - Facility. 
Uqübat al-muqaddar shari'ah Legally fixed punishments. 
Uqübät al-Shar'iyyah -Islamic penology. 
`Urf `Amm -General custom. 
`Urf khäsah -Part icular/individual custom. 
`Urf Qawli- Verbal custom. 
`Urf- Custom. 
`Urfiyyah - Has to do with customary norm. 
`Usr- Difficulty. 
Usül al-Fiqh - Science of Islamic jurisprudence. 
Wahm - Illusion. 
Wäjib, Obligatory. 
Waliyy -Legal guardian. 
Yagin -Certainty. 
Zähir -Apparent. 
Zajr -Deterrence. 
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Zann -Probable. 
Zinä -Adultery. 
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Appendices 
Appendix (A) 
List of Legal Maxims Mentioned in the Thesis 
1- Idhä däq al-'amr ittasa' wa idhä ittasa` däq "Whenever the circle of an 
affair narrows it is widened and whenever it widens it is narrowed. 157,267. 
2- al- `Ibrab fr al- `ugrid li al-magäsid wa al-ma `ini'lä li al-Ifaz tva al-mabäfii - 
The effect is given to intention and meaning not to literalness and structure. 
57,267. 
3- al- `Adak Mubakkam - Custom has legal authority. 54,56,188,267 
4- a1- AcI fi al- `uqi d ridä a1-muta'ägidayn - the fundamental principle of 
contracts is the consent of the two contractual parties. 37,267. 
5- ab `Ibra bi umüm al-lafzlä bi khusi s al-sabab- Consideration is given to the 
generality of the word, not the peculiarity of the cause (of revelation). 158, 
267. 
6- al- `ibrah Ii al ghälib al-shä'i `lä al-nadir - Effect is only given to a prevailing 
widespreading custom, not a rare one. 198,267. 
7- al- Umtir bi magäsidiha- Actions are considered together with their 
intentions. 56,63,267. 
8- al-'Asl `arm al-ni) ah idhä tajarrad `an al- `aural lä taken mu'atbthirah (li al- 
`umcir al-duuryäwiyyab) - fundamentally there is no effect (in worldly 
matters) on intention devoid of act. 66,267. 
9- a1-'Ac1 al-`adam- the fundamental principle is the non - existence of 
something. 94,267. 
10- al- 'Asl a11ä yubnä al-ahkäm i11ä `all al- `ilm. - The principle is that rules 
should only be based on real knowledge. 44,267. 
11- al-'Asl ann al-su'äl yams `all mä to `irafa kull qawm fl makinihim - The 
principle is that a question should be based on how people understand it in 
their domain. 54,267. 
12- al-'Asl bagä' mä kin `all mä kanä `hattä yagrim al-darl `a1ä k/h f- Affairs 
remain lawful, the status quo (until otherwise proved). 96,267. 
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13- al-'Ac1 barä' a1-dbimmab -The fundamental principle is freedom of liability. 
94,268 
14- al-'As1 fi al'ashya' al-hibähab `hattä yard al-darl `ali talirimihä - The 
Fundamental Principle is that things are lawful for use until there comes a 
proof of prohibition. 106,268. 
15- ab 'Asl fi al-kalarn a1- iagiqah - The fundamental principle of speech is real 
meaning. 221,268. 
16- al-'Asl idäfah al-hidith i1ä aqrab awqitih - The fundamental principle is to 
ascribe an event to its nearest point in time. 96,268. 
17- ab 'Idtirir 1ä yubtil hagq al ghayr Necessity does not invalidate the right of 
the other. 150,168,181,223,268. 
18- al-'Ishirät al-ma hüdab 11 al-akhras ka al-bayin bi al-lisin -A rccognizcd 
indication of a dumb person is considered as an explicit expression. 196,268. 
19- al-Bayyinah `all al-mudda i wa al yarn7n `all man ankar-The burden of 
proof is on him who alleges and the oath is on him who denies. 38,117,268. 
20- al-barar al-'ashadd yuzäl bl al-dararal-'akbaf Greater injury should be 
prevented by committing lesser injury. 180,268. 
21- al-DararI yuzäl bi al-darar- Harm is not repelled with harm. 178,268. 
22- al-Dararlä yuzäl bi mithlihi - Harm is not repelled by its like. 178,268. 
23- al-Dararyudfa bi gadral-'imkin -Harm/injury should be prevented as much 
as possible. 56,173,268. 
24- al-DararyuzäI- Injury should be removed. 56,173,268. 
25- al-Darrirät tubib al-mabzrurät -Necessities render unlawful things lawful. 168, 
223,268. 
26- al-Darvrät tugaddar bi qadari a- - Necessities are estimated according to their 
quantity. 163,268 
27- al-Dan rab tuqaddar bi gadar hä -Necessity is estimated according to its 
quantity. 168,223,268. 
28- al-Häjab tunazzal manzila al-dart rab, 'imab känat aivkbässah -Need, 
whether of public or private nature, is considered as necessity. 165,268. 
29- al-Hagiqab tutrakbi dalälab al-`ädab Real meaning shall be left out for 
denotation of al-`ädah. 196,268. 
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30- aI-Hudi d tudra' bi shubhät -a fixed punishment should be averted by means 
of doubt. 111,152,197,223,269. 
31- al-Rudi d tusgat bi al-shubhät (Fixed Punishments should be averted in the 
case of doubt/suspicion. 108,269. 
32- al-Hukm idhä thabata bi `illah zila bi zawälibi -A Rule that is established 
by virtue of 711ah (cause) shall expire when the cause expires. 44,269. 
33- al-Ijtihäd lä yugad bi al-Ijtibäd -A ruling established by the means of i jtihäd 
is not reversed by another ijtihäd. 53,269. 
34- al-Il h yamna ` ci i4ah al-igrir- Coercion prevents the validity of 
Confession. 137,269. 
35- a1-Igrär fi hugdq a1- `ibäd lä yahtamil al-ruju `- Retraction of confession is not 
allowed in rights of men. 140,269. 
36- al-Igrirtujjah gäsirah - Confession is an intransitive evidence. 45,135,269. 
37- al-Jawiz al-share i yunäfi al-daman - legal permission invalidates liability. 98, 
269. 
38- al-kharäj bi al-flamin - Revenue and responsibility go together. 38,269. 
39- al-Kitäb ka al-kbltäb -A written document is like an expression. 196,269. 
40- al-Ma `rrif `urfan ka al-mashrrit shartan - What is known by the virtue of 
custom is as a stipulated condition. 195,269. 
41- al-Mar'mu'äkhadh bi igrärihi- One is responsible for his confession. 135, 
269. 
42- al Mashaqqah tajlib al-tayslr- Hardship begets facility. 23,52,56,146,269. 
43- al-Mutlaq yajri `all itI qih ma lam yaqum darl al-tagyid nassan aw dalälah - 
An unrestricted word should remain as it is, if the evidence of restriction is 
not textual or connotative. 214,269. 
44- al-Nätij awlimina al-`Rif- The producer of something is more entitled to its 
profit than the claimant (of the ownership). 40,269. 
45- al-Rukhac lä yata'addä mawädi'ihä - Facilities should not be taken beyond 
their premises. 41,269. 
46- al-Shubah tam la ` wuji b al-hadd wa lä tamna ` wujiib al-mä1- Doubt only 
interdicts the implementation of hadd but not monetary compensation. 116, 
269. 
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47- al-Su'äl ma `äd fr al jawäb ... aw ka al-maid fi al jaiväb - An inquiry 
should be concurrent to the answer. 216,269. 
48- al-Ta yin bi al-`urfka al-ta yin bi al-nas- What is stipulated by the virtue of 
`urfis as what is stipulated by the text. 195,270. 
49- al-Ta'sis awlimina al-ta'Hd -establishing a new meaning is preferable than 
emphasising. 170,270. 
50- al-Ta'zlrilä al-imäm `a1ä qadr `azam al juror wa cigharlh- It is lcft to the 
leader/ judge to decide an appropriate discretionary punishment considering 
the proportionate (nature) of the offence. 40,270. 
51- al-Täbi ` täbi `- The accessory shares the same rule of the root. 60,270. 
52- al- Tacarruf `a1ä al-ra `iyyah mannt bi al-maslahah- Governancc should be of 
the public interest. 57,270. 
53- al-Thibit bi al-burhan ka al-thäbit bi al-`iyän -What is establishcd by 
convincing and just evidence is as what is established by an eyewitness. 120, 
270. 
54- al-Yaq n lä yazil bi al-shakk-Certainty shall not be overruled by doubt. 56, 
87,270. 
55- Dar' al-mafisid awls min falb al-masälih- Preventing evils is better than 
attracting/acquiring benefits. 184,187,224,270. 
56- Dhikr ba `d mä lä yatajazz' ka dhakr kullih - Pronouncing what is 
undivided is the same as pronouncing the whole. 213,270. 
57- Hal al- `ibrah !i al-magäsid wa al-ma `ani aw li al-alli wa al-mabuni - Should 
effect be given to intentions and meanings or the words and forms. 77,270. 
58- Hal al-aymäu mabniyyah `alp al- `urf- "Is oath based on custom? 78,270. 
59- I'mil al-kalim awlä min ihmilih -A word should be construed as having 
some meaning, rather than disregarded. 56,209,270. 
60- Idba to `adhdbar '1 `mä1 al-kalim yuhmal - If giving an effect to a speech 
becomes impossible in any way it will be derelict. 212,270. 
61- Idha Vq al-'amrittasa `- "Where a matter is narrow it becomes wide ... 157, 
270. 
62- Idha ijtama `al-amrägam min fins wähid, walam yakhtalifal-magAd dakhal 
ahadbimä fi al-äkhargbaliban - When two matters emerge from one class, 
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group or category, and the purpose does not differ, in most cases, one 
intergradates into another. 79,270. 
63- Idhä ijtama `a1-ha1ä1 wa al-haräm aw al-mubih wa al-muharrim ghullib a! - 
harn-If lawful and unlawful things conjure, preference will be given to the 
Unlawful. 189,270. 
64- Idhä ijtama `al-mubäsbir wa al-mutasabbib, yudäf al-hukrn i1ä al-mubasir- In 
the presence of the direct author of an act and the person who is the causer, 
the direct author is responsible thereof. 97,271. 
65- Idh to `grad al-mini' wa al-m ugtadiä yugaddim al-mini `i11ä idlhi ki na al- 
mugtadä a `azam- If a prohibitive injunction contradicts with what seems to 
be permissible, the prohibitive is given preference over the permissible. 185, 
271. 
66- Idhä to `äradat mafsadatin ru-`iya a zamahumä dararan bi irtikäb akhaf uhuma 
-If two evils clash, the greater one should be prevented by committing the 
lesser one. 180,271. 
67- Idbä to `adhdbar a1-bagiqab yusirilä a1-maj. ia- If a real meaning becomes 
impossible, the metaphoric meaning should be resorted to. 212,271. 
68- Iona al- `ädah tuhkam frmä 1ä dabt lahu shar`an- Custom only is enforced 
where there is no legal detail. 198,271. 
69- Innami tu `tabar al- `ädah idhä ittaradat awghalabat - Effect is only given to 
`ädah that is regularly occurring and universally prevailing. 198,271. 
70- Ishirah al-ma'büdab li al akbaras ka al-bayän bi al-lisin - an identifiable sign 
of a dumb person is like a declaration with tongue. 217,271. 
71- Isti `mä1 al-n s Ilujjah yaghib al- `amal bibä- People's practice is 
authoritative and should be reckoned with. 194,271. 
72- Kull muskirrn haräm - "Any intoxicant is forbidden. 55,271. 
73- Kullu shayin fi al-qurän aw, aw, fahuwa mukhayyar - "In the Qur'an, every 
injunction in which many things are joined together with the conjunctive 
particle `or' (Arabic: aw) is an indication that a free choice is allowed among 
these things. 39,271. 
74-La- `ibrah li al- `urfal- in '- No effect for an emergent custom. 198,271. 
75- La Barar wa lä dirär- No injury or harm shall be inflicted or reciprocated/ Do 
not harm others and do not exchange harm. 23,56,169,271. 
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76- Lä yujma `al-ajr wa al-damära - The wage and responsibility cannot be 
combined. 41,271. 
77- Liyunkar taghayyur al-ahkDm a1- `urfiyyah aw al-ijtihädyyah bi taghayyur al- 
azmin - Changing rulings based on customs or personal opinion with 
changes in times or circumstances cannot be denied. 204,271. 
78- Lä yunkar taghayyur al-ahkiin bi taghayyur al-azmin - It is undeniable that 
rules change as times change. 36,202,272. 
79- Liyunsab i1ä säklt qawlu qi'il walä `ama `. Emil, innamiyunsab ii kullln 
qawlihi wa 'amalihi- No statement or action should be imputed to someone 
who is silent , but a statement and action should 
be imputed to the one who 
made the statement or did the action. 54,272. 
80- Lä yunsab li al-säkit qawlun -No word shall be imputed to one who is silent.. 
216,272. 
81- Lä yunza `shayun min yadi ahadin i11ä bi hagq thatbit ma `arüf f Nothing 
should be stripped from someone without legal right. 40,272. 
82- Lä yusab gawlun i1ä säkit- walla al-suki t £i ma `rad al-bayän bay, -17 
Word shall not be imputed to one who is silent---- but a silence where 
explanation is required is considered as an explanation. 216,272. 
83- Laysa li `irq zälim hagq - No right for unjust root. 52,272. 
84- Laysa Iii Imam an yakhruj shayanmin yad ahadin i11ä bi hagqin th bit ma `arüf 
- It is not the right of the Imam (leader) to take away someone's property 
without an established and well-known right. 40,272. 
85-Mä askarahukathiruhu, fagarlubuharm- "Any substance whose large 
quantity intoxicates, its small quantity is also prohibited. 38,272. 
86- Mä haruma isti `mälubu haruma ittikh dbubu - When its utility is forbidden, 
its possession is also forbidden. 57,272. 
87- Mä jizli `udhur batala bizawilihi- What is permissible by the virtue of 
excuse, becomes invalid with the expiring of the excuse. 164,272. 
88- Mä thabat bi al yagin lä yazii bi aI-shakk- "indeed, whatever is established 
by certainty cannot be removed by doubt. 89,272. 
89- Mä ubiba li a1-darzirät yugaddar bi gadariba -What is permitted by the virtue 
of necessity should be estimated according to its quantity. 163,272. 
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90- Man gasam a1-ribh fall damän 'alaylil - "A profit shareholder is not held 
responsible for loss. 39,272. 
91- Man sharat `a1ä nafsihi tä'i `an ghayr mulcrah fahuwa `alayhi - He who 
willingly gives a condition binding himself without compulsion shall be held 
responsible for it. 39-40,272. 
92- Magäsid a1-lafz `alä niyyah al-lift i11ä `inda al-gädlhi -The purpose of 
utterance is based on the intention of the locator, except if it is demanded 
before the court. 210,273. 
93- Min gawä `id al-shar`i al-kulliyyah : annabu lä tväjib ma ` al- `ajz wa1, Karam 
ma`darrirah - Among the general legal maxims (of Islamic Law is that ) 
there is no obligation in the face of incapability and there is no prohibition in 
the face of necessity. 44,273. 
94- Yudäfal-'amriiä aqrab al-wagt - matter is attributed to the closest time of 
the event. 106,273. 
95- Yukbtär `abwan al-sharrayn aw 'akbaffal-dararayn- Lesser evil or injury 
should be preferred. 180,273. 
96- Yutabammal al-darar a1-khic Ii daf Barar `äm! - Personal injury should be 
incurred to prevent general injury. 183,273. 
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(B) List of Unreported Cases referred to in the Thesis 
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ýýend ;x1 
IN THE SHARI'A COURT OF APPEAL SITTING IN GUSAU' 
ZAMFARA STATE 
CASE NO. SCA/GM/H/001/05 
DATE: 28-9-05 
BETWEEN :- 
ISIYA ALH. ALIYU & OR ................ APPELLANT 
AND 
A. G.. ZAMFARA STATE ..:.... RESPONDENT 
JUDGMENT 
The appellant were charged with offences under S. 123,184 and 
146 S. P. C. and were convicted to a jail term of 3 1/2 years in 
prison by the Upper Sharia court Gummi on the grounds that 
the prosecution one Idris Adamu prosecuted Abubakar ' Shehu 
and Isiya Alh.. Aliyu on the above stated offences. 
The 
. prosecution 
told the" court that, on 30/1/200S at about 
2: 00PM the accused conspired and broke into the house of one : 
Alh. Danjirr. ma of Daki Takwas and made away with 3 and 1/2 
sacks of millet valued at N17,500.00; which were sold at Danko 
market. 
The accused confessed the commission of the offence before 
the court, but there 'were believed to be the course boys to the 
victim, 
'because 
they used-to enter into his house freely 
The prosecution too is aware of that fact. The 3rd accused 
person by name Gwangwani the prosecution failed to establish 
the offence against him for wants of evidence. 
)Based 
on 
justifiable stand of the provision of S. 155 SCPC and Sharia 
C. P. C. The court is satisfied that, the accused committed the said 
offences. but the 3rd accused was discharge for want of evidence 
under S. 157 SCPC. 
The appellants were not satisfied with this decision and 
appealed to this court. Sharia Court of Appeal Gusau, Zamfara 
State. Their grounds of appeal are: - 
1. They are not satisfied with the judgment of U. S. C. , 
Gummi 
due to the reason that, they told the court -that they have 
witnessed to bringing to defend them, but the judge refused to 
give them that right. They prayed. to this court to give them fair 
hearing by permitting them to produce their witnesses. Though 
not represented by ä lawyer, yet the first appellant. Isiya gave 
more reasons to their appeal. That he was a barrow pusher who 
was engaged to render service by one of the victims boys- a (co- 
accused) Abubakar from a filling station and was paid the 
amount agreed. Later he was arrested and charged with that 
offence just like that. 
The 2nd appellant too explained that, he is an okada rider, 
he saw the said Gwagwani at that filling station with 3 1/2 bags. 
He asked me to light the sacks for him, I said no I cannot carry 
the whole, I only took the 1/2 for him to grains market. -he pleaded 
with me to get a barrow pusher for him from there. I called on 
Isiyaka I directed him . to the filling station where Gwangwani was 
waiting for him with 3 sacks I don't know whether he went or 
not. 
Barely after two months of this incidence we were called and 
charged with Isiyaka that, we were the one that lifted the sacks 
from filling station for Gwangwani to sell in the market. Despite 
the confessional. statement of Muh'd Gwangwani that he was the 
one that paid us to. convey the goods to him in good faith).. , et the 
judge went on to convict each one. of us to a3 nears 6 months jail 
terms whereas the said Muh'd Gwangwani was discharged. Again 
the said confession which was said we made before the court was 
not true, we have never confessed that we stole anything. 
Likewise, the 2nd appellant denied -making any confession that 
was alleged he made before the trial court. 
On this note, the counsel to A. G. Rabi Bashir contended 
that, the charge. was -read over to the accused persons. All of 
them heard and understood the charge, they later confessed 
committing the offence. Moreso,. each of the accused . gave 
detailed 'information as to how they committed the offence as can 
be found in page 7 paragraphs 20 of the copy of proceedings. The 
same applies to Isiyaka at page 7 paragraphs 21 - 27 of the said 
copy. 
What -we should consider, is that whoever make any 
I voluntary confessional statement freely, there is no need 'for the 
court to call. any -witness in defence. Because non of them denied 
committing the offence and nobody retract his confession. Again, 
they never denied committing the offence even in their grounds of 
appeal, as such, this court can act, the same way the trial judge 
acted. Again by looking at page . 5-6 of copy of proceedings up -to 
the point of judgment. It is settled -Islamic law that, when an 
accused. made confessional statement voluntarily, or informed 
the court in detail, of how he committed an offence, then the 
statement is enough to convict him, as it was stated in the book 
of MUWAHIBUL -JALIL vol. C at page 420. The same could be 
found in HUKAMIYYA which carries the commentary of Grand 
Kadi Usman Moh'd Katsina. 
On this note, we are urging the court to strike out this 
appeal and confirm the judgment of the trial court (U. S. C 
Gummi). 
With these submissions of both counsels we the Hon. Kadis 
considered the issue. *to comes to an end, after careful perusal -of 
the copy of proceedings. 
COURT OPINION 
In considering the admission of an offence which the state 
counsel Rabi Bashir contested in which she sought to rely in 
what was obtained in page 2 paragraph 10 - 27" which was also 
relied by the trial court. 
It is* fundamental under Sharia Islamic law in confessional 
statement of this nature to support it with just witness. for it to 
be used in convicting the accused, as it was said in the book of 
BAHAJA vol. 1 page 137 (new edition) where it was stated. 
Meanin :- 
"Conviction of an accused cannot stand without the testimony 
of just witnesses" 
1. This authority shows categorically that, the . court 
is 
mandated to support this type of -confession with just witnesses 
for any conviction to stand. The lower court failed to observe 
that, and since the accused denied making it, the conviction 
creates doubt and suspicion of injustice. 
2. Also, the provision of S. 155 SCPC of Zamfara State made it 
very clear that when. , an accused appeared 
before a court and 
confessed committing the offence before judgment; the court will 
presume that he understood the charge against him. Yet, it is 
mandatory for the court to explain to him that, he can retract his 
confession if he so desires. 
The trial. court fails to observe that and went a head in haste 
and convict them. If we look at page 5 paragraph (14) the court 
said to the accused do you helve anything to say? 
fiut 
surprisingly something different was written instead of the exact 
words used by the.. accused. That, they have committed the 
offence despite the fact that they were trustful servants to the 
victim yet they stole the items. After this, they were also . asked 
whether they have any defence, they said non. This also 
contravened what the section provide, and entirely creates 
injustice in an offence of this magnitude. . 
We therefore found no merit in the judgment of. the trial 
court, because the entire proceedings contravened the rule of law 
and the' available law under Sharia Islamic law, with this the 
appeal. must succeeds,. since the entire proceedings was not 
conducted from the grass root, we agreed that injustice has been 
done to the accused. 
With respect to what transpired above we, the Hon. Kadis of 
this court SCA Gusau. Zamfara State, we set aside the judgment 
of the Upper Sharia Court Gummi which convicted the accused 
Isiya Alh. Aliyu and Abubakar Shehu to a3 1/2 years jail term, 
each with payment. of compensation of #17,500.00 'for not 
complying to the provisions of Sharia Islamic laws and the 
constitution of the Federal Republic 'of Nigeria. We discharged the 
2 accused. The appeal succeeds. 
-SIGNED 
The Hon. Alh. Muh'd A. A. Gummi- Kadi 
4. /10/05 
SIGNED 
The Hon. Alh. Ibrahim A. R/Dorawa - Kadi " 
4/10/05 
Translated by 
Mahmud M. Labaran 
Ministry of Justice, Gusau. 
CR/FI/8/2002 
24- 1-2002 
COURT: - Upper Shari'a Court K/Namoda 
JUDGE: - Hon. Alh. Ibrahim Abubakar Zurmi 
COMPAINANT: - Jamilu Isaka B/Magaji 
DEFENDANT: - Abubakar Abdullahi Kaura 
NATURE OF OFFENCE: - Theft. 
STATEMENT OF COMPLAINT 
I, Jamilu Isaka. B/Magaji wish to lodge this complaint 
against Abubakar Abdullahi Kaura,. because on the 20th of Nov, 
2000 at about 3: 30AM- you broke and entered into my. shop from 
behind, where you took away the following items: - 
1, Nine bundles of -shadda brocade. 
2. Children wears, all of which were valued at N30,350.00. 
That is why-you are suspected to have committed the above 
stated offence. 
Court. - To Abubakar Abdullahi you heard the complaint 
against you. Is it true. 
Ans. - Abubakar. Abdullahi, I heard the complaint, ' but it. is 
not true. 
Court. - To Isaka Jamilu, you heard the suspect denied - the 
allegation; do you have witness to produce? 
Ans. - Jamilu Isaka, yes I have witness! 
Court. - To Jamilu Isaka, are the witnesses available now. 
Ans. - Jamilu Isaka, they are not available now, and we are 
urging the court to 'summon them. 
Court. - Gave directives that, the witnesses be summoned to 
appear on 31/l/02, the case is adjourned to that 
date. 
Court. - The court resumes sitting today 31/l/2002 for 
continuation of this case. 
Court. - Enter the P. W. I. Sgt Isah N. P. F. B/Magaji out post, 
No. 131063, " a 33 years old, what do you know in 
this case, to God who made you. 
Ans. - P. W. I. Sgt. Isah, " what is that on 20/10/2092 at 
. about- 10: 00AM one Jamilu Isaka, respondent of 
B/Magaji came to police station B/Magaji and 
reported that, his shop was broken from behind and 
took away his 9 bundles of shadda miro and some 
children . *-wears. One policeman was assigned by 
name Muhammadu Abubakar to investigate; we 
went there with the D: P. O. and Copl. Hamidu, we 
saw how the building was burgled. When we 
returned to the office, we got information that, there 
was one. strange person who visited his friend known 
as Abubakar Abdullahi. We went B/Magaji because 
we got informatiön that, they used to steal together. 
We directed the vigilante group members to arrest 
the said suspect and bring him to our office.. The two 
people where brought to. our office, we took them to 
D. P. O'S office where, they were thoroughly 
investigated. In the course of our investigation 
Court. - 
Ans. - 
1St Ques. - 
Ans. - 
2nd Ques. - 
Ans. 
Court. - 
Ans. - 
Court. - 
Ans. -. 
Abubakar Abdullahi told us that they were the 
people that committed the offence. We demanded to 
know where they kept the property, he told -us that, 
the properties were kept in one 6 maize-bunch in the 
farm.. When we went to the said, place Abubakar 
Abdullahi, opened up, the said bunch and we 
packed the property to the police station. That is all I 
know. 
To Abubakar Abdullahi you heard what P. W. I said, 
do you agree or you have question or objection. 
Abubakar Abdullahi, I have question and objection. . 
Sgt, did you hear me admitting the offence when you 
were investigating us? 
Sgt. Isah, of course, I heard you confessing that you 
committed the offence. 
Sgt. Isah, before we admit committing the offence, 
did you torture us or not? 
Nobody ever torture you, and if at all you were 
tortured,. ". how could-you be able to show where the 
items were kept, and we snapped your pictures at 
the venue. 
To Abubakar, you heard him, do you have more 
question? 
There is no more. 
To Jamilü Isaka do you have any question. 
Jamilu Isaka, there is non. 
Court. - To Copl, Hamidu Nuhu, a Nigeran Police force 
B/Magaji NO. 152722, a 26years old, what do you 
know to God who made you. 
Ans. "- Copl. Hämidu Nuhu, what I know is' that, one 
Jamilu reported at the B/Magaji police station, that, 
his shop was burgled and made away with 9. bundles 
of shadda mirrow and children wears; when we 
received the report we embark on investigation to 
discover' the hoodlums, we invited people with 
relevant information, we gathered that, there was 
one man called Mustapha who kept a stranger in his 
house known as "Kowa a dogo" we apprehended the 
said Mustapha he told us that his visitor is. known 
as "Kowa a dogo" from K/Namoda, police went and 
arrested the said "Kowa a dogo", we continue our 
investigation but they denied the allegation; our 
D. P. O at that time . Adeji, directed, that, search 
warrant- should be executed to the house of 
Mustapha, we went and found nothing 
incriminating, at the. police station, the said 
Abubakar Abdullahi confessed that they took the 
said properties, when we demanded to know where 
they kept the properties, they said in the farm, we 
went together they shows us the properties, we 
parked all back to police station and later Abdullahi 
confessed that he was the one that broke into the 
shop., we took both of them to the broken shop, 
where we snapped their pictures we returned back to 
the police station and charged them with the offence 
of theft, where the complainant valued the stolen 
-property at 'x#30,350.00. We later took them to High 
Sharia' Court B/Magaji I was the prosecutor at that 
time and I have some copies of the pictures. 
Court. - To Abubakar Abdullahi you heard what PW2 says do 
you have'question or objection? 
Ans. - Abubakar Abdullahi, I heard him I have question 
which is, when you were interrogating us " did -I 
confessed committing the offence? 
Ans. - Copl. Hamidu, you yourself told us that you did steal. 
the properties. 
Obj. - My objection is that Hamidu is a police 'officer, he 
will never be happy if I am freed. That is all. 
Court. To Hamidu you heard him? 
Ans. - Hamidu he knows I knew him before now, "I..... in 
Kaura for 3" years and 7 months and he has no any 
business apart from stealing. 
Court. - Jamilu do you have any question to your witness. 
Ans. - Jamilu , 'none. 
Court. - To PW3, Shiba, Hausa,. Vigilante member, 37 years, 
what do you know to God who made you.. 
Ans. Shiba, what I know to God who made me is that, the 
B/Magaji Police stated that, a shop was broken open 
and property were stolen from it, they investigated 
one man called Bako, they traced his house, they 
apprehended him and he led them to the house of 
Mustapha. When we got to the house, the house wife 
informed me that, he was not in the house I 
demanded to know the where about of . the person 
that entered in now, she said nobody. I told her that, 
I was following him now, I forced myself in, .I saw 
him taking forage,. her husband Mustapha was at 
the extreme end of the room hiding attempting to 
jump over the wall, I saw him and told him I am 
looking for him, he demand to know why, I told him 
my D. P. O. wishes to see him, we turn back to the 
entrance-J. asked him of his friend, he says he has no 
friend, I said look Mallam, come out, he came out, I 
said you told you told me that, you have no . friend 
who is that, he told me, he don't know the time he 
enters I told them D. P. O. wish to see them, on our 
way, * we. met my friend a vigilante man I told him 
those are the people. We also met Sgt. -Isah on the 
road, I handed them over to him, when we reach 
police station, they urged them to lead them. to 
where they hide the stolen property in the bush, we 
went together and back to police station with the 
discovered. property. That is all I know. 
Court. - To Abubakar Abdullahi you heard what the, witness 
says do you have any question or objection? 
Ans. - Abubakar Abdullahi Najiya I have no objection, . and I 
-did not say. I stole the said property. 
Court. - Jamilu Isahaka do you have any question to your 
. witness? 
Ans. - Jamilu, no. 
çQ9çIM 
Court. - To Abubakar Abdullahi is Almustapha you friend. 
Ans. Abubakar Abdullahi when we were taken to court, 
the court sentence him to 6 months imprisonment 
only. 
Court. - To Jamilu where are the stolen property? " 
Ans. - Jamilu when the case 
was disposed the trial 'Judge 
handed over the property to me and I have already 
sold them out. 
Court. - The court ordered that the accused continue to 
remain in prison custody, till the adjourned date. 
CHARGE 
I, Sharia Court 'Judge of Upper Sharia Court 
K/Namoda, charge you. the 1St accused Abubakar 
Abdullahi with the offence of theft of 9 brokade with 
2 children wears valued at N30,350.00 belonging to 
Jamilu Ishaka as a result of the broken off his shop 
together with your friend you stole his property and 
hide them in a bush, you committed this offence at 
B/Magaji. I therefore charge you with this offence 
under the provision of section 144 punishable under 
section 145 of Zamfara State Sharia Penal Code 
1999. 
EXPLANATION OF CHARGE 
Court. - To Abubakar Abdullahi Kaura, now listen to the 
charge and if it is established you will be punished. 
Court. - To Abubakar Abdullahi, the meaning of a charge is 
that. you voluntarily in your capacity as an -adult 
person sane and sober agreed to break into Jamilu's 
shop and took away his property, which is an offence 
punishable with amputation of your right hand, if, it 
is established against you. 
Court. - To Abubakar Abdullahi, do you understand the 
meaning of this charge? 
Ans. - Abubakar-Abdullahi, I understood 
Court. - Abubakar Abdullahi, do you agree that you 
committed the said offence? 
Ans. - Abubakar Abdullahi, I did not commit the said 
offence. 
Court. - To Abubakar Abdullahi, do you. have any defence 
witness? 
Ans. - Abubakar. " Abdullahi, I have no witness because, 
nobody knows that I did not commit the offence. 
Court. - Do you have anything to say before the court pass 
it's decision. 
Ans. - Abubakar Abdullahi, yes I would like the court to do 
lenient with me and do justice to me. 
FOUND GUILTY 
I, the Upper Sharia Court Judge K/Namoda Alh. 
Ibrahim Maigandi Abubä. kar Zurmi, found you guilty 
Abubakar Abdullahi with the offence of theft of (9) 
pieces brocades together with some children wears 
valued at N30,350.00. Because I am satisfied that 
you committed the said offence, due to the fact that, 
the stolen items were. found in your *possession 
together with the witnesses that testified that you 
and your friend led them to the venue you hide the 
said -properties. A picture was snapped at the venue, 
for this reasons and the witnesses available and the 
discovery of the said properties under your 
possession, I found you guilty for the commission of 
that offence, the offence is established, because you 
have no ' locus or any relationship With-'the owner 
that would make you break into his shop and took 
away the said properties it was stated in the book of 
IHKAMUL-AHKAM at page 5 that a judge can convict 
on the basis of getting witnesses as it' was agreed by 
all the Jurists. For this, the offence is established 
against you. 
EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER 
" Court. "- To the prosecution, - Musa PC and 
Musa.. Dan Agaji, 
do you know the accused before or this, is his first 
time of committing this similar offence. 
Ans. -, Musa P. c, I am aware that, he was once arraigned 
before the court, but I don't know the type of 
punishment he receives. 
Court. - To Abubakar Abdullahi, do you do you have 
anything to say on that? 
Ans. - Abubakar Abdullahi, 'it was a case of debt and I was 
sentence, to 2 months imprisonment, for this I am 
appealing for the mercy- of this honourable court, my 
friend with whom we committed the offence together 
was sentence to 6 months imprisonment by 
B/Magaji High Sharia Court, due to the influence he 
has in the area. I am a stranger, with no money and 
I don't know anybody, that is why my punishment 
differs. Moreso, I have family, my mother is tdo old, 
nobody close to her but. myself and God and .I would 
like the court to take cognizance of my long stay in 
prison. That is all, this is my first criminal offence. 
JUDGMENT 
I, Upper' Sharia Court Judge of Upper' Sharia 
Court K/Namoda Alh. Ibrahim Maigandi Abubakar 
due to the reasons that, I found you guilty you 
Abubakar Abdullahi, Kaura, with the offence of theft 
of 9 bundles of brocades together with 2 pieces of 
children- wears, valued at #30,350.00. which 'were in 
the proper custody of someone and, the. value is 
aggregate with the Nisab that can warrant; the 
amputation of a right hand of the offender. 
On your. capacity, as a Muslim, you. voluntarily 
agreed to commit the offence; for that I ordered that, 
your right hand be amputated, as it was contained 
in the provision of section 145 Zamfara State Sharia 
Penal Code, which is also -equivalent to what God 
(SWA) said in the Holy Quran at Suratul - '. Mäidah 
verse 39 -41 which states: - 
Meaning 
"For Male thief and Female thief cut off their right hands 
each at the joint. If they steal property worth Rubu" dinnar and 
whatever is above that, that is the reward of their deeds and it is 
ordained by God, God is unbeatable in His creation that he made 
this important punishment very clearly. 
In the attempt of. reducing the 'level of thief in the society if 
this punishment is being carried out according to God's 
instruction, thief would have reduced 'drastically. and whoever 
repents to God Allah would forgive him. Because He is forgiven 
and merciful" 
RIGHT OF APPEAL 
There is right of. appeal to Sharia Court of Appeal Gusau 
within 30 days to whoever is not satisfied. The case is disposed 
off today 14/2/2002. 
SIGNED. 
Translated by 
Mahmud Labaran Gusau 
Min. Of Justice 
Gusau 
A 
NPJlk3 
IN THE UPPER SHARIA COURT I GUSAU 
SITTING AT GUSAU BY THE HONOURABLE 
JUDGE ALH. MUHKTAR UMAR GUNMI 
CASE NO CR/FI/03/2003 
COMPLAINANT: - ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DEFENDANT: - IBRAHIM SULEIMAN 
CAUSE OF ACTION: - THEFT 
DATE OF HEARING: - 15TH -01-2003 
STATEMENT OF CLAIM 
I Hashimu Moh'd on behalf of commissioner and. attorney 
general Zamfara State I am sueing you Ibrahim Suleiman that on 
10thday of January 2003 at about 2.30 that one Mansur Muh'd a' 
resident of Tudun Wada area Gusau come to police station and 
lodged a complainant against you in the same day at about 1.50 
you went to his shop at Tudun Wada area Gusau you open his 
shop with the master key and stealed his tape recorder estimated 
to cost N1000.00 and 2 tins of Nido estimated to cost N1000.00 
and one soap at the rate of N25.00 and cash worth N19,000: 00 
that is why you are suspected to commit the above mentioned 
offence 'under section* 145 of Sharia penal code. 
COURT: - Court had accepted the case and ordered. the parties 
to appear Immediately. 
COURT: - Court read the statement of claim to the suspect 
and he said he understand, the contents. 
COURT: - To the suspect you heard the claim of the complainant 
what do you have to say? 
 
ANS: - Yes'it is true and I agreed that I have committed the 
offence. I entered his shop and use a key, which I 
open it. I stealed a bag containing N19,000.00 and 
2 tins of Nido milk, and bathing soap and one tape 
recorder without the owners consent " and 
permission and he is not my relation and no body 
had permitted me to entered his shop and carried 
away the properties out of its custody. 
COURT: - To the suspect do you have any reason of steeling. 
ANS: - No.. 
COURT: - To the complainant you heard what he said what do 
you have to say? 
ANS: -- I am appealing to the court to grant me permission 
to forward the exhibits. 
COURT: - To the prosecution, you are permitted to bring the 
exhibits to the court. 
ANS: - Here is- the stolen exhibits 
COURT: - The exhibits received are as follows: 
1 One piece of soap 
2 One radio 1 cassette recorder (Socoo type) with 
registration number SG. 730. 
3 Two tins of peak milk 
4 One handbag with VEDAN GLUTAMATE SAE 
SONING. WRITTEN at the back. These are the items 
stolen inside the shop after the shop was broken 
with master key and brought out the properties 
from its custody. 
COURT: - To the suspect have you seen the exhibits? 
ANS: - Yes I have seen it. 
COURT: - To the suspect what do you have to say? 
ANS: - It is true that are the properties I steale from a 
shop at Tudun Wada Gusau. 
COURT: - Do you have anything to say? 
ANS: -. I plead for court mercy. 
COURT: - To the prosecution do you have any thing more to 
say? 
ANS: - Yes here are 8 bunched of keys tide together 
which he uses and committed theft. 
COURT: - Court had shown the keys to the accused person. 
COURT: - To the suspect what do you have to. say? 
ANS: - Yes it is true that they are the master keys I used 
and open the shop and stealed the properties. 
COURT: - To the suspect do you have any additional 
explanation to make before judgment? 
ANS: - No. 
COURT: - To the suspect how old. are you? 
ANS: - I am 18 years old. 
FOUND GUILTY 
The complainant HashimU Moh'd on behalf -of 
Commissioner of Justice and Attorney general Zamfara State 
sued Ibrahim Suleiman age 20 years on 10th day of January 2003 
at about 2.30 that one Mansur Moh'd at Tudun Wada market 
reported that you Ibrahim Suleiman use one master key at 
Mansur Moh'd shop' *Tudun Wada market Gusau withöut the 
owner's consent and permission and which you stealed one set of 
tape recorder, one piece of soap, 2 tins of peak milk and hand 
bag containing the sum. of N19,000.00 the tape recorder was 
estimated to cost N1000.00 two tins of peak milk cost at 
N1000.00 and one piece of soap cost N25.00. The accused person 
confessed to the Commission of the crime under section 145 of 
Sharia penal code that he used a master key and. open the shop 
and stealed the' above mentioned items without the 'owner's 
permission the prosecution had tendered exhibits of -the stolen 
items before the court where' the accused person confirmed the 
exhibits . he also show 8 bunches of keys which the accused used 
to steal peoples properties and which the accused person did not 
denied in the end court. had requested the accused whether he 
has a defence in the action and which he said he has no defence. 
What court had consider here is that since Ibrahim Sulieman 
make a confessional -statement that he committed theft of N 19, 
000.00, two tins , of peak milk-, one piece of soap, one 
hand bag 
and which . 
have exceeded 1/4 of Dinar, the theft was committed 
inside (Hirz) (Safe custody) he entered the place- without 
permission, he entered and carried out the property in owner's 
custody, he is adult because he is 18 years old, he could not 
defend himself, he has no right over the property stolen he make 
the confession freely and knowing fully that judgment will be 
pass against him, he is same and aan adult member. Therefore 
based on the Islamic principles and section 144 of Sharia. penal 
code Ibrahim Sulieman is found guilty of committing theft a 
punishment which will amount to amputation of right hand 
under section 145. of Sharia penal code also as provided by 
Risalaah thamaruddani page 599-600 where it ' says 
MEANING 
Who ever steal property amounted to 1/4 of Dinar 'or 
estimated to be 3 Dirham his punishment is amputation of 
hand". 
Based on court observation and considering. the. above 
ground. I found you Ibrahim Suleman of committing the offence 
of theft under section 144 and punishable under section 145 
Sharia penal code based on your confessional statement under 
section 155 of Sharia penal code. 
COURT: - To the accused person what did you say? 
ANS: -- I seek for court mercy. 
EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER 
COURT: - To the prosecution did the accused person' committed 
similar offence? 
ANS: - The accused is first time offender from my record. 
SENTENCE 
Because I found you Ibrahim Suleiman guilty of committing 
theft I sentence you to be amputated on your right hand side in 
accordance with the provision of Holy Quran in the' verse of 
maidah as it says: - 
MEANING- 
As to the thief, male or female cut off his or her hands. A 
punishment by way of example from God. For there crime, and 
God is exalted in power wise. 
Based on the above provision, today in God wishes I 
sentenced you Ibrahim Sulieman to. cut off your right hand side 
from the wrist to your fingers in accordance with section 145 of 
Sharia penal code and I ordered the return of the properties to 
the owner after 30 days. . 
RIGHT OF APPEAL 
The aggrieved party has right 'of appeal to Sharia court, of 
appeal Gusau within 30 days. 
Finished today 15/01'/2003 
The Hon. Judge 
Alh. Muhutar Umar Gunmi 
3/2/2005 
TRANSLATED BY: - 
HAYATU WADATAUBUNGUDU 
PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR 
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IN THE UPPER SHARIA COURT I GUSAU 
SITTING AT GUSAU BY THE HON. JUDGE 
ALHAJI MUHTAR UMAR GUMMI 
CASE NO CR/TR/'17/2003 
COMPLAINANT: - ATTORNEY GENERAL ZAMFARA STATE 
ACCUSED: - SURAJO MOHAMMAD 
CAUSE OF ACTION: - THEFT SECTION 148 SPC 
DATE OF HEARING: - 20-02-2003 
STATEMENT OF CLAIM 
I Hashimu Mohammed on behalf of Commissioner of 
Zämfara State I am sueing you Surajo Mohammed suspected you 
to have committed theft that on 3/2/2003 at about 9.00 am that 
one Sani Lawali of unguwar gwaza Gusau came to Tudun Wada 
Gusau police station brought a complainant against Mohammed 
of Dogon Kade village of Kasuwar Daji Local Government area on 
the same' date at about 5.00 am that you did entered his house 
and stealed his goat estimated to cost N2,200.00 therefore you 
are suspected to have committed the offence. 
COURT: - Court accepted the case and ordered all parties to 
appear in court. Court read the statement of claim 
to the suspect and he said. he understand. 
COURT: - You heard what you are suspected to have 
committed what do you have to say? 
ANS: - It is true that I- stoled, his goat I went and entered 
Sani Lawali's house and I stoled the goat 
estimated to cost 
_ 
N2000 I bought it out of the 
house to ä nearby bush at unguwar Gwaza area is 
my first time * to committed theft and .I am 
physically fit and I am not in poverty that will 
warrant me to streal peoples property it.. is an act of 
God and I pray for court to do mercy for . 
God sake. 
COURT: - To the complainant/ prosecution you heard, what 
do you have to say? 
ANS: - Since he agreed and he confessed to the 
commission of the crime, the court should proceed 
to Judgment and that court should order me to 
present the exhibit ie (goat) 
PROSECUTION: - The prosecution ' presented she goat and court 
show it. to the suspect. 
COURT: - Court consider that the she goat 'is very small and 
the estimated made earlier N2000.00 is in correct 
and therefore another valuer should be contacted 
for new estimate. 
COURT: - To the suspect what do you have to say? 
ANS: - Yes it was the goat I stealed from Sani Lwali's 
house which I. brought it out and later I was 
arrested. 
COURT: - Court adjourned the case until 19/3/2003 for the 
goat tobe 'estimated. 
COURT: - Today 19/3/2003 both parties in court.. 
COURT: - To the -prosecution were able to get the valuer and 
has he valued it? 
ANS: - Yes, Sarkin fawa Aiti is the new valuer and he had 
estimated the goat to cost N1,800. Q0 and Sarkin 
fawa Alti is here present. 
COURT: - To the suspect you heard what do you have to 
say? 
ANTS: - I agreed. 
COURT: - To the complainant do you have. anything to say? 
ANS: - No. 
COURT: - To the suspect do you have anything to say? 
ANS: - No. 
COURT: - To the suspect do you have anything to say in 
addition to what you have said earlier? 
ANS: - No 
COURT: - To 'the defendant/ suspect do you have any *defence 
or any reason which will prevent the court to 
punish you? 
ANS: - No I have no defence. 
FOUND GUILTY/ CONVICTION 
That the prosecution Hashimu Mohammed who filed the 
case on behalf of the commission of Sharia Zamfara State against 
you Surajo Moh'd who is 30 years old charged with the offence of 
theft contrary to section 148 of Sharia penal. code that on 
3/2/2003 at about 9.00 am one Sani Lawali of unguwar" Gwaza 
Gusau came to tudun wada police station reported that you 
Surajo Mohammed of Dogon' Kade "town of kasuwar Daji Local 
Government area of Zamfara State that on the same day at about 
5.00 am you entered his house and stealed a goat estimated to 
cost N2,200.00 and that is why you are suspected to have 
committed the above offence. 
Sdurajo Mohammed confessed to have stoled the goat 
"surely I have stolen his goat" that I entered Sani Lawali's house 
and bring out the goat valued ät N2000 I even took it to unguwar 
Gwaza Gusau nearby a bush where I was arrested and I have 
never committed theft through out my life I am not in State of 
difficulty or in a place of poverty that will warrant me to commit 
stealing-but it is an act of God. 
The prosecution then presented the goat as an exhibit ie a 
female goat, short red in colour before the court estimated to cost 
N2000.00 and the suspect confirmed the stolen goat the expert 
on estimated (valuer). 'Named Sarkin fawa Alti estimated the goat 
to cost N1,800.00 and all parties concerned in the matter was 
present. Court had asked the suspect whether he has any 
defence to the action and he replied "No defence". 
On the court finding. court is satisfied that the suspect had 
committed the offence of theft based on his confessional 
statement only and now left for the court to pass judgment as it 
says . 
in SHARHUT TANUDI" VOLUME I page ' 125 
MEANING: - 
Confession is strong than calling witnesses. The confession 
should be made on the following conditions. 
1, The thieves should be Adult and sane 
2. Safe custody (Hirz) ie (inside the house) 
3. Estimated to cost N1,800.00 exceeding 1/4 of Dinar 
4. Carrying away the property outside its custody 
5. He took out the property without a genue reason 
provided under Islamic law. 
6. The accused person is. a Muslim. 
7. He confessed to the Commissioner of the crime 
without undue influence compulsion or promise. 
8. He did not -withdraw his confession. 
9. He entered the house without lawful authority. 
10. He, is not under the control of the property stolen. 
11. Considering the above facts these what is called 
theft under Islamic law as it is stated in . the Holy 
Quran in SURATUL= MAIDAH where it says: - .:...... 
MEANING: - 
As to the thieve Male or female cut off his or her' right hand 
a- punishment by way of example from God, for Gad is exalted 
power wise". 
Therefore the offence of theft has been established only left 
for sentence as it is provided under section 145 of Sharia penal 
code of Zamfara State Imam 'ib Asimim says in Tuhfa page 117 
where it say:. .................................................................... 
MEANING: - 
The hand of a thieve is to be cut off if he confessed -to the 
commission of the crime or where there is two male Adult and 
pious witnesses. 
Therefore the offence of theft has been established and the 
cutting off hand is to. be enforced. 
COURT: - To the accused person do you have anything to 
says? 
ANS: - I seek for court mercy. 
., 
ALLOCUTUS 
COURT: - To the prosecution has he ever found guilty of 
committing similar offence? 
ANS: - No, this is the first time. 
SENTENCE 
Because I found you guilty, I hereby ordered you Surajo 
Mohammed to be amputated at your right heard side under 
section 145 of Sharia. penal code and section 144 of the same 
Sharia penal code. 
T ordered the goat to be return to the owner under section 
101 of Sharia penal code. 
RIGHT OF APPEAL 
The aggrieved party can appeal to Sharia court of appeal 
Gusau within 30 days. 
Disposed today 
3/4/2003 
THE HONOURABLE JUDGE 
ALH. MUHTAR. UMAR HUMM 
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY 
TRANSLATED BY 
HAYATU WADATAUB. UNGUDU 
PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR 
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE GUSAU. 
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IN THE SHARI'A *COURT OF APPEAL SITTING IN GUSAU 
ZAMFARA STATE 
BEFORE: - 1. HON. ALH. MUH'D BELLO ALKANCI 
2. HON ALH. MUH'D BALARABE ANKA 
3. HON. ALH. IBRAHIM RUFAI IMAM- 
4. HON. ALH. MUH'D A. A. GUMMI 
5. HON... LH. IBRAHIMA. R/DORAWA 
BETWEEN: - 
SIRAJO MUH'D ................ APPELLANT 
AND 
A. G. ZAMFARA STATE ....... RESPONDENT 
CASE NO. SCA/GS/H/9/03 
JUDGMENT 
This is an appeal. from the decision of Upper Shariä. court I 
Gusau to this court, (Sharia court of Appeal) Gusau Zamfara 
State. 
The appellant Sirajo Muh'd was arraigned on a charge of 
theft on 3/2/03 at about 9: 00AM. That on that, same date at 
5: 00AM the accused' broke into the house of one Sani Lawal of 
Unguwar Gwaza and made away with a she - goat valued at 
N2,200.00. 
The accused was said. to have admitted committing the 
offence from the said House, I really stole the said she-goat 
valued at N2,200.00. I took it from that house, and was arrested 
at outskirt of Unguwar. Gwaza. I have never steal anybody's 
property. This is the . 
first time the accused was believed to have 
the physical ability to find his lawful means, he has no any .' 
deformity or poverty, it is just a fate against me. I am pleading 
with the court to be lenient with me. 
After cross-examining the prosecution and the accused, the 
court found the accused guilty of the offence of stealing a she- 
goat valued at N1,800.00 and ordered that, the right hand the 
accused be amputated by relying on his voluntary confession, the 
court stood by the word of Allah SWA. 
For that, the court convicted the accused under the 
provisions of S. 145 SPC law of Zamfara State since he confessed 
as detailed in tuhufa page 117. which says: - 
Meaning 
"The hand of' "a thief can be amputated on his own 
confession or by two just witnesses, there is no doubt on this" 
On this the court ordered that the accused right hand 'be 
amputated under the provision of S. 145 SPC law of Zamfara 
State: 
The accused was dissatisfied with this decisioti and 
appealed to this court (Sharia Court of Appeal) Gusau Zamfara 
State. 
In his grounds of appeal before this court, he stated that, he was 
not satisfied with the decision of the court for the injustice done 
by ordering that, his right hand be amputated. Secondly, he 
informed the court that he was suffering with insanity ever before 
Id-el-Kabir, he left family and never return, his families. are still 
looking for him. 
He introduced his lawyer one Abubakar Garba Gajam who 
adds 2 more grounds-"Where he stated that, (3) The court erred in 
law in the conduct of the proceedings entirely, it violates the . 
provision of S. 155. SCP, C (4) the court made mistake in -taking 
the plea of . the accused on 
baseless confession in accordance with 
Islamic laws. 
He made detailed submission one after another. The 
provision, of, S. 154 made detailed procedure on taking the plea of 
an accused person not as it was obtained in the present case. 
The question of. reading the complaint to the accused and 
asking him to reply violate the procedure as contained in S. 154 
SCPC law of Zamfara State. 
The question put to him by the trial court preclude him 
from telling the court he was insane. And if we critically look at 
the copy of the proceedings at page 3 at precisely paragraph 14 - 
19 we could notice that, the question put to the accused whether 
he has anything to say or to defend-him from court punishment. 
The accused told the court he has nothing to say. This is not a 
pleading. The only reliable procedure acceptable to Sharia laws is 
by way of producing 2 just witnesses to testify against the 
accused, as it was enshrined in IHKAMIL - AHILAM page 21 
which it says. 
It also adds that, any judgment without proper plea is a nullity. 
Again the reasons that the lower court relied upon in convicting 
the accused on his -confessional statement, at page 5 of the copy 
of proceedings are above ten reasons 
1. The court state' that, being a mature , and sane person, 
his 
confession is reliable. Which method did the court -adopt to 
determine that he is sane. Again the law permits an accused- to 
retract his confession see TABSIRATUL HUKAMI page 41 
The law permits him to withdraw his confession especially 
those related to adultery and theft. Again the provision of section 
155 SCPC has not been followed strictly to enable the accused 
benefit from it's criteria rather it was turned down against him, 
which occasioned injustice. 
We therefore urge this Hon. Court to quash this decision for 
the interest of justice, as it was enshrined in the book of DASUKI 
in MUHTASAR commentary vol. 4 P. 83. The respondent counsel 
Abubakar Umar disagreed with all of the appellant counsel's 
submission. 
At first he submitted that, the lower court adhered strictly 
to what was obtained in S. 154 SCPC. When we look at -page 3 
paragraphs 17 of the proceedings, where the court asked the 
accused, whether he has anything to defend himself to escape the 
punishment of the court. This sort of questions shows that, the 
court complied with the provision of S. 155 SCPC. 
The appellant counsel also submitted that, the lower court 
did not establish the confessional statement with 2 witnesses. 
This is not acceptable. considering the nature of the confession, 
see ADAWI. page 307, where it was stated "It is only in civil cases 
that the requirement of witnesses. arise not in criminal -cases". 
This submission is weak that may warrant the court to quash the 
judgment as prayed in the appellant counsel. 
2. The saying that al- 'lizari has not been done is not' true, 
because it was conducted where the court asked the accused to 
give it reasons of defence that would. exonerate him from" liability. 
3. With respect to the age of the accused, there is nowhere 
that the court is mandated to enquire about the age. of the 
accused. Apart, his age has been stated in the F. I. R. 
4. The last point raised by the appellant that the . accused was 
insane I wish to draw the attention of the court in the interest of 
justice to the provision of S. 50 of Sharia Court Laws 1999' and S. 
251 of SCPC -which requires the courts not to interfere with it's 
proceedings, in thecourse of justice. 
He finally prayed the court to dismiss the appeal and 
affirmed the decision of the trial court. 
1. In his first ground of appeal, the appellant 'contended that 
he was insane. If we look at S. 281 SCPC sub section 24 (i)it was 
provided that when the court observe in the course of it's 
proceedings that the accused was insane or is mad. which 
incapacitate him- to defend himself. The court is required to 
investigate the cause and nature of that insanity. 
Because, the responses of the 'accused in the present case, 
create doubt and suspicion for the failure of the court to take 
necessary steps to investigate the unsanity. 
2 The second grounds of the appellant that, there was a total 
deviation from the provisions of S. 155 SCPC. Because when we 
look at page 2, the first witness at the end of page 3, the court 
asked the accused do you have anything to say he responded 
«NO». 
This shows that, the court did (injustice for it's failure to 
consider the conditions enshrined in S 155. The section prövides 
that, when an accused appeared before the court, and admitted 
committing an offence, before the " court could convict him, it 
must satisfy itself that, the accused understand the nature of the 
offence charged and the consequences of his confession. and the 
right given to him to withdraw or retract his confessional 
statement. The court failed to observe all of these benefits to the 
accused. This confirmed that, there were irregularities in the 
entire criminal proceedings of the Zamfara State SCPC. And lack 
of following these procedures create injustice and suspicion. 
Prophet Muhammad (S. A. W) said in FIKIHUL-WALIHI vol. 2 page 
628 that: - 
You should avoid executing judgment, if there exist doubt no 
matter how minute" 
The detention of the accused over a period of one year and 
four months in prison custody over the theft of a she-goat valued 
at N1,800.00 and the total failure of the trial court to consider 
certain fundamental criteria in it's proceedings as it was stated in 
BAHAJA at page 158. 
t 
Meaning 
Jurists unanimously agreed that the confessional 'statement of a 
person with insanity and detained based on such confession, on an 
offence which he confessed to have committed due to his detention or 
torture, the majority jurists agreed that, he should only be made, to 
pay the amount equal to what he 'stole but his hand would not. be 
amputated. 
In this wise, the long detention of the accused in prison custody, 
is enough to stand as a ta'azir to him as it was contained , 
in the 
provision of S. 148 SCPC. 
With regards to what transpired above, we the Hon. Kadis of 
Sharia court of appeal Gusau, Zamfara State, due to a lot of 
irregularities, we observe in the entire proceeding of U. S. C. Gusau, we 
quashed the decision of the * court. and discharge the accused 
accordingly. The appeal succeeds. 
SIGNED 
1. The Hon. Alh. Muh'd Balarabe Anka G/Kadi 
Sharia Court of Appeal Gusau 
Date ....................................... 
SIGNED 
The Hon. Alh. Muh'd Awwal A. A. Gummi- P/Kadi. 
Sharia Court of Appeal Gusau 
Date ....................................... 
Translated by 
Mahmud M. Labaran 
Ministry of Justice; Gusau. 
Comp No. 106/2004 
Case No. 106/2004 
8/11/2004 
UPPER SHARIA'A COURT DUTSINMA 
Judge: - Bello Usman Daura 
Members: - 1. A. Suleiman Buhari D/Ma 
2. Mal. Umar Muhammad D/Ma 
3. Mal. Mustafa Nuhu K. T 
Plaintiff: - Commissioner of Police Katsina 
Accused: - 1. Ibrahim Rabi'u Yalle 
2. Lawal Sama 
Claim: - Accused of Conspiracy and Stealing of (2) Two Cows. 
Statement of plaintiff 
I Cpl. Suleiman Lawal Force No. 199732 N. P. F, D/Ma on behalf of C. 0 of 
police Katsina state command, I present these two people (1) Ibrahim Rabi'u 
who is well known as Yalle who is residing at Dabawa (2) Lawal Sama who is 
well known as Jan Barurne all of them are residing at Dabawa in Dutsintna 
Local Government Area accused of conspiracy and stealing of two cows. 
Because on 1/11/2004 at about 1: 00pm somebody named Bala Na'aiya and 1 
other residence of Shema village in D/ma carne to D/ma Police Station and 
reported that about 9 days ago you Ibrahim Rab'u and Lawal Sama you conspire 
and entered plaintiffs house Bala Na'aiya at Shema village and steal (2) two 
male cows valued at N150,000.00 which at the time you are driving this 2 cows 
you pass in front of somebody named Musa Sani's house where he saw you with 
those 2 cows, therefore you are accused and summoned before the court under 
section 120/133 Katsina State Shari' a Panel Code. 
Court to Accused Person No. 1 
Q you heard the statement of Cpl. Suleiman? 
A Yes I heard. 
Q Do you understand? 
A Yes. 
Q How far it is true? 
A No, I don't agree. 
Court to Accused Person No. 2 
Q you heard the allegation made against you? 
1 
A Yes I heard. 
Q Do you understand? 
A Yes. 
Q How far it is true? 
A No, I don't agree. 
Court to Prosecutor 
Q Cpl. Suleiman you heard the accused persons denied, do you have 
witnesses? 
A Yes, I will call the witnesses. 
The court adjourned and the accused persons are kept under prison custody until 
15/11/2004. 
Parties. are in court for continuation of hearing statement of P. W. 
Court to Prosecutor 
Q Cpl. Suleiman do you come with your witnesses? 
A Yes, they are around. 
Court to PW. No. 1 
Name: - Musa Sani Age: -35yrs. 
Q The court summoned you to testify about this issue will you swera or 
promise to tell the truth? 
AI promise to tell the truth about what I knew. 
Q What do you knew? 
A What I knew for the sake of Allah is at Saturday night next morning of 
Sunday at about 12: 00pm I saw Yalle driving cows I carne to stream in order to 
get water he was together with somebody that is all I saw. But here is a counsel 
to represent accused Ibrahim Yalle. 
Q Mr. Jerry you heard the testimony of PW? 
A Yes I heard. 
Q Do you understand? 
A Yes. 
Q How far it is true? 
A It is not true? 
Q Do you have question? 
A Yes. 
Q What is the question? 
A My question is the time he saw Yalle on what condition did he saw him? 
Court to PW. No. 1 
Q You heard counsel's question? 
A At that time it was in the morning. 
Q Mr. Jerry you heard his reply? 
2 
AI heard 
Q Do you have another question? 
A Yes, what time did they make Sahur? 
Court to PW. No. 1 
Q You heard counsel's question? 
A At about 4: am 
Q You heard his answer? 
Q Do you have another question? 
A Yes, what is the color of Bala's cows? 
Court to PW. No. 1 
Q Dou heard counsel's question? 
AI heard 
Q Do you have any question? 
A didn't you saw the other person? 
A No, I did not saw him. 
Q Mr. Jerry you heard his reply? 
AI heard and there is question. 
Court to PW. No. 1 
q The time you saw Yalle what is the distance between you and Yalle? 
A Just like here to Aminu Makera's house. 
Court to counsel of accused 
Q You heard his reply? 
AI have another question. 
Court to PW. No. 1 
QI know you knew Yalle very well before you saw him? 
AI knew him last year he stole my cows. 
Q Mr. Jerry you heard his reply? 
A Yes, I heard. 
Q Witness what are you going to do since you know he is a thief? 
A Until I went back home 
Court to prosecutor 
Q You herd the statement of your witness do you have question? 
AI heard and I will ask him question 
Q Witness these cows are the male or females cows? 
A Female cows 
Q Prosecutor you have heard his reply? 
A Yes, I heard 
Court to PW. No. 2 
Name: - Baushe Rabe: - Age 42 yrs. 
3 
Q Baushe Rabe the court summoned you to testify will you take oath or 
promise to tell the truth? 
AI will promise to tell the truth 
Q For the sake of Allah what do you know? 
A What I know for the sake of Allah is I saw Yalle driving Bala's cows 
together with a small boy who I don't know, I was sitting down clearing my 
gun, after I return home I heard shouting (ihu) I told BAla it was Yalle who 
stole his cows , that 
is all I knew about this issue. 
Court to counsel of accused 
q You heard the statement of PW No. 2? 
A Yes, I heard. 
Q Do you understand? 
A Yes 
Q How far it is true? 
A No, we have question? 
Q What is your question? 
A From the first information report of the police you are not among those 
who saw Yalle? 
Q Baushe you heard counsel's question? 
A That time it was 10: 00 of the month of Islam I saw the cows. 
Q Baushe which time do you saw them? 
AI don't have watch I relied upon stars to have my (Sahur). 
Q Mr. Jerry you heard his reply? 
A Yes. 
Q Baushe the time you saw them is it the time of (Salms)? 
AI went home and ordered for food also I heard calling for prayer. 
Q Mr. Jerry counsel you hear? 
AI heard this is my question. 
Q Baushe since you said that you saw Yalle what type of cloth he wore? 
A Black cloth. 
Q Mr. Jerry you heard his reply? 
AI heard. 
Q Baushe what is your relationship with bala? 
AI am related with him 
Q Mr. Jerry you heard his reply? 
AI heard there is another question 
Q Baushe what is the distance between Bala's house and the place you saw 
Yalle with 2 cows? 
A About 2 kilometers. 
Q Baushe the time you saw Yalle what do you do as evidence that you saw a 
thief? 
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AI was alone and they are 2I did not say anything. 
Q Mr. Jerry you heard his reply? 
AI heard. 
Q Baushe can you recognize the person you saw together with Yalle? 
A No, I can't recognize him. 
Q Mr Jerry you heard the answer of your question? 
A Yes I heard. 
Court to Prosecutor 
Q you heard the testimony of your witness? 
AI heard. 
Q Do you understand? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you agree? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have question to ask the witness? 
A Yes. 
Q Baushe is the cows male or females? 
A Male cows. 
Q Cpl. Suleiman you heard his reply? 
A Yes I have another question. 
Q Baushe Rabi'u do you initially knew Yalle 
A Yes, I knew him. 
Q Baushe between your village and that of Yalle what is the distance? 
A It is not very far. 
Court to Prosecutor 
Q Cpl. Suleiman you heard his reply? 
A Yes I heard. 
Q Do you have additional witness? 
A No. 
Court to Counsel of Accused 
Q You heard the statement of PW No. 1 and 11 do you have anything to 
say? 
AI have nothing to say. 
Court to DW No. 1 
Name: - Muhammad Sani Age: -22yrs 
Q Muhammad Sani the court summoned you to testify will you swear or 
promise to tell the truth? 
AI will promise to tell the truth. 
Q What do you know. 
S 
A What I knew for the sa' -e of Allah is we are together with Yalle 3 of its at 
Tashar Bara'u on Friday myself, Yalle and Bukadi up to 12: 30 am, Bukadi drive 
his motor cycle myself drive bicycle a 'd went home that is all I knew. 
Q Mr. Jerry do you hear the statement of your witness? 
A Yes I heard. 
Q Do you agree? 
A Yes, I agree. 
Q Are you satisfied? 
A yes. 
Q Do you have question? 
A No. 
Q Cp. 1 Suleiman you heard the statement of D. W? 
AI heard. 
Q Do you understand? 
A Yes. 
Q How far it is truth? 
A Yes it is true. 
Q Do you have question? 
A Yes. 
Q Muhammad Sani you said it was on Friday how many days ago? 
A Above 20 days. 
Q Cpl. you heard his reply? 
AI heard 
Q Do you have another question? 
A No. 
Q Mr. Jerry do you have additional witnesses to present? 
A No. 
The court adjourned till on 2/10/04 for judgment. 
Court to Counsel of Accused 
Today being 2/12/04 both parties are present before the court. 
q You heard the proceedings of the court what do you wish to say? 
AI heard but there is contradiction between the statement of PW No. 1 and 
that of PW No. 2 
Q Is this statement told by Mr. Jerry as his last statement i. e. Al Izari? 
A Yes. 
The court adjourned till on 9/12/2004. 
Today being 9/12/2004 both parties are in court. 
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Q Barrister do you anything to say? 
A Yes, the court explained that the prison Authority said that, they have 
picture of the accused person and there is contradiction between the statement of 
PW No. 1 and No. 2. 
Court to Prosecutor 
Q Do you wish to say anything? 
A The witnesses are enough because the accused person is habitual criminal 
Court opinion 
I Mal. Bello Usman U. S. C Judge D/ma and court members, we charge you 
Ibrahim Rabi, u Yalle residence of Dabawa village with conspiracy and stealing 
of 2 cows, because on 11/11/04 at about 1: 00 pm in the afternoon somebody 
named Bala who is residency of Shema district of D/ma came to police station 
and reported that about 9 days ago you Ibrahim Rabi, u Yalle and you Lawal 
Sama is who is well known as Jan Barme whom all you are residence of same 
village you conspire and entered Bala's house and stole 2 male cows valued at 
N150,000.00. 
Based on the opinion of this court and testimonies of witnesses you are hereby 
charged with stealing as provided in a book called "IHKAMUL AHKAM" page 
where it was said a judge pass judgment based on the light of witnesses and 
Nassi provided in "FATAH[JL JAWAD" page 101. 
Izari 
Q Barrister Nasiru do you have anything to say? 
A Yes, there is contradiction between the testimonies of PW No. 1 and No. 
2. 
JUDGMENT 
I Mal. Bello Usman U. S. C Judge D/ma. and court members we ordered that you 
should be remained in prison custody fro 2 years i. e. Ibrahim Rabi'u based on 
Nassi adduced above. 
Right of appeal 
Any aggrieved party can file appeal to H/C D/ na within 30 days from today. 
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COURT: - UPPER SHARIA COURT MARU 
JUDGE: - ALH. IBRAAHIM AHMED K/KOSHI 
COMPLAINANT: - ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DEFENDANT: - LAWALI AKWATA R/DORUWA 
CAUSE OF ACTION: -. DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER 
STATEMENT OF. CLAIM 
I Lawali Sani Dauda on behalf of commissioner for Justice 
Attorney general of Zamfara State I am sueing you Lawali Dauda 
Akwata Ruwan Doruwa before this court for suspecting you to 
have committed th offence of defamation of chracter under 
section 323 of sharia , penal code 
that two weeks ago you Lawali 
Akwata Ruwa Doruwa of Maru Local Government area when you 
came back from kazaure that somebody inform you 'that one 
Ibrahim Sabo that he will never reconciled with anybody. or any 
member of P. D. P from there you abused Ibrahim Sabo and on 
this ground I am suspecting you to have committed the offence. 
COURT: - Court. had accepted the case under section 141 (b) 
of sharia civil procedure code. 
COURT: - To the suspect Law, -4i Akwata you heard what you 
are being sued what do you have to say? 
ANS: - It was not true I did not abuse him. 
COURT: - To the complainant Lawali who knows he had 
abuse Ibrahim Sabo? 
ANS: - The complainant said yes there is witnesses they 
are (1) Yusuf Driver (2) Danindo Driver (3) Sanusi 
Mande that is all. 
COURT: - Court had adjourned the case until 9/ 12/04 in order 
to summon the witnesses and the suspect is 
ordered to be in Maru prison custody unless he 
produce reasonable sureties to stand for his bail in 
order to avoid anarchy and confussion. 
COURT: - Court had resume duty today 9/12/04 and both 
parties present including witnesses. 
COURT: - PW1 Yusuf Driver are going to swear or you 
are 
going to take affirmation? 
ANS: - That in good faith I was repairing motor vehicle ,I 
heard Lawali abusing Ibrahim Sabo I came and 
talk to Lawali he refused to stop then Ibrahim 
turned and met Lawali, I told him to leave him he 
said I can not abuse your parents but I live him to 
God that is all what I know. 
COURT: - To the complainant you -heard what the witness had 
said do you have anything to say? 
ANS: - The complainant Lawali said since he heard that 
Lawali had abused Ibrahim Sabo that is all. 
COURT: - To the suspect you heard what the witness had said 
do you agreed? 
ANS: - Yes I heard but I disagreed. 
COURT: - To the suspect do you have any question or objection 
to make? 
ANS: -- I have no question but PW1 is a motor mechanic to 
Ibrahim Sabo. 
COURT: - To the PW1 you heard that you are motor mechanic 
to Ibrahim Sabo what do you have to say? 
ANS: - I am in the side of Lawali and not Ibrahim Sabo. ' 
COURT: - To the suspect Lawali you heard do you have any 
additional objection? 
ANS: - To be sincere I don't have any objection again, 
COURT: - PW 2 is called to give evidence he is Dan indo he 
said what I know in good faith I came to repair my 
car at Yusuf's garriage then Lawali started 
abusing Alh. Ibrahim Sabo at that material time 
my attention was in my car I did not heard the 
abused-. words he used on reply Alh. Ibrahim said 
he can nöt abuse him rather he left him to God. 
That is all I know. 
COURT: - To the suspect Lawali you heard what PW 2 stated 
do you agreed? 
ANS: - I did not agreed, because he is not a hausä man 
by tribe. 
COURT: - To PW 2 you heard what he said? 
ANS: -* PW 2 said I am a hausa man by tribe. 
COURT: - To Lawali you heard what do you say? 
ANS: - I heard but which type of abuses words I pronounced? 
ANS: - PW 2 said at that material time my attention-was iii 
my car. 
COURT: - PW 3 is called to give evidence by name Sanusi 
Mande you. summon to give evidence in respect of 
what happened between Lawali and Ibrahim what 
did you know in good faith? 
ANS: - When they started the fighting I was not around 
but at the time I came I met people advising Lawali 
to stop fighting, I met him and told him why cant 
you stop the fighting from there he turned and live 
the place. Ibrahim Sabo said he abused him but he 
leave him to God that is all what I know. 
COURT: - To the suspect Lawali you heard what PW 3 had 
stated do you agreed?. 
ANS: - Yes I agreed. 
COURT: - To the complainant do you have any additional 
witnesses? 
ANS: - That is all my witnesses. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on what had happened in this case where PW 1 and 
PW 2 give evidence that they heard Lawali had abuses. Ibrahim 
Sabo but they did not know the abuses words he uses because 
their attention was to repair their cars. 
Court had informed the accused person on what the 
witnesses but he disagreed with there testimonies and he did not 
discredit their evidence. Therefore on this ground court had 
found Lawali guilty of abusing Ibrahim as stated by the witnesses 
although they did not informed the court the abusive words 
uttered to Ibrahim by Lawali and on that ground court had found 
Lawali guilty of committing the offence. 
Therefore if Lawali'can swear an oath that he did not abuse 
Ibrahim court will discharge him as it is provided in the Book of 
'Iý, ihfa page where it says. ........................................................ 
...................................................................................................... 1........ 
MEANING 
Where there is strong suspicions the . accused 
person. can take an oath and it can not to be rebert 
to another. 
COURT: - To the suspect Lawali Akwata can you take an 
oath, ' that you did not abuse Ibrahim Sabo and 
where you refused to take the. oath a Judgment 
will be pass on you in accordance with Islamic 
principles.. 
ANS: - I can not take an oath but I agreed with what ever 
sentence that the court will enforce on me, 
COURT: - To the complainant since the accused person had 
refused to take oath has he committed -similar 
offence? 
ANS: - The complainant said No he is a first time offender. 
SENTENCE 
I Alhaji Ibrahim Ahmed upper Sharia court Judge of- upper 
Sharia court Maru after. I have considered the above stated facts 
I am satistfied that you Lawali you did abuse Alhaji Ibrahim Sabb 
as testified by the witnesses although they did not know the 
words used for abusing him and on that ground you were -asked 
to take an oath that you did not abuse Alh. Ibrahim and in which 
court found you guilty under section 323 of. Sharia penal code. 
COURT: - To the accused person do you need to say something 
before court pass judgment on you? 
ANS: - The accused Lawali said I plead for court mercy. 
SENTENCE 
Considering the fact that Lawali had plead for mercy and 
that he is first time offender I sentenced Lawali to six months 
Imprisonment or N 10', ' 000.00 to serve as deterrence to- others. 
Dispersed off today 
Alh. Ibrahim Ahmed 
KOTORKOSHI 
UPPER SHARIA COURT 
JUDGE. 
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CASE NO-CR/FI/02/2002 
DATE- 2001-02-2002 
COURT - Upper Sharia Court Shinkafi 
JUDGE - Alhaji Labaran Suleman Gusau 
COMPLAINANT - Hashimu Galadima Maberaya 
DEFENDA. N 1- Abdul- Rahman Isahaka and 2 others 
CAUSE OF ACTION - Theft under section 144 sharia penal 
Code Law 
DATE OF HEARING -27-02-2002. 
STATEMENT OF CLAIM 
I Hashimu Galadima Maberaya I am sueing Abdul- Rahman 
Isahaka Abdullahi Abübakar and Halilu Usman all of them 
resided, in m aberaya town, this is because on 7th day of January 
2002 at about 3.00 am they went and open my shop by force and 
they stoled my properties as follows: - 
1. One sack of, sugar valued at N2,800.00 
2. One packet of soap valued at N900.00 
3. One tailor head valued at N3,600.00 
4. One. tape recorder valued at N1,400.00 
5. Two 7-ic ces of long key soap valued at N 120.00 
6. Two packets of chewing gum valued at N 140.00 "" 
7. One packets of touch light battery at N150.00 
8. One packets of mixed items valued at N180.00 
9. One packets of cigarette valued at N260.00 
10. Four packets of biscuits valued at N280.00 
11. Seven pieces of saletives valued at N 140.00 
12. Two . -N , ets valued N20.00 
13. One packets of electric bulbs . at 
N120.00 
14.5 pieces bottles of cream valued at N130.00 
15.3 pieces of shoes for children valued at N450.00 
16.5 thread of pieces of tailor thread valued at N50.00 
17. Bathing soap valued at the cost of N25.00 
18. One sacck of pear of shoes valued N1,920.00 
19. Shoes 30 pears valued at 1,350.00 
20. Yards (two bundles) all valued at N14,335.00 this is what ,I 
am sueing for. 
COURT: - Court had had received the case which was transferred 
from shinkafi on the ground that the court lack 
Jurisdiction to here the case. 
COURT: - 2c, th the complainant and the suspects had appeared 
in court ie Hashinu Galadima complaint an d Abdul- 
Rahman Isahaka Abubakar and Halidu Usman today 
28/2/2004. 
COURT: - Court had read the compliant to the suspects Abdul- 
Rahm, an Ishahka, Abdullahi Abubakar and *Halidu 
Usman as contained above. 
COURT: - To the suspect number (1) Abdul-rahman Abubakar 
Abdullahi and Halidu have you head on the charge 
sheet read over to you? 
ANS: - The 1St suspect said I heard and I understand- 
The 2nd suspect said I heard and I understand- 
The 3rd suspect said yes, I heard and I understand 
COURT: - To the suspects Abdul- Rahman, Abdullahi and Halidu 
b srnan is it true that you have committed the- offence as 
Stated by the complainant? 
ANS: - The Ist suspect bdul-Rahman Ishaka yes it was true-- 
That Hashimus shop was broken and it was my self 
Abdullahi and Halilu aforementioned properties, we 
Brought the properties to my house at maberaya, we 
stoled the properties from his shop. After we keep the 
properties later Abubakar bdullahi came and took one 
items from the stolen goods to. shinkafi town where he 
and myself were arrested and suspected to have stoled 
the properties. I and Halilu went and brought out the 
remaining properties and that is all I know. 
ANS: - The 2nd suspect Abdullahi Abubakar said. yes it was 
true that myself and Abdul-Rahman Ishaka aand 
Halilu Usman we went and broke down the shop of 
Hashimu Galadima and took out properties for the 
huge sum of money we brought the properties to Abdul- 
Rahman's house for having safe keeping- after one day 
myself and Abdul-Rahman decided to -bring out some 
for sale to Shinkafi market. I brought but I was arrested 
by a member of Vigilante group and he took me to their 
office for interrogation and that he is suspecting me to 
have stolen the properties and he ordered for the arrest 
of Halilu and Abdul - Rahman and that is all what 
happened. 
ANS: - The 3rd. suspect Halilu stated that I saw Abdul-Rahman 
breaking the shop and brought out properties from the 
shop and handed over them to Abubakar Abdtillahi and 
Abubakar bdullahi forwarded it to me where I took them 
to the field and keep them there after we gathered them 
all together, we_ took them to Abdul-Rahmann" house and 
keep them there and we came out from the house in the 
mid night. And from there we departed to our 'various 
place of residence. 
COURT: - To the 3rd suspect Halilu do you know the properties 
that was been stolen in the shop? And it was together 
with you that this properties was took out from the shop 
and given to you and which you took it to. a certain field 
and put it there do you know the purpose of doing such 
thing or you don't know? . 
ANS: - Halilu said yes I know we agreed to conspired and 
break the shop of Hashimu Galadima in the 'night of 
that faithful day we went there in the midnight Abdul- 
Rahman brought out a knife and put it inside the locker 
of the door and break down the door of the shop and he 
entered inside and he brought' out properties to us we 
took them and put it a certain field. After the operation 
we carried the properties to Abdul-Rahman's house for 
safekeeping. 
COURT: - To Usman Hassan and the representative of Hisbah 
commissioner you heard confessional statement of 
Abdul-Rahman; Halilu and Abdullahi in respect of the 
suspected stolen properties. 
ANS: - Usman Hassan said yes I heard the confessional 
statement of Abdul- Rahman Halilu, and Abdullahi of 
stolen the properties where they went in the midnight 
and break down the shop and took away. properties 
worth Hundreds of Naira. 
COURT: - To Aminu Ibrahim of upper shairia court shinkafi you 
heard what Halilu, Abdul-Rahman and Abdullahi and 
Abubakar did. 
ANS: - "Arninu Ibrähim said I heard that Abdul-Rahmän 
Abdullahi Abubakar and Halilu had made a 
confessional statement that they went in the midnight 
and break the shop of Hashimu Galadima and went 
away with properties of large sum of money. 
COURT: - To the registrar of the court said the man who received 
the stolen properties was summon to appear on 
Wednesday and the properties stolen was already 
estimated in accordance with sharia principles. 
COURT: - Court had.. adjourned, the matter to 14/3/2002 for 
continuation of hearing. 
COURT: - Court resume sitting today 14/3/2002 the complainant 
Hashimu Galadima and the suspects Abdul-Rahman 
Abdullahi and Halilu Usman all appeared in court. 
COURT: - To the -Registrar where is the man who estimated the 
items in present of the suspects. 
ANS: - The Registrar Yusuf said here is the estimate as 
follows: - 
1 Sweet 1/2 carton estimated to cost N130.00 
2 Cream 1/2 carton estimated to cost N 120.00 
3 Battery one carton estimated to cost N 130.00 
4. Four packets of carbin biscuits estimated to cost 
14280.00 
5 One packet of marches estimated to cost N120.00 
6 One packet of excel cigarette estimated to cost N280.00 
7 Two packets of chewing gum estimated to cost N150.00 
8 One carton of electric bulbs estimated to cost N 160.00 
9 One packet of pen cow estimated to cost N70.00 
10 One packet of Mix medicine to cost N90.00 
11 10 pieces of solative estimated to cost N200.00 
12 Two pieces of long key soap estimated to cost N130.00 
13 Six pieces of Giv soap (bathing soap) estimated. to cost 
N120-00 
14 Five pieces of tailor thread estimated to cost N50.00 
15 White key soap one carton estimated to cost N800.00 
16 Six dozen of soso shoes and one pear estimate to cost 
N2433.00 
17 Three pears of Dunlop slipper shoes estimated to cost 
N240.00 
18 One- sack of Dangote sugar estimated to cost N2,700 
19 One tailor head estimated to cost N2,500.00 
20 One tape recorder estimated to cost N1250.00 
21 Two yards (with kobo circle) estimated to cost N300.00 
Grand Total N12, '328.00 
The above items are the properties estimated 'which 
was found in the possession of Abdul-Raman Abdullahi 
and Halilu Usman after Hashimu's shop was broken 
and properties was packed out. 
COURT: - To the valuer malam Usman in good faith is it the 
current price of the properties? 
ANS: - The valuer mälam Usman said in good faith this is the 
current market price of the properties. 
COURT: - To the suspects Abdul-Rahman, Abdullahi.. and Halilu 
Usman you heard the estimated cost of the. properties 
found in the. possession belonging to . Hashimu Galadima 
ANS: - Abdul-Rahman said yes, it is true. 
Abdullahi said yes, it is true 
Halilu Osman. yes, it is true 
COURT: - Court had ordered the suspects to be remanded in 
prison custody until 6/6/2002. 
COURT: - Court had resume sitting today 6/6/2002 the 
complainant.. malam Hashimu and the suspects. Abdul- 
Rahman, Abdullahi and Halilu both parties appeared in 
court. 
PLEADING 
COURT: - To the suspects Abdul-Rahman, Abdullahi and. 
Halilu 
Usman do you have anything to say? 
ANS: - The 1St suspect Abdul-Rahman said I have nothing to 
say I only plead for justice in respect of the theft. 
ANS: -' The 2nd suspect Abdullahi said I have nothing to say I 
only plead for court mercy. 
ANS: - The 3rd suspect Halilu Usman said I have nothing to say 
I only plead for justice in respect of the theft. 
CONVICTION 
I Labaran Suleiman upper Sharia court Judge Grade II 
Shinkafi of upper Shaira court- I based on the case brought by 
Hashimu against Abdul-Rahman, Abdullahi and Halilu that in 
midnight you went and break. the shop and carried away packets 
of provisions as follows: - 
1 1/2 carton of sweets at the cost of N260.00 
2 1/2 dozen of cream at the cost of N120.00 
3 One packet of battery at the cost of N130.00 
4 Four packet of carbin biscuits at the cost of N280.00 
5 Marches one packet at the cost of N120.00 
6 Packet of excel cigarette at the cost of 280.00 
7 Two packet of chewing gum at the rate of N 150.00 
8" One packet of electric bulbs at the rate of N160.00 
9 Packet of pen cow at the rate of N70.00 
10 One packet of mixed medicine cost at N90.00 
11 Ten pieces of solutive at the rate of N200.00 
12 Two long key soap at. the rate of N130.00 
13 Six pieces of Giv soap at the rate of N120.00 
14 Five pieces of tailor threads at the rate of N50.00 
15 One carton of white key soap cost at N800.00- 
16 Six dozen of soso shoes and one pear cost at N2,433.00 
17 Three pieces of Dunlop shoes cost at the rate of N240.00 
18 One sack of Dangote sugar cost at N2,700.00 
19 One tailor head cost at. N2,500.00 
20 One tape recorder cost at Ni, 250.00 
21 Two yards (with kobo circle) cost at N300.00 
With grand total of N12,328.00 
This means that each of the accused person had stoled 
properties valued at'. the rate of N3,400.00 and which have 
reached 1/4 of. DINAR NISAB a minimum amount required under 
Islamic Law and all of them have confessed to the commission of 
the offence. that they went and entered this shop after they have 
breaked down the door and put the properties in packets and 
brought it out of the shop and hide the properties some where 
and which they later decided to carry it to Abdul-Rahman, 
Abdullahi and Halilu made confessional statement. and that all of 
you are male Adtilt and sane and what you stealed was inside a 
custody (Hirz) both of you agreed to entered and steal the 
properties of Hashimu in the 12.00 mid night valued at 
N3,400.00 each with grand total of N12,323.00 and that after 
they stealed the properties they later decided to take the 
properties to Abdul-Rahman's house on that ground I convicted 
you Abdul-Rahman of committing . theft under section '144 of 
sharia penal code law, and you Halilu I also convicted yöu of the 
offence of committing theft under section 144 of sharia 'penal 
code as it is provided under' Islamic sharia in the book of 
ASAHALUL MADARIKI VOL III page 187 where it says: - 
MEANING 
"Judgment can be based on confessional statement of an 
accused person either he is big or small what it means here also 
a hand of a thieve can be amputated if the properties. stolen 
amounted to NISAB ie 1/4, Dinar and either the property are cash 
or kind". 
" JUDGMENT 
I Labaran Suliemam upper sharia court judge Shinkafi of 
shinkafi upper sharia court based on the above facts *here the 
accused person were found guilty of committing theft and which 
if the accused were found guilty their punishment is amputation 
of right hand side from the whist and because this' is the first 
time for the accused person to have committed the offence of 
theft under section 144 of sharia penal code. Therefore 
considering the fact. that Abdul-Rahman, Abdullahi and Halilu 
Usman were found guilty of breaking a shop at around 2.00 mid 
night and the properties stolen have exceeded to 1/4 of Dinar 
(NISAB) ie N3,400.00 and also in addition Abdullahi made 
confessional statement that he went together with Abdul-Rahman 
and breaked Hashimu's shop and removed the property and you 
have no any connection or relationship with him in what ever 
form. Likewise I found Halilu Usman guilty of committing theft 
under section 144 of sharia penal code based on his confessional 
statement that he went together with Abdul-Rahman and 
Abubakar at round 2.00. mid night and break Hashimu shop and 
remove the property there in and being him an adult and some 
and the property stolen have exceeded 1/4 Diner (NISAB) IE 
n3,400.00. 
Therefore because they* were found guilty of committing 
theft under -section 144 of sharia penal code of Zamfara Sate. I 
Labaran Suleiman Gusau 'I. sentenced you Abndul=Rahman, 
Abdullaahi and Halilu to be amputated on your right hand from 
wrist to the fingers in accordance with Islamic law principles in 
the book of ASHAHAALUL MADARIKI VOL III page 187 and 
section 144 of sharia penal code in Ashahalul madariki it says: 
RIGHT- OF APPEAL 
. 
The aggrieved party has right of appeal to sharia court 
of appeal Gusau within 30 days from today. 
TRANSLATED BY: - 
HAYATU WADATAU BUNGUDU 
PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR 
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE GUSAU 
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Case NO. USC/TM/CR/006/2000 
21-2-2000 
COURT: Upper Sharia Court Talata Mafara 
JUDGE: Alh. Ibrahim Maigandi Abubakar 
COMPAINANT: - Commissioner of police 
DEFENDANT: - Buba Bello Jangebe 
NATURE OF OFFENCE: - Conspiracy and theft contrary. to S. 
123 & 145. S. P. C. 
CHARGE 
I, P. C. Shaii Garba, force NO. 2001, on behalf of 
Commissioner of police Zamfara. State wish to 'lodge this 
complaint against you Buba Bello Mashaya of Jangebe with the 
offence of conspiracy-and theft under the provision of section 123 
and 145 S. P. C. 
That on 14/2/2000 at about 2: 30PM one Haruna Kofa of 
Jangebe who is a head of vigilante group &4 ors went your louse 
situate at Masaya of Jangebe arrested you and took you to police 
station , 
of Jangebe .. over alleged theft of a cow valued at 
N22,700.00 in connivance with your friend by name Ali of Tureta 
area of Sokoto State where you conspired and steal at Dan 
Mande Matuna House at Kagara Village T/Mafarä Local 
government. ' 
You were hereby suspected to have 4committed 
the above 
stated offence. 
Court. - Buba Bello Jangebe you heard the allegation against 
you. Is it true that you commit the said offence of 
stealing a cow valued at N22,700,00 which belonged 
to Dan Mande Matuna? 
Ans. - Buba Bello,. yes it is true that Ali took a. cow to my 
house. Haruna 8& ors met me at my house, and 
brought me to police station together with the said 
cow. But since the said Ali is at large I will be 
responsible for the offence. 
Court. - To Buba Bello are you a Muslim? 
Ans. - Buba Bello of course I belonged to Muslim faith, and 
I will like to inform the court that, the said cow 
belonged to Dan Mande. 
FOUND GUILTY 
I, Upper Sharia Court Judge T/Mafara Hon. Alli. 
Ibrahim *Maigandi Abubakar duly satisfied that you 
Buba Bello Jangebe committed the above-alleged 
offence of theft of a cow valued at #22,700.00, 
belonging to Dan Mande Matuna which you stole at 
his house, which. also contravene the provision of S. 
145 SPC. You also made voluntary confession to the 
court that you was the one that committed the 
offence arid the said cow was found in your house. 
Court. - P. C Shafiu has the accused been convicted before? 
Ans. - Sahafiu he was once convicted at Jangebe on the 
same offence of theft of a bicycle, he was sentenced 
to 6 months imprisonment. 
Court. - To the accused Buba Bello do you have anything to 
say? 
Ans. - Bello Buba I am praying for leniency. 
JUDGEMENT 
I, Upper Sharia Court Judge T/Mafara U. S-. C Alh. Ibrahim 
Maigandi Abubakar Zurmi, due to the court finding of guilt, you 
Buba Bello Jangebe .I found you guilty with the theft of a cow 
valued at V122,700.00 which is more than 94 of dinar as a result 
of your confessional statement that you committed the said 
offence. I therefore ordered that your right hand be amputated in 
line with the provision of S. 145 S. P. C.. which also corresponds 
with chapter (Al- Maldah) verse 37 -38 of Holy Quran where 
Allah (S. A. W) said: - 
RIGHT OF'APPEAL 
Court. - There is a right of appeal to Sharia Court of Appeal 
Gusau Zainfära State within 30 days from today. The 
Case is disposed off today 21/2/2000. 
SIGNED' 
Translated by 
Mohammed M. Labaran 
Ministry 
. of 
Justice. 
.. ýPQý. x ý 
CASE NO JC/ 148/2000 
DATE: - 24/7/2000 
COURT: - HIGHER SHARIA COURT TSAFE 
JUDGE: - ALHAJI IDRIS USMAN GUSAU 
COMPLAINANT: - POLICE 
DEFENDANTS: - BARIYA &3 OTHERS 
FIRST INFORMATION REPORT 
I CPL Aminu Sule with police force registration " number 
128025 that I bought this case on behalf of commissioner of 
police Zamfara State sueing Bariya Ibrahim Ado Ä1h. ' Moh'd 
Moh'd Sani and Hamisü Sani all of them residence ' nearby 
Magazu town in Tsafe Local Government area of Zamfara' State 
that they are suspected to have committed Adultery (ZINA) which 
is an offence under Islamic Sharia of Zamfara State ie Sharia 
penal code Qection 127. 
That on 22/7/2000 at about 8.40 one Alh. Lawali 
Mohammed a residence of Magazu town who is a member. of 
Islamic Sharia monitoring group of Tsafe town arraigned the 
above suspects at Tsafe police station that on 21/7/2002'Sharia 
monitoring group of nearby magazu town brought this 
complainant that some time back since. from the first month of 
this year (she) Bariya committed Adultery which presently she 
has pregnancy and she explained to us that it was Ado Alh. 
Moh'd Moh'd Sani and Hamisu did commit adultery with her and 
make her conceived and that is why they are suspected to have 
committed the above-mentioned offence. 
COURT: - Court had received the case in order to go ahead 
with the hearing and here is their explanation as 
follows: - 
BARIYA: - She said I heard what they said and it. was true 'I 
am carrying pregnancy and it was Ado Mamman 
Sani and Hamisu that did committed adultery with 
me. 
ADO: - I heard but it is not true I did not commit Adultery 
with her. 
MOH'D: - I heard but it is not true ,I did not commit 
Adultery. 
COURT: - Do you know what is the meaning of Zina 
(Adultery)? 
BARIYA: - Yes I know. 
COURT: - Do you know the punishment under Islamic 
Sharia? 
ANS: - Said it- is Illegal. 
COURT: - To Bariya you know it is illegal under- Islamic law 
and you committed the offence after you know that 
you area Muslim. Is it with your consent or are 
you compelled? 
ANS: - Bariya said no they persuaded me while I was 
selling they called me . inside their house and make 
me pregnant. 
COURT: - That based on this suit field before this court I am 
satisfied that Briya had committed Adultery based 
on her confessional statement and the appearance 
of pregnancy on her and she has no reason of 
doing so under Sharia as it was provided in 
KAWAHINUL-FIKILIYA page 233 where it says:.. 
Then, with regards *to the 3 suspects which Bariya 
alleges.. that they committed Adultery with her, 
because they denied the allegation there is need to 
bring evidence and on, that ground court adjourned 
the matter to 28/7/2000 and court had' ordered 
the 3 suspects to be remanded in prison custody 
until that day, while court ordered Bariya to be 
remanded in their village at village head's house 
until adjourned, date. 
COURT: - Today 3/8/2000 ' is the resume date 
' the 
prosecution cpl Aminu and the 3 accused persons 
both present in court the prosecution said Bariya 
had informed me that there are six witnesses they 
include - 1. Alh. Lawali Moh'd 2. Salisu Manta 3. 
Isah Alh. Bala 4. Sani Abubakar 5. Abdul mumin 
COURT: - 
6. Magaji Magazu. Therefore I pray to the court to 
allow them to give their evidence. of what they 
know. 
Court invited PW1 Alh. Lawali Moh'd 31 years old, a 
civil servant reside at tsafe town I asked him what 
he know in respect of this matter? 
PW 1 said it is true that we went and took the 
accused person's to police station and I gave my 
statement to police and that it was Sharia 
monitoring group of Magazu met me in my house 
together with Shuiaibu Isah and Mohrd and 
explained to me that they were suspected' to have 
committed Adultery with Bariya. Before the case 
came to me for the past two weeks during the 
Investigation and that parties are going to settled 
the matter amicable at the end the sharia 
monitoring group informed me that the case was 
settled and they agreed to have committed the 
offence and the case was settled between Magaji 
Gari (village head) the accused persons and the 
Girl's parent and if the agreed they should provide 
money. for medicine in order to committed abortion 
on the pregnancy and one of the accused had even 
agreed to marry her after this has been done in 
village head house later Sharia monitoring group 
disagreed with the settlement because people will 
expect that we were given money and that is why 
they invite us for the settlement to be made in our 
presence and when they suggested the matter to 
be refer to police station for investigation. That is 
all I know. 
COURT: - Do you know that the accused persons did commit 
adultery with Bariya? 
ANS: - No I have no knowledge about the accused person 
committing adultery " with her they were only 
brought before me because I am the chairman of 
Sharia monitoring group and in which I forwarded 
the matter to the police. 
COURT: - Court had invited PW2 Salisu Musa 28 years, 
farming by occupation residing at Magazu he was 
asked to state you know and he sated 'äs follows: - 
What I know as a chairman of Sharia Monitoring 
committee -of Jamiatul Izalatul Bidia wa ikamatus 
Sunnah in Magazu town one day the village head 
of Magazu. invited me to his house where he 
informed me that Bariya had committee adultery 
and was pregnanted by Ado Moh'd Sani and 
Hamisu as he heard and therefore I should give 
him my co-operation in order to settle the matter 
amicably because it is very shameful that this type 
of crime starting in our village and on hearing this 
information I advised them to follow the matter 
logically on 21/7/2000 at about 10.00 pm he sent 
for me that I should see him in his house -I come 
and we entered Mua'zu telas shop together with 
the accused persons also along with Bariya Salisu 
Alh. Bala Abdulmunin Sani Abubakar Alh. Musa & 
Sule them Magaji told me the reason why I called 
all of you Sharia monitoring group) is to hand over 
the accused person to you and if they escape is . 
left 
to us he told me that. they have settled " the 'matter 
amicably and one of the accused person had 
agreed' to marry her they told us there. is no 
problem but we should go and met the chairman 
from there, we brought the accused person to the 
chairman Alh. Lawali Tsafe at about 11.00 pm 
after we explained to him he referred us to police 
station. That is all I know. 
COURT: - Court invited PW3 Isah Alh. Bala, 32 years farming 
by occupation who. is residing at Magazu he. was 
asked to state what he knows who stated as follow 
That on. Friday at about 10.00 pm Magaji Gari 
(village head) called me in his house in respect of 
Bariya case who committed Adultery and was 
pregnated by Ado, Moh'd Sani and Hamisu as I 
was told by the village head and that they 
requested him for amicably settlement '. iii the 
matter and he said the matter was beyond his 
power since it has reached tsafe town we said we 
have nothing to do the accused person rather than 
to forward them to our chairman we transport 
them to tsafe town and to our chairman Alh. 
Lawali informing him. what the accused had done 
who instructed us to take the accused to the police 
station that is all. 
COURT: - Because of . time factor court adjourned the matte 
to 7/8/2000. 
COURT: - Today 7/8/20.00 both parties in court for 
continuation of the case. 
PROSECUTION: - Today the 7/8/2000 the case is stated for 
hearing' and the remaining witnesses are in 'court'. 
COURT: - Court had invited PW4 Sani Abubakar who is 2 
years old a civil servant residing at Magazu town 
who testified as follows-. - 
We were called by Magajin gari (village head)- in his 
house at about 10.00 pm after our meeting,, when 
we came we meet Ado Hamisu and Sani, 
Abdulmunin, Isiya, Lawali Salisu and ALH. Musa 
telling us that their matter has arising now that 
they are suspected to have committed Adultery 
and pregnated Bariya Ibrahim he invited them-for 
amicably' settlement and that is why he invited us 
to met our chairman at tsafe town and one of the 
accused person had agreed to marry the victim. : 
When we come to tsafe we met our chairman and 
together with him we went to police station and we 
explained the case to the police they ordered -us to 
come back on Monday and when we came back 
there was closed discussion between the' father of 
the girl Salisu and the -chairman but we don't 
know what they discuss because we were outside 
we saw when they took the girl to the hospital and 
from there we are asked to come back on Monday 
and that is. all I know. 
COURT: - ' PW5 Shehu 30 year old who reside at Magazu he 
stated as follows: - 
What I know was that on Friday at. about 10.00 pm 
the village head (Magaji) Invited me to his : town and 
showed the accused person to me ie Ado, Sani and 
Hamisu he instructed us to forward them to. police 
station after showing him to our chairman and 
from there we are' ordered to resume back on 
Monday for unward transmitting the case to the 
court that'is all I know. 
COURT: - PW 6 Magaji, 46 years who reside at Magazu stated 
that what I know Alhaji Musa and Labaran. come to 
my house along with the girl known as Bariya that 
she is pregnant through Adultery, when she was 
asked on how does she get the pregnancy she said 
it was Ado, Sani and Haruna that committed 
Adultery with her I instructed. them to go -back 
home until tomorrow, when they come back on the 
following morning I repeated what they stated 
yesterday, they denied the allegation against them 
I ordered Lbaran to go back with the suggested 
until tomorrow again when the came back on the 
following day I still asked them. whether they 
committed the offence they objection 'to the 
commission of the crime when I heard that the 
matter was spreader in the town I called the 
attention of Sharia monitoring group committee 
whether they are aware of what is happening in the 
town they told me yes they are aware I then told 
Salisu, Musa, Sani, Isah, Abdulmumin and Isiya 
that this matter is beyond my power and therefore 
they should report back tomorrow for possible 
settlement before the Sharia monitoring committee 
that is 'all I know. 
COURT: - To the prosecution is that all your witness. 
ANS: - That is all for my witnesses but I am praying to the 
court to ask- the . accused person to give 
explanation on how the incident happened. 
COURT: - To the 2nd, 3rd, 4th accused persons do you need 
to make any explanation to the court** but is not 
compulsory unless you wish to do)so. 
ANS: - The 2nd accused Ado my explanation is that Magaji 
(village. head) invited me to his house I asked what 
happened he -said complainant was brought 
against . 
me when I was there Hamisu came and 
met me from there Magaji called me inside his 
sitting room together with the girl (Bariya) he' said 
to me this girl said you and 2 others have 
pregnated " her I told him it was not true them he 
informed Hamisu the * same, Hamisu denied the 
allegation, he told the girl what we have replied she 
said we are not the only people because Moh'd 
Sani also is included them Moh'd Sani DanAlhaji 
was called who also denied the allegation. 
After. all this had happened the elder brother to her 
father Labaran was also called who informed us 
that if we did not accept the blame we are to " be 
sent to. " 
C. I. D Gusau I still denied the allegation 
and from there Magaji instructed us to go back 
home until tomorrow . and when we came 
back he 
still interrogated us on whether we have, cömmitted 
the offence we told him that non of us had 
committed the offence, he later invited the girl's 
parent whether the parent of the girl said one of us 
should marry the girl and whether we have -agreed 
or not. since the matter have reached tsäfe town 
and that Salisu Musa should take us to police 
station we told him to take us where ever he want 
knowing that we did not committed the offence, 
there and then. he gathered all of us in his palace 
that he want the matter to be settle amicably in 
agreement with Sharia monitoring committee and 
that there was rumour in the village that village 
head had collected money and that is why he want 
the matter to be settle out of trial and on that 
ground he forwarded us to the committee of tsafe 
town for what . ever settlement might have been 
done the committee then transport us to tsafe 
police station where we were remanded and later 
presented ' us to the court on money series of 
deliberation by the committee. That is all I know. 
COURT: - Court adjourned the case until 8/8/2000 because 
of the time factor. 
COURT: - Today 8/8/2000 court resume sitting both the 
prosecution and the accused person. were in court 
the 3rd accused person Moh'd Sani stated as 
follows: - 
Moh'd Sani: - My explanation is the same of what Ado had stated 
yesterday. 
COURT: - To the 4th accused Hamisu do you have any 
explanation to make? 
Hamisu: - I relied on Ado explanation made yesterday. 
ANS: - I seek court permission to allow me invite pw 7 
Ibrahim who is now present in court 
COURT: - Permission is granted to the prosecution to called 
pw7 Ibrahim Moh'd in order to give evidence he 
is 33, years old a farmer by occupation residing at 
Magazu town who gave his testimony as follows: 
That I am the father of Bariya and we are not the 
people that sued in this matter it was one Alhaji 
Musa and Labaran that sued in this case and they 
did not consult me neither do they seek my wife 
consent before they took the matter " to the 
prosecution do you have any thing to present? 
ANS: - I still seek court permission to called . more 
additional witness whom are yet o appear in court. 
COURT: - Permission granted on the prosecution to 
summons the remaining witness to appear on 
4/9/2000. 
COURT: - Today 6/9/2000 both parties are present in court 
for continuation of hearing prosecution witnesses.. 
PROSECUTION: - Presently my witness is yet to appear in court 
and for this reason I still crave the indulgence of 
this Hon. Court. to kindly adjourned the matter for 
me to another date in order to enable me summon 
the remaining witness. 
COURT: - Case adjourned to 8/9/2000 
COURT: - Today 8/9/2000 both parties are in court together 
with the witness of the prosecution. 
PW7: - PW7 said I know is that Ibrahim is my younger 
brother who gave birth to Bariya one day we 
invited"Bariya after we heard rumour that she had 
conceived pregnancy we asked her. on. what 
happened and she told us that she used to visit 
some boy's ie Ado, Hamisu and Sani we took the 
matter to Magaji, the village head of Magazu and 
narrated him the story that is all I know. 
COURT: - To the prosecution is that all for your witnesses? 
ANS: - Yes that is all. . 
COURT: - Therefore since the prosecution have closed it case 
the court will fixed the case for judgment. " 
PLEADING 
COURT: - To the parties in this case do you need to say 
something before court decided to pass judgment? 
PROSECUTION: - I have nothing more to say. 
ADO 2ND ACCUSED: - I have nothing to say, but she only defamed 
our character. 
SANI 31ýJ" ACCUSED: - I have nothing to say. 
HAMISU 4TH ACCUSED: - I have nothing to say. 
COURT: - Court '-adjourned the case to 9/9. /2b00 for 
judgment. 
COURT: - Today 9/9/2000 both parties are court and here is 
court judgment. 
COURT OBSERVATION: - 
Based on these case field by C. P. C Aminu Sule, of tsafe 
central police station-dated 24/2/2000 which from the content of 
the F. I. R they are suspected' Ado Sani and Hamisu with the 
offence of committed Adultery with Bariya an offence contrary to 
section 127 of Zamfare Sharia penal code he also suspected Ado 
Sani and. Hamisu to have committed sexual' inter course 'with 
Bariya and as a result she became pregnant Bariya 
confessed to have committed the offence and that it- was the' 3 
accused person did commit adultery with her and became 
pregnant. Therefore based on the finding made under. Islamic 
principles court is satisfied that she committed the offence 
willingly without undue influence and without ignorance* of law. 
On this the commission of Adultery by Bariya has been 
established two grounds ie 1. The existence of pregnancy 2. Her 
confessional statement as it is ' provided in the book of 
KAWANINUL-FLKHIYAL page 233 where it says: - 
................................. 
'I:.. 
_........... 1.............................. ........... 1.. 
.................... ................................... :........................................ 
Likewise another ground exist in the book of Ashahnul Madariki 
Volume (III) where it say: ........................................................... 
................................................................................................ 
MEANING: - ' 
Hadd punishment can only be inflicted on either one or on 
the following: - 
1. Cohfe-9sional statement. 
2. The existence or appearance of pregnancy to 
unmarried woman. 
3. Producing four male adult just unimpeachable 
witness who have seen the culprit committing 
Adultery at the same time. 
And with regard to Ado, Sani and Hämisu they 
denied the' allegation while Bariya confessed to 
the commission of the crime and the witnesses 
must to be produced as it was provided in the Holy 
Quran in Suratal Nur verse 14 where it says: - 
MEANING: - 
Those who accused chaste woman for committing Adultery 
shall produced four male credible witness if they refused flog 
them 80 lashes. "Therefore I have confirmed the punishment of 
gazaf as it provided in the book of Al-figh-aal mazahibil-arbaa 
volume 5 page 233 where it says: - ..................... 
MEANING: - 
All jurists have unanimously agreed that who ever 
Defamed another persons character, in the presence of a judge 
and that person defamed was not there at that particulär time 
and it became mandatory for the judge to confirm their right. On 
this ground I confirm the right of Ado, Sani and Hamisu for being 
defamed of their character as they stated as follows: - 
ADO: - Yes I am seeking my right 
Sani: - Yes likewise me I did not forgive her. 
Hamisu: - Myself, the something. 
COURT: - To 'Bariya can you prove your case beyond 
reasonable doubt that the accused person- had 
committed the offence in order to exonerate your 
self from Hadd punishment of -80 ,. 
lashes for 
defaming the accused person character as it says 
in the book of AL-FGH-AL ISLAMIC volume 7 
page 5419 where it says: - ................................... 
MEANING: - 
If the victim of defamation produced witnesses- or whether 
the accused make confessional statement for the commission of 
the crime or where witnesses confirmed his confessional 
statement before the court of law then is such situation the 
punishment shall be for Zina (Adultery) and not defamation. 
And on this ground I asked Bariya if she can confirm it. 
ANS: - No I have no witnesses who was an eye witness at 
the time we are committing the Adultery. 
JUDGMENT 
Idris Usman Gusau upper Sharia court Judge tsafe of upper 
Sharia court tsafe based on the above reasons- I am satisfied that 
you Bariya had committed Adultery (Zani) based on your 
conceived and your confessional * statement. 
.ý 
I therefore ordered you to be stroke 100 lashes in presence 
of public as it says in SURATUL-NUR verse 2 where it says: - 
"........ " " ................ " . .. "......... t.................................. " "..... " 
And the authority from ASHALAL-MADARILA voluine 3 
page 162 where it says .............................................................. 
Likewise in Sharia penal code of Zamfara State section 127 
it also stated in the book of Ashalul- Madarila volume 3 page 174 
where it says: - ........................................................................... 
................................................................................................ 
Also as it was provided under section 142 . of Sharia penal 
code of Zamfara State and I ordered you to be under the care of 
your village head of Magazu (Magaji) until when you are 
physically fit and delivered and to received your . Hadd 
punishment ie (100 lashes). 
RIGHT OF APPEAL 
The aggrieved party can appeal to Sharia court of appeal 
Gusau within 30 days from today. 
Sign 
Idris Usman Gusau 
HON. JUDGE 
9/9/2000 
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TRANSLATED BY 
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PRINCIPAL REGISTRAR 
HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE GUSAU 
IN THE SHARIA COURT OF APPEAL ,. 
r 
DIVISION I, KANO. ý: ' 
BEFORE: 
HON. GRAND KHADI ALH. DAHIRU RABI'U 
........................... (PRISIDING) 
HON. KHADI ALH. MUHAMMAD KHALIL 
............................... (WRI'T'ER) HON. KHADI ALH. MUSA ADAMU ZAKIRAI. 
SCA/CR/KN/1/2005 2O-2 1426 All 
30-3-2005 
DAH IRU GAMB0................................................................................. A P PE: L L; 1 NT 
AND 
THE STATE ................................ ...................................................... 
RESPONDENT 
This case originates from upper sharia court Rano in their case No. CR/2; 2005 
Commissioner of Police vs. Dahiru Gambo which was presented before the court on 
1/2/2005 in an allegation of theft under section 136 S. P. C. 2000, from Sgt. Yahaya 
Dan kadi the prosecutor. He says that; Dahiru Gambo has entered the house of one 
Sabi'u Stile and stole Guinea corn valued at the sum of N3,000.00k (Three Thousand 
Naira only). After reading the first information report to hint, the court then 
immediately asked him. 
COURT - ACCUSED PERSON: - Did you hear the statement of the complain made against you, 
did you understand it and did you agree that you have committed the offence? 
ANS -I- Yes, I heard it and I admit that I have committed the offence. 
COURT - ACCUSED PERSON: - Look at this guinea corn, is it the subject matter in question'? 
ANS -I- Yes, it is the one. The court then appointed witnesses to witness his admission, the court 
them called on both parties to conclude their evidence. It them proceed ahead and 
writes it's Judgment. It has given details of the complain and the admission made by 
the accused person in it is Judgment. Finally in page 2 of the record of proceedings of 
the lower court, the hand written one line 8 by the bottom, it says that; "therefore, you 
Dahiru Gambo, I hereby found you guilty of committing this offence of theft based 
on the admission you made with your own mouth, in view of that, I hereby sentence 
CERTIFIED TRUE TRA"! A. r"m 
you to two (2) years imprisonment with fifty 50 lashes under section 136 S. P. C. 
because court can punish a person on the basis of the admission he made with his own 
month just as it has been provided in Risala, where it says; 
............................................ 
ARABIC............................................... . 
The said Dahiru has started serving his prison term since on 1-2- 2005, he then got 
a chance of filing his appeal on 28 -2- 2005. 
During the appeal session of Division I of the Sharia court of appeal at Kibiya the 
court has started hearing the matter. The appellant who is in prison was produced 
before the court, but the court on that date adjourned the matter to 23/3/05 because of 
the late coming of the state counsel. The appellant was also produced before the Kano 
state session and that a state counsel M. Yakubu Bako Sulaiman also appears, the 
court then read the appellant's grounds of appeal: 
1. I didn't agreed with the Judgment passed by upper sharia court Rano because iý 
there is no Justice inndue to it's resticted enquiry. 
2. That, it didn't give details, whether the guinea corn in question is one sack or one 
Mudu. It just valued the corn at N3,000.00k (Three Thousand). 
3. That, doing this has violated the Islamic law procedure because the Judgment 
passed by the court is too severe -2 years prison term with fifty lashes. 
4. That, I am urging this court to Quash the Judgment of the trial court by way of 
substituting it with a sentence of fine. 
COURT - APPELLANT: - Do you have additional grounds or address to make? 
ANS, I- These are my only ground. 
COURT - STATE COUNSEL: - Do you have objection or address to make? 
ANS. FROM M. YAKUBU: I am hotting objection against the grounds presented by the appellant 
because: - 
(a) The Judgment passed by upper a sharia court Rano was passed in the interest of 
Justice under the law because it was based on the admission made by the 
appellant in open court. The court has read the accusation made against him over 
to him after which he told that court that he understood it and he then confirmed 
to the trial court that he has committed the offence as has been shown in the 
record of proceedings of the trial court in page one second paragraph. The lower 
"ýiF TUE TRAAc, SLA rV 
court has passed it's Judgment in line with section 289 P. C. Sharia law 
amendment 2000. 
After that, the court has already called on him to conclude his evidence before 
passing it's Judgment for the sake of achieving Justice, and that the admission 
made by the Appellant voluntarily before the court, the court did not force him to 
do it. The court passed it's Judgment under the provisions of Tulufa - Guidance 
for judges, item No. 1543, page 554 in which he finally said that; "the court has 
relied on the investigation made by the police which was presented before the 
court and for the sake of it's Justice in which the court sentenced the appellant to 
prison term in stead of a sentence of amputation of his hand, " This is why we are 
urging this court to affirm the Judgment of the lower court against the appellant. 
After the court has refered to appellant on the objection made by the state counsel, 
he then says that; "I am urging the court to mitigate the sentence which was 
passed against me by the lower court". The court them called on appellant and 
Respondent to conclude their evidence before passing it's Judgment. This call is 
made in the presence of witnesses: M. Hassan and Tafida messenger. It then fixed 
the 30 -3- 2005 for passing it's Judgment which Khadi Muhammad Khalil will 
write. 
JUDGMENT 
After this court has studied the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant and has also studied 
the length of response made by the state counsel. It then studied the record of proceedings of the 
lower court. It hereby deliver it's Judgment as follows: 
1. The appellant Dahiru Gambo who was prosecuted for the offence of theft pursuant to which 
the accused person was sentenced to two years imprisonment and fifty (50) lashes. He then 
challenged that Judgment in his grounds of appeal, particularly in his 2°d and 3rd grounds of 
appeal in which he alledged that the lower trial court has restricted it's enquiry and that it has 
not ascertain the exact quantity of the guinea corn which was said to have been stolen or it's 
value. 
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2. We have noticed that after the trial court - Upper Sharia Court Rano has read the contents of 
the accusation over to the accused person / appellant and he then admitted it for the first time 
before the court and in the presence of admission witnesses, it then administer the call for 
conclusion of evidence and pass it's Judgment and sentence immediately. 
(a) The meaning of admission it that: the accused person to agree that he has committed 
the offence, and that the admission to satisfy the conditions of an admission, and that 
the person making the admission has to poses the required legal capacity with regard 
to his or her age and mental condition, the contents of the admission will have to be 
devoid of ambiguity, and that the person making the admission should do it 
voluntarily, therefore that admission is the type which is in line with the provisions of 
Tabisirat Al-Hukkam Hashiyatt Batahu Al-Ali Al-Malik, Valume 2, page 39. 
................................................ 
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(b) What the state counsel M. Yakubu Bako Sulaiman was saying in his presentation is 
true, that is by the time when he was chellenging the appellant's grounds of appeal by 
submitting that the trial court has relied on the admission made by the appellant 
before it and which he made voluntarily and that the strenth of an admission in legal 
proceedings is more than the strenth of an evidence given by witness this is correct. 
But it is compulsory that, before an accused person is call upon to make an admission 
of an offence or after he has made an admission of an offence that court must fully 
4 
explain to him details he efoffence in respect of which he is fagcing prosecution 
particularly the details of the quence qunces of his admission through questions and 
explanation. We saw that the record of proceedings of this trial court has shown that, 
after the content of the accusation has been read over to the accused person, the court 
has then asked him. 
"COURT - ACCUSED PERSON: - Did you hear the accusation against you, did you understand it, 
and did you agree that you have committed the offence? 
ANS. I- Yes, it is like that, I heard it and I agreed that I have committed that offence. 
COUER - ACCUSED PERSON: - Look at this guinea corn, is it the subject matter in question? 
ANS. I- Yes, it is" 
Record of proceedings of the trial court - the hand written one, page 1,10th line from 
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the bottom. 
(c) An admission under the Islamic Law, it is having four ingredients, out of which there 
is: how to say it - that is the wordings to be use in uttering it, Imam Al-Dasuki has 
narrated I his commentary of Mukhtasar that; "It is compulsory in making on 
admission that the wordings must clearly mention the offence, but if it did not 
mention it, that admission it then defective. 
................................................... 
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Dasuki - the commentary of Mukhtasar volume 3, page 402. 
The wordings of the admission made by the appellant Dahiru as show in the record of 
proceedings of the trial court did not contain a stright forward statement like: "It is 
like that, I entred Sabi'u Sale's house and stole away guinea corn from so so place". 
This has originated from the gap left by the trial court because of it's refusal to ask 
the accused person some questions on his admission. 
3. We have also observed that in the first information report read before the court by the 
prosecutor, he has mentioned that the accused person Dahiru is being accused for the offence 
of theft under section 136 S. P. C. 2000, which if it is prove4against him, he can then be 
sentence to amputation of the hand, but after that court becomes satisfied that the accused 
person has admitted committing the offence it then just sentence him to two (2) years 
imprisonment and fifty lashes. What that court ought to do under such a situation which the 
complain did not satisfy the conditions of theft in which sentence of amputation of the hand 
can be passed is that, it should first of all determine the value of the subject matter of the 
theft to find out whether the value has reach the minimum value as required by the law or 
not. And that, was the subject matter stolen away from a secured place if it's minimum value 
did not reach the legal requirement or was it stolen from an unsecured place? For example; 
the accused person has entered some body's house, the owner of the house then takes a sack 
of corn and put it on him and then alledged that he has stolen it. Or that, he just put his own 
property on the accused person and then accuses him of stealing the property. All these has 
protected the accused person from receiving a sentence of amputation of the hand, he can 
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only receive another type of punishment lesser than amputation. The court is to use section 
208 C. P. C. which section 410 (1) C. P. C. amendment law 2000 cap 37 gave it the power to 
substitute the offence contained in the police first information report with another offence, 
the court can then proceed and pass Judgment by sentencing him to a lesser sentence than 
amputation of the hand under the new substituted offence. 
4. This court satisfied with the appellant's ground of appeal No. 2 which says that, the lower 
court has restricted it's enquiry, this is because of the Islamic law provision derived from the 
Tradition of Prophet which was mentioned by A'isha may Allah agree with her. That 
tradition was narrated by Turmizi in which he says; "it will be better for a Judge to mistakely 
release a criminal who has conunitted an offence than to mistakely sentenced someone who 
has not committed an offence. 
................................................ 
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Sheik Al-Turmizi, the commentary of Tuhfa Al-Ahawaziyya, vol. 4, page 688. 
InVAiew of the above mentioned analysis, this court hereby release Dahiru Gambo 
under order 8 (1) (9) upper Sharia court of Appeal rules 2000. 
This appeal succeeds 
Whoever is dissatisfied can appeal against it within three months from today 
30/3/2005. 
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